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citation codes
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  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 read with Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 90 and 100 and Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Section 47, Section 151 and Order 21, rules 90 and 100 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 and Section 47 and 151 C.P.C
  • Section 114 and Order 47, rule 1 read with Section 151 C.P.C
  • Article 11, Schedule I of the Limitation Act.
  • Bharat Singh.31. Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C
  • record.14. Order 21, rules 58 and 63
  • sub-rule (2) of that Rule (Rule 58)
  • case.23. Order 21, rule 57 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C
  • Order 21 rule 58 C.P.C
  • Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C
  • Rule 58 of Order 21
  • Order 21, rule 58
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 read with Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 90 and 100 and Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Section 47, Section 151 and Order 21, rules 90 and 100 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 and Section 47 and 151 C.P.C
  • Section 114 and Order 47, rule 1 read with Section 151 C.P.C
  • Article 11, Schedule I of the Limitation Act.
  • Bharat Singh.31. Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C
  • record.14. Order 21, rules 58 and 63
  • sub-rule (2) of that Rule (Rule 58)
  • case.23. Order 21, rule 57 C.P.C
  • Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C
  • Order 21 rule 58 C.P.C
  • Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C
  • Rule 58 of Order 21
  • Order 21, rule 58
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment disposes of R.F.A 28-D of 1965 and Civil Revision No. 111-D of 1964, both filed by Bharat Singh. The appellant filed a suit against five defendants seeking a declaration that shops Nos. 32, 45, and 46 at Narela mandi, Delhi, belonged to him and his brother Kirpa Ram (defendant No. 5). The suit challenged the validity of a sale of these shops in execution of a decree dated March 18, 1950, which the appellant alleged was collusive and void, and asserted that the auction-purchasers (defendants 3 and 4) had no rights over the shops.

The appellant and Kirpa Ram were sons of Ram Narain and constituted a joint Hindu family. The decree had been passed in favor of Mst. Bhagirathi (defendant No. 2), widow of Maha Chand, another son of Ram Narain, and the firm M/s. Sheo Pershad Giani Ram (defendant No. 1). The appellant alleged the decree was collusive and sought to restrain execution against the joint family property.

Following the decree, the shops were attached and sold in auction in July 1962. The appellant had filed objections under various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which were dismissed. The suit was filed shortly after the dismissal of objections to the auction sale. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation, leading to the present appeal. Additionally, Civil Revision No. 111-D of 1964 concerns the dismissal of the appellant’s review application challenging confirmation of the auction sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit filed by the appellant challenging the sale of the shops was barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the dismissal of earlier objections under Order 21, rule 58 CPC, and the non-filing of a suit under Order 21, rule 63 CPC, barred the present suit by conclusiveness or res judicata.
  3. Whether a review petition under Order 47, rule 1 CPC could be filed by a person not party to the lis.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree dated March 18, 1950 was collusive and void, and did not confer rights on the auction-purchasers.
  • The appellant and his brother had been in possession of the shops for over 25 years and denied ownership rights of defendants 3 and 4.
  • The dismissal of objections under Order 21, rule 58 CPC in 1950 was irrelevant as the execution application was dismissed in 1953, and a fresh attachment was made in 1956, thus the suit filed after dismissal of objections in 1962 was within limitation.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The suit was misconceived and barred by limitation.
  • There was no collusion between Mst. Bhagirathi and defendant No. 1.
  • The dismissal of objections under Order 21, rule 58 CPC in 1950 was final and conclusive since no suit under Order 21, rule 63 CPC was filed, barring challenge to attachment and sale.
  • Appellant was delaying the process and harassing defendants 1 to 4.
  • In the Civil Revision, the review application was incompetent as the petitioner was not a party to the lis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Najimunnessa Bibi v. Nacharaddin Sardar, AIR 1924 Calcutta 744 Interpretation of "shall be conclusive" in Order 21, rule 63 CPC and limitation of suit after attachment ceases. Supported the view that a suit to resist attachment is not barred by limitation if attachment ceases and is re-attached later.
Radhabai Gopal Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi, AIR 1944 Bombay 50 Reiteration of principles regarding conclusiveness of order under Order 21, rule 63 CPC. Reiterated the principle that conclusiveness is conditional on subsisting attachment.
