Benefit of Doubt Where Demand Is Attributed to a Third Person and a Listed Trap Witness Is Withheld
1. Introduction
Case: Rajinder Kumar v. C.B.I. (2026 DHC 2130), Delhi High Court, decided on 16-03-2026.
The appellant (A1), a Junior Clerk at DESU (Radhu Palace office), appealed his conviction for offences under
Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”),
and Section 120-B IPC. The prosecution alleged that A1 conspired with A2 (a pan vendor outside the DESU office)
to obtain ₹500 as illegal gratification for correcting/adjusting an electricity bill.
The core controversy was not merely “recovery” of tainted money, but whether the prosecution proved the indispensable ingredient of
demand by A1 beyond reasonable doubt—especially after the complainant’s later testimony attributed demand to a
third person (“Raj Kumar”) and evidence suggested that this third person was apprehended during the trap but was not examined.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted A1.
- It held that the evidence created grave suspicion but did not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- The Court found that the defence version of false implication at the behest of PW6 was probabilised through prosecution evidence itself (notably PW8).
- The Court treated the combination of: (i) attribution of demand to “Raj Kumar”, (ii) testimony about arrest of a third person, and (iii) non-examination of “Raj Kumar Pal” (listed as a charge-sheet witness), as creating a material doubt undermining the prosecution’s theory of demand and acceptance by A1.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)(2023) 4 SCC 731
The High Court relied on this decision for the settled proposition that for convictions under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) PC Act, the prosecution must prove demand (and the bribe-giver’s offer) as a
fact in issue. It reaffirmed that mere acceptance/recovery of money, without proof of demand, is insufficient.
Influence on outcome: This precedent framed the High Court’s approach: once demand became doubtful (given PW1’s later version and surrounding circumstances),
the conviction could not be sustained merely on recovery/trap formalities.
The prosecution invoked this case to argue that even if key witnesses turn hostile, the Court may rely on other reliable evidence,
and that the presumption under Section 20 PC Act can arise once acceptance is proved (not necessarily by direct evidence).
The High Court carefully distinguished it on facts:
- In M. Narsinga Rao, the accused did not immediately dispute receiving the tainted notes and introduced the “stuffed into pocket” story after years.
- In the present case, A1 protested at apprehension (as spoken to by PW4), and the defence of false implication was supported by PW8’s testimony indicating a motive linked to PW6.
Influence on outcome: The Court accepted the general law on Section 20 presumptions, but held that the surrounding circumstances here generated reasonable doubt
and made the prosecution’s narrative insufficiently reliable for conviction.
(c) Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220
Cited for the principle that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in toto; the Court may accept credible parts.
Influence on outcome: While acknowledging this doctrine, the Court found that the “credible parts” of the overall record did not cohere into proof beyond reasonable doubt,
particularly because the defence doubt was strengthened by PW8 and by the unexplained absence of “Raj Kumar Pal”.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Demand is the fulcrum; recovery is not enough
Applying Neeraj Dutta, the Court treated demand as the central ingredient. PW1’s later testimony claimed:
demand came from “Raj Kumar”, and the instruction “Chotu paan khila de” led PW1 to hand money to A2 at Raj Kumar’s instance, not A1’s.
This directly attacked the prosecution’s “demand by A1” theory.
(ii) Hostility and delay in cross-examination: acknowledged, but not decisive
The Court noted that PW1 initially supported the prosecution in examination-in-chief but turned hostile after a long delay in cross-examination,
and observed the possibility of PW1 being “won over”. However, the acquittal did not rest solely on PW1’s hostility; it turned on
corroborative doubts arising from other evidence and prosecutorial omissions.
(iii) Defence need only show “preponderance of probabilities”
The Court reiterated the asymmetry of burdens in criminal trials:
the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the accused can rebut by establishing a
probable defence. Here, A1’s plea of false implication due to PW6’s enmity with PW8 was “probabilised” by PW8 himself.
