Introduction
The Delhi High Court considered whether anticipatory bail could be granted to Ajeet Bharti in an FIR alleging caste-based abuse and humiliation through an online video. The FIR invoked Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(u), 3(1)(v), 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”), Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Sections 196(1)(c) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The complaint concerned a publicly accessible video allegedly containing caste slurs and derogatory comments directed principally at Chandrashekhar Azad, a Member of Parliament and a member of a Scheduled Caste. The complainant was the Delhi State President of the Azad Samaj Party.
The central question was not whether the applicant was ultimately guilty, but whether the FIR and the underlying video disclosed a prima facie offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. If they did, Sections 18 and 18A(2) of that Act would exclude anticipatory bail.
Analysis
The governing statutory framework
Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act penalizes intentional insult or intimidation, with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, in a place within public view. Section 3(1)(s) penalizes abusing such a person by caste name in a place within public view.
Sections 18 and 18A(2) remove the protection of anticipatory bail in cases involving offences under the SC/ST Act. The exclusion is stringent but not mechanically triggered merely because the FIR mentions the Act. The Court must first examine whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of an offence under it.
Precedents cited
This Supreme Court decision supplied the principal test. It held that the bar on anticipatory bail applies where prima facie material points to an offence under the SC/ST Act. Conversely, where the allegations do not disclose the necessary ingredients even on their face, the bar does not prevent the Court from considering pre-arrest bail.
The Delhi High Court also relied on the decision’s explanation of “intent to humiliate.” Not every insult directed at a person who happens to belong to an SC/ST community is caste-based humiliation. The insult must be linked to caste identity, untouchability, or historically entrenched ideas such as upper-caste superiority and notions of social purity or pollution.
This principle ultimately operated against the applicant. Unlike the generalized or reckless allegations considered in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, the present statements repeatedly used caste slurs and invoked a supposed hierarchy between the named individual and a “savarna” family.
This precedent reaffirmed that the statutory exclusion of anticipatory bail is ordinarily absolute once a prima facie SC/ST Act offence is disclosed. The narrow exception applies only where the absence of such an offence is apparent “at first blush” from the FIR itself.
It further cautioned that a court deciding anticipatory bail cannot enter the evidentiary realm or undertake a mini-trial. The Delhi High Court adopted this approach, limiting itself to the allegations, the transcript and the allegedly offending publication rather than deciding disputed questions of guilt.
State of M.P. v. Ram Krishna Balothia
This decision upheld the constitutional validity of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act. It recognized offences arising from untouchability and caste oppression as a distinct class and justified the exclusion of anticipatory bail because alleged offenders may intimidate victims or obstruct prosecution.
The precedent explains the legislative purpose underlying the bar: the restriction is not an arbitrary denial of bail but a protective measure responding to the social conditions in which caste atrocities occur.
Legal reasoning
1. Section 482 BNSS is subject to the SC/ST Act
Although Sections 18 and 18A refer to Section 438 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court held that Section 482 BNSS is its equivalent. The legislative prohibition therefore continues under the new criminal-procedure framework.
2. Open Internet publication satisfies “public view”
The applicant admitted that the social-media platform was public and that the video had reached a wide audience. The Court nevertheless articulated an important digital-age principle: content placed on the open Internet is available for viewing, consumption, engagement and redistribution by persons across the world. It is therefore capable of constituting conduct “within public view.”
The targeted person need not be physically present when the statement is made. Online accessibility and exposure to the public can satisfy the public-view requirement.
3. The statements had to be read contextually
The Court did not isolate individual words. It examined the video’s tone, sequence, context and manner of expression. It found that the caste slurs were connected—directly and indirectly—to the named individual, who was repeatedly identified as the subject of the discussion.
The reference to the named individual having to become “worthy” of seeking the hand of a “savarna” daughter was especially significant. It suggested a hierarchy in which the individual was treated as socially inferior because of caste. This moved the speech beyond ordinary political criticism or personal abuse into prima facie caste-based humiliation.
4. Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) were prima facie attracted
For Section 3(1)(s), the Court found repeated public use of caste names or slurs in connection with the named individual. For Section 3(1)(r), it inferred an intent to humiliate from the language, repeated references, caste-based othering and invocation of upper-caste superiority.
Once these offences were prima facie established, the Court was legally precluded from granting anticipatory bail. It therefore found it unnecessary to examine the remaining SC/ST Act provisions or the offences under the IT Act and BNS.
5. Online provocation was no defence
The applicant argued that the comments were made in response to online provocation. The Court rejected this submission because provocation cannot justify deliberate caste abuse. Moreover, the alleged provocation did not come from the person against whom the remarks were directed. The absence of any later clarification, retraction or apology was also noticed.