Bibi Amar Kaur v. Shiv Karan and others, AIR 1965 Punjab 206 Concurrent remedies under Order 21, rule 58 and rule 63 CPC; requirement of subsisting attachment. Clarified that the order under rule 58 is operative only while attachment subsists; suit under rule 63 must be within one year.
Kumara Goundan v. Thevaraya Reddi and others, AIR 1925 Madras 1113 Effect of cessation of attachment on conclusiveness of order under rule 58 CPC. Supported that conclusiveness depends on continuance of attachment and that cessation within or beyond one year affects operativeness.
Mangru Mahto and others v. Thakur Taraknathji Tarkeshwar Nath and others, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1390 Effect of order under Order 21, rule 58 CPC on res judicata and conclusiveness under rule 63 CPC. Held that order in claim proceedings is not res judicata and conclusiveness under rule 63 applies only if suit is not filed within one year.
Sant Lal and others v. Firm Udhi Ram Walait Ram, AIR 1938 Lahore 568 Effect of sale on attachment and competence of claim petition under Order 21, rule 58 CPC. Discussed whether claim petitions are competent after sale and the requirement of postponing sale pending claim investigation.
Chet Singh v. Gujar Singh and others, AIR 1931 Lahore 74 Conclusive effect of order under Order 21, rule 63 CPC related to attachment validity. Clarified that conclusiveness applies only between claimant and decree-holder in the same execution proceeding and is conditional on attachment subsisting.
Ramchandra Singh and others v. Mt. Bibi Khodaijatul Kubra and others, AIR 1945 Patna 369 Conditional conclusiveness of order under Order 21, rule 63 CPC depending on continuance of execution proceedings and attachment. Held that when execution proceedings end and attachment ceases, a suit beyond one year for title is not barred by limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the sequence of attachments, execution applications, and objections filed by the appellant. The trial court had erred in treating the dismissal of objections under Order 21, rule 58 CPC in 1950 as the relevant date for limitation, ignoring the dismissal of the execution application in 1953 and the subsequent attachment in 1956. The court held that the conclusiveness of an order under rule 58 and rule 63 CPC is conditional on the subsistence of the attachment. Since the execution application was dismissed in 1953 and the attachment ceased, the bar of limitation for filing a suit under rule 63 CPC after the 1950 dismissal did not apply to the present suit filed after the 1962 dismissal of objections to the second attachment and sale.

The court relied on authoritative precedents from various High Courts and the Supreme Court that consistently held that the conclusiveness of orders under Order 21, rule 58 and rule 63 CPC applies only while the attachment subsists. If the attachment ceases, the order becomes defunct, and a fresh claim or suit can be filed within the prescribed limitation period from the date of dismissal of objections to the new attachment.

Regarding the Civil Revision, the court held that a review petition under Order 47, rule 1 CPC can only be filed by a party to the lis. Since Bharat Singh was not a party to the original lis, his review petition was incompetent and rightly dismissed.

Holding and Implications

The appeal in R.F.A 28-D of 1965 is allowed, the finding of the trial court that the suit is barred by limitation is set aside, and the suit is remanded for trial in accordance with law.

This decision means the appellant's suit challenging the auction sale is not barred by limitation and may proceed on merits. No costs were ordered in the appeal.

The Civil Revision No. 111-D of 1964 is dismissed.

This dismissal confirms that review petitions under Order 47, rule 1 CPC are restricted to parties to the lis, preventing third parties from seeking review of orders affecting them indirectly. No costs were awarded for this dismissal.

    Bharat Singh v. M/S. Sheo Parshad Giani Ram & Others S

    Prakash Narain, J.:— This judgment will dispose of R.F.A 28-D of 1965 and Civil Revision No. 111-D of 1964, both filed by one Bharat Singh.

    2. R.F.A 28-D of 1965 is directed against the judgment and decree of a Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi, dismissing the appellant's suit only on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
    3. This suit was filed by the appellant against five defendants for a declaration that shops Nos. 32, 45 and 46 situate at Narela mandi in the Union Territory of Delhi belonged to him and his brother Kirpa Ram (defendant No. 5) and that the sale of the said three shops in execution of a decree dated March 18, 1950 passed by the court of Shri Parshotam Sarup, Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi, was null and void and did not confer any rights on defendants 3 and 4, the auction-purchasers.
