AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 3(a) of the Act, Section 3(n) of the Act
  • Section 31 of the Act, Part V (including Section 21) of the Act
  • The Act
  • various statutes
  • Section 2(a) of the Act
  • Section 31 of the K.R.C Act
  • Section 3(a)(y) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 3(a)(y)(3) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 3(a)(y) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961
  • Section 2(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
1996 INSC 12
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 3(a) of the Act, Section 3(n) of the Act
  • Section 31 of the Act, Part V (including Section 21) of the Act
  • The Act
  • various statutes
  • Section 2(a) of the Act
  • Section 31 of the K.R.C Act
  • Section 3(a)(y) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 3(a)(y)(3) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Section 3(a)(y) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955
  • Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961
  • Section 2(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns “Opera House,” a cinema theatre located on Brigade Road, Bangalore. Ownership of the property changed several times beginning with its lease by Mrs. Evelyn Elizabeth Holland Smith to one R. Phul Chand. In 1939 the property, inclusive of furniture, fixtures, fittings and machinery, was sold to Shri C. S. Krishnaiah Chetty (3/8 share) and his wife Smt. Rangamma (5/8 share).

In 1944 Chetty and Rangamma leased the fully-equipped theatre to Shri S. V. Govindrajan. Following Govindrajan’s death in 1955, the leasehold interest passed to his heirs—the present appellants—who periodically executed fresh lease deeds with the landlords. The leases consistently demised the building together with furniture, fittings and some machinery; however, projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers were always supplied by the tenants themselves.

After successive assignments of the landlords’ shares, respondents 1 & 2 came to own the building and fittings, while respondents 3–5 owned the furniture. The final written leases expired on 30-11-1978. When the appellants did not vacate, respondents 1-5 filed O.S. No. 409 of 1980 before the IV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, seeking eviction.

The suit was originally framed on the footing that Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 excluded premises with rent exceeding ₹500 per month from the Act’s protection. While the suit was pending, Section 31 was struck down in H. Padmanabha Rao v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1986 Kar 2480). The appellants thereupon amended their written statement to invoke the Act’s protection, leading the trial court to frame an additional issue on its maintainability.

The trial court decreed eviction on 7-1-1989, holding that the demise was a composite lease of a running cinema theatre and therefore outside the Act. The Karnataka High Court affirmed this view on 22-4-1994 (RFA No. 80 of 1989). The tenants obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a lease of a cinema theatre building together with furniture, fittings and some equipment—but without projectors and certain other apparatus—constitutes a lease of a “building” within Section 3(a) read with Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
  2. If the lease is so covered, whether the tenant is entitled to the protection against eviction under Section 21 of the Act, thereby ousting the civil court’s jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The dominant purpose of the lease was the building itself; furniture and fittings were merely incidental and intended for its beneficial enjoyment.
  • Rental apportionment (₹2,750 for the building vs. ₹500–1,000 for furniture) demonstrated that the building was the primary subject-matter.
  • Relied on Anant Narayanrao Gadre v. Gomtibai (AIR 1983 MP 72) where a similar lease was held to fall within rent-control protection.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The premises had always been used as a cinema and earlier leases reflected an intention to let out a ready-to-run theatre.
  • The lease of furniture was not an independent transaction; building and movables formed one composite demise whose dominant object was running a cinema.
  • Absence of some equipment did not alter the essential character of the lease.
  • Relied on Supreme Court rulings in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf to contend that such composite leases lie outside rent-control statutes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H. Padmanabha Rao v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1986 Kar 2480) Struck down Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Eliminated the earlier statutory exemption based on rent amount, compelling examination of whether the lease fell within “premises” under the Act.
Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani (AIR 1965 SC 716) Adopted “dominant intention” test to determine whether a composite lease is primarily of a building or of business equipment. Supreme Court applied the same test to assess whether the Opera House lease was primarily of the building.
Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976 1 SCC 128) Reiterated that a lease of a cinema with expensive equipment, where equipment predominates, lies outside rent-control statutes. Cited as comparative authority; Court distinguished present facts on the ground that major equipment was excluded and rent apportionment favoured the building.
Anant Narayanrao Gadre v. Gomtibai (AIR 1983 MP 72) Held that lease of a cinema building with furniture and fittings but without projector is within rent-control protection. Relied upon by appellants; Supreme Court found the reasoning in line with its own conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reiterated that the test established in Uttamchand and Dwarka Prasad—the “dominant intention of the parties”—governs whether a composite demise is a lease of a building under rent-control legislation.

