Parity in Recruitment: Illegally Introduced Interview Cut-offs Must Not Defeat Higher Merit of Similarly Situated Candidates

1. Introduction

The Calcutta High Court in NIRMAL CHANDRA BISWAS v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (17.02.2026) addressed a recurring service-law problem: whether a recruiting authority can deny appointment to a candidate who has secured higher aggregate marks than the last selected candidate, by applying an interview “qualifying mark” that was introduced mid-process and later declared illegal in the same recruitment.

The petitioner, an SC-category aspirant for the post of Krishi Prayukti Sahayak, challenged his non-recommendation by the West Bengal Public Service Commission (PSC) despite his aggregate score (81.75) being higher than the last selected SC candidate (81.50). The PSC relied on a subsequently introduced interview cut-off (5 marks for SC). The core issue was whether, after the Tribunal and the High Court had already quashed the same interview cut-off in another candidate’s case arising from the same selection process, the State/PSC could still deny identical relief to the present petitioner.

A procedural complication also shaped the case: the petitioner’s earlier-filed Original Application remained pending due to the Tribunal’s inability to constitute a required bench and later non-functionality. The High Court therefore examined the claim directly in writ jurisdiction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the PSC to recommend the petitioner’s name within eight weeks, and thereafter directed the State to appoint him within a further eight weeks.

The Court held that:

  • The illegality of introducing interview qualifying marks mid-recruitment had already been conclusively determined in the same recruitment process (in favour of Pritam Ghosal), and the respondents could not re-agitate that justification.
  • The petitioner was identically situated and had approached the Tribunal even earlier than Pritam Ghosal; hence, he could not be branded a “fence-sitter” nor denied parity on grounds of delay, laches, or acquiescence.
  • Principles of equality and non-discrimination in service matters demanded extension of the same benefit.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (2015) 1 SCC 347

This decision supplied the governing framework for extending the benefit of a judgment to persons not party to the earlier litigation but who are similarly situated. The High Court relied particularly on paragraph 22, which crystallises:

  • The normal rule: when a court grants relief to a set of employees/candidates, similarly situated persons should receive the same benefit; refusal would offend Article 14.
  • Exceptions: benefit can be denied where claimants are “fence-sitters” guilty of delay/laches or acquiescence.
  • A nuanced distinction between judgments in rem (intended to benefit all similarly placed persons) and judgments in personam (confined to parties), affecting whether authorities must extend benefits on their own.

Applying this matrix, the Court held the petitioner squarely within the “normal rule”, and outside the exceptions: he had moved the Tribunal in 2019 (earlier than Pritam Ghosal), and his matter remained pending for institutional reasons.

(b) K.C. Sharma v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226

This case is cited within Arvind Kumar Srivastava to illustrate situations where the nature of the pronouncement (often policy/scheme-oriented) may impose an obligation on the State to extend benefits broadly. While the present decision is not about regularisation policy, the citation reinforces the doctrinal point: where the court’s declaration addresses a general illegality affecting a class, authorities should avoid unequal application.

(c) Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited represented by its Chief Manager and Others (2020) 6 SCC 1

The petitioner invoked this authority to justify writ court intervention when the Tribunal became non-functional and the petitioner would otherwise be left remediless. The High Court accepted the practical premise—Tribunal dysfunction and the impossibility of obtaining timely adjudication—and proceeded to decide the merits rather than relegating the petitioner to a non-operational forum.

(d) Earlier decisions within the same recruitment: OA/WPST history

Two prior adjudications formed the immediate foundation:

  • The Tribunal’s order dated 04.12.2020 in OA No. 940 of 2019 (Pritam Ghosal) held that introducing cut-off marks in the interview after the process had progressed was “arbitrary and illegal” and directed recommendation and appointment.
  • The Calcutta High Court’s affirming order in WPST 9 of 2021 held that qualifying marks were not prescribed prior to the interview and were apparently prescribed after its conclusion, justifying no interference with the Tribunal’s quashing of the cut-off.

The present Bench treated these as determinative of the illegality issue for the same selection process, leaving no room for the PSC’s attempted re-justification.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Illegality already settled for the recruitment: The Court reasoned that the key dispute—validity of introducing interview qualifying marks mid-process—had already been answered against the PSC in the same selection. Since Pritam Ghosal had already received the “fruits” of that litigation, re-arguing the point in a parallel claim would undermine legal certainty and equal treatment.
  2. Equality-driven extension of relief: The Court emphasised the service-law norm that once a process defect is judicially declared, authorities should ordinarily extend benefits to all affected, to avoid discriminatory outcomes—especially where merit comparison shows the petitioner’s aggregate exceeds the last selected candidate.
  3. No “fence-sitter” bar on facts: The decisive factual finding was temporal: the petitioner had approached first (OA No. 741 of 2019), and his case remained pending not due to inaction but due to the Tribunal’s inability to constitute a bench and later its non-functionality. Consequently, the classic defences of laches/acquiescence could not be invoked.
  4. Effective remedy despite Tribunal non-functionality: The Court entertained the writ petition to prevent a remediless situation, aligning procedural access to justice with the substantive equality claim.

3.3 Impact

  • Recruitment administration: Recruiting bodies are put on notice that post-hoc interview cut-offs (or other midstream changes) risk not only being quashed in individual cases, but also triggering parity-based extension to similarly placed candidates, particularly where aggregate merit is higher than selected candidates.
  • Article 14 discipline in service matters: The judgment reinforces that once an illegality is judicially declared in a selection process, authorities should proactively avoid differential treatment among identically situated candidates, unless delay/laches/acquiescence is clearly established.
  • Institutional delay and litigant protection: Candidates who promptly initiate proceedings will not be penalised due to forum incapacity. The decision strengthens the principle that litigants should not suffer for systemic non-functionality of adjudicatory bodies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualifying marks / cut-off in interview: A minimum score required in the interview to be considered for final selection. If introduced after candidates have participated (or without notice), courts often view it as arbitrary because it changes the “rules of the game” mid-way.
  • Aggregate marks vs. component-wise disqualification: Even if a candidate’s total score is higher, a later-added minimum in one component (interview) can exclude them. Here, that exclusion was held illegal for being introduced subsequently.
  • Fence-sitter: A person who does not challenge an illegality in time, waits for others to succeed, and then claims the same benefit. Courts can deny relief for delay/laches/acquiescence in such cases.
  • Judgment in rem vs. in personam: A judgment in rem is intended to apply broadly (often affecting a class); a judgment in personam is limited to the parties. This distinction matters when deciding whether non-parties can claim automatic parity.
  • Laches and acquiescence: Laches is an unreasonable delay that prejudices the other side; acquiescence is implied acceptance of the situation by not challenging it in time.

5. Conclusion

The decision establishes a clear service-law rule in the context of a common recruitment: once a midstream interview cut-off is judicially declared illegal for a selection process, identically situated candidates—especially those who approached the forum in time—cannot be denied the same relief on the basis of that very cut-off. By anchoring parity in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others and rejecting the “fence-sitter” objection on compelling facts, the Calcutta High Court reinforces Article 14’s demand for consistent outcomes in public recruitment and prevents institutional delay from defeating substantive justice.