4. Analysis
4.1 Precedents Cited
Thansingh Nathmal vs Superintendent of Taxes, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13
This Constitution Bench authority supplied the foundational principle that the existence of jurisdiction does not compel its exercise. Although Article 226 is broad, High Courts have developed self-imposed restraints, including the rule that a writ petition should ordinarily not be entertained where an adequate alternative remedy exists.
The Delhi High Court used this principle to stress that extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because it is legally available. The statutory criminal process must not be rendered redundant.
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. vs The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2026 INSC 442
This was the most direct authority on the issue. The Supreme Court held that a person complaining of non-registration or improper investigation should ordinarily follow the BNSS mechanism before invoking Article 226.
The judgment identifies the following sequence:
- approach the officer in charge of the police station under Section 173(1) BNSS;
- on refusal, approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS; and
- thereafter approach the Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS.
The quoted expression that “Article 226 is not a panacea for all grievances” became central to the Delhi High Court’s conclusion. The petitioners had not completed even the second step of the statutory process.
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India & Others, 2026 SCC Online SC 741
This decision characterized the remedies under the CrPC and the BNSS as a “comprehensive and multi-tiered mechanism” for grievances relating to non-registration of FIRs. It also recognized that the Magistrate’s supervisory jurisdiction is of wide amplitude and can ensure a fair, impartial and lawful investigation.
The Delhi High Court relied on this authority to reject the argument that a Magistrate could not secure CCTV footage or direct necessary investigative measures. The statutory forum was therefore not merely available but efficacious.
Lalita Kumari (supra)
As referred to in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India & Others, this precedent establishes that registration of an FIR is mandatory where information discloses a cognizable offence. The Delhi High Court found that this threshold was not met because the pleaded allegations disclosed, at most, non-cognizable hurt.
Radha Krishan Industries (supra)
This authority was cited in the extract from Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. vs The State of Maharashtra & Ors. for the recognized exceptions to the alternative-remedy rule. These include cases involving enforcement of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, complete absence of jurisdiction or a challenge to the validity of legislation. No comparable special circumstance was established here.
Sakiri Vasu (supra) and Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe (supra)
These authorities were invoked for the proposition that complaints concerning non-registration or defective investigation should ordinarily be addressed through the criminal procedural framework, especially the Magistrate’s supervisory powers, rather than by treating the High Court as the forum of first instance.
4.2 Legal Reasoning
A. Article 226 is extraordinary and discretionary
The Court began with the breadth of Article 226 but emphasized its discretionary character. The alternative-remedy doctrine is a rule of judicial policy designed to preserve statutory procedures and institutional competence.
B. Failure to exhaust the BNSS remedies
Although the petitioners had submitted a complaint to the SHO on 22 August 2026, they neither approached the DCP under Section 173(4) BNSS nor moved the Magistrate. Their petition also did not explain why these remedies were ineffective.
Mere non-registration within the period alleged did not, without more, establish such negligence, bias or urgency as would justify immediate constitutional intervention.
C. Nature of the alleged offence
The Court considered the allegation that unarmed persons had beaten, slapped, thrashed and dragged the petitioners. On that description, it found that the complaint disclosed at most causing hurt under Section 114 BNS, a non-cognizable offence.
This classification was decisive because Section 174 BNSS prevents a police officer from investigating a non-cognizable offence without the Magistrate’s authority. A writ directing immediate police or CBI investigation would therefore bypass the governing statutory scheme.
D. Availability of CCTV-related relief before the Magistrate
The petitioners argued that a Magistrate could not order seizure or preservation of CCTV footage. The Court rejected this contention by relying on the powers contained in Chapter XVI BNSS and the broad supervisory role recognized in the cited Supreme Court decisions.
E. Refusal to transfer the matter to the CBI
The request for an independent agency rested mainly on the fact that respondent no.1 was a Member of Parliament belonging to the ruling dispensation. The Court regarded this as a sweeping and unsupported allegation against the Delhi Police. It also noted the inconsistency in claiming that the CBI—a government body—would necessarily be independent while the Delhi Police would not.
F. The Bar Council representation was distinct
The representation sought resignation of respondent no.1, institutional accountability, advocates’ welfare measures, legal education reforms and consideration of a no-confidence motion. The Court found that these demands had no necessary connection with the criminal investigation sought in the other prayers. They could not be added to an otherwise non-maintainable criminal writ petition.