Key considerations applied:

  • Subject-matter of the demise: Building, fittings, furniture and some equipment were included, but core projection apparatus was excluded.
  • Apportionment of rent: The rent for the building was approximately twice the hire for furniture and equipment, indicating the building was the principal component.
  • Nature of equipment: Without projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers, the premises could not operate as a “fully equipped” cinema; thus the lease could not be characterised as one of a running cinema business.

From these factors the Court concluded that the building qua building was the dominant subject of the lease, with movables passing only incidentally. Consequently, the demise fell within the definition of “building” in Section 3(a) and “premises” in Section 3(n) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The appellants were therefore entitled to statutory protection, and eviction could occur only through proceedings under the Act before the competent authority.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of both the trial court and the Karnataka High Court, and dismissed the landlords’ eviction suit for want of jurisdiction. The immediate effect is that the appellants continue in possession and may only be evicted under proceedings compliant with the Karnataka Rent Control Act. The decision reinforces the “dominant intention” test for distinguishing between leases of buildings and leases of business undertakings under rent-control statutes; however, it does not announce a new legal principle beyond applying established precedent to the facts.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    B.G Kumaravelu And Another v. K.R Kanakarathnam Chetty And Others

    S.C Agrawal, J.—Special leave granted.

    2. The question that falls for consideration in this appeal arising out of a suit for eviction of the appellant-tenants is whether a lease of a building with fittings and furniture for running a cinema theatre falls within the purview of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and the tenant is entitled to avail of the protection against eviction available under Section 21 of the Act.

