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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 16
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
  • Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
  • Act 9 of 1935
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, Section 17 of the PSCC Act, Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972
  • Section 17 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2002 INSC 16
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
  • Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
  • Act 9 of 1935
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, Section 17 of the PSCC Act, Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972
  • Section 17 of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant–landlord instituted a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Allahabad, for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction of the respondent–tenants under Section 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. On 9 August 1996 the suit was decreed ex parte; the decree directed payment of Rs 8,500 as pre-suit arrears and Rs 250 per month thereafter, and ordered eviction.

Pursuant to execution proceedings, the landlord obtained possession of the premises on 21 February 1998. Five days later, on 26 February 1998, the tenants applied under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex parte decree. Crucially, they neither deposited the decretal amount nor sought prior leave to furnish security as required by the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (PSCC Act).

The trial court rejected the application on 15 November 1998 for non-compliance with the statutory proviso. In revision, the Additional District Judge on 22 April 1999 condoned the delay, allowed the tenants to furnish security, and remitted the matter for decision on merits. The landlord’s writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution was dismissed by the High Court on 18 May 1999. The present appeal to the Supreme Court was filed by special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887—requiring deposit of the decretal amount or prior leave to furnish security at the time of presenting an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC—is mandatory.
  2. If mandatory, whether courts have any discretionary power to condone non-compliance or late compliance with that proviso.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The language of the proviso to Section 17(1) PSCC Act is peremptory; hence an application lacking the requisite deposit or prior security is incompetent and must be dismissed in limine.
  • Even assuming some scope for condonation, the tenants failed to show “sufficient cause”; possession has already changed hands, making equitable relief inappropriate.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Courts possess discretion, analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone delay in making the required deposit or furnishing security.
  • Reliance was placed on certain single-judge decisions that purportedly treat the proviso as directory.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohd. Ramzan Khan v. Khubi Khan, AIR 1938 Lah 18 Proviso to Section 17 is mandatory Relied upon to support mandatory character of the proviso
Murari Lal v. Mohammad Yasin, AIR 1939 All 46 Strict compliance with deposit requirement Cited affirmatively
Shikhani v. Bishambhar Nath, AIR 1941 Oudh 103 Non-compliance leads to dismissal Cited affirmatively
Jagdamba Prasad v. Ram Das Singh, AIR 1943 All 288 Mandatory nature of proviso Cited affirmatively
Roshan Lal v. Brij Lal Amba Lal Shah, AIR 1944 Oudh 104 Mandatory nature of proviso Cited affirmatively
Vembu Amal v. Esakkia Pillai, AIR 1949 Mad 419 Mandatory nature confirmed Cited affirmatively
Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi, AIR 1961 Ori 37 Deposit/security is a condition precedent Cited affirmatively
Dhanna v. Arjun Lal, AIR 1963 Raj 240 Mandatory character of deposit requirement Cited affirmatively
Series of Allahabad High Court decisions (1978-2000) including Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohammad Umar, Ram Chandra v. IXth ADJ, etc. Consistent view that proviso is mandatory Collectively cited to demonstrate settled position in U.P.
Surendra Nath Mittal v. Dayanand Swarup, AIR 1987 All 132 Contrary single-judge view treating proviso as directory Distinguished; not followed
Chigurupalli Suryanarayana v. Amadalavalasa Coop. Society, AIR 1975 AP 196 Discretionary interpretation Distinguished; not followed
Tarachand Hirachand Porwal v. Durappa Tavanappa Patravali, AIR 1943 Bom 237 Fact-specific; no general rule Held inapplicable

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Textual interpretation. The Court emphasized that the legislature framed the proviso in unequivocally mandatory language. The 1935 amendment, which substituted the current wording requiring a “previous application” for permission to furnish security, underscored legislative intent to tighten the requirement.

2. Purpose of Small Cause Courts. The summary jurisdiction of Small Cause Courts is designed for expeditious disposal; restricting the right to reopen ex parte decrees through a stringent deposit requirement fits that statutory scheme.

