ORAL ORDER
1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Dipak Dave for the petitioner and learned advocate Ms. Taruna Makwana for the respondents.
2. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs:
"(A) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
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(i) to quash and set aside impugned order at Annexure A dated 26.10.2018 as well as 23.10.2018 passed under Sections 14B and 7Q of the Act respectively;
(ii) to hold and declare that recovery certificate dated 25.04.2019 is illegal, unjust and contrary to the provisions of law and further may be pleased to quash and set aside the said recovery certificate dated 25.04.2019;
(B) Pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to restrain the respondents from taking any coercive action against the petitioner in pursuance to the impugned orders at Annexure A to the petition and further may be pleased to stay the execution, implementation and operation of recovery certificate dated 25.04.2019;
(C) Any other and further relief or reliefs to which this Hon'ble Court deemed fit, in the interest of justice; may kindly be granted;"
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3. Brief facts of the case are as under:
3.1 The petitioner-Trust started educational institution in the year 2012 in the name of Shree Vidya Bharti for imparting education to the downtrodden people of Navsari District.
3.2 In the year 2012, the school run by the petitioner-Trust exceeded 19 employees. However, thereafter, again the strength was decreased to 14. The petitioner being unaware with regard to applicability of the provisions of the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 [for short 'the Act'], could not apply before the Provident Fund Department for registration.
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3.3 The petitioner thereafter made an application on 17.04.2017 for registration under the provisions of the Act and allotment of the Code number.
3.4 It is the case of the petitioner that as per the Scheme floated by the Central Government, any declaration made for the purpose of registration and declaration of employees' strength would be exempted from levy of damages and token amount of Rs. 1 could be charged.
3.5 Accordingly, under the said Scheme, the petitioner was entitled to the exemption from levy of damages under the provisions of the Act in view of the declaration made by the petitioner in the prescribed form within the extended time
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upto 30.06.2017. The petitioner made declaration on 17.04.2017 which was within the extended time under the said Scheme.
3.6 The petitioner also paid the entire amount with the respondent- Provident Fund Department in August 2007. The petitioner received a show-cause notice dated 06.07.2018 to show cause as to why damages under the provisions of section 14B and interest under section 7Q of the Act amounting to Rs. 2,74,151/- and Rs. 1,40,760/- respectively should not be recovered from the petitioner.
3.7 The petitioner however, could not appear pursuant to the show-cause notice which has resulted into the impugned orders dated 23.10.2018 under section 7Q
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raising a demand of Rs. 1,40,760/- and order dated 26.10.2018 under section 14B of the Act towards damages amounting to Rs. 2,74,151/-.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Dave for the petitioner submitted that so far as Notification dated 29.03.2017 issued by the Ministry of Labour and Employment in exercise of powers conferred under section 5 read with sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act, the Central Government has made amendment to the Employees Provident Fund (7thAmendment) Scheme,2016 by extending the date of declaration from 30.03.2017 to 30.06.2017. The petitioner has made declaration on 17.04.2017 with regard to employees who are not covered by the Scheme. It is therefore submitted that
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the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the Scheme.
5. He further submitted that respondents authorities have not assigned any reason while passing the impugned order under sections 7Q and 14B of the Act.
6. On the other hand, learned advocate Ms. Taruna Makwana for the respondent authority referred and relied upon the averments in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 following averments:
"10. The respondent has served/communicated both 14B and 7Q orders to the petitioner through EPFO's "Compliance e-Proceedings"
portal and also through post. The EPFO has made available all proceeding u/s 14B and 7Q with next date of hearing, daily orders and final orders publicly on EPFO's
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"Compliance e-Proceedings" portal http://eproceedings.epfindia.gov.inf or employer / establishment in respect of natural justice and public interest. Thus everybody including establishment / employer is able to see the proceedings, next date of hearing, daily orders and final orders u/s 14B and 7Q. Thus, it is not questionable that the 14B/7Q orders have not been served to petitioner establishment in time. The petitioner ignored the order dated 26/10/2018 issued u/s 14B and order dated 23/10/2018 issued u/s 7Q of the Act and did not remit the assessed damages and interest within Stipulated time limit mentioned in those orders. The Recovery Officer has initiated coercive actions against the establishment to recover the damages and interest.
11. It is submitted that in response to PARA-3.9, reproduce section 7Q of the Act as follows:
"7Q. Interest payable by the employer - The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount
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has become so due till the date of its actual payment:
Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank."
The payment of interest by the employer in case of belated payment is statutorily leviable and a specified rate having been provided, the authority has no discretion and, therefore, it is only a matter of computation and there cannot be any challenge to it.