    3. A cinema theatre known as “Opera House” bearing No. 24 (Old) (New No. 57) 101, Brigade Road, Civil Station, Bangalore belonged to Mr T.C.W Skipp. After the death of Mr Skipp on 10-11-1934, Mrs Evelyn Elizabeth Holland Smith (nee Skipp), one of his heirs, obtained the letters of administration in respect of the properties of Mr Skipp, including the “Opera House”, and she leased out the said property to one R. Phul Chand. Mrs Evelyn Elizabeth Holland Smith (nee Skipp) along with other heirs of Mr Skipp sold the said property including furnitures, fixtures, fittings and machinery free of all encumbrances, except the leasehold rights of R. Phul Chand, to Shri C.S Krishnaiah Chetty and his wife, Smt Rangamma under a sale deed dated 20-7-1939. Shri C.S Krishnaiah Chetty had 3/8th share in the property while Smt Rangamma had 5/8th share in the said property. By lease deed dated 29-9-1944 C.S Krishnaiah Chetty and Smt Rangamma leased out the premises of the “Opera House” including fittings, furnitures, machineries etc. to Shri Rao Sahib S.V Govindrajan, the father of the appellants herein. Under the said lease deed the rent was Rs 800 per month and the hire for furnitures etc. was Rs 300. The said lease was for a period of 69 months and it expired on 29-6-1950. Thereafter Shri Govindrajan became a tenant holding over and the landlords were receiving the rents from him. After the death of Shri Govindrajan in 1955, there was a family partition vide deed dated 15-7-1957 and the leasehold interest in the suit property was allotted to the appellants and the appellants were treated as tenants holding over by the landlords. Smt Rangamma died on 17-8-1958 and after her death Shri C.S Krishnaiah Chetty, as sole executor (as per her last will), sold her 5/8th share in the property to his son-in-law Shri K.R Kanakarathnam Chetty, Respondent 1 herein, by sale deed dated 16-11-1959. On the same day Shri C.S Krishnaiah Chetty sold his own 3/8th share in the said property to his daughter, Smt K. Yasodamma, Respondent 2 herein. On the same day there was attornment of tenancy by the appellants in favour of Respondents 1 and 2. On 30-11-1959 the appellants executed a lease deed in favour of Respondents 1 and 2 in respect of the building as well as furniture and fittings and all articles including machinery etc. The said lease was for a period of two years. The appellants continued to be tenants by executing from time to time lease deeds in favour of Respondents 1 and 2. Lease deed dated 6-1-1962 was executed for a period of 55 months from 1-12-1961. Under the said lease the rent was Rs 950 per month and the hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs 550 per month. This lease was followed by lease deed dated 11-8-1966 for a further period of 55 months from 1-7-1966. Under this lease deed the rent was Rs 1300 per month and hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs 700 per month. After the expiry of the said lease, the appellants executed two separate lease deeds dated 28-1-1971, one in favour of Respondent 1 and the other in favour of Respondent 2. Both the lease deeds were for a period of 55 months from 1-2-1971. Under the lease deed executed in favour of Respondent 1 the monthly rent was Rs 937.50 and the hire of furniture and machinery etc. was Rs 468.75 per month. Under the lease deed executed in favour of Respondent 2 the said amounts were Rs 562.50 and Rs 281.25 respectively. On 1-10-1975 the appellants executed a lease deed in favour of Respondent 1 in respect of his 5/8th share in the suit property whereunder the monthly rent was Rs 1750 and a lease deed was executed in favour of Respondent 2 on 27-9-1975 in respect of his 3/8th share whereunder the monthly rent was Rs 1000. Both these leases were in respect of the theatre with machineries and fixtures. As regards the furniture it appears that Respondent 2 had made a gift of her share of the furniture to her son Ramakrishnan, Respondent 3 herein, and Respondent 1 had made a gift of his share of furniture to his daughters, Smt Uma Devi, Respondent 4 herein, and Smt Rajeshwari Gupta, Respondent 5 herein, in equal shares. On 10-10-1975 three separate lease agreements were executed by the appellants in favour of Respondents 3, 4 and 5. Under the lease agreement executed in favour of Respondent 3, the rent was Rs 200 per month whereas under the lease agreements executed in favour of Respondents 4 and 5 the monthly rent payable to each of them was Rs 150. All the leases were for a period expiring on 31-8-1978. By an agreement dated 9-9-1978 the leases were extended for a period of three months till 30-11-1978. On failure on the part of the appellants to hand over the possession on the expiry of the leases on 30-11-1978, Respondents 1 to 5 filed the suit giving rise to this appeal in the Court of Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City.

    4. The suit was originally filed on the basis that under Section 31 of the Act, the provisions contained in Part V (including Section 21) of the Act were not applicable to a non-residential building, the monthly rent of which exceeded Rs 500 or the annual rental value of which exceeded Rs 6000. It was claimed that the rent in respect of the suit premises exceeded Rs 500 per month and the provisions of the Act did not apply to the leases in question. During the pendency of the suit, Section 31 of the Act was struck down by the Karnataka High Court in H. Padmanabha Rao v. State of Karnataka ILR 1986 Kar 2480. After the said decision, the appellants amended their written statement on 25-6-1988 raising the plea that the provisions of the Act covered the lease in question and the suit was not maintainable and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In view of the said amendment in the written statement, the plaintiff-respondents were permitted to file a reply by way of rejoinder. In the rejoinder, the plaintiff-respondents pleaded that the lease was of a well-equipped permanent cinema theatre with all the equipments, namely, machineries, fixtures, furniture and fittings etc. and was not a lease of mere ordinary tenancy of a building, and, therefore, the provisions of the Act were not attracted. In the light of the said plea, the following additional issue was framed by the trial court:

    “Is the suit not maintainable in view of Section 31 of the K.R.C Act was struck down and this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?”

