Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The record on appeal demonstrates that the plaintiff was placed with the appellant to perform certain receptionist duties. While working for the appellant, the plaintiff's work was directed and controlled exclusively by employees of the appellant. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in failing to find that the plaintiff was a "special employee" of the appellant as a matter of law and in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by the Workers' Compensation Law (see, Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553; Schulze v Associated Univs., 212 A.D.2d 588; Hoskins v MIA Assocs., 201 A.D.2d 459; Carreras v Lawrence Aviation Indus., 201 A.D.2d 693; Cameli v Pace Univ., 131 A.D.2d 419). Bracken, J.P., Rosenblatt, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.