Section 71 provides for appeals to the tribunal. The said provision reads as follows:
"71, Appeals to Tribunal ~ (1) Any person
aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to subsection (3), or sub-section (4) of section I, or section 3, or subsection (1) of section 7A, or section 7B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section
(5) thereof, or section 7C, or
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section 14B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order.
(2) Every appeal under sub-section
(1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed."
On a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is evident that an appeal to the tribunal lies in respect of certain action of the Central Government or order passed by the Central Government or any authority on certain provisions of the Act. It is quite vivid that though an appeal lies against recovery of damages under Section 14B of the Act, no appeal is provided for against imposition of interest as be
Stipulated under Section 7Q. It seems to note here that Section 14B has been enacted to penalise the defaulting emplovers as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the emplovees. It is not only a warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries, i.e. to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them. The
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entire amount of damages awarded under Section I4B except for the amount relatable to administrative charges is to be transferred to the Employees' Provident Fund, Hence the language of the section is clear and unambiguous and Section 7I of the Act does not provide for an appeal against the determination made under 7Q. Needless to say, a tight of appeal cannot be assumed to exist unless expressly provided for by the statute and a remedy of appeal must be legitimately traceable to the statutory provisions. If the express words employed in a provision do not provide an appeal from a particular order, the court is bound to follow the express words To put it otherwise, an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law and that explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute. In the instant case an opportunity of hearing is given and the second one which relates to imposition of damages, there is discretion on the part of the authorities but as far as the levy of interest component is concerned, it being only an arithmetical calculation the question of affording an
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opportunity to the employer does not arise. When interest payable by the employer is automatic and the competent authority has no discretion to waive the interest or reduce the interest or limit the interest otherwise, the question of affording of an opportunity of hearing to the employer is not warranted.
There cannot be any dispute that the Act in question is a beneficial social legislation to ensure health and other benefits of the employees and the employer under the Act is under statutory Obligation to make the deposit that is due from him. In the event of default committed by the employer Section 14-B steps in and calls upon the employer to pay the damages. Section 7Q of the Act, which provides for interest for belated payment, is basically a compensation for payment of interest to the affected employees. This provision has been made to secure just and humane conditions of work as has been opined in Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Hooghly Mills Company Limited and others (2012) 2 SCC 489.
The language employed In Section 7Q provides for levy of Interest on delayed payment and the rates have been stipulated. When a composite
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order is passed or order imposing interest becomes a part of the order or levy in any of the provisions of the Act the authority grants a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employer/affected party. In the instant case, the respondent issued an independent demand notice vide
No.SR/SRT/1583468/SO/7Q/502/1794 dated 23/10/2018 requiring the petitioner to remit a
sum of Rs.1,40,760/towards interest' under Section 7Q of the Act for the belated remittances made from 01/04/2015 to 31/03/2018. The demand notice manifestly has been issued in exercise of power under Section 7Q of the Act and is an independent action and against such an order or issue of demand no appeal could have been filed. The petitioner is challenging the order which demanded interest under Section 7Q of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (the 'Act' for short). As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arcot Textile Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner AIR 2014 SC 295 AND (2013) 16 SCC 1 interest under Section 7Q of the Act is automatic and there can be no challenge against order demanding interest under Section 7Q. The delay in payment would automatically
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attract Section 7Q and that there is also no provision for appeal which indicates that the levy is automatic. Even though an appeal lies against the order under Section 14B, the delay has effectively frustrated the remedy for the petitioner.
12. It is submitted that in response to PARA 3.10 & PARA 3.11, PARA 3.12, PARA 3.13 and PARA 3.14 the Petitioner himself has confirmed under paragraph 3.7 and 3.8 of his petition, that respondent has provided him several opportunities to explain the delayed payments and under his own decision and choice, he has neither appeared in the proceedings nor submitted any clarifications/ reasons /objections documentary evidence for belated payment of PF and allied dues during the opportunities given to him on 27/08/2018, 12/09/2018, 03/10/2018, and 17/10/2018, Even otherwise an appeal lies against the order under Section 14B, the delay has effectively frustrated the remedy for the petitioner."
7. It was further submitted that the petitioner was given ample opportunity of
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hearing, no reply was filed to the show cause notice. It was therefore, submitted that no interference may be made in the impugned orders passed by the respondents.
8. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the facts of the case, on bare perusal of the impugned orders it appears that, no reasons are assigned by the respondent authority for passing the impugned orders. In similar facts, this Court in case of Vishv Enterprise vs. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner in Special Civil Application No. 11091/2019 has held as under:
"13. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having considered the submissions as well as the documents placed on record; it is apparent that the respondent nos.1 and 2 have passed the impugned orders
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without assigning any reasons to fasten the liability under section 14B and 7Q of the Act towards the damages and the interest respectively upon the petitioner.