    5. The IV Additional City Civil Judge, by his judgment dated 7-1-1989, decreed the suit and directed the appellants to deliver vacant possession of the Opera House building, furniture, fittings, machinery fittings, fixtures etc. It was, however, found that the projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers were not the property of the plaintiffs as claimed by them and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents in respect of the said properties. The trial court has held that though the plaintiffs have not alleged in the plaint, that it was a composite lease of a running cinema theatre but from a reading of the plaint, in entirety, it is clear that the plaintiffs have leased out the cinema theatre as a running concern. The trial court has held that Phul Chand had taken the premises to run it as a cinema theatre and thereafter the father of the appellants and, after his death, the appellants have continued to be the lessees of the cinema theatre as such but not the building or the furniture and that a fully equipped cinema theatre was leased in favour of the appellants and that they also had taken the cinema theatre as a running concern, and, therefore, the suit was maintainable even though Section 31 of the Act had been struck down.

    6. The High Court, on appeal, has affirmed the said judgment of the IV Additional City Civil Judge. The High Court has upheld the finding recorded by the trial court that the lease did not include the projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers. The High Court, however, held that the dominant purpose of the lease was to run a cinema business in the building with the furniture, machinery and equipment provided therein and that in fact the lease is a composite lease of the building with furniture, fittings, machineries and equipments for running a cinema theatre and the lease was outside the purview of the Act and the same does not come under the provisions of the Act. In coming to the said conclusion, the High Court has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Uttamchand v. S.M Lalwani AIR 1965 SC 716, 1965 MPLJ 594 and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128, (1976) 1 SCR 277. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Anant Gadre v. Gomtibai AIR 1983 MP 72, 1983 MPLJ 13 was held to be inapplicable in the facts of this case.

    7. Before we proceed to deal with the submissions of the learned counsel, it would be necessary to refer to the definition of the expression ‘premises’ and ‘building’ as contained in the Act. ‘Premises’ is defined in Section 3(n) of the Act in the following terms:

    “(n) ‘premises’ means —

    (i) a building as defined in clause (a);
    (ii) any land not used for agricultural purposes;”

    The expression ‘building’ is defined in Section 3(a) of the Act as follows:

    “(a) ‘building’ means any building or hut or part of a building or hut other than a farmhouse, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes—
    (i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut or part of building or hut;
    (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for the use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut;
    (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or a lodging house.”

    8. The definition of ‘building’ in Section 3(a) of the Act is similar to the definition of the expression ‘accommodation’ in Section 3(a)(y) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 and Section 2(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.

    9. In Uttamchand v. S.M Lalwani AIR 1965 SC 716, 1965 MPLJ 594 this Court has dealt with the question whether the lease in respect of a Dal Mill building with fixed machinery could be said to be a lease of ‘accommodation’ within the meaning of Section 3(a)(y) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955. It was urged that the lease was of the Dal Mill building and that the machinery came under the lease was incidentally as having been fixed in the said building. It was submitted that the Court must apply the test of the dominant intention of the parties. Construing the lease deed by applying the test of the dominant intention of the parties, the Court held that though the document purported to be a lease in respect of the Dal Mill building the said description was not decisive of the matter and that it was not a case where the subject-matter of the lease was the building and along with the leased building incidentally passes the fixture of the machinery in regard to the Mill and that in truth it was the Mill which was the subject-matter of the lease, and it was because the Mill was intended to be let out that the building had inevitably to be let out along with the Mill. In that context, this Court has held that the fixtures in the schedule to the lease are in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building and that the fixtures are the primary objects which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. It was, therefore, held that it was a case where the tenant had entered into the lease for the purpose of running of the Dal Mill which was located in the building and that a Mill of this kind would have to be located in some building or another, and so, the mere fact that the lease purported to be in respect of the building would not make it a lease in respect of an accommodation as defined in Section 3(a)(y)(3) of the M.P Accommodation Control Act, 1955.

