Orders of NCDRC Between Private Parties: Article 227 Is the Proper Route; Impleading NCDRC Does Not Cure an Article 226 Defect

Case: TRIPTI DAS AND ANR. v. DR. PHANI BHUSAN MANDAL AND ORS.
Court: Calcutta High Court (Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction, Appellate Side)
Date: 16-02-2026
Coram: Om Narayan Rai, J.
Matter: W.P.A. 2580 of 2025 (styled as Article 226/227) challenging NCDRC order dated 10.05.2024 affirming dismissal of revision from State Commission order dated 15.12.2022

1. Introduction

The petitioners (Dr. Tripti Das & Anr.) approached the Calcutta High Court assailing an order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”). At the threshold, the respondents—who were all private parties—raised a maintainability objection: a petition under Article 226 ordinarily lies against the “State” (Article 12) or bodies performing public/statutory duties, and not where all respondents are private persons.

The petitioners insisted that the proper remedy was Article 226 and alternatively sought to implead NCDRC as a party to “cure” the defect. The Court therefore framed two questions:

• Whether an Article 226 petition is maintainable where all respondents are private parties; and
• Whether NCDRC can be added as a party so that the petition can proceed under Article 226.

A further procedural issue arose from the Calcutta High Court’s roster rules: Article 226 and Article 227 matters are assigned to different Benches, so an Article 226 Bench cannot simply decide an Article 227 matter without appropriate determination.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

(A) The “private parties” bar under Article 226

• Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329
  The Court treated paragraph 51 as dispositive: a writ petition is a public law remedy and “the main respondent” should be Government/State/instrumentality under Article 12; “all the respondents” cannot be private parties. A writ may issue to “any person”, but only where that person owes a statutory/public duty.
  
  Influence: This was the binding rule used to answer the first issue against the petitioners.

(B) Correct supervisory remedy against NCDRC orders

• Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited (2023) 11 SCC 594
  The respondents relied on this to argue that since NCDRC is a tribunal, the appropriate remedy against certain NCDRC orders is the High Court’s Article 227 jurisdiction.
  
  Influence: The Court used this as a strong reason to route the petitioners to Article 227 rather than insist on Article 226.
• Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited v. Suresh Chand Jain & Another (2024) 9 SCC 148
  The petitioners invoked this to contend that Article 226/227 is maintainable against NCDRC orders.
  
  Influence: The Court accepted the proposition that NCDRC orders are judicially reviewable, but clarified the mode: Article 226 review still requires satisfaction of the “main respondent/State duty” requirement from Shalini Shyam Shetty, whereas Article 227 remains available irrespective of the private character of the parties.
• Siddhartha S. Mookerjee & Another v. Madhab Chand Mitter & Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4285
  Cited for the proposition that where the contest is between private parties, the Supreme Court has directed recourse to Article 227.
  
  Influence: Reinforced the Court’s conclusion that Article 227 is the fitting remedy in private-party consumer disputes reaching High Court supervision.

(C) “Maintainability” vs “entertainability” and discretion under Article 226

• Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. (2023) 109 GSTR 402 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95
  The Court extracted the Supreme Court’s articulation distinguishing:
  • Maintainability: goes to the Court’s power to receive the lis; and
  • Entertainability: discretionary refusal even where power exists (e.g., alternative remedies).
  Influence: Even assuming arguendo some availability of Article 226, the Court held it could (and should) decline to entertain it given the more appropriate Article 227 channel, aligning with Supreme Court policy and convenience principles.

(D) Whether impleading a tribunal makes it a “main respondent”

• M.S. Kazi v. Muslim Education Society & Others (2016) 9 SCC 263
  Relied upon to state that a tribunal “is not required to step into the arena of conflict for defending its order” and thus is not a necessary party.
  
  Influence: The Court treated this as fatal to the “implead NCDRC to sustain Article 226” strategy: if the tribunal need not defend its order, it cannot realistically be the “main respondent” whose public duty is being enforced under Article 226.
• Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited & Others (2010) 7 SCC 417, Sudhamayee Pattanaik & Others v. Bibhu Prasad Sahoo & Others (2022) 17 SCC 286, J. N. Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan & Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015
  Cited by the petitioners on “proper party” impleadment doctrine.
  
  Influence: The Court acknowledged these principles but held they do not solve the Article 226 structural requirement articulated in Shalini Shyam Shetty.

(E) High Court decisions entertaining Article 226 with NCDRC impleaded (distinguished)

• M/s. Kkreation Associates, Bhubaneswar v. The Registrar, NCDRC & Another (Orissa) WP(C) No. 14583 of 2024, decided on 13.03.2025
  
• Kkreation Associates & Another v. Registrar, NCDRC, New Delhi & Another 2025 SCC OnLine Ori 2816
  
• BCIL Zed Ria Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. The Registrar, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi & Another (Madras) WP No. 10749 of 2024, decided on 05.03.2025
  
• Cannon Properties Private Limited v. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission & Others WPA 7291 of 2025 (Calcutta), decided on 13.05.2025
  
• The Estate Officer HSVP Sonipat & Another v. Rajan Bhatia WP(C) 4394 of 2025 (Delhi), decided on 16.09.2025
  

Influence: The Court treated these as non-determinative because the critical issue—maintainability/entertainability under Article 226 where all substantive parties are private and the effect of Shalini Shyam Shetty—was not shown to have been raised and adjudicated in those cases.

(F) Calcutta High Court tribunal-writ line (distinguished on facts)

• Haji Hanif Hakam v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkata & Others 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 288 and Bhowanipore Gujrati Education Society v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation AIR 2009 Cal 140
  Cited to argue Article 226 lies against tribunal orders.
  