(iv) PW8’s testimony as an internal corroborator of the defence theory
PW8 (Finance Officer; A1’s maternal uncle) admitted strained relations with PW6 and deposed that on 08.08.1994 PW6 telephoned him stating
he had “managed to harm” PW8’s sister’s son (A1). The Court stressed that the prosecution did not clarify this in re-examination,
thereby leaving a strong prosecution-originating basis for reasonable doubt.
(v) The “third person” problem and non-examination of a listed witness
A critical evidentiary pivot was the recurring suggestion that a third person (“Raj Kumar”) was involved and apprehended:
- PW1 stated three persons (A1, A2, and Raj Kumar) were arrested and that Raj Kumar was later released.
- PW5 admitted three persons were arrested; though he did not affirm the third was Raj Kumar, he did not deny it and professed lack of recollection.
- The charge-sheet listed “Raj Kumar Pal” (CW5) as a witness, yet the prosecution did not examine him and gave no explanation.
The Court treated this as generating a legitimate doubt: if the prosecution’s own materials pointed to a third person central to the demand narrative,
withholding that witness (or failing to explain his absence) weakened the prosecution’s ability to establish the precise chain of demand and acceptance.
(vi) Rejection of the prosecution’s “defence should have asked the IO” argument
The prosecution argued that the defence did not confront the Investigating Officer on the third arrest. The Court rejected this,
holding that once the defence extracted favourable admissions from prosecution witnesses, it was not obliged to “clarify away” its own advantage.
The burden remained on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3.3 Impact
-
Heightened scrutiny of “demand attribution” in trap cases: Where evidence plausibly points to a different official/third person as the demander,
courts are likely to insist on clearer proof tying demand to the accused on trial.
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Prosecutorial duty in witness selection (practical consequence): While the prosecution has discretion in choosing witnesses,
this judgment signals that non-examination of a charge-sheeted witness who appears central to a disputed fact (like demand)
can seriously impair the case if the record suggests that witness could resolve the controversy.
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Section 20 presumption remains rebuttable on circumstances: Even where recovery/phenolphthalein evidence exists, immediate protest,
credible motive evidence of false implication, and investigative gaps can cumulatively rebut the prosecution narrative to the point of reasonable doubt.
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Institutional caution: The Court’s remarks on delayed cross-examination reflect an institutional concern: procedural delays can distort testimonial reliability
and complicate corruption trials—though such concern will not substitute for proof.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- “Demand” (in PC Act trap cases)
-
The prosecution must prove that the public servant asked for the bribe (directly or through a proved intermediary arrangement).
Recovery of money alone does not automatically prove demand.
- Hostile witness
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A witness who departs from an earlier statement or the party’s case. Courts may still rely on the portions of testimony that are credible and consistent with other evidence.
- Section 20 presumption (PC Act)
-
If acceptance of gratification is proved, the court may presume it was accepted as a bribe (motive/reward), unless rebutted.
The accused can rebut by showing a probable alternative explanation; the standard is not “beyond doubt” but preponderance of probabilities.
- “Benefit of doubt”
-
If, after considering the entire evidence, a reasonable doubt remains about guilt, the accused must be acquitted.
Strong suspicion cannot replace proof.
5. Conclusion
Rajinder Kumar v. C.B.I. reinforces that corruption convictions—particularly under Sections 7 and 13 PC Act—cannot rest on recovery alone;
demand must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in line with Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)(2023) 4 SCC 731.
While hostile testimony may be partially relied upon (per Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220) and presumptions may arise (per
M. Narsinga Rao v. State Of A.P ., (2001) 1 SCC 691), this judgment demonstrates that credible doubts—especially where evidence points to a
third-person demand narrative and the prosecution withholds an apparently material, listed witness—will compel acquittal.
The decision thus stands as a cautionary precedent on evidentiary completeness and the prosecution’s obligation to eliminate reasonable doubt in trap cases.