    10. In Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128, (1976) 1 SCR 277, the question which came up for consideration before this Court was whether a cinema theatre equipped with projectors and other fittings and ready to be launched as an entertainment house was an accommodation as defined in Section 2(1)(a) of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. As indicated by the Court, the core of the controversy was whether the lease was of the building, the fittings and the fixtures merely making for the beneficial enjoyment of and ancillary to the building, as urged by the tenant, or whether the building provided a bare, though appropriately designed, enclosure to have an enterprise, the dominant purpose or real subject of the lease being the cinema, apparatus and fittings, including subsidiarily and incidentally, though necessarily, the structure of brick and mortar. The Court held that the lease of an ‘accommodation’ must essentially be of a building — not a business or industry together with the building in which it is situated. Referring to the amenities which may be provided in the building by the landlord to see that the tenants' enjoyment of the tenement may be more attractive, viz., furniture and fittings, it was observed that the crucial point is that these additions are appurtenant, subservient and beneficial to the buildings itself and they make the occupation of the building more convenient and pleasant but the principal thing demised is the building and the additives are auxiliary and that whether the lease is composite and has a plurality of purposes, the decisive test is the dominant purpose of the demise. In that case the rent for the building was Rs 400 per month and the rent for the projector and all other items fixed in the building was Rs 1000 per month and the commencement of the lease was to synchronize with the inaugural cinema show on 25-3-1953. In the light of these facts it has been held:

    “In the present case we have to visualize what was the dominant or decisive component of the transaction between the parties, the tenancy of the building qua building or the taking over of a cinema house as a business, the projectors, furniture, fitting and annexes being the moving factor, the building itself playing a secondary, though necessary, role in the calculations of the parties. Going by the rental apportioned, it is obvious that the parties stressed the cinema equipment as by far the more important. Judging by the fact that there had already been a cinema in this house for several years, with the necessary certificates under the various statutes for running a cinema theatre obtained by the landlord and that the lease itself was to commence only from the date of the first show of the films, doubts regarding the essential object and subject of the bargain stand dispelled. (SCR pp. 283-84)
    In the case before us the fixtures are not for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. On the contrary, the possession of the building is made over as an integral part of, and incidental to, the making over of the cinema apparatus and costly appliances. In the language of the learned Chief Justice in Uttamchand case AIR 1965 SC 716, 1965 MPLJ 594, the ‘fixtures’ are the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. (SCR p. 287)
    A lease of a lucrative theatre with expensive cinema equipment, which latter pressed the lessee to go into the transaction, cannot reasonably be reduced into a mere tenancy of a building together with fittings which but make the user more comfortable. (SCR pp. 289-90)”

    11. Shri P.P Rao, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, has urged that adopting the dominant test laid down by this Court in Uttamchand v. S.M Lalwani AIR 1965 SC 716, 1965 MPLJ 594 and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128, (1976) 1 SCR 277 the lease in the present case is primarily a lease for the building and the fittings and furnitures etc. are incidental to the building which was meant to be used as a cinema theatre and, therefore, the lease is for a ‘building’ as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act. In this regard Shri Rao has laid emphasis on the fact that projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers were not part of the equipment that was leased out and that the said equipment has to be provided by the appellants and, therefore, that it was not a lease in respect of the business of a cinema theatre or for running a cinema theatre. The submission is that furniture, fittings and other equipment which was leased out along with the building was for the beneficial enjoyment of the building which had been constructed for being used as a cinema theatre and the said furniture, fittings and equipment were incidental and not the dominant purpose of the lease and that the dominant purpose of the lease was the building which was to be used as a cinema theatre. Shri Rao has also submitted that in the present case the furniture was owned by Respondents 3, 4 and 5 while the building, fittings and the equipment were owned by Respondents 1 and 2. Moreover, Shri Rao has pointed out that as per the terms of the lease the rent for the building payable to Respondents 1 and 2 was Rs 2750 per month and rent for the furniture that was payable to Respondents 4 and 5 was Rs 500 per month which was later on raised to Rs 1000 per month. Shri Rao has placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Anant Gadre v. Gomtibai AIR 1983 MP 72, 1983 MPLJ 13 where the lease was of a cinema building with the furniture, fans and other fittings but without projector or the machinery for exhibition of films and it was held that the dominant intention was to lease out the building with furniture and fittings and not to let out the cinema business. Shri Rao has urged that in the impugned judgment the High Court was in error in holding that the said case was not applicable in the facts of this case.

