Threats Against a Prosecutor Do Not Require Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 528 Absent a Qualifying “Personal Relationship” (Anders Dismissal)

Introduction

In United States v. Ademeko Maclin-Carney (7th Cir. June 11, 2026) (nonprecedential order), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal under the Anders framework after appointed counsel concluded that no nonfrivolous appellate issues existed. The defendant, Ademeko Maclin-Carney, had been convicted by a jury of federal kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and sentenced to 360 months (within a guidelines range of 360 months to life).

The case arose from the 2022 kidnapping of James “Ed” Good. The government’s proof included eyewitness identification, surveillance video, physical and digital forensics, and letters seeking to fabricate an alibi. Pretrial and trial disputes included the admissibility of internet searches (including the penalty for third-degree murder), the admission of alleged alibi-fabrication letters, a mistrial request following a witness’s reference to “threats,” the proper phrasing of kidnapping elements in jury instructions (conjunctive indictment vs. disjunctive instruction), and a motion to disqualify the prosecutor based on threats attributed to the defendant.

The most legally notable discussion concerns the attempted use of 28 U.S.C. § 528 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 to argue that a prosecutor who has been threatened must be disqualified—an argument the court rejected as lacking textual support and as creating perverse incentives (i.e., “shopping” for prosecutors).

Summary of the Opinion

Applying Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the Seventh Circuit reviewed counsel’s submission, limited its examination to the issues counsel discussed (consistent with United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014)), and concluded the appeal was frivolous. It therefore granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal.

The court addressed, and found frivolous, potential appellate challenges to: (1) admission of internet-search evidence; (2) denial of the motion to disqualify the prosecutor under § 528; (3) sufficiency of the evidence; (4) admission of alibi-fabrication letters; (5) denial of a mistrial after a witness referenced threats; (6) jury instructions using the disjunctive “or” despite a conjunctively worded indictment; (7) alleged variance; (8) denial of post-trial motions under Rules 29/33/34; and (9) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, including an obstruction enhancement and consideration of lack of remorse.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967): Established the procedure allowing appointed counsel to withdraw where an appeal is frivolous, paired with an independent court review. This case is the gateway doctrine—without a viable nonfrivolous issue, the appeal ends in dismissal rather than merits briefing.
  • United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014): Supports the Seventh Circuit’s practice of limiting review to issues counsel identifies when the Anders brief is thorough.
  • United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 2009): The court used this to emphasize that an “issue of first impression” is not automatically nonfrivolous in an Anders posture. That principle mattered for the prosecutor-disqualification argument (no controlling circuit caselaw on point).
  • United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2013): Provided the Rule 403-style balance underpinning the admission of potentially prejudicial evidence (internet searches), where probative value (intent/plan) can outweigh prejudice.
  • United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2022): A key analogy: threats against a judge do not require recusal. The court invoked this reasoning to reject the notion that threats against a prosecutor, standing alone, compel disqualification—especially where such a rule would invite strategic threats.
  • United States v. Scott, 150 F.4th 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2010): Standards for sufficiency review—whether any rational trier could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Frazier, 129 F.4th 392, 406 (7th Cir. 2025) (and at 403–04): Supported admission of “consciousness of guilt” evidence (alibi-fabrication letters) and reinforced that transporting a kidnapping victim can satisfy the “carried away” concept.
  • United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2006) and Yu Tian Li v. United States, 648 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2011): Governing mistrial/limiting-instruction doctrine—mistrial is reserved for serious incurable prejudice; juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions.
  • United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2008): Controls the conjunctive-indictment/disjunctive-instruction point: a court may instruct in the disjunctive even if the indictment is conjunctive.
  • United States v. Heon Seok Lee, 937 F.3d 797, 806 (7th Cir. 2019): Used to reject “fatal variance” arguments where the proof does not differ materially from the indictment’s allegations.
  • United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2020): Standard for Rule 33 new-trial relief: whether letting the verdict stand would be a miscarriage of justice.
  • United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022): Reinforced forfeiture principles where the defendant agreed with the guidelines calculation.
  • United States v. Ranjel, 872 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2017): Confirmed that the obstruction enhancement applies to attempted obstruction, not only successful obstruction.
  • United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2021): Sentencing courts need address principal mitigation arguments; they need not mechanically discuss every detail.
  • United States v. Keskes, 703 F.3d 1078, 1090–91 (7th Cir. 2013): Authorized consideration of lack of remorse in sentencing (within constitutional boundaries) as relevant to deterrence/rehabilitation.
  • United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022): Within-guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable; adequate explanation tied to § 3553(a) sustains substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2019): Waiver/forfeiture and presumptive reasonableness principles applied to supervised release issues.