    4. According to the appellant he, Kirpa Ram, (defendant No. 5) and Maha Chand are the sons of one Ram Narain. Mst. Bhagirathi (defendant No. 2) is the widow of the said Maha Chand. The appellant and Kirpa Ram constituted a joint Hindu family after the death of their father Ram Narain and Mst. Bhagirathi lived with them but was not a member of the coparcenery. It was alleged that on March 18, 1950 Mst. Bhagirathi got a collusive decree for Rs. 5900 passed in favour of firm M/s. Sheo Pershad Giani Ram (defendent No. 1), the decree being against M/s. Jai Ram Dass Ram Narain, the joint Hindu family firm of the appellant and Kirpa Ram. On July 18, 1951 the appellant and other members of his aforesaid joint Hindu family firm filed a suit in the court of Shri S.D Tyagi, Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi. (Suit No. 733 of 1951) for a declaration that the said decree dated March 18, 1950 was a nullity and was not executable against the appellant and the property of the joint family of Jai Ram Dass Ram Narain and for a permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from proceeding with the execution of the said decree and getting the coparcenery property of the appellant sold in execution of the said decree. One of the properties mentioned in the said suit as being coparcenery property were shops Nos. 37, 45 and 46 situate at Narela. This suit was decreed by the trial Court on April 9, 1960 and the decision was confirmed by the judgment and decree of the Senior Sub Judge, Delhi dated August 19, 1961. The appellant claims that he and his younger brother Kirpa Ram as owners have been in possession of the aforesaid three shops for more than 25 years and have consistently been denying the ownership of the aforesaid auction-purchasers, defendants 3 and 4, though the property was sold in auction. It may be mentioned here that the auction sale of the said three shops in execution of the decree for Rs. 5900 took place on July 17, 1962. Originally, the said three shops had been got attached by defendant No. 1 and objections filed by the appellant under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C were dismissed on August 19, 1950. No suit under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C was filed by the appellant at that stage. The execution application in which the attachment had been made was, however, dismissed on January 10, 1953. Thereafter, a second execution application was moved by defendant No. 1 and on January 29, 1956 the said three shops were once again attached. As noticed earlier, the auction sale took place on July 17, 1962. The appellant then filed objections to the sale and attachment of the aforesaid three shops under Order 21, rule 58, Section 47, Section 151 and Order 21, rules 90 and 100 C.P.C These objections were filed on August 13, 1962 and were dismissed on December 1, 1962. The present suit was filed a few days later.
    5. The suit was resisted by defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2, defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 4. Kirpa Ram, defendant No. 5 supported the suit. According to the contesting defendants the suit was misconceived and time-barred. They denied any collusion between Mst. Bhagirathi and defendant No. 1. The also pleaded that dismissal of the objections under Order 21, rule 58 C P.C to the attachment of the said shops by an order of the executing Court dated August 19, 1950 was final and conclusive inasmuch as no suit was filed under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C Therefore, the attachment and sale could not be challenged. They also pleaded a decision of the High Court of Punjab in R.F.A 151 of 1954 in which it was held that Mst. Bhagirathi was a one-third absolute owner of the property of the coparcenery of the descendants of Ram Narain and it was against her one-third share that the decree for Rs. 5900 was to be executed. It was further pleaded that the appellant was merely delaying the process of court and was unnecessarily harassing defendants 1 to 4.
    4. After replication was filed by the appellant, the trial Court framed the following issues: —
    “1. Whether the present suit is barred by principle of res judicata ? O.P.D
    2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? O.P.D
    3. Whether the suit does not lie in the present form ? O.P.D
    4. Whether the suit is properly valued for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction ? O.P.D
    5. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs u/s 35 (a) C.P.C ? O.P.D”
    6. On issue No. 2 the trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellant's objections under Order 21, rule 58 having been dismissed on August 19, 1950, and the suit not having been brought within one year it was clearly barred by time. No plea was raised at that stage or in the trial Court by either party that the instant suit was a title suit challenging the attachment made on June 29, 1956, i.e the attachment taken out by defendant No. 1 for the second time after dismissal of the First Execution Application on January 10, 1953. The trial Court rejected the appellant's contention that it stood proved on the record that the First Execution Application had been dismissed on January 10, 1953 and, therefore, the dismissal of the claim under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C on August 19, 1950 was irrelevant. The contention that the objections under Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 90 and 100 and Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C having been dismissed on December 1, 1963, the suit as filed on December 3, 1963 under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C would be within time, was negatived.
