Earnest-Money Forfeiture Requires Proven Loss Where Provable; A Claim for Double Bayana Includes Refund of the Principal
Case: SOMNATH KHARBANDA (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LRS & ORS. v. ARVINDER KAUR (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HER LRS
Citation: 2026 DHC 9462
Court: Delhi High Court
Judge: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna
Decision: 27 October 2026
Proceeding: RFA 814/2026, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
1. Introduction
This judgment addresses a recurring problem in property transactions: whether a seller may retain earnest money merely because the purchaser failed to complete the purchase and the agreement expressly authorised forfeiture. It also considers whether a court can order repayment of the original deposit when the purchaser claimed double that amount, rather than separately pleading an alternative claim for its refund.
The Delhi High Court affirmed that a contractual forfeiture clause does not displace the requirement of reasonable compensation under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Where the alleged loss is capable of proof, the seller must establish it. The purchaser’s inability to justify non-performance does not, by itself, establish the seller’s entitlement to retain the deposit.
The decision principally applies established Supreme Court authority rather than creating an entirely new forfeiture doctrine. Its particular significance lies in combining that doctrine with a procedural clarification: in a straightforward money-recovery suit seeking double the earnest money, an award limited to the original earnest money is a lesser monetary award within the claim, not an unclaimed alternative relief.
2. Background, Parties and Issues
The agreement and its reciprocal default clauses
Arvinder Kaur, the original plaintiff and purchaser, entered into an agreement dated 21 June 2008 with Somnath Kharbanda and Anoop Kharbanda, the original defendants and sellers. The transaction concerned property at 6/2, Second Floor, with roof rights, Ramesh Nagar, Delhi. The agreed consideration was ₹40,00,000.
The purchaser paid ₹4,00,000 in cash as earnest money, acknowledged by a receipt. The remaining ₹36,00,000 was payable on or before 5 September 2008. The agreement provided that:
- If the sellers defaulted, they would pay the purchaser double the earnest money.
- If the purchaser defaulted, the sellers could forfeit the earnest money.
Both sides were subsequently represented by legal representatives following the deaths of the original parties.
The competing explanations for non-completion
The purchaser alleged that the sellers repeatedly failed to produce their title documents for verification. She therefore withheld the balance consideration and ultimately claimed ₹8,00,000, representing double the earnest money, with interest at 12% per annum.
The sellers admitted the agreement and receipt of ₹4,00,000 but maintained that the purchaser had defaulted by failing to pay the balance. They also alleged a consequential loss: anticipating completion of this sale, they had agreed to purchase another property from Mr. Paramjeet Singh and paid him ₹4,60,000 as earnest money. According to them, the purchaser’s default prevented completion of that onward transaction, leading to forfeiture of their deposit.
The trial court’s decision
The trial court rejected the purchaser’s explanation concerning non-production of title documents and found that she had not established readiness and willingness to complete the purchase. Accordingly, it refused her claim for double the earnest money.
Nevertheless, the court also rejected the sellers’ justification for forfeiture because their alleged loss had not been established. It therefore awarded refund of ₹4,00,000 with pendente lite and future interest at 6% per annum.
Questions raised in appeal
The sellers’ legal representatives challenged that decree, raising four central questions:
- Could the deposit be forfeited under the agreement once the purchaser failed to complete the transaction?
- Had the sellers sufficiently established loss through the failed onward purchase?
- Could the court award refund when the purchaser had claimed double the earnest money without separately praying for repayment of the principal?
- Had the trial court improperly travelled beyond the pleadings by discussing the sellers’ title and the purchaser’s readiness and willingness?
3. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the refund decree. Its principal findings were:
- No automatic forfeiture: Breach of contract does not automatically entitle the other party to retain the stipulated deposit.
- Section 74 governs: The forfeiture provision fixed the maximum potential compensation; it did not establish entitlement to that amount.
- Provable loss required proof: The alleged forfeiture of ₹4,60,000 in the onward transaction was capable of proof through documents and testimony, but cogent evidence was not produced.
- Refund was within the monetary claim: Awarding ₹4,00,000 against a claim for ₹8,00,000 did not introduce a new or unclaimed alternative relief.
- Title observations were incidental: The trial court had not issued a substantive declaration concerning ownership.
- Readiness was not decisive: The purchaser’s conduct could be examined, but the central question remained whether the sellers had established a lawful basis for forfeiture.
The decree for ₹4,00,000 with pendente lite and future interest at 6% per annum consequently remained intact. The pending applications were also disposed of.
4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited
4.1 Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das, (1964) 1 SCR 515
This Constitution Bench decision supplied the foundational interpretation of Section 74. The High Court relied on its distinction between a contractual stipulation and a judicially enforceable entitlement to compensation.
A sum named in a contract does not become payable merely because breach is established. The court must award reasonable compensation within the contractual ceiling. Crucially, the statutory expression “whether or not actual damage or loss is proved” does not authorise compensation where no legal injury has resulted.
Its influence on the present decision was direct: the sellers could not treat Clause 5 as a self-executing right to retain ₹4,00,000. The contractual provision had to operate within Section 74, rather than independently of it.
