There was substantial evidence (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. Of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 181-182) to support the challenged administrative determination. The testimony of the police officer who stopped petitioner for speeding, as to his training and qualifications in estimating motor vehicle speeds, and his independent estimation of the speed at which petitioner was driving just prior to the stop, was sufficient to support petitioner's speeding conviction (see People v. Olsen, 22 N.Y.2d 230, 231-232; Henig v. State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 122 A.D.2d 250, 251), and petitioner's admissions that he had improper plates affixed to his vehicle and that he failed to produce proof of insurance or registration corresponding to the plates on his vehicle, were sufficient to support his convictions for driving an uninsured and unregistered vehicle and for having improper plates affixed to his vehicle. That petitioner may have had an insured and registered transporter plate on the rear windshield is not a defense.
Finally, petitioner's contentions that he is, in the context of administrative proceedings respecting alleged traffic infractions pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law article 2-A, entitled to rely upon Criminal Procedure Law provisions providing for notice of a defendant's right to a supporting deposition and a speedy trial, are without merit (see Matter of Steiger v. Wozniak, 72 A.D.2d 944, 944; Matter of Sulli v. Appeals Bd. of Admin. Adjudications Bur., 55 A.D.2d at 460; People v. Zagorsky, 73 Misc.2d 420, 423).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.