3. Consistent High Court authority. A long line of decisions from several High Courts—especially Allahabad—treat the proviso as an absolute pre-condition. The Court found this consensus persuasive and preferable to isolated contrary rulings.

4. Application to present facts. The tenants neither deposited the decretal amount nor moved any prior application for leave to furnish security when filing their Order 9 Rule 13 application. Consequently, the application was “incompetent” and could not be entertained.

5. Error by revisional and writ courts. The Additional District Judge exceeded jurisdiction in condoning non-compliance; the High Court, despite being apprised of the jurisdictional error, failed to exercise supervisory powers. Both orders were therefore set aside.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Supreme Court restored the trial court’s order dated 15 November 1998 rejecting the tenants’ application, and set aside the orders of the District Court (22 April 1999) and the High Court (18 May 1999).

Implications: The decision re-affirms that compliance with the proviso to Section 17(1) of the PSCC Act is a mandatory pre-condition for entertaining applications to set aside ex parte decrees or review judgments of Small Cause Courts. Litigants must either deposit the decretal amount or obtain prior direction to furnish security at the time of filing; failure is fatal, and courts lack discretion to condone such non-compliance. The ruling strengthens the summary and expeditious nature of Small Cause Court proceedings without creating new substantive precedent beyond this clarification.

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    Kedarnath v. Mohan Lal Kesarwari And Others

    R.C Lahoti, J.— The appellant-landlord filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and for eviction against the respondent-tenants on the ground available under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter “the U.P Urban Buildings Act” for short. A suit of the nature filed by the appellant being triable by a Court of Small Causes, as provided by the U.P Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 was filed in the Court of Small Causes, Allahabad. On 9-8-1996, the suit came to be decreed ex parte. The decree directed the respondent-tenants to pay an amount of Rs 8500 as pre-suit arrears of rent and a further amount calculated at the rate of Rs 250 per month from the date of institution of suit to the date of recovery of possession. A decree for eviction was also passed. The decree was put to execution and on 21-2-1998 the decree-holder obtained possession over the suit premises with police help. The Court Amin certified the delivery of possession to the executing court. On 26-2-1998, the respondent-tenants moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC seeking setting aside of the ex parte decree. Neither was the amount due under the decree deposited nor was an application filed seeking direction of the court to give security for the performance of the decree in lieu of depositing the decretal amount. On 14-10-1998, arguments were heard on the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The court appointed 16-10-1998 for orders.

    2. It appears that during the course of hearing the appellant decree-holder pointed out to the court that the application seeking setting aside of the ex parte decree was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed in limine for non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter “the PSCC Act” for short). On 15-10-1998, the respondent-tenants filed an application praying that they may be permitted to furnish security for payment of decretal amount. The reason assigned for failure to deposit the amount due under the decree or to furnish security along with the application seeking setting aside of the ex parte decree is somewhat oscillating. At one place it is stated that their advocate had never advised them to deposit the decretal amount as the advocate himself was not aware of the provision. Then, at another place, it is stated that the rent was already paid to the landlord decree-holder and there were no arrears required to be deposited. At yet another place it is stated that their advocate had advised them that on the application seeking setting aside of the ex parte decree being allowed and the suit being restored to file, on the first date of hearing the tenant has to deposit the rent in arrears which would be done at that stage only. Vide order dated 15-11-1998, the learned Judge, Small Causes, rejected the application filed by the respondent-tenants forming an opinion that ignorance of law was not excusable and the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC filed without complying with the proviso to Section 17 of the PSCC Act was not maintainable.

    3. The respondent-tenants preferred a revision in the Court of Additional District Judge, which was allowed. The learned Additional District Judge vide order dated 22-4-1999, condoned the delay in moving the application dated 15-10-1998 and directed the trial court to accept security as proposed and hear and decide the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC on merits. The abovesaid revisional order was put in issue by the appellant-landlord by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, which has been rejected. The landlord has filed this appeal by special leave.