    7. Having held the suit was barred by limitation, the trial Court did not choose to decide Issue No. 4. Issue No. 1 was also not decided fully. Issue No. 3 was given up by the defendants and so, was not decided. Being impressed by the fact that the suit in question was filed after so many years of the dismissal of the claim under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C on August 19, 1950 the trial Court ordered compensatory costs under section 35a c.p.c in favour of defendant No. 1 Aggrieved by the above decision the appellant has come up in appeal and the only point for decision is whether the suit was barred by limitation.
    8. Whether the present suit is maintainable or not and whether it is liable to be decreed or dismissed on merits or in law is not a matter which we are called upon to decide at this stage. Indeed, the matter has not been gone into by even the trial Court. Any observations, therefore, that may be made hereafter were without prejudice to the suit being decided by the trial Court and those observations will not affect the merits of the suit. As noticed earlier, since we have to decide only the question of limitation, the observations that we make must be read in the context of the suit being within time or barred by time and in no other context.
    9. The obvious fallacy in the impugned judgment and decree is that it proceeds on the assumption that the present suit has been filed under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C in consequence of the claim of the appellant under Order 21 rule 58 C.P.C having been dismissed on August 19, 1950. Admittedly, no suit was filed after the dismissal of that petition. The present suit has been filed after the dismissal of the petition under Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 read with Section 47 and Section 151 C.P.C This petition was dismissed on December 1, 1962 and the suit was filed on December 3, 1962. The first question which comes in for determination is whether there is any evidence on record to justify the above proposition of fact.
    10. It is an admitted case that no suit was filed after the dismissal of the application under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C on August 19, 1950. It is also not in dispute that the sale of these three shops took place on July 17, 1962 and an application under Order 21, rule 58, Order 21, rules 99 and 100 and Section 47 and 151 C.P.C was filed on August 13, 1962. This application was dismissed on December 1, 1962. The trial Court, in our opinion, has erred in treating the only relevant date of dismissal of the claim under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C to be August 19, 1950.
    11. The trial Court has relied on the judgment of the High Court, Exhibit D.2, to come to the conclusion that the objections of the appellant under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C were dismissed on August 19, 1950. There is no doubt about this fact. The question really is whether the relevant date for the present suit is August 19, 1951 or December 1, 1962.
    12. This brings us to the question as to whether the execution application of defendant/respondent No. 1 was dismissed on January 10, 1953 and if so, what is its effect on the attachment that was made and also whether the non-filling of a suit after dismissal of the objections under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C on August 19, 1950 makes the decision on the claim in that application so conclusive as to bar the filing of a second application when the second attachment was effected on June 29, 1956.
    13. Both Mr. S.N Chopra, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. J.R Goel, learned counsel for respondent 3 and 4, have jointly prayed that the dates and events January 10, 1953 and June 29, 1956 be taken as proved on the record.
    14. Order 21, rules 58 and 63 read as under at the relevant time: —
    “58. (1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection with the like power as regards the examination of the claimant or objector, and in all other respects, as if he was party to the suit:
    Provided that no such investigation shall be made where the Court considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed.”
    “63. Where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which, he claims to the property in dispute, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.”
    15. Admittedly, no suit was filed after the dismissal of the objections in 1950. The question is whether in view of the execution application having been dismissed in 1953 the rule as to conclusiveness would be attracted. In our opinion, there is no bar to a second application under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C being filed if the execution application was dismissed in 1953, as it was, and despite the appellant not having filed a suit under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C on dismissal of his earlier application in 1950. Indeed, had the appellant filed a suit under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C the same was bound to be dismissed as infructuous on the execution application being dismissed in 1953 because the moment the execution application was dismissed the attachment ceased and there was nothing left to challenge. The bar of conclusiveness would apply only if there is any subsisting attachment and not otherwise. Similarly, the bar of the proviso to Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C enacted by the Punjab High Court would be attracted if there was a subsisting attachment. It would be an exercise in futility to file or go on with a suit under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C if there was no subsisting attachment.
