Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

S.A.O No. 17 of 1978

Advocates

For the Petitioner: Mr. P.P Juneja with Mr. Sodhi Teja Singh, Advocate.
Miss Anjna Kalia, Advocate.

Judges

SULTAN SINGH, J.

Acts

SECTION 39 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958

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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Sultan Singh, J. (Second Appeal under Section 39, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958)

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (appellant) inducted the respondent as tenant of house No. 49, Block ‘A’, Lajpat Nagar I, New Delhi, on 1 August 1970 at a rent of Rs. 250 per month. On 20 May 1974 the appellant filed an application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming that the premises were required bona fide for his own residence and that he and his family had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

The Additional Rent Controller allowed the eviction application and passed an order of eviction on 3 April 1976. On appeal the Rent Control Tribunal reversed that order by judgment dated 7 November 1977 and dismissed the eviction application. The present matter is the landlord's second appeal under Section 39 of the Act against the Rent Control Tribunal's order.

Relevant factual detail on the record: the appellant had been residing on the ground floor of a property at Plot No. S-191, Greater Kailash, New Delhi, which is admitted to belong to the appellant's daughter-in-law. The Tribunal found the appellant to be in possession of that ground-floor accommodation and noted that the daughter-in-law was not produced as a witness. The daughter-in-law and the appellant's son were, according to the opinion, settled in Bangkok and were pressing the appellant to vacate their property.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the accommodation in which the appellant was residing (the ground floor at Plot No. S-191 belonging to his daughter-in-law) constitutes "other reasonably suitable residential accommodation" for the appellant within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Whether the requirements of Section 14(1)(e) — ownership, residential letting, bona fide requirement and absence of other reasonably suitable residential accommodation — are satisfied so as to entitle the appellant to an eviction order against the respondent.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant asserted a bona fide need to occupy the suit premises for himself and his family and contended that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation in which he had a legal right to continue to reside.
The appellant maintained that continuing to reside in the daughter-in-law's house was inconsistent with his self-respect and circumstances after being asked to vacate.

Respondent's Arguments

The respondent contested the eviction application on various grounds (the opinion describes those as "various grounds" but does not detail them).
The learned counsel for the respondent specifically contended that three letters alleged to have been written by the daughter-in-law from Bangkok asking the appellant to vacate had not been proved in accordance with law.
The respondent argued (as recorded) that the appellant was suitably and comfortably accommodated in the daughter-in-law's house and that this accommodation negated his need for the suit premises.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Smt. Basi Devi v. Faqir Chand (1971, The Punjab Law Reporter, Delhi Section, page 19)	Explication that the clause "landlord does not have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation" implies three essentials: (1) the landlord must have a legal right to reside in the accommodation, (2) the accommodation must be in fact available for occupation, and (3) the accommodation must be reasonably suitable for the landlord.	The court adopted these three criteria and applied them to find that the appellant lacked a legal right to reside in the daughter-in-law's house; hence that accommodation could not be treated as "reasonably suitable residential accommodation".
Pitamber Jethwani and others v. Chaman Lal Narula and another (S.A.O No. 271 of 1972, decided 29 March 1974)	Held that a landlord residing in the house of his mother-in-law had no legal right to continue in occupation which he could enforce; permissive occupation, even if long continued, does not confer an enforceable right.	The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that permissive occupation (occupation at the mercy of the owner) does not amount to a legally enforceable right and so cannot be treated as "other reasonably suitable residential accommodation".
Shri Parkash Chandra v. Shri Nirpendra Kumar Aggarwal (1971, All India Rent Control Journal, page 474)	Held that a son residing in the house of his father had no right to stay and that the son's occupation did not negate the landlord's entitlement to eviction from his own property.	The court used the principle to reinforce that personal/permissive occupancy in another's property (here the daughter-in-law's) does not defeat the landlord's claim to his own premises under Section 14(1)(e).
Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1059)	The Supreme Court observed that where premises (e.g., Truth Bungalow) were in occupation of a person on leave and licence, such occupation was not available to the appellant and therefore could not be taken into account to negate the appellant's need for other premises.	The court applied this Supreme Court observation to conclude that the appellant's occupation of the daughter-in-law's house on a permissive/leave-and-licence basis could not be treated as available accommodation to defeat his bona fide need for the suit premises.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by outlining the statutory requirements of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act: to obtain eviction the landlord must prove (a) ownership of the premises, (b) that the premises were let for residential purposes, (c) a bona fide requirement for occupation by the landlord or dependent family members, and (d) that the landlord (or person for whose benefit the premises are held) has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The court observed that the last two elements are interdependent: the existence of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation may negatethe bona fides of the requirement, and the absence of such accommodation tends to show bona fides.