    4. Mr Gourab K. Banerji, the learned counsel for the appellant has made two submissions: firstly, that the proviso to Section 17 of the Act is mandatory in its character and non-compliance therewith cannot be condoned; and secondly, assuming that the court has power to condone the delay in making the deposit or furnishing the security on the principles deducible from Section 5 of the Limitation Act, even then no sufficient cause was made out for belated offer to make compliance and inasmuch as the landlord has already secured possession of the premises, the respondent-tenants' application was liable to be rejected.

    5. It is not disputed at the Bar that such a suit as was filed by the appellant-landlord is, in the State of U.P, to be heard and disposed of by a Court of Small Causes and hence would be governed by the provisions of the PSCC Act. Section 17 thereof provides as under:

    “17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure.—(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall, save insofar as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits:
    Provided that an applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.
    (2) Where a person has become liable as surety under the proviso to sub-section (1), the security may be realized in manner provided by Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

    It is relevant to note that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 has undergone a material change through an amendment brought in by Act 9 of 1935. Earlier these were the words — “security to the satisfaction of the court for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the court may direct” which have been deleted and substituted by the present words — “such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment as the court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1935 amendment was set out as under:

    “The Act is designed to remove certain doubts which have arisen in the interpretation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. As the section stands, an applicant is required to give security to the satisfaction of the court at the time of presenting his application. It follows that, in order to ascertain what security satisfies the court, the applicant must already have made an application in that behalf. There is some doubt whether the words ‘as the court may direct’ apply to the deposit of the whole decretal amount as well as to the giving of approved security. The Act is intended to make it clear that the preliminary application to ascertain what security will satisfy the court must be made and decided before the substantive application for the order to set aside the decree, and that it always is open to the applicant to adopt the alternative course of depositing the total decretal amount. (Vide Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, 1935, Part V, p. 90).”

    6. The object behind establishing Small Cause Courts conferred with jurisdiction to try summarily such specified category of cases which need to be and are capable of being disposed of by adopting summary procedure of trial is to secure an expeditious disposal and to curtail the lengthy procedure of litigation. Excepting an order for compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences or an order imposing fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person (except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree), orders and decrees of Courts of Small Causes are not appealable: they are only revisable by the High Court (or by the District Court under Section 115 CPC as amended in its application to the State of U.P). The jurisdiction to entertain and hear an application to set aside a decree passed ex parte or for a review of judgment by Courts of Small Causes is sought to be qualified and narrowed down by imposing a condition as to deposit or giving security for performance or compliance by enacting proviso to sub-section (1). Such a provision fits in the scheme of the PSCC Act. Although there is no authoritative pronouncement by this Court (none brought to our notice) interpreting the nature and scope of the proviso however, the learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice a number of decisions delivered by the High Courts of Allahabad, Oudh, Madras, Orissa, Rajasthan and Lahore which have taken the view that the proviso is mandatory and non-compliance therewith would entail dismissal of the application because such non-compliance cannot be condoned or overlooked by the court. They are, to wit: Mohd. Ramzan Khan v. Khubi Khan AIR 1938 Lah 18, ILR 1937 Lah 728 (DB), Murari Lal v. Mohd. Yasin AIR 1939 All 46, 1938 All LJ 1078, Shikhani v. Bishambhar Nath AIR 1941 Oudh 103, 1940 OWN 1190, Jagdamba Prasad v. Ram Das Singh AIR 1943 All 288, 1943 All LJ 241, Roshan Lal v. Brij Lal Amba Lal Shah AIR 1944 Oudh 104, 1943 OWN 486, Vembu Amal v. Esakkia Pillai AIR 1949 Mad 419, (1949) 1 MLJ 71, Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi AIR 1961 Ori 37, ILR 1960 Cut 481 and Dhanna v. Arjun Lal AIR 1963 Raj 240, 1963 Raj LW 571. As the present case arises from the State of Uttar Pradesh, the learned counsel for the appellant cited a series of decisions delivered by the Allahabad High Court so as to show the view of the law being consistently taken there. These are: Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohd. Umar 1978 All LJ 738, 1978 All LR 541, Sharif v. Suresh Chand 1979 AWC 256, Roop Basant v. Durga Prasad (1983) 1 ARC 565, Mohd. Islam v. Faqir Mohd. (1985) 1 ARC 54, Krishna Chandra Seth v. Dr K.P Agarwal (1988) 1 ARC 310, Mamta Sharma v. Hari Shankar Srivastava (1988) 1 ARC 341, Mohd. Yasin v. Jai Prakash (1988) 2 ARC 575, Purshottam v. Special Addl. Sessions Judge, Mathura (1991) 2 ARC 129, Ram Chandra v. IXth ADJ, Varanasi AIR 1991 All 223, Sagir Khan v. District Judge, Farrukhabad (1996) 27 All LR 540, Mohd. Nasem v. Third ADJ, Faizabad AIR 1998 All 125, 1998 All LJ 760 and Beena Khare v. VIIIth ADJ, Allahabad (2000) 2 ARC 616.

