Wyoming Adoption Procedure: Unmarried Adults May Not File a Joint Adoption Petition Under § 1-22-104(b), But May File Separate Petitions Subject to Consolidation

Introduction

In In the Matter of the Guardianship Of: RTT, a Minor Child, James Serfoss, III and Leslie M. Salmon v. Tyler Thomas, the Supreme Court of Wyoming answered a W.R.A.P. 11 certified question from the District Court of Converse County: whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) permits two unmarried individuals to file a single, joint petition to adopt a minor child.

The dispute arose in the context of an existing guardianship. RTT’s maternal grandfather, James Serfoss, III, and his domestic partner, Leslie M. Salmon, had been appointed RTT’s co-guardians in 2016. In 2025, RTT’s biological father, Tyler Thomas, petitioned to terminate the guardianship. The co-guardians answered and (jointly) counterclaimed to adopt RTT. RTT’s mother consented; the father did not. The father moved to dismiss the joint adoption petition as unauthorized by statute, prompting certification of the statutory question.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) does not allow unmarried individuals to file a joint adoption petition. Under the statute’s plain language, a joint petition is permitted only when filed “jointly by a husband and wife who maintain their home together.”

Critically, the Court also clarified that multiple unmarried individuals who each seek to adopt the same child may do so by filing separate petitions, and the district court may consolidate those petitions and then grant or deny each petition as its findings dictate.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Palm-Egle v. Briggs and Miech v. Sheridan Cnty.: The Court relied on these authorities for the certified-question posture—when answering a certified question, it relies on facts supplied by the certifying court and addresses the legal issue presented rather than engaging in fact review. (The opinion also includes a citation string that repeats/cross-references these cases and Skoric v. Park Cnty. Circuit Ct. to emphasize the de novo posture for legal questions.)
  • Bankers Standard Ins. Co. v. JTEC, Inc. and Sinclair Wyo. Refining Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd.: These cases supplied the governing framework for de novo statutory interpretation and the core principle that the Court’s primary objective is to effectuate legislative intent, beginning with whether statutory text is clear or ambiguous.
  • Vahai v. Gertsch: Used for the definitions of “unambiguous” and “ambiguous,” setting the threshold for when the Court may employ interpretive canons beyond plain meaning.
  • In re ATWS: The key adoption precedent. There, the Court found ambiguity in the phrase “single adult” in § 1-22-104(b) and held “single adult” means “one/individual,” not “unmarried.” In this case, the Court distinguished ATWS: the present dispute concerns whether unmarried persons may file jointly, and the Court found the “jointly by a husband and wife” clause unambiguous. The Court also corrected Petitioners’ characterization of ATWS as turning on “absence of an explicit prohibition.”
  • Bain v. City of Cheyenne and State ex rel. Wyo. Dept. of Revenue v. Hanover Compression, LP: Cited for the rule that when a statute is unambiguous, the Court applies plain meaning and does not resort to interpretive canons.
  • Conrad v. Uinta Cnty. Republican Party and In re VS: Cited for the “read the statute as a whole” principle—giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.
  • Kobielusz v. State and Minter v. State: Cited for the rule that omission of words is presumed intentional and courts do not read words into statutes that the legislature chose not to include.
  • In re CRA and Adelizzi v. Stratton: Used for the negative-implication textual principle: when the legislature uses a word in one place (here, “jointly” for “husband and wife”), the Court will not interpret that same word into other places where it was not used.
  • Hede v. Gilstrap and In re Estate of Kirkpatrick: Cited for strict construction of adoption statutes because adoption is purely statutory and did not exist at common law.
  • Matter of Adoption of MAJB (quoted within In re ATWS): Invoked for the proposition that adoption statutes aim at children’s welfare and should not be construed to defeat legislative intent—yet the Court confined that principle to circumstances involving ambiguity (as in ATWS), not to rewrite clear text.
  • In re Adoption of MA and GG v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs.: Petitioners cited these out-of-state decisions; the Court rejected them as persuasive because the Maine and Kentucky statutory schemes materially differ from Wyoming’s § 1-22-104(b), and thus do not alter the plain reading of Wyoming law.
  • Noe v. State ex rel. Dep't of Fam. Servs.: Cited to reject the father’s undeveloped standing argument due to lack of cogent analysis and authority.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured textualist sequence:

  1. Identify the statutory text and the precise procedural permission. Section 1-22-104(b) authorizes an adoption petition to be filed “by any single adult” or “jointly by a husband and wife who maintain their home together.” The Court emphasized the placement and limitation of the word “jointly”: it appears only in connection with “husband and wife.”
  2. Determine ambiguity—and find none on the joint-petition issue. Unlike In re ATWS (where “single adult” was ambiguous), the clause authorizing joint filing “by a husband and wife” was deemed clear. With no ambiguity, the Court applied plain meaning and declined to employ broader construction doctrines to expand the statute.
  3. Refuse to add omitted categories of joint petitioners. Relying on Kobielusz v. State and Minter v. State, the Court treated the absence of language authorizing “joint” petitions by unmarried individuals as intentional. The Court reinforced this with In re CRA and Adelizzi v. Stratton: because the legislature used “jointly” in one specific context, the Court would not carry that authorization into another context by implication.
  4. Reject “silence equals permission,” particularly under strict construction of adoption statutes. The Petitioners argued that because § 1-22-104(b) does not expressly forbid unmarried joint petitions, it should be allowed. The Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with strict construction recognized in Hede v. Gilstrap and In re Estate of Kirkpatrick, and as a misreading of In re ATWS, which turned on ambiguity and harmonization with related provisions, not on treating silence as authorization.
  5. Separate eligibility to adopt from the procedure for petitioning. A pivotal move in the opinion is the distinction between: (a) who may adopt (eligibility under § 1-22-103), and (b) how an adoption may be petitioned (procedure under § 1-22-104(b)). The Court characterized § 1-22-104(b) as “purely procedural,” and held its reading does not restrict eligibility: both unmarried adults remain able to petition to adopt under § 1-22-103; they simply cannot do so in a single joint filing.
  6. Provide a practical procedural path consistent with the statute. The Court answered “no” to the certified question but made clear the district court may accommodate the case through ordinary civil procedure: Petitioners may seek to amend under W.R.C.P. 15 and consolidate under W.R.C.P. 42(a), so that separate petitions can be considered together. The Court noted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-103 makes the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly applicable in guardianship proceedings, and further observed the adoption statutes do not expressly incorporate the rules but also do not preclude their application.

Impact

The decision establishes a clear procedural rule for Wyoming adoption practice: only a married couple may file a joint adoption petition under § 1-22-104(b). Unmarried co-guardians, domestic partners, relatives, or other caretakers who wish to adopt the same child must file separate petitions.

Likely practical effects include:

  • Pleading and filing practice: practitioners will need to avoid joint petitions by unmarried petitioners and instead file parallel petitions with a motion to consolidate (or request consolidation) for efficiency.
  • Litigation posture in guardianship-related adoptions: where adoption is raised as a counterclaim in a guardianship dispute, parties should plead separate counterclaims (or separate petitions) to avoid dismissal on procedural grounds.
  • Legislative pressure point: the Court’s opinion signals that any expansion of joint-petition eligibility for unmarried adults is a matter for legislative amendment, not judicial construction—especially given strict construction of adoption statutes.
  • Substantive “best interests” determinations remain available: by characterizing § 1-22-104(b) as procedural, the Court preserved the ability of courts to assess the child’s welfare under the adoption framework without treating marital status or household structure as an eligibility bar.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certified question (W.R.A.P. 11): instead of deciding the entire case, the Supreme Court answers a specific legal question sent by the trial court, so the trial court can proceed with the correct legal rule.
  • De novo review: the Supreme Court decides the legal question independently, giving no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusion.
  • Ambiguity vs. plain meaning: if statutory language can reasonably mean more than one thing, it is “ambiguous,” and courts may use interpretive tools (context, purpose, related statutes). If not ambiguous, courts apply the ordinary meaning without adding or subtracting words.
  • Strict construction of adoption statutes: because adoption exists only by statute (not common law), courts insist on close adherence to statutory text, particularly where parties ask courts to infer permissions not clearly granted.
  • Eligibility vs. procedure: § 1-22-103 addresses who can adopt (broadly, “any adult person” meeting residency and fitness standards); § 1-22-104(b) addresses how to file (single adult filing, or joint filing limited to “husband and wife”).
  • Consolidation (W.R.C.P. 42(a)): even if separate petitions must be filed, the trial court can manage them together—hearing evidence once, coordinating schedules, and issuing coordinated rulings—while still entering separate legal dispositions on each petition.

Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question is categorical: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-104(b) permits a joint adoption petition only for “a husband and wife who maintain their home together,” and therefore does not permit joint petitions by unmarried individuals. At the same time, the Court preserved the practical ability of unmarried co-caregivers to pursue adoption by requiring separate petitions—potentially consolidated— and emphasized that the statute at issue is procedural rather than a limitation on who may adopt under § 1-22-103.