  Influence: The Court did not dispute the general proposition but held it does not answer the specific obstacle here: all respondents are private persons and Article 226’s “main respondent” requirement (per Shalini Shyam Shetty) is unmet.
• Shamsul Haque v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Others 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 6924
  Influence: Similarly distinguished as not addressing the private-party maintainability point.

(G) Rajasthan High Court view rejected as inconsistent with binding Supreme Court law

• Rajeev Chaturvedi v. Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority & Another 2024 SCC OnLine Raj 365
  Cited by petitioners to suggest Article 227 is not maintainable in such circumstances.
  
  Influence: The Court held it cannot be treated as good law in view of Ibrat Faizan and Siddhartha S. Mookerjee & Another.

(H) Roster discipline and conversion to Article 227

• Neeta Singh v. State of U.P 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761
  Applied to hold that nomenclature/substance matters because allocation by the Chief Justice controls what a particular Judge/Bench can hear.
  
  Influence: The Court converted the matter to Article 227 and directed placement before the appropriately assigned Bench, rather than adjudicating it itself under Article 227.
• Within Neeta Singh, the Supreme Court’s discussion referenced Pepsi Foods and Kiran Devi (for “nomenclature not relevant” in some contexts), and roster authorities Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal and State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (Chief Justice as master of roster).
  Influence: These authorities were used to justify that the Article 226 Bench could not unilaterally decide the matter under Article 227 without roster assignment.

3.2 Legal Reasoning (How the Court Reached the Result)

• Step 1: Apply the Article 226 “main respondent” requirement.
  Since the petition, as filed, impleaded only private parties and alleged no public function/public duty, the petition failed the Shalini Shyam Shetty threshold for Article 226 in its ordinary operation.
• Step 2: Examine whether exceptions justify Article 226 against private parties.
  The Court noted typical exceptions (public function; inherent lack of jurisdiction; vires challenge; fundamental rights infringement; breach of natural justice). On the pleadings as characterized by the Court, the challenge was essentially “erroneous exercise of jurisdiction”, suitable for supervisory correction under Article 227, not an exceptional Article 226 case.
• Step 3: Prefer the “more appropriate” constitutional remedy.
  Anchored in Ibrat Faizan (and reiterated in Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited), the Court emphasized Article 227 as the appropriate route for challenging NCDRC orders where Supreme Court appeal is not available and where parties are private.
• Step 4: Reject impleadment of NCDRC as a workaround.
  Even if NCDRC were a “proper party”, it would not become the “main respondent” in the sense required by Shalini Shyam Shetty, because (per M.S. Kazi) tribunals do not defend their orders as litigating parties.
• Step 5: Enforce roster discipline.
  Applying Neeta Singh, the Court held it could not itself treat and decide the petition as Article 227 (because this Bench lacked Article 227 determination). The correct course was conversion and placement before the proper roster Bench.

3.3 Impact

• Channeling effect for consumer litigation: Parties challenging NCDRC orders in disputes essentially between private parties should expect High Courts to steer them to Article 227, not Article 226, unless a recognized exception is clearly pleaded and made out.
• Limits on tactical impleadment: The decision discourages impleading NCDRC (or similar tribunals) merely to create an Article 226 “State respondent” veneer, particularly where the tribunal is not expected to defend its order.
• Greater procedural certainty: By insisting on roster discipline and conversion rather than substantive adjudication under the “wrong” Article, the judgment reinforces institutional allocation rules—reducing vulnerability of orders to challenge on the ground of improper bench assignment.
• Clarifies interrelationship of Supreme Court guidance: The Court harmonizes Universal Sompo (reviewability of NCDRC orders) with Shalini Shyam Shetty (Article 226’s public-law respondent requirement) and Ibrat Faizan (Article 227 as the appropriate supervisory remedy).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 226 vs Article 227:
  • Article 226 is primarily a public law remedy—usually against the State or bodies performing public/statutory duties.
  • Article 227 is the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over courts/tribunals; it is commonly used to correct jurisdictional errors and serious procedural irregularities of tribunals.
• “State” under Article 12: A constitutional category covering Government and its instrumentalities. Private persons do not ordinarily fall within it.
• “Public duty/public function”: Even a non-State entity may be amenable to writs if it performs functions with a public character under statute or public mandate. The Court found no such element here.
• Necessary party vs proper party:
  • Necessary party: without whom no effective order can be passed.
  • Proper party: whose presence may help complete adjudication, though not indispensable.
  The judgment holds that even if NCDRC is argued to be a proper party, that does not satisfy Article 226’s requirement that the main respondent be State/instrumentality (and in any event, tribunals do not defend their own orders).
• Maintainability vs entertainability:
  • Maintainability concerns whether the court can take cognizance at all.
  • Entertainability concerns whether the court should, as a matter of discretion, hear it even if maintainable.
  The Court used this distinction to underline that even where writ power exists, it may be declined in favour of a more appropriate remedy.
• “Master of the roster”: The Chief Justice allocates categories of cases to specific Benches. A Bench cannot decide matters outside its roster assignment; otherwise the decision risks being void for want of proper allocation.

5. Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision crystallizes a procedural rule of high practical importance in consumer jurisprudence: where an NCDRC order arises from a dispute between private parties, an Article 226 writ is generally not the correct vehicle unless exceptional public-law conditions are demonstrated. Attempting to implead the NCDRC to “convert” the dispute into an Article 226 matter will not ordinarily succeed, since tribunals are not expected to defend their orders and cannot be treated as the “main respondent” for Article 226 purposes.

Consistent with Supreme Court guidance (Shalini Shyam Shetty & Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited, and Neeta Singh v. State of U.P), the Court directed the matter to proceed under Article 227 before the appropriately assigned Bench—reinforcing both the substantive boundary between Articles 226 and 227 and the institutional discipline of roster allocation.