    7. The learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice Surendra Nath Mittal v. Dayanand Swarup AIR 1987 All 132, (1985) 2 ARC 517, Chigurupalli Suryanarayana v. Amadalavalasa Coop. Agricultural Industrial Society Ltd. AIR 1975 AP 196, (1975) 1 Andh WR 129 and Tarachand Hirachand Porwal v. Durappa Tavanappa Patravali AIR 1943 Bom 237. All the three decisions are Single Bench decisions. Suffice it to observe that the first two decisions are more or less ad hoc decisions which do not notice other decisions and the general trend of judicial opinion. The view propounded therein does not appeal to us. The Bombay decision does not lay down any general proposition of law and proceeds on its own facts.

    8. A bare reading of the provision shows that the legislature has chosen to couch the language of the proviso in a mandatory form and we see no reason to interpret, construe and hold the nature of the proviso as directory. An application seeking to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Court of Small Causes or for a review of its judgment must be accompanied by a deposit in the court of the amount due from the applicant under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment. The provision as to deposit can be dispensed with by the court in its discretion subject to a previous application by the applicant seeking direction of the court for leave to furnish security and the nature thereof. The proviso does not provide for the extent of time by which such application for dispensation may be filed. We think that it may be filed at any time up to the time of presentation of application for setting aside ex parte decree or for review and the court may treat it as a previous application. The obligation of the applicant is to move a previous application for dispensation. It is then for the court to make a prompt order. The delay on the part of the court in passing an appropriate order would not be held against the applicant because none can be made to suffer for the fault of the court.

    9. In the case at hand, the application for setting aside ex parte decree was not accompanied by deposit in the court of the amount due and payable by the applicant under the decree. The applicant also did not move any application for dispensing with deposit and seeking leave of the court for furnishing such security for the performance of the decree as the court may have directed. The application for setting aside the decree was therefore incompetent. It could not have been entertained and allowed.

    10. The trial court was therefore right in rejecting the application. The District Judge in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could not have interfered with the order of the trial court. The illegality in exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court disposing of the revision petition was brought to notice of the High Court and it was a fit case where the High Court ought to have in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction set aside the order of the District Court by holding the application filed by the respondents as incompetent and hence not entertainable. We need not examine the other question whether a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in moving the application for leave of the court to furnish security for performance was made out or not and whether such an application moved at a highly belated stage and hence not being a “previous application” was at all entertainable or not.

    11. The appeal is allowed. The impugned orders of the District Court and the High Court dated 22-4-1999 and 18-5-1999 respectively are set aside and the order of the trial court dated 15-11-1998 is restored. No order as to the costs.

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    Kedarnath v. Mohan Lal Kesarwari And Others
    (Jan 10, 2002)