    16. In Bibi Amar Kaur v. Shiv Karan and others, AIR. 1965 Punjab 206 (1), a bench of that Court held:
    “Order 21, R. 58 of the Code provides a summary remedy to third parties, i.e, persons other than judgment-debtors or their legal representatives for raising objections to the attachment of the property. Where a third party has a claim or an objection to the attachment of property attached in execution of a decree, there are two courses open to him. He may straightway file a suit claiming the appropriate relief, or he may file an objection-petition under “O. 21, R. 58 of the Code of Civl Procedure to the Court executing the decree. The remedy provided thus is not only summary but is also concurrent and results only in a summary investigation and not a full trial of the issues between the parties. The party aggrieved by an order passed after such investigation has to file a suit under R. 63 within one year to establish the rights which he claims to the property in dispute. If the suit is instituted by the decree-holder, against whom an order has been passed on objections filed under O. 21. R. 58 releasing the property from attachment, the right which he claims in the suit is the right to have the property attached in execution of the decree against the judgment-debtor. If, on the contrary, the plaintiff is the objector, who has been unsuccessful in the objection proceedings before the executing Court, the right which he claims in the suit under O. 21, R. 63 is the right to have the property in dispute released from attachment on the ground that it belongs to him and not to the judgment-debtor. Subject to the decision in that suit, the order passed by the execution Court is conclusive. It is, however, essential that the order on the application under O. 21, R. 58 must be subsisting when the suit is filed. If the objections under O. 21, R. 58 are dismissed and the attachment is upheld and for some reason or the other the attachment subsequently comes to an end, the order upholding the attachment would, in the circumstances, become defunct and in such an event there is no purpose in filing a suit to have the attachment set aside.”
    17. In the same case the bench explained that the words “such attachment” in Rule 58 point to the conclusion that the order passed on the objections is operative only in respect of the particular attachment against which objections are filed. If that attachment ceases for any reason, there is nothing further to challenge.
    18. In Najimunnessa Bibi v. Nacharaddin Sardar, A.I.R 1924 Calcutta 744 (2), a bench of that High Court also took the same view as was later taken by the Punjab High Court. It was held that where an attachment was released within one year after the order dismissing the claim case and execution proceedings were again taken after the lapse of several years, a title suit brought to resist the attachment was not barred by limitation. Dealing with the phrase “shall be conclusive” in Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C Rankin, J. observed: “The meaning of the words ‘shall be conclusive’ is that the act of the Court is to be valid unless there is a suit. It means that the attachment held valid in the claim case shall be valid and the attachment removed shall be as though it never was, so far as the parties are concerned The rule seems to mean that subject to a suit factum valet the act of the Court shall not be questioned save in that way. The effect of the decision as to possession in other proceedings in which that question may again arise is not the matter to which the words ‘shall be conclusive’ are directly addressed. The principle is that the object of making a claim in execution is to remove the attachment, that when the attachment is withdrawn that object is gained and that if there exists no attachment, or proceeding in execution on which the order in the claim case can take effect, one is not bound to bring a suit complaining of such order. It is no answer at all to say that a decree-holder's suit under R. 68 has always to be brought after the attachment is removed. If the decree-holder succeeds, he gets the attachment restored as at the date it was made and that is what he fights for.”
    19. In Radhabai Gopal Joshi v. Gopal Dhondo Joshi and another, A.I.R 1944 Bombay 50 (3), again the above noted views were reiterated.
    20. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that suppose the attachment lapses and suit is not filed, then what would be the position ? Would not the rule of collusiveness apply if on an earlier occasion the suit had not been filed ? The answer is to be found in the observations of the Rankin, J., noted above. Further, in Kumara Goundan v. Thevaraya Reddi and others, A.I.R 1925 Madras 1113 (4), it was observed by Ramesam, J.: “In the first place, if it is conceded that the order becomes useless and inoperative when the attachment ceased within one year of the order, this is a concession not allowed by the literal reading of the section. Secondly, if the operativeness of an order on a claim petition is to be regarded as conditional on the continuance of the attachment, it is difficult to see why the cessation of the attachment within one year should destroy the operativeness and the cessation of it beyond one year should have just the opposite effect merely because a suit to set aside could not be brought more than one year after the date of the order.”
