Maintenance Tribunals Cannot Order Eviction Under Sections 4–5 of the 2007 Act; Their Orders Are Amenable to Article 226 Review

1. Introduction

These connected writ petitions before the Calcutta High Court (WPA No. 10504 of 2025 and WPA No. 16316 of 2025) arose from an order of the Sub-Divisional Officer (functioning as the Maintenance Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“the Act of 2007”)).

Parties: The first petitioner, Smt. Pushpa Sharma (mother/senior citizen), proceeded against her sons, Shyam Sundar Sharma @ Bablu and Gajanand Sharma. The son, Shyam Sundar Sharma, independently challenged the portion of the Tribunal’s order directing him to vacate the premises.

Background: The mother sought maintenance (Rs. 30,000/- per month) and medical reimbursement under Section 5. The Tribunal, by order dated 06.09.2024 (and a compliance direction dated 06.12.2024), directed the sons to pay monthly amounts and also directed them to vacate the building within three months.

Core issues before the High Court:

1. Whether, on an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 2007, the Tribunal can direct eviction/vacation of property.
2. Whether the mother’s writ seeking implementation/enforcement of the Tribunal’s order was maintainable in view of Section 11.
3. Whether children/relatives can maintain a writ petition against Tribunal orders under the Act of 2007, and whether such challenge lies under Article 226 or Article 227.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court held that Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 2007 empower the Tribunal only to determine and grant maintenance; they do not contemplate or authorize eviction. Accordingly, the portion of the Tribunal’s orders (06.09.2024 and 06.12.2024) directing Shyam Sundar Sharma to vacate the building was set aside.
• The mother’s writ petition (WPA 10504 of 2025) seeking “implementation” of the Tribunal’s orders was dismissed, principally because the Act provides an internal enforcement mechanism under Section 11, and the mother had not pursued that statutory route (particularly when the son was shown to be paying maintenance).
• On maintainability, the Court held that Tribunal orders under the Act of 2007 (being quasi-judicial and not civil court decrees) are amenable to Article 226 judicial review. It accepted that children/relatives can approach the High Court by writ if aggrieved (especially because an appeal under Section 16 is not conferred upon them under the Act as it stands).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(A) Eviction powers under the Act of 2007

• Joya Roy and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal & Others (WPA No. 651 of 2024, order dated 30thJuly, 2024) (unreported): cited for the proposition that where eviction is sought, the proper remedy is a civil eviction suit and use of the Act of 2007 for eviction may amount to abuse. While not treated as binding like a reported precedent, it reinforced the interpretive direction that maintenance proceedings cannot be converted into a property recovery forum.
• Swati Das Vs. State of West Bengal and Others (2022 SCC OnLine Cal 4552): relied upon to underscore that, under the Act of 2007, eviction is not generally provided for, save in contexts traceable to Section 23. This strongly influenced the Court’s conclusion that Sections 4–5 cannot sustain an eviction direction.
• Samtola Devi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 669): invoked by the mother to argue for a maintenance-centric approach with eviction as a consequence for default. The High Court, however, did not adopt that remedial structure here because it read Sections 4–5 narrowly (maintenance only) and found Section 23 inapplicable on the pleadings. The citation served more as an argumentative aid than as the controlling ratio on the facts.

(B) Writ maintainability against Tribunal orders; Article 226 vs Article 227

• Smt. Mamata Sarki and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (MAT No. 61 of 2019, order dated 19thMarch, 2020): treated as key authority to hold that children/relatives—who do not enjoy a statutory appeal under Section 16 as the Act currently stands— are not remediless and may maintain writ proceedings when aggrieved by Tribunal orders. The Division Bench’s observation about the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was used to infer legislative intent: the proposed creation of an appeal for children/relatives indicates its current absence.
• Kirti v. Renu Anand & Ors. (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2089): used as an analytical bridge on the Article 226/227 choice. The Delhi High Court (citing Supreme Court authority) held that tribunal/quasi-judicial orders are amenable to Article 226 (and also to Article 227), whereas judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226. The Calcutta High Court adopted the same structural distinction and concluded that Maintenance Tribunal orders are reviewable under Article 226.
• Anirban Chakraborty v. State Of West Bengal & Ors. (2019 SCC OnLine Cal 733): relied upon to affirm that High Courts retain judicial review over statutory tribunals; the existence of tribunal mechanisms cannot extinguish the High Court’s constitutional role. This case also supported the proposition that such tribunal orders are not “civil court” orders, thus fitting within Article 226 certiorari review.
• State of Karnataka v. Vishwabarathi House Building Coop. Society ((2003) 2 SCC 412) and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G Industrial Institute . ((1995) 3 SCC 583): cited (through Anirban Chakraborty) to emphasize that quasi-judicial consumer-style fora/tribunals are meant to supplement, not supplant, courts—and that judicial review remains intact.
• Universal Consortium of Engineers (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (unreported, W.P. No. 23027 of 2017, decided on February 18, 2019): cited (again through Anirban Chakraborty) to caution against treating alternative statutory remedies as an automatic bar to writ jurisdiction where doing so would make justice illusory.
• T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (AIR 1954 SC 440): used to define the core nature of certiorari—as supervisory correction of jurisdictional or patent legal errors in “judicial acts” including quasi-judicial functions—without converting the High Court into an appellate forum.
• Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhika Bai & Anr. (1986 Supp SCC 401): relied upon for the doctrinal distinction between Article 226 (original writ jurisdiction) and Article 227 (supervisory jurisdiction), including the broader remedial flexibility in Article 227 but its sparing use.
• Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. ((2015) 5 SCC 423): relied upon to reiterate that civil court judicial orders are not amenable to certiorari under Article 226, thereby sharpening the contrast: Maintenance Tribunal orders are quasi-judicial and not civil court orders, so Article 226 remains available.
• Within the quotation from T.C. Basappa, references such as Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, R. v. Electricity Commissioners, exp London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd., and other English authorities are used to show the historical and conceptual foundations of certiorari but are not applied as independent ratio to the maintenance dispute.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) The “maintenance-only” architecture of Sections 4 and 5

The Court anchored its interpretation in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2007: the statute aims to provide a simple, inexpensive, and speedy mechanism for parents/senior citizens to obtain maintenance, as compared to proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

It then applied a structural reading of Chapter II:

• Section 4 was described as a substantive right-and-obligation provision: it creates entitlement to maintenance and imposes a duty on children/relatives.
• Section 5 was characterized as the machinery provision: it sets the process for making and deciding the maintenance application.

