Preconditions for Section 156(3) CrPC Complaints and Gender-Specific Scope of Section 354B IPC: Quashing as Abuse of Process

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court (Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction) in RIYA RAY @ ROY & ANR. v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR. (CRR 4638 of 2023, judgment dated 30.01.2026) exercised inherent and revisional powers under Section 482 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) to quash an FIR and the consequential proceeding (G.R. No. 2753 of 2023 arising from Srerampore P.S. Case No. 506 of 2023).

The dispute arose between residents of the same residential building over the issue of keeping the main gate under lock-and-key. The petitioners (mother and daughter) asserted that the impugned case was a retaliatory “counterblast” to an earlier complaint lodged by petitioner no. 1 against the husband of opposite party no. 2 concerning an alleged incident of outraging modesty and abuse.

Key legal issues considered by the Court included:

  • Whether the complaint under Section 156(3) CrPC was vitiated for non-compliance with prerequisite steps under Section 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC.
  • Whether, on the allegations and materials, continuation of the proceedings would constitute an abuse of process warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC.
  • Whether Section 354B IPC (“assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe”) could be invoked against female accused for an incident prior to the coming into force of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”).
  • How delay, exaggeration, and lack of corroboration (injury report, recovery) affect the “prima facie” threshold in quashing proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the revision and quashed the criminal proceeding pending before the Magistrate. The Court found, inter alia, that:

  • The complaint filed under Section 156(3) CrPC did not disclose compliance with the prerequisites of approaching the police under Section 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC, as required by Supreme Court authority.
  • The allegations appeared to be an exaggerated version of a trivial dispute (main gate locking), coupled with unexplained/prolonged delay in lodging the complaint.
  • The materials in the case diary did not substantiate serious allegations (notably: absence of injury report, non-recovery of alleged iron rod), and there were inconsistencies including in the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement.
  • Section 354B IPC—as it stood at the relevant time—used the expression “Any man”; the Court held it was not applicable against the petitioners (female persons). The Court noted the position under the BNS but held it inapplicable to an incident preceding its enforcement.
  • Applying the principles from State of Haryana versus Bhajanlal, the Court held that allowing the proceeding to continue would be a gross abuse of the process of law.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) State of Haryana versus Bhajanlal

The Court relied on State of Haryana versus Bhajanlal as the canonical framework governing the exercise of inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings. It reproduced the well-known categories, including situations where allegations do not constitute an offence, are inherently improbable, disclose only non-cognizable offences, or where proceedings are maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive.

Influence on the decision: After evaluating the case diary and materials, the Court concluded that the allegations were exaggerated and insufficiently supported, that delay was not plausibly explained, and that a retaliatory motive was plausible—bringing the case within the Bhajanlal paradigm, particularly categories addressing inherent improbability and mala fide/ulterior motive.

(b) Punith Beriwala

The opposite party relied on Punith Beriwala for the proposition that quashing should be exercised sparingly and that, at the threshold, the Court should proceed on the footing that allegations are true.

Influence on the decision: While acknowledging the “sparingly and with circumspection” standard, the Court treated the matter as falling within the exceptional class where continuation itself would be abusive—particularly because the foundational procedural prerequisite for invoking Section 156(3) was missing, and the record did not yield supportive material.

(c) Md. Allauddin Khan vs State of Bihar

The judgment refers to Md. Allauddin Khan vs State of Bihar in the context of cautioning High Courts against quashing without evaluating whether the complaint prima facie discloses offences, and also against quashing merely because of a parallel civil dispute.

Influence on the decision: The Court distinguished the present situation: it did not quash merely due to a “civil flavour,” but because of (i) procedural non-compliance in the 156(3) route, and (ii) lack of prima facie supporting material after scrutiny of the case diary and statements.

(d) Babu Venkatesh and others versus State of Karnataka

The Court treated Babu Venkatesh and others versus State of Karnataka as decisive on the procedural discipline governing Section 156(3) CrPC: an applicant must, as a prerequisite, have approached the police under Section 154(1) and, upon failure, the higher police authority under Section 154(3).

Influence on the decision: This precedent became a principal ground for quashing. The Court found that the complaint did not state compliance with Section 154(1)/(3) and no supporting documents were annexed. It also faulted the Magistrate for taking cognizance without considering this binding requirement.

(e) Indira Mohan Goswami and another versus State of Uttaranchal and others

The Court invoked Indira Mohan Goswami and another versus State of Uttaranchal and others for the principle that the power under Section 482 CrPC is wide but must be exercised sparingly, carefully, and with great caution—particularly to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Influence on the decision: The Court used this authority to justify intervention even though a charge-sheet had been filed during pendency of the revision, reasoning that allowing prosecution to proceed on such materials would cause injustice.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Defective invocation of Section 156(3) CrPC

A central plank of the judgment is that a Section 156(3) CrPC application is not a shortcut to bypass the statutory pathway under Section 154. The Court noted the complaint was silent on steps under Section 154(1) and 154(3), and lacked annexures evidencing such steps. This omission, viewed through Babu Venkatesh and others versus State of Karnataka, was treated as a foundational defect.