    21. In Chet Singh v. Gujar Singh and others, A.I.R 1931 Lahore 74 (5), Addison, J. observed: “The order under O.2.1, R.63, is conclusive in the sense that it cannot be agitated again in the execution proceedings in which it was passed unless a suit is brought within one year of the date of the order, i.e, that it is conclusive as between the claimant and the decree-holder who is proceeding against the property. If, however, the decree-holder raises the attachment within a year, obviously “there is no reason why the claimant should institute a suit to set aside the order as there is no attachment in force. It makes no difference if the attachment is raised after the termination of one year. It does mean that in those proceedings the claimant is running a risk and will be estopped from contesting the decree-holder's right to proceed against the property, but if the decree-holder does not sell the property and the decree is satisfied otherwise, the fact that the attachment was raised more than a year after the date of the order on the claim does not make any difference.”
    22. In Ramchandra Singh and others v. Mt. Bibi Khodaijatul Kubra and others, A.I.R 1945 Patna 369 (6), a bench of that court noticed with approval the views of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts and laid down the proposition that the conclusiveness of an order in a claim case contemplated by Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C is conditional on the continuance of the execution proceedings and the attachment ensuing therefrom, and that consequently when an order is made on an application under Order 21, rule 58 of the Cods dismissing a claim but the sale itself held in that execution proceedings is set aside and the attachment ipso facto comes to an end, a subsequent suit brought beyond one year by the claimant for a declaration of his title is not barred under Article 11, Schedule I of the Limitation Act. It was further held that it was immaterial that the execution proceedings came to an end within or beyond one year of the date of the order in the claim case.
    23. Order 21, rule 57 C.P.C has some relevance and may be noticed at this stage. This provision reads as under: —
    “57. Where any property has been attached in execution of a decree but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease.”
    If the execution application is not prosecuted and is dismissed for default it has the same effect as the dismissal of the execution application otherwise. The consequence of the dismissal of the execution application is that the attachment ceases. If the attachment ceases any suit filed under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C would become infructuous and will have to be dismissed for there would be nothing which the plaintiff could claim and there would be nothing in respect of which the plaintiff could feel aggrieved.
    24. Apart from the concession by the learned counsel that the execution application was dismissed on January 10, 1953, this fact stands established on a reading of paragraph II (g) of the grounds of appeal in Execution First Appeal No. 2-D of 1963 filed in the High Court of Punjab, Circuit Bench at Delhi which was brought on record. The trial Court was in error in not relying upon this substantive piece of evidence and treating August 19, 1950 as the date from which limitation had to be computed for the filing of the present suit. Inasmuch as the execution application stood dismissed on January 10, 1953 the appellant was not required to prosecute his claim by a suit under Order 21, rule 63 C.P.C on dismissal of his claim petition on August 19, 1950. The date of December 1, 1963 was the only relevant date from which the period of limitation had to be computed.
    25. Mr. J.R Goel then sought to sustain the decree on the ground of res judicata. He relied on Mangru Mahto and others v. Thakur Taraknathji Tarkeshwar Nath and others, A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 1390 (7). The decision relied upon does not help to advance the contention of the learned counsel. It cannot be said that the dismissal of the claim petition in 1950 would operate as res judicata to the claim petition preferred in 1962. In the case relied upon it has been clearly held that a claim under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C is not a suit or a proceeding analogous to a suit. An order in the claim proceedings does not operate as res judicata. It is because of rule 63 that the order becomes conclusive. It is further clarified in this very decision that the effect of Rule 63 is that unless a suit is brought as provided by the rule, the party against whom the order in the claim proceedings is made, or any person claiming through him, cannot reagitate in any other suit or proceeding against the other party or any person claiming through him the question whether the property was or was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree out of which the claim proceedings arose, but the bar of Rule 63 extends no further. Mangru's case was not considering the effect of the attachment being raised or ceasing to be operative, nor was it considering a second claim petition under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C being filed on a fresh attachment being made.