On this reading, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Sections 4 and 5 is confined to fixing maintenance; there is “neither direct nor indirect reference” to eviction, and therefore an eviction direction is ultra vires the Act. This led to modification of the Tribunal’s order by striking down only the eviction/vacation portion as against Shyam Sundar Sharma.

(B) Section 23 as the limited statutory gateway for property-related relief

The Court treated Section 23 as a narrowly conditioned provision dealing with the avoidance of transfers (gift or otherwise) where the transferee fails to provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. It identified three prerequisites: (i) post-commencement transfer, (ii) transfer conditional on providing amenities/needs, and (iii) failure/refusal by transferee.

Since the pleadings did not satisfy these ingredients, the Court held Section 23 to be “out of question” on the facts. Consequently, a property recovery or eviction outcome could not be routed through the Act in this case.

(C) Enforcement choice: Section 11 and the mother’s writ

For the mother’s enforcement-focused writ, the Court foregrounded Section 11, which provides the statutory mechanism for enforcement/execution of maintenance orders and equates such orders’ force to an order under Chapter IX of the CrPC. The Court noted that the son (respondent no.6) was regularly paying the ordered maintenance and that the mother had not invoked Section 11.

In that posture, the Court declined to issue writ directions for “implementation,” dismissing the mother’s writ while leaving her free to pursue Section 11 remedies if default occurs.

(D) Article 226 as the vehicle to challenge Maintenance Tribunal orders

On the constitutional question, the Court synthesized: (i) the absence of a statutory appeal for children/relatives (as recognized in Smt. Mamata Sarki and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.), and (ii) the certiorari doctrine and tribunal review principles in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhika Bai & Anr., and Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors..

The key move was classification: Maintenance Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal are quasi-judicial bodies, “inferior to the High Court,” and their orders are not “judicial orders of civil courts.” Therefore, they are amenable to Article 226 judicial review.

3.3 Impact

• Clear limit on Tribunal powers in West Bengal: The ruling strengthens a jurisdictional boundary: maintenance proceedings under Sections 4–5 cannot be used as a de facto eviction process. Parties seeking eviction must ordinarily approach the civil court unless Section 23 is properly triggered on pleaded facts.
• Sharper pleading discipline for Section 23 claims: Senior citizens seeking property-related relief under the Act must plead and establish the three Section 23 contingencies; otherwise, the Tribunal cannot travel into property repossession outcomes.
• Procedural roadmap for enforcement: The judgment reinforces Section 11 as the primary enforcement route, potentially reducing “execution-by-writ” attempts where the Act itself supplies execution machinery.
• Constitutional review access for children/relatives: Since the Act (as it stands) does not provide them an appeal under Section 16, writ review remains the practical check against jurisdictional overreach by Tribunals—especially on issues like eviction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Maintenance Tribunal (under the Act of 2007)

A statutory, quasi-judicial authority meant to decide maintenance claims of parents/senior citizens through summary procedure. It is not a civil court and does not decide full-fledged title/possession disputes unless the Act specifically authorizes it.

Section 11 (Enforcement of order of maintenance)

The Act’s “execution” clause: it allows maintenance orders to be enforced with the same force as CrPC maintenance orders. Practically, it is the first port of call when a maintenance order is not complied with.

Section 23 (Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances)

A targeted remedy for senior citizens who transferred property (typically to children/relatives) on the condition of being maintained, and are then neglected. If conditions are met, the Tribunal may declare such transfer void. It is not a general eviction power.

Article 226 vs Article 227

Article 226 is the High Court’s original writ jurisdiction (e.g., certiorari) to correct jurisdictional/patent legal errors of public bodies and tribunals. Article 227 is supervisory control over courts/tribunals to keep them within jurisdictional bounds. The Supreme Court has clarified that civil court orders are not challenged under Article 226 by certiorari, but tribunals’ quasi-judicial orders generally can be.

Mitakshara coparcenary claim (raised by the son)

A Hindu law concept where a child may acquire an interest by birth in certain ancestral/coparcenary property. In this judgment, the Court did not adjudicate title/copracenary rights; it decided the narrower question that the Tribunal lacked power under Sections 4–5 to order eviction.

5. Conclusion

The judgment crystallizes two practical rules for disputes under the Act of 2007 in West Bengal: (i) on applications under Sections 4 and 5, the Maintenance Tribunal’s remit is confined to maintenance and it cannot order eviction (absent a properly attracted Section 23 scenario); and (ii) Maintenance Tribunal orders, being quasi-judicial, are amenable to Article 226 judicial review, allowing children/relatives—who lack a statutory appeal under the present Act—to challenge jurisdictional overreach.

By dismissing the mother’s enforcement writ while preserving her Section 11 remedy, and by setting aside the eviction direction, the Court reaffirms the Act’s core purpose: a speedy maintenance mechanism—not a substitute forum for property repossession litigation.