The court then analysed the phrase "landlord does not have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation" by adopting the three essential requirements stated in preceding authority: (1) a legal right to reside in the alternative accommodation, (2) actual availability of that accommodation for occupation, and (3) reasonable suitability of that accommodation for the landlord's needs.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that although the appellant had been residing in the daughter-in-law's house at Plot No. S-191, he had no legal right to remain there; his occupation was permissive and at the mercy of the daughter-in-law (and the son). The Tribunal's finding that the appellant was "in possession" of the ground floor was held to be erroneous in legal effect because possession arising from permissive occupation does not confer a legally enforceable right to continue living there. The court noted authorities holding that permissive or leave-and-licence occupation cannot be treated as available accommodation for negating need.

The court addressed the respondent's contention about non-proof of the letters from the daughter-in-law but nevertheless accepted on the record that the appellant had been asked to vacate and that it was proper for the appellant to consider it unbecoming to continue residing in premises belonging to his daughter-in-law. The court also observed there was no suggestion that the appellant's requirement was mala fide.

On that basis the court concluded that the accommodation in the daughter-in-law's property was not a "reasonably suitable residential accommodation" because the appellant lacked a legal right to continue occupation. Accordingly, the Tribunal erred in treating that accommodation as negating the appellant's need for the suit premises.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is accepted. The judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 7 November 1977 is set aside, and the judgment and order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 3 April 1976, which granted eviction in favour of the appellant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, is restored.

Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the court):

The respondent is granted two months' time to vacate the premises provided that, within one week, he files an affidavit in this Court undertaking to vacate the entire suit premises and deliver vacant possession to the appellant within two months from the date of the judgment.
The affidavit must state that the respondent and his family members alone are in occupation and that nobody else is in occupation. If the affidavit containing the undertaking is filed as required, the order of eviction will not be executable for the two-month period granted.
No order as to costs was made by the court.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established authority on permissive occupation and the meaning of "reasonably suitable residential accommodation" under Section 14(1)(e); the court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying earlier precedents to the facts.

Show full summary ...

Gurbachan Singh /Tenant v. Raj Paul /Landlord.

Sultan Singh, J.:— This second appeal on behalf of the landlord under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (nereinafter called ‘the Act’) is directed against the judgment and order dated 7th November, 1977 of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, reversing the judgment and order dated 3rd April, 1976 of the Additional Rent Controller and finally dismissing the appellant's application for eviction of the respondent under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. The appellant inducted the respondent as a tenant in his house No. 49, Block No. ‘A’, Lajpat Nagar Ist, New Delhi, on 1st August, 1970, at Rs. 250/- per month. He filed an eviction application, out of which this second appeal has arisen on 20th May, 1974. The ground of eviction is worded as follows:—

“That the premises in suit were let to the respondent-tenant for residential purposes and the same are required bona fide by the petitioner-landlord for occupation as residence for himself and for other members of his family dependent on him. The petitioner-landlord is the owner of the premises. The petitioner has four members of his family. He has been living in the house which belongs to his daughter-in-law. On account of some family dispute the daughter-in-law, who is the owner of the premises in which he is residing is pressing hard the petitioner to vacate the said premises and it is inconsistent with the self-respect and circumstance of the petitioner to continue to reside in the premises in which he is residing which belongs to his daughter-in-law. As such, the petitioner has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The petitioner or any of his family member does not own nor are they in occupation of any other residential accommodation.”

The respondent contested the eviction application on various grounds but the Additional Rent Controller, as already stated, passed an order of eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act holding that the appellant is the owner of the suit premises, that the premises were let for residential purposes, that he bona fide requires the suit premises for his own residence and that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. On appeal, the Rent Control Tribuual held that the appellant was the owner of the suit premises and that the premises were let for residential purposes. The Tribunal however, held that the appellant was in possession of the ground floor of the property at Plot NO. S-191, Greater Kailash, New Delhi, which house is admittedly owned by the daughter-in-law of the appellant. The Tribunal was of the view that there were no circumstances which prompted the appellant to seek eviction of the respondent and that there was no plea that the accommodation with the appellant on Plot No. S. 191 was not otherwise suitable for his requirement and for his family.