14.It would be therefore germane to refer to the provisions of Section 14B and section 7Q of the Act, which reads as under:
7Q. Interest payable by the employer. —The employer shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent. per annum or at such higher rate as may be specified in the Scheme on any amount due from him under this Act from the date on which the amount has become so due till the date of its actual payment:
Provided that higher rate of interest specified in the Scheme shall not exceed the lending rate of interest charged by any scheduled bank. 14B. Power to recover damages.—Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Fund 3 [, the 2 [Pension] Fund or the Insurance Fund] or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-section
(2) of section 15 4 [or sub-section
(5) of section 17] or in the payment of any charges payable under any
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other provision of this Act or of 5 [any Scheme or Insurance Scheme] or under any of the conditions specified under section 17, 6 [the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf] may recover 7 [from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceedingthe amount of arrears, as may be specified in the Scheme:]
[Provided that before levying and recovering such damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard]:
[Provided further that the Central Board may reduce or waive the damages levied under this section in relation to an establishment which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction established under section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985,subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified in the Scheme.]
15. On perusal of the above provisions Section 7Q applies for charging of interest when the employer who is liable to deposit the amount as specified in the scheme has not been able to deposit the amount as per the
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scheme. Whereas Section 14B refers to the damages to be paid by the employer as per the order passed by the respondent-Authority where an employer makes default in payment of any contribution to the fund. As per first proviso to Section 14B before levying and recovering damages, the employee is required to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard. Considering the material available on record the petitioner was provided opportunity of hearing and the petitioner filed the reply but in the impugned order only reference is made to the reply dated 27.11.2017 without considering the contents of the reply as to why there was a delay in making the payment in depositing the amount of the contribution to the fund, the same is not considered by the respondent- authority in detail, no reasons are assigned and only vague reason is assigned in the impugned order which is reproduced herein below:
"In reply to the notice sent to the establishment vide letter no: 1605. dt 27/11/2017 the establishment submitted that the delayed contributions made were as per the Employees' Enrollment Campaign 2017 and wherein there as a provision not to levy damages. Based on that they requested to waive the damages. However it was found that certain conditions were required to be met to get the waiver of the damages. After examining the matter it was submitted by the EO that the establishment has failed to fulfil
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all the conditions required for waiver of damages as per the Employees Enrollment Campaign 2017. Therefore for the delayed payments, interest and damages will be levied on the establishment as is levied in normal cases of delayed remittances. After that also, the establishment requested for time to submit counter reply. However even after taking sufficient opportunities the establishment failed to even appear in the case. Therefore it seems that the establishment is not interested in pursuing the case and contesting the matter."
16. Verbatim same reasons are given for fastening the liability of interest under Section 7Q of the Act which reads as under:
"In reply to the notice sent to the establishment vide letter no: 1605 dt 27/11/2017 the establishment submitted that the delayed contributions made were as per the Employees' Enrollment Campaign 2017 and wherein there as a provision not to levy damages. Based on that they requested to waive the damages, However it was found that certain conditions were required to be met to get the waiver of the damages. After examining the matter it was submitted by the EO that the establishment has failed to fulfil all the conditions required for waiver of interest as per the Employees' Enrollment Campaign 2017. Therefore for the
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delayed payments, interest and damages will be levied on the establishment as is levied in normal cases of delayed remittances. After that also, the establishment requested for time to submit counter reply. However even after taking sufficient opportunities the establishment failed to even appear in the case. Therefore it seems that the establishment is not interested in pursuing the case and contesting the matter."
17. Considering the so called reasons which are assigned to fasten the liability of damages as well as interest upon the petitioner, it is apparent that the respondent-authority has without application of mind and without considering the contents of the reply of the petitioner has passed absolutely vague orders. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Star Of Gujarat Textile Mills Limited Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ahmedabad in such circumstances has held as under:
"3. The fact remains that, apart from the sweeping statement in the summing up paragraph of the impugned proceedings, factors which have been set down as relevant to be considered while assessing the question of imposition of damages, have not been discussed at all by the 1st respondent. In the pronouncement in Organo Chemical Industries & Anr. V. Union of India & Ors., 1979 (II) LLJ 416 the Supreme Court observed:
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"xxx Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under Section 14B and the consequences that ensue therefrom, an order under Section 14B must be a 'speaking' order containing the reasons in support of it. The guidelines are provided in the act and its various provisions, particularly in the word "damages" the liability for which in Section 14B arises on the "making of default".
While fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into considerations as he has done here, various factors, viz., the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. Xxxxx"
Here, we find that, it is not a case of total omission to make the
contributions. There had been only delayed contributions. The periods are different and the days of delay are also different. A glance at the statement of damages, annexed to the impugned proceedings, shows that the day of delay range from a minimum of 7 days to a maximum of 47 days, but, a flat rate of 25% has been adopted by the 1st respondent; and certainly, we cannot commend the impugned proceedings on the ground that the application of the norms, as set down by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, referred to above, has been done. This only exposes lack of application of mind on the part of the 1st respondent. As to how the functionary under Section 14B of the Act should discharge the obligations has been expatiated by S. Natarajan, J., as he then was, of the High Court of Madras in K. A. Subramaniam v. The Commissioner, the
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Regional Provident Fund, Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry States & Anr., 1979 Labour and Industrial Cases 981, in the following terms :
"xxx The authority empowered to impose damages has to, first of all, decide whether the facts of a case warrant the imposition of damages. If his assessment of the situation results in a finding that imposition of damages is called for then he has to determine the quantum of damages with reference to relevant factors such as the loss suffered by the affected party, the hardship caused to the beneficiaries, the efforts taken by the enforcement machinery to collect the defaulted payments etc. There is, therefore, a clear line of distinction between imposition of penalty which is penal in nature and imposition of damages which is compensatory in nature. We, cannot straightway say that what has been done by the 1st respondent by the impugned proceedings does respondent by the impugned proceedings does conform to what has been recapitulated by the learned single Judge in the above pronouncement. The petitioner has been declared as sick unit and the 1st respondent declines to take note of it for any consideration on a peculiar reasoning that the concerned authority BIFR has not specifically recommended for partial or total waiver of penal damages under the Act. When we take note of these features, we have no other alternative but to interfere in writ powers.
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Accordingly, this Special Civil Application is allowed and the matter stands remitted back to the file of the 1st respondent for him to reconsider the whole question, taking note of the norms set down therefore by the pronouncements, referred to above, as well as other pronouncements throwing light on the subject."
18. It is a trite law that the reasons to be given by any authority, more particularly, a Quasi Judicial Authority are nothing but the heart of the order which is required to be considered in the order to be passed. The Honorable Supreme Court in the following decisions has emphasized the importance of giving reasons by the quasi judicial authority:
(1) In case of State of Uttaranchal Vs. Sunilkumar Singh Negi reported in 2008 (11) SCC 205 held as under:
"5) In order to find an answer whether the impugned order of the High Court is sustainable, it is relevant to refer to the assertion made by the State of Uttaranchal in their petition before the High Court. It was stated that though respondent No 1 therein was engaged as daily wager on 07.09.1987 and thereafter when the work was available, he did not work for 240 days in any calendar year. Pursuant to the award of the Labour Court dated 23.07.2001, the Horticulture Department deposited an amount of Rs.6,000/- and the workman was asked to work as daily wager in Government Food Preservation
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Centre, Pauri under the Department of Horticulture and Food Processing. He did not join the work as requested but he approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner by filing a petition and lodged a claim of Rs.92,842/-. The Assistant Labour Commissioner himself advised the workman to join place of work at Pauri. However, the worker ignored the advice of the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Thereafter, the very same officer directed the Department to pay Rs.92,842/- holding that the Department ought to have reinstated the worker at the same place where his services were terminated. In several paragraphs, the Department highlighted that the worker alone was guilty of not joining the place of work despite repeated letters sent by them as such there was no justification to award a claim of Rs.92,842/-. With these particulars and other details, the Horticulture and Food Processing Department filed a writ petition NO. 820 of 2005 before the High Court, Uttaranchal."
(2) In case of Kranti Association Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan And Others reported in 2010 (9)
SCC 496:
"15. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi- judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually
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reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970 SC 150.
16. In Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1973 SC 389, this Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord Denning in Rigina vs. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim [(1970) 2 WLR 1009] and quoted him as saying
"that heresy was scotched in Ridge and Boldwin, 1964 AC 40".
17. The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report)
18. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi- judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the `inscrutable face of a Sphinx'.
19. In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669, the question of recording reasons came up for consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such refusal, the
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transferee moved the High Court contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of Indian Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed. Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his shares which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central Government quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the Company to register the transfer. However, in passing the said order, Government did not give any reason. The company challenged the said decision before this Court."
9. In view of the above dictum of law, the impugned orders are required to be quashed ans set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondent-authority to decide the show-cause notice afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Such exercise shall be completed within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
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10. Petition is accordingly disposed of. Notice is discharged.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
JYOTI V. JANI
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