The Court further observed that the complaint’s vague reference to “reporting to Sheoraphuli TOP” lacked essential particulars (date/number of GD entry), undermining the claim of prior approach and the credibility of the asserted cause for delay.

(ii) Delay and credibility assessment within a quashing enquiry

The complaint was filed approximately four months after the incident; the complainant’s Section 164 CrPC statement was recorded even later. While delay alone is not invariably fatal, the Court treated the delay as significant because:

  • the explanation was considered not plausible in the factual setting,
  • the record lacked medical/injury corroboration consistent with the gravity alleged, and
  • the narrative appeared inflated relative to the dispute’s immediate trigger (gate locking).

(iii) Section 354B IPC: “Any man” and the BNS transition

The Court directly addressed the complainant’s contention based on Section 8 IPC (“gender” interpretive rule) to argue that “he” includes females. The Court rejected this line by focusing on the text of Section 354B IPC, which expressly begins with “Any man”.

The judgment notes that under the BNS (referred to in the judgment as section 76), the phrase “Any man” has been replaced with “whoever,” expanding liability irrespective of gender; however, since the alleged incident predated the BNS enforcement, the Court held the IPC provision as it then stood applied, and thus Section 354B IPC was not maintainable against the female petitioners.

(iv) “Counterblast” and mala fide: fitting the Bhajanlal categories

The Court did not merely accept the “counterblast” claim as a slogan; it evaluated chronology and context: the petitioners’ earlier FIR (about outraging modesty) and the later complaint by the wife of the earlier accused, combined with the nature of building-level dispute, made a retaliatory motive a plausible inference. On that basis, the Court held the case fit for quashing under the Bhajanlal principles, observing that “the possibility of lodging the complaint maliciously with an ulterior motive cannot be ruled out.”

(v) Evidentiary thinness at the prima facie stage

Although quashing jurisdiction is not meant for a mini-trial, the Court examined whether the record contained basic corroboration for serious allegations: it highlighted absence of injury report, non-recovery of the alleged iron rod, and “serious inconsistencies” between the complaint and the Section 164 statement. Coupled with the Court’s observation regarding the elderly petitioner’s ailments, the allegations were found prima facie improbable and unsupported.

3.3 Impact

  • Stricter procedural discipline for Section 156(3) filings: The judgment reinforces that Magistrates should not mechanically direct registration/investigation on a 156(3) complaint unless the complainant shows prior recourse to Section 154(1) and 154(3), aligning with Supreme Court authority.
  • Gender-specific drafting of IPC offences matters: For pre-BNS incidents, offences drafted with an explicit gendered offender (“Any man”) may not be extendable to female accused merely through interpretive provisions, at least in the Court’s view here. This can influence charging decisions and quashing challenges in legacy IPC prosecutions.
  • Post-charge-sheet quashing remains viable: Even after submission of charge-sheet during pendency of a quashing petition, High Courts may still intervene where continuation would be abusive and unsupported by materials.
  • Neighbourhood/property-management conflicts and criminalisation: The judgment signals judicial sensitivity to criminal proceedings being used as leverage in resident disputes, especially where allegations appear inflated and documentary/medical corroboration is absent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 482 CrPC (Inherent powers)
A High Court’s residual power to prevent abuse of court process and to secure justice. It is exceptional—used sparingly—typically where prosecution is baseless, legally barred, or malicious.
Section 156(3) CrPC
A Magistrate’s power to direct the police to register/investigate a cognizable offence. Courts often require a complainant to first approach the police (Section 154(1)) and then the higher police authority (Section 154(3)) before invoking this route.
Section 164 CrPC statement
A statement recorded before a Magistrate (often used to preserve an early account). It is not automatically proof of guilt, but inconsistencies can affect the credibility assessment at the prima facie level in quashing scrutiny.
“Counterblast” complaint
A retaliatory case filed in response to an earlier complaint, often alleged to be motivated by vengeance rather than genuine grievance. Courts look at timing, context, and supporting material to assess plausibility.
Section 354B IPC and “Any man”
As drafted in the IPC, the offence is framed with the offender described as “Any man.” The judgment treats this as limiting liability (for the relevant period) to male accused, while noting that the BNS has adopted gender-neutral phrasing for future cases.

5. Conclusion

This decision is significant for two reasons. First, it treats compliance with the Section 154(1)/(3) CrPC pathway as a meaningful precondition to entertaining Section 156(3) CrPC complaints, and faults mechanical cognizance when such compliance is absent. Second, it underscores that courts will intervene under Section 482 CrPC where allegations appear exaggerated, delayed without plausible explanation, and unsupported by basic corroboration—particularly in a context suggesting retaliatory criminalisation of a residential dispute.

The judgment thus reinforces the Bhajanlal guardrails: criminal process cannot be permitted to operate as a tool of vendetta or pressure, and where continuation would be an abuse of process, quashing remains an appropriate corrective.