1. Introduction
The Delhi High Court considered whether a litigant could reopen a cheque-dishonour complaint after its nominated counsel had twice represented that the dispute had been fully settled and the cheque amount received. Those statements were first made before the Judicial Magistrate and later reiterated before the National Lok Adalat, resulting in compounding of the offence and acquittal of the respondents.
Equitas Small Finance Bank Ltd., the petitioner, sought certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. It requested that the Lok Adalat Award dated 14 September 2024 be recalled and its complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 be restored.
The central question was whether the bank could disown its counsel’s recorded settlement statements on the later plea that they had been made through confusion and without authority.
5. Analysis
5.1 Precedents Cited
The Judgment does not cite or discuss any previous judicial decision. Consequently, no cited precedent directly influenced the Court’s reasoning.
The decision instead rests upon general principles governing counsel’s authority, the evidentiary weight of statements recorded in judicial proceedings, procedural finality, delay, acquiescence and the need to preserve confidence in court-assisted settlements.
5.2 Legal Reasoning
A. Repetition before two forums gave the statement enhanced reliability
This was not a case of a single accidental concession. The statement that the dispute had been settled and payment received was first made before the JMFC and then repeated before the Lok Adalat. Both forums formally recorded counsel’s statement. The Court described the statements as having obtained the “imprimatur of two Courts”.
Repetition materially weakened the explanation that counsel had merely misunderstood an isolated instruction.
B. A duly authorised counsel is not merely a mechanical messenger
Counsel had been nominated by the petitioner and held a duly executed vakalatnama. The Court emphasised that an advocate is an officer of the court and not merely a mechanical agent of the client. Judicial proceedings must ordinarily be capable of proceeding upon representations made by counsel appearing with ostensible authority.
The ruling therefore protects institutional reliance upon formal submissions made by advocates. A litigant cannot ordinarily retain the benefit of legal representation while later disowning inconvenient statements without compelling proof.
C. Delay and subsequent conduct undermined the petitioner’s case
The petitioner did not challenge counsel’s authority immediately. It waited approximately thirteen months before approaching the JMFC and then waited a further period before invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.
More significantly, the same counsel allegedly responsible for the unauthorised concession continued to represent the petitioner. No complaint, disciplinary proceeding or other action was initiated against him. The Court treated this conduct as inconsistent with a genuine grievance of serious professional misconduct.
D. Lack of supporting evidence
The petitioner did not provide sufficient details identifying the bank representative who had communicated the instructions or explaining precisely how those instructions were misunderstood. Nor was there a supporting affidavit from the concerned representative.
Since the challenge sought to displace recorded judicial proceedings, a bare assertion of confusion was insufficient.
E. Contradictory factual versions
On one hand, the petitioner claimed that no settlement had ever occurred. On the other, it alleged that the respondents had been given an opportunity to pay and later took advantage of the Lok Adalat Award by reneging on their promise. The Court found these positions difficult to reconcile.
This inconsistency reinforced the conclusion that the challenge was devised after the settlement proceedings had concluded.
F. Finality and orderly administration of justice
The Court reasoned that permitting litigants to withdraw from orders passed on counsel’s representations would generate uncertainty and chaos. Courts, Lok Adalats and opposing parties must be able to rely upon solemn statements made in proceedings.
The petitioner was therefore not permitted to obtain a “second bite at the cherry” by reviving a prosecution already compounded on its own counsel’s statements.
5.3 Scope of the Principle
The Judgment should not be read as laying down an absolute rule that every statement made by counsel is immune from challenge. Its reasoning is strongly fact-dependent. Relevant factors included repeated statements, a valid vakalatnama, long and unexplained delay, continued engagement of the same advocate, absence of action against him, lack of documentary support and inconsistent pleadings.
A promptly raised challenge supported by credible evidence of fraud, coercion, impersonation or an express lack of authority may stand on a materially different footing. No such evidence was produced here.
5.4 Impact
- Settlement finality: The decision strengthens the finality of settlements recorded by Lok Adalats and criminal courts.
- Advocate-client responsibility: Institutional litigants must maintain clear instructions and internal records when authorising settlements.
- Prompt objections: Any allegation that counsel acted without authority must be raised immediately and supported by evidence.
- Cheque-dishonour litigation: Once an offence is compounded under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act upon the complainant’s representation of satisfaction, revival will not be readily permitted.
- Judicial reliance on counsel: The ruling affirms that courts are entitled to act upon statements made by duly appointed advocates.
- Writ jurisdiction: Extraordinary jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be used to escape the consequences of voluntary and uncontroverted statements recorded in earlier proceedings.