This decision provided the more detailed framework applied to the evidence. The High Court reproduced three important propositions:
- Damage or loss caused by breach is an essential condition for compensation under Section 74.
- Where actual damage or loss can be proved, the requirement of proof is not dispensed with.
- Section 74 applies to contractual forfeiture of earnest money, although the cited decision distinguishes forfeiture under public-auction conditions before an agreement is reached.
The authority also recognises that where damage is difficult or impossible to prove, a genuine contractual pre-estimate may support compensation. The present case did not fall within that qualification. The alleged onward transaction involved an identifiable counterparty, a stated deposit and documents that could have been produced.
Accordingly, this precedent explains why the sellers’ evidentiary failure was decisive. Their allegation concerned a concrete, verifiable financial loss, not an inherently unquantifiable injury.
The appellants invoked this authority to argue that refund of earnest money could not be ordered without a specific prayer. As described in the judgment, the decision concerns a suit for specific performance and the requirement under Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that refund relief be specifically claimed, whether initially or through amendment.
The High Court distinguished the procedural setting. Arvinder Kaur had not sought an order compelling completion of the sale. She had brought a money-recovery suit for ₹8,00,000 based on the earnest-money arrangement. Awarding ₹4,00,000 therefore reduced the monetary claim rather than substituting a different kind of relief.
The distinction preserves the specific pleading requirement applicable to specific-performance proceedings while rejecting its extension to this ordinary recovery action.
Paragraph 51 contains an apparent drafting inconsistency in its description of specific-performance suits. Read with paragraphs 32 and 50–52, however, the reasoning is clear: the statutory requirement discussed in this precedent did not prevent the lesser monetary award in the present recovery suit.
This authority appeared in the appellants’ criticism of the trial court’s treatment of their title documents. They argued that reliance on it was misplaced because the proceedings did not seek a declaration of title or ownership rights.
The High Court did not undertake a fresh examination of that precedent’s substantive title doctrine. Instead, it confined the significance of the trial court’s observations: the documents had been discussed while assessing the purchaser’s explanation for abandoning the transaction, not to conclusively determine ownership.
This authority therefore did not supply the basis for the appellate outcome. The refund decree stood on the independent ground that forfeiture had not been justified under the law of contractual compensation.
4.5 Authorities invoked against relief beyond the pleadings
The appellants also cited the following decisions in support of their objection that courts cannot decide an unpleaded case or grant relief outside the issues:
| Authority |
Role in the present appeal |
| Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, 2008 INSC 1072 |
Invoked to challenge adjudication and relief allegedly extending beyond the pleaded dispute. |
| Rohit Singh v. Parimal Bhattacharjee, 2024 DHC 8175 |
Cited within the same group of authorities supporting the appellants’ pleading-based objection. |
| Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456 |
Relied upon against granting relief on a case said not to have been pleaded. |
| Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307 |
Invoked in support of limits on judicial relief beyond the parties’ pleaded case. |
| Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar, AIR 1991 SC 409 |
Cited as part of the challenge to the supposed introduction of issues outside the pleadings. |
| Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234 |
Relied upon in resisting what the appellants characterised as an unclaimed refund remedy. |
| Fertilizer Corp. of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath, AIR 1996 SC 2744 |
Included among the authorities supporting the objection to relief beyond the pleaded claim. |
The supplied judgment lists these authorities together but does not separately reproduce their facts or analyse their individual holdings. Their influence must therefore be understood through the argument for which they were cited, rather than through an assumed case-by-case adoption by the High Court.
The court rejected the factual premise of that argument. Forfeiture was already a pleaded defence and the subject of a framed issue. The plaintiff’s claim was already monetary and arose from the same agreement and deposit. No new transaction, cause of action or declaratory remedy was introduced by ordering repayment of ₹4,00,000.
Thus, the court did not reject the general importance of pleadings. It held, in substance, that those limits had not been crossed.
5. Legal Reasoning
5.1 Breach and entitlement to compensation are separate inquiries
The central analytical move was to separate the purchaser’s failure to complete the sale from the sellers’ right to retain her money. Rejecting the purchaser’s explanation did not automatically validate forfeiture.
A party relying on a forfeiture clause must still establish the conditions for legally recoverable compensation. The court therefore did not need to vindicate the purchaser’s conduct in order to direct repayment.
This explains the apparently mixed outcome: the purchaser failed to secure double the deposit but succeeded in recovering the principal because the sellers had not established a compensatory basis for keeping it.
5.2 The stipulated sum is a ceiling, not an automatic award
Clause 5 expressly addressed default and stipulated financial consequences. The High Court consequently treated it as falling within Section 74.
The contractual figure limited the maximum compensation potentially available. It did not conclusively determine either the existence of loss or the reasonableness of retaining the entire amount. Nor did describing the payment as “bayana” remove it from judicial scrutiny.
5.3 The alleged onward-transaction loss was not established
The sellers’ case was not merely that the purchaser breached the agreement. They identified a particular financial consequence: forfeiture of ₹4,60,000 paid to Mr. Paramjeet Singh.