The short question in this case is whether the accommodation with the appellant and his family on the ground floor of the property at Plot No. S-191, Greater Kailash, New Delhi, is not a reasonably suitable residential accommodation with the appellant. It is proved on record that this property belongs to the daughter-in-law of the appellant. The appellant has, no doubt, been residing in this property but it seems to me that he has no right to continue to reside there. He is at the mercy of his daughter-in-law. The daughter-in-law and the son of the appellant are settled in Bangkok but they do not want the appellant to continue to reside in their property. The Tribunal further observed that the daughter-in-law has not been produced as a witness and therefore it could not be held that the appellant was not in possession of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

Section 14(1)(e) of the Act reads as follows:

“14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely;—

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, “premises let for residential purposes” include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purpose;”

To obtain an order of eviction the landlord has to prove that he is the owner, that the premises were let for residential purposes, that he bona fide requires the premises and that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The last two ingredients are inter-dependent. If a landlord has a reasonably suitable residential accommodation, it may be held that his requirement is not bona fide but if the landlord is not in possession of the reasonably suitable residential accommodation, his requirement would be held to be bona fide. The question is: what is meant by the words “landlord does not have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation”. It seems to me that if a landlord has no right to remain in occupation of the existing premises, it cannot be said that he has a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. The said clause implies three essential things: (1) the landlord must have a legal right to reside in the said accommodation, (2) the residential accommodation must be, in fact, available for occupation and (3) the same must be reasonably suitable for the landlord. (see Smt. Basi Devi v. Faqir Chand: (1971 The Punjab Law Reporter, Delhi Section, page 19). The first proposition, as mentioned above, shows that the landlord must have a legal right and if he has no legal right, the availability of the accommodation at the mercy of somebody else cannot be held to be a suitable accommodation. If the landlord resides in the premises of others on leave and licence basis, it cannot be said that he has a reasonably suitable accommodation. In Pitamber Jethwani and others v. Chaman Lal Narula and another (S.A.O No. 271 of 1972, decided on 29th March, 1974). T.V.R Tatachari J.; as he then was, held that the landlord residing in the house of his mother-in-law has no right to continue in occupation which he can legally enforce. It was further observed that the fact that the landlord had been in occupation for a long lime is immaterial as the said occupation was only permissive. Again, in Shri Parkash Chandra v. Shri Nirpendra Kumar Aggarwal (1971 All India Rent Control Journal, page 474) the son was residing in the house of his father and he had no right to stay in that house. It was held that the son was entitled to the order of eviction with respect to his own property. The Supreme Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others (A.I.R 1974 S.C, 1059) observed, “If the Truth Bungalow was in occupation of Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence, it was obviously not available to the appellant for occupation and it could not be taken into account for negativing the need of the appellant for the ground floor premises.” In the present case the appellant-landlord is at best in occupation of the premises owned by his daughter-in-law on leave and licence basis. The respondent-tenant, it seems to me, cannot as such resist the appellant's claim for eviction. The appellant has no claim and cannot enforce any legal right to remain in occupation of the existing premises belonging to his daughter-in-law. Under these circumstances, it appears that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the appellant was in possession of a suitable residential accommodation. It is not necessary for a landlord to prove that the existing accommodation is not suitable for his need and for the need of his family if he has no legal right to continue occupation of the existing premises. It is not suggested that the appellant has any other premises in which he may legally claim occupation.

The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the three letters alleged to have been written by the daughter-in-law from Bangkon to the appellant have not been proved in accordance with law. By these letters the appellant was required to make his own arrangement and to vacate the premises in possession. It appears to me that the appellant has been asked by his daughter-in law to vacate and the appellant does not consider it proper and befitting to his status and self-respect to continue to reside in the premises belonging to his daughter-in-law. There may be various reasons for this. It is the will of the landlord that he may reside in the premises of others on leave and licence basis but when he desires to occupy his own house and he has no other house in which he can legally remain in occupation, it seems that it is not necessary for the landlord to produce the owner of the other premises to to depose that such person does not want him to continue to occupy the premises. There is no suggestion that the requirement of the appellant is mala fide. The only allegation is that the appellant is suitably and comfortably accommodated in the house of his daughter-in-law. As already observed, the house of the daughter-in-law is not a reasonably suitable residential accommodation as he has no right to remain in occupation. I, therefore, hold that the judgment and order of the Rent Control Tribunal is not in accordance with law. The appeal is, therefore, accepted and the impugned order of the Rent Control Tribunal is set aside. The judgment and order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 3rd April, 1976, passing an order of eviction in favour of the appellant and against the respondent under Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Act is restored.

The learned counsel for the respondent lastly prays that some time be granted to the respondent-tenant to vacate the premises. I grant the respondent two months' time to vacate the premises provided he files an affidavit in this Court within one week undertaking to vacate the entire suit premises and deliver vacate possession thereof to the appellant within a period of two months from today. He should also state in the affidavit that he and his family members alone are in occupation of the suit premises and that nobody else is in occupation. If the affidavit containing the undertaking as above is filed, the order of eviction would not be executable for a period of two months from today. No order as to costs.

Gurbachan Singh /Tenant v. Raj Paul /Landlord.

Case Summary — Sultan Singh, J. (Second Appeal under Section 39, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Gurbachan Singh /Tenant v. Raj Paul /Landlord.

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