    12. Shri Harish N. Salve, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents, has submitted that the purpose of the lease was to run a cinema which was already running in the premises and in this regard he has invited our attention to the earlier leases granted in favour of Phul Chand and Govindrajan as well as the appellants. The submission of Shri Salve is that the lease for furniture was not an independent transaction and that the High Court has rightly held that the dominant intention was to grant the lease for running a cinema theatre. Shri Salve's contention is that the mere fact that some equipments were not leased out would not alter the nature of the lease.

    13. Though there are separate lease deeds executed by Respondents 1 and 2 in respect of their respective shares in the premises and separate lease deeds have been executed by Respondents 3 to 5 for the furniture but having regard to the leases executed earlier, we will treat all of them as part of a single lease for the building, fittings and equipment and furniture.

    14. In view of the decisions of this Court in Uttamchand v. S.M Lalwani AIR 1965 SC 716, 1965 MPLJ 594 and Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf (1976) 1 SCC 128, (1976) 1 SCR 277 for the purpose of determining whether the lease in the present case is in respect of a ‘building’ under Section 3(a) of the Act so as to fall within the ambit of expression ‘premises’ as defined in Section 3(n) of the Act, we have to apply the test of the dominant intention of the parties. It is, therefore, necessary to find out what is the dominant purpose of the demise. The property covered by the lease is the cinema building, fittings and furniture and some equipment. The projectors, amplifiers, screen and speakers are, however, not included in the demise. In the lease deeds that were executed from time to time since 1944 the rent for the building and fittings and the hire for furniture and machinery etc. has been apportioned and that rent for the building is much more than the hire for furniture and machinery etc., the ratio being 2:1 approximately. It cannot, therefore, be said that cinema equipment is more important part of the demise than the building. Having regard to the apportionment of the rent for the building and the furniture and equipments it can be said that the dominant purpose of the demise is the building qua building and the fittings and other equipment only incidentally pass with the building which has been constructed for being used as a cinema theatre. This is not a case where it can be said that the fittings and the equipment are the primary objects which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which they are located comes in incidentally. It must, therefore, be held that the dominant intention of the parties was to let out the building for being used as a cinema theatre and it cannot be said that the dominant intention was to let out the fittings, furnitures and equipment and the building playing a subsidiary role only. Moreover, in the absence of the projectors, amplifiers, screen and the speakers, which are the major part of the equipment required for exhibition of films it cannot be said that the lease was of a running cinema business or of a fully equipped running cinema theatre. On that view of the matter there is no escape from the conclusion that the lease in favour of the appellants is of a ‘building’ as defined in Section 3(a) of the Act and it falls within the ambit of the expression ‘premises’ as defined in Section 3(n) of the Act. This would mean that the appellants are entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Act in the matter of eviction and they can be evicted only in accordance with the provisions of the Act in proceedings initiated before the appropriate forums.

    15. Since we are of the opinion that the lease was primarily of a ‘building’ falling under Section 3(a) of the Act and the appellants are entitled to the protection of the Act in the matter of eviction, it must be held that the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for the eviction of the appellants in the civil court was not maintainable. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 22-4-1994 in Regular First Appeal No. 80 of 1989 as well as the judgment and decree of the IV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore City dated 7-1-1989 in Original Suit No. 409 of 1980 are set aside and the said suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents for the eviction of the appellants is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    B.G Kumaravelu And Another v. K.R Kanakarathnam Chetty And Others
    (Jan 3, 1996)