| Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1967 S.C. 1857) |
Authorities set up by statute may be "State" under Article 12 if they are agents/instruments of government, exercise powers to implement laws, have governmental/quasi‑governmental powers or can make enforceable regulations. |
The Court relied on this decision as guiding principles to determine that RBI's statutory powers, governmental functions and control by Central Government bring it within Article 12. |
| All India Reserve Bank Employees' Association & another v. Reserve Bank of India & another (AIR 1966 S.C. 305) |
Endorsement of Desai Tribunal's observation that, where possible without detriment to efficiency, employees in the same category serving in different departments should be grouped for promotion and common seniority maintained. |
The Court recorded that the Supreme Court endorsed the Tribunal's views, which formed the background for the Bank's later schemes including the Optee Scheme of 1965. |
| L.P.A. No. 155 of 1972: Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Delhi Administration (Full Bench, Delhi High Court) |
Reviewed case law on "State" under Article 12 and laid down principles on when a statutory body is "State". |
The Court relied on the Full Bench's synthesis (cited at length) to frame tests applied to RBI — whether it is agent of Government, vested with duties to administer laws, power to give enforceable directions, etc. |
| Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (AIR 1953 S.C. 250) |
Employment under a specified temporary contract can be purely contractual; such persons may have remedies in ordinary courts rather than under Article 32/226 for alleged violation of Articles 14/16. |
The Court distinguished this authority on facts, noting the petitioner there was a temporary contract employee; the Court held the RBI employees' situation was different and the case did not bar writ remedy here. |
| Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa (AIR 1972 S.C. 843) |
Contractual employment (e.g., headmaster under private school's contract) does not permit enforcement of contractual rights via writ petition after takeover; contractual rights are enforced in civil suit. |
The Court distinguished the case: here petitioners were employees of a statutory body that is "State" and no deliberate waiver of fundamental rights was shown; therefore Article 226 was open. |
| Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income‑tax (1959) 1 S.C.R. 528 |
Fundamental rights (Article 14) cannot be waived by voluntary private settlement; Article 14 imposes a constitutional obligation on the State. |
The Court used the principle to support the view that employees could not be taken to have waived constitutional protections by contract or agreement with the Bank. |
| D.F.O., South Kheri & others v. Ram Sanehi Singh (1970 S.C.W.R. 194) |
Even where rights arise from contract, a writ may be maintainable if a public authority has exercised statutory power in a manner depriving a person of valuable rights. |
The Court applied this authority to hold that private contractual origin of a right does not preclude writ jurisdiction where action involves public/statutory authority (RBI). |
| Union of India & others v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies (AIR 1968 S.C. 718) |
Schemes and executive measures may impose obligations; courts can compel performance of obligations imposed by departmental schemes where appropriate — substance, not form, matters. |
The Court invoked this principle to hold that the Optee Scheme of 1965, being a substantive scheme formulated by the Bank, obliged the Bank to implement obligations arising from it vis‑à‑vis those who acted under it. |
| Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (AIR 1958 S.C. 538) |
Tests for permissible classification under Article 14: intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus to object; and further enumerated principles (presumption of constitutionality, burden on challenger, etc.). |
The Court used these tests and accompanying principles as the framework to evaluate whether the combined seniority scheme complied with Articles 14 and 16. |
| Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar (AIR 1955 S.C. 191) |
Articulated the two‑limbed test for permissible classification under Article 14 (intelligible differentia; rational relation to object). |
Referred to within the Dalmia analysis; used as foundational authority for Article 14 analysis of the schemes. |
| B. Gopalaiah and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1969 A.P. 204) |
Where a whole class is discriminated against, courts should not refuse relief simply because members of the favored class are not before the court; impleading all beneficiaries is impractical. |
The Court relied on this decision to reject the objection that necessary parties were not impleaded in the challenge to the combined seniority scheme (C.W. No. 690/72) when the seniority list had not yet been prepared. |
| All India Station Masters' & Assistant Station Masters' Assn. v. General Manager, Central Railway (AIR 1960 S.C. 384) |
Equality of opportunity in promotion applies within the same class — distinct recruitment/training or separate classes permit different channels of promotion. |
The Court cited and distinguished this doctrine when analysing whether different groups (clerical vs non‑clerical) could be treated as same or different classes for promotion/seniority purposes. |
| Mervyn Cotinho & others v. Collector of Customs & others (AIR 1967 S.C. 52) |
Permissibility of a rotational system where two recruitment sources exist; but rotational system cannot apply where only one source exists (and may violate Article 16). |
The Court used these principles to explain why the combined seniority scheme's merging of unlike classes (clerical and non‑clerical) could not be justified by analogy to permissible rotational systems. |
| S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 S.C. 1427) |
Recruitment/promotion combining direct recruits and promotees can be valid if classification has reasonable relation to office requirements; equality in promotion predicated only where promotees drawn from same source. |
The Court invoked this line of authority to stress that reasonable classification is permissible, but the combined seniority scheme failed the applicable tests when it merged distinct classes without adequate basis. |
| Other authorities cited (summary list in opinion): K.N. Guruswamy; K.T.M. Nair (Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair); State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy; Md. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh; Govind Dattaray Kelkar; State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao; C.A. Rajendran; Anand Prakash Saksena; H.S. Shivalingaiah |
Various principles on Article 14/16: permissible classification, when merger/absorption is permissible, when discretionary schemes require guiding principle, and when administrative schemes are open to writ challenge. |
The Court relied on the cumulative guidance of these authorities to analyse whether the Optee Scheme of 1965 and the combined seniority scheme of 1972 accorded with Article 14/16 tests; overall the precedents supported upholding the 1965 Optee Scheme but condemning the 1972 combined seniority scheme. |