However, the receipt and agreement concerning that transaction were de-exhibited because the originals were not produced. No other cogent evidence established either the onward agreement or the reasons for its non-performance. Mr. Paramjeet Singh was not examined to substantiate the account.
The court considered this loss capable of proof. Its conclusion was therefore an evidentiary one: the sellers had not established the alleged injury through available, appropriate evidence. The judgment does not lay down that every onward-purchase loss is legally irrecoverable, or that oral evidence can never establish contractual loss.
The reference to Section 73 reinforces the underlying requirement of compensable loss, while Section 74 controls the effect of the stipulated forfeiture amount. Because the factual foundation failed, the court did not need to determine whether a proven onward loss would satisfy every further requirement for compensation.
5.4 Refund was a lesser award within the recovery claim
The purchaser sought ₹8,00,000 because she alleged sellers’ default under the agreement. Although that allegation did not establish entitlement to the doubled amount, the court still had to decide whether the sellers could lawfully retain the admitted ₹4,00,000 payment.
Awarding the principal did not transform the suit into a different proceeding. It remained a money claim arising from the same earnest-money payment, with forfeiture already directly contested.
This reasoning is narrower than a general permission to grant unpleaded relief. It does not eliminate the need for specific prayers where a statute expressly requires them, particularly in specific-performance litigation.
5.5 Title and readiness were contextual, not decisive
The High Court treated the trial court’s title-related observations as incidental to assessing the purchaser’s stated reason for not completing the sale. They were not a substantive declaration invalidating the sellers’ ownership.
Similarly, the purchaser’s readiness and willingness could inform the assessment of contractual conduct without converting the action into one for specific performance. The High Court expressly regarded the detailed inquiry into her financial capacity as unnecessary to the decisive forfeiture question.
This qualification matters because the trial court had referred to an application for additional time to pay court fees as indicating financial difficulty. The appellate decision should not be read as establishing that such an application, by itself, proves inability to complete a property purchase.
The appellants also argued that time was of the essence and that cancellation of the agreement had not been sought. Neither contention displaced the need to justify retention of the deposit under the applicable compensation principles.
6. Potential Impact and Limits
Property-sale disputes
The judgment reinforces that an express forfeiture clause is not a substitute for evidence. Sellers relying on a failed onward purchase should preserve the agreement, payment records, evidence of forfeiture and material establishing the connection between the purchaser’s breach and the claimed loss.
Drafting and conducting recovery suits
The decision assists courts in distinguishing a reduced monetary award from a genuinely new remedy. A claim for double earnest money does not necessarily fail altogether merely because the claimant cannot establish entitlement to the contractual enhancement.
Nevertheless, expressly pleading alternative refund relief remains prudent. The judgment’s reasoning depends on the nature of this recovery action and should not be transplanted indiscriminately into proceedings governed by special pleading requirements.
Assessment of evidence
The ruling discourages reliance on unsupported assertions of consequential loss. At the same time, it preserves the distinction recognised in the governing precedents between loss that can be proved and loss that is genuinely difficult or impossible to quantify.
Limits of the holding
- It does not hold that earnest money can never be forfeited.
- It does not require precise proof in every conceivable case of stipulated damages.
- It does not conclusively determine the sellers’ ownership of the property.
- It does not excuse the purchaser’s failure to complete the transaction.
- It does not relax Section 22(2) requirements in specific-performance suits.
- It does not automatically validate the reciprocal clause requiring payment of double earnest money.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Earnest money or bayana
- An upfront payment demonstrating commitment to a transaction. Its contractual label does not make forfeiture automatically lawful.
- Forfeiture
- Keeping money already paid because of the other party’s default. Here, the sellers had to justify retention through the law governing compensation.
- Liquidated damages and penalty
- Amounts stipulated in advance for breach. Section 74 permits reasonable compensation within the stipulated maximum, rather than automatic enforcement of the stated figure.
- Legal injury
- A legally recognised harm resulting from breach. Proof that a promise was broken does not necessarily establish a compensable loss.
- Genuine pre-estimate of loss
- A realistic advance assessment of likely damage. It may be relevant where actual loss is difficult or impossible to prove.
- Readiness and willingness
- The capacity and intention to fulfil contractual obligations. Although especially important in specific-performance suits, the concept may also help assess conduct in other contractual disputes.
- Specific performance
- A court order requiring the promised transaction to be completed, rather than merely awarding money.
- Pendente lite and future interest
- Interest during the litigation and after the decree until payment. The affirmed award provided both at 6% per annum.
- Incidental observation
- A comment made while addressing the actual dispute, rather than a conclusive decision granting a separate substantive remedy.
8. Conclusion
The judgment confirms that contractual default and lawful forfeiture are distinct questions. Even where the purchaser fails to complete the sale, the seller cannot retain earnest money merely by invoking the agreement: loss must be established where it is capable of proof, and compensation must remain reasonable.
Its procedural clarification is equally important. In this money-recovery suit, refunding ₹4,00,000 against a claim for double that amount remained within the pleaded monetary dispute. The decision therefore combines evidentiary discipline in forfeiture claims with a practical distinction between awarding less money and granting a different, unclaimed remedy.