    26. Mr. Goel also relied upon Sant Lal and others v. Firm Udhi Ram Walait Ram, A.I.R 1938 Lahore 568 (8) and urged that no claim petition under Order 21, rule 58 C.P.C was competent once the sale had taken place because the attachment ipso facto stood determined on the property being sold. The bench, no doubt, laid clown the above proposition but it is pertinent to note the further observations in the judgment of Addison, J., namely, “It is true that by sub-rule (2) of that Rule (Rule 58) a Court is not bound to postpone the sale pending the investigation of the claim but usually it should do so except where it is of opinion that the claim is frivolous or vexatious or meant to delay the execution proceedings” If that be the correct proposition then, and we say it with respect, the proposition laid down by the bench does not appear to be correct. What happens to a claim petition filed before sale where the sale is not postponed and it does take place ? Does such a claim become infructuous ? If the proposition laid down by the Lahore High Court was correct then a claim petition under Order 21, rule 58, though otherwise having merit, may stand defeated because the court did not stay the sale and sale takes plate. Indeed, it is keeping in view the uncertainty of the proposition propounded in the above noted decision of the Lahore High Court, which followed the views of Calcutta, Patna and Rangoon High Courts, that Rule 58 of Order 21 has been amended recently and it has been clarified that no claim or objection under Rule 58 shall be entertained where, before the claim is preferred or objection is made the property attached has already been sold.
    27. Giani Ram appearing in person for respondent No. 1 wanted to address us on the merits of the suit but we did not allow it. He made no submissions on the question of limitation.
    28. In this view of the matter we accept the appeal, set aside the finding of the trial Court that the suit is barred by limitation and remand the suit for trial in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
    29. We now come to Civil Revision No. 111-D of 1964. This revision petition has been filed by Bharat Singh against an order dated December 19, 1963 passed by a Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi, dismissing Bharat Singh's application for review of an order passed by the same Sub Judge on January 5, 1963. The application was moved under Section 114 and Order 47, rule 1 read with Section 151 C.P.C In regard to the order dated January 5, 1963 confirming the auction sale in Execution Case No. 452 of 1962. The Sub Judge dismissed the review application on the ground that as far as his court was concerned, there was no injunction order from the court of Shri R.L Lamba, Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi, either restraining the court or the decree-holders from getting the sale confirmed in the execution case started by M/s. Sheo Parshad Giani Ram, respondent No. 1 herein. There was some controversy as to whether the injunction order, as served on the decree-holder, respondent No. 1, was an injunction order “till further orders” or was an injunction order operative only till January 4, 1963.
    30. In our opinion, it is not necessary to go into the facts of the case because the impugned order dismissing the review application can be upheld on a preliminary point, namely, that no review petition under Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C could be filed by Bharat Singh.
    31. Order 47, rule 1 C.P.C reads as under: —
    “1. (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: —
    (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
    (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
    (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.”
    On a very reading of the rule it is clear that a review application can be filled only by a party to the lis in which the order sought to be reviewed has been passed. It cannot be preferred by a third party. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the phrase “any person considering himself aggrieved” would include anyone who is adversely affected by the impugned order, whether that person is or is not party to the list in which the impugned order has been passed. We do not agree. As will be apparent from a reading of the rule any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order may apply for review provided he can establish that he “from the discovery of new and important matters of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made.” This postulates that the person applying for review has to satisfy two conditions, namely, that he is aggrieved by the order and also that he for the reasons mentioned was not in a position to bring that fact to the notice of the Court earlier which resulted in a wrong order being passed. If these two conditions are necessary before a review application can be moved, it follows that the review application has to be made by a person who was a party to the list decided by the impugned order or decree.
    32. No authority contrary to the view that we have expressed above was cited, nor was any authority cited in favour of the view that we have expressed. We are, however, fortified in taking the view that we have taken on the same principle that a decree or order adversely affecting a person who is not a party to the list in which that order or decree is passed is in law not binding on him. Such a person, therefore, can ignore the order or decree which adversely affects him and so, cannot apply for a review of that order or decree. He may take such other steps as may be available to him in law to protect his rights as and when the order or decree adversely affecting him is sought to be enforced so as to jeopardise his rights. (See 61 Indian Cases 534).
    33. We, therefore, dismiss this revision petition but in the circumstances of the case make no orders as to costs.
    Ordered accordingly.
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    Bharat Singh v. M/S. Sheo Parshad Giani Ram & Others S
    (May 24, 1977)