Legal Reasoning

1) Admission of internet-search evidence (Rule 403 balancing)

The court accepted counsel’s assessment that challenging admission of the phone’s search history would be frivolous. Although the “penalty for third-degree murder” search carried prejudice (because no murder charge was brought), its probative value lay in showing intent and willingness to employ lethal force in connection with the kidnapping scheme, consistent with United States v. Eads.

2) Disqualification of the prosecutor after threats (28 U.S.C. § 528; 28 C.F.R. § 45.2)

The opinion’s most policy-significant analysis rejected a theory that threats against a prosecutor, without more, require disqualification. The court parsed the statutory/regulatory framework:

  • 28 U.S.C. § 528 requires the Attorney General to issue regulations providing for disqualification where participation “may result in a personal … conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof.”
  • The implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2), defines relevant “personal relationship” in terms of a “close and substantial connection” likely to induce partiality, with presumptions for close family relationships.

Because the prosecutor “was threatened” but “had no other relationship with Maclin-Carney,” the court found no plausible textual fit for a “personal conflict” under § 528 as implemented by § 45.2. It further reasoned that adopting the defendant’s reading would be “neither textual nor sensible” because it would incentivize threats as a tactic for “shopping” for prosecutors—an analysis bolstered by the analogous judge-recusal principle in United States v. Walsh.

The court also relied on United States v. Easter to stress that the lack of on-point circuit authority did not prevent rejection of the claim as frivolous at the Anders stage.

3) Sufficiency of the evidence

Under United States v. Scott, the record supported a rational jury’s verdict: victim identification (including in-court), surveillance, matching vehicle damage, phone apps consistent with ransom-call concealment and remote access, incriminating searches, and strong physical forensics (DNA, fingerprints, fibers). On this evidentiary record, a sufficiency challenge could not meet the “no rational trier of fact” threshold.

4) Alibi-fabrication letters as “consciousness of guilt” evidence

The court approved admission of the letters as classic consciousness-of-guilt evidence under United States v. Frazier. The defendant’s objection that she ultimately did not present an alibi defense did not neutralize relevance: efforts to fabricate an alibi tend to show awareness of guilt regardless of whether the alibi is later used.

5) Denial of mistrial after witness referenced “threats”

When a witness stated she withheld a letter due to “threats on my life,” the court excluded further testimony about the new letter and issued a limiting instruction. Under United States v. Danford and Yu Tian Li v. United States, the appellate court found it frivolous to claim incurable prejudice warranting mistrial, especially because the witness did not identify the defendant as the source of the threats and jurors are presumed to follow limiting instructions.

6) Kidnapping elements: conjunctive indictment vs. disjunctive instruction; “carried away”

The defendant argued that because the indictment listed multiple verbs conjunctively (“seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried away”), the government had to prove all of them. The court relied on United States v. Rice to reaffirm the standard rule: statutes framed in the disjunctive may be charged conjunctively, and the jury may be instructed disjunctively so long as the instruction accurately states the law.

On the “carried away” concept, the court rejected any suggestion that physical carrying is required; transporting the victim by vehicle suffices, consistent with the discussion in Frazier (129 F.4th at 403–04).

7) Variance and post-trial motions

No “fatal variance” existed because the proof tracked the indictment’s allegations; United States v. Heon Seok Lee guided that conclusion. Post-trial challenges under Rules 29 and 33 failed under Doody and Friedman because the evidence was ample. The Rule 34 arrest-of-judgment motion was also rejected (including as untimely insofar as it resembled a Rule 12(b)(3) challenge).

8) Sentencing: guidelines calculation, obstruction, mitigation, remorse, substantive reasonableness, supervised release

  • Procedural reasonableness / forfeiture: Any guidelines-calculation challenge was foreclosed where the defendant agreed with the calculation, invoking United States v. Boyle.
  • Obstruction enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): Attempted obstruction is enough; letters need not succeed, per United States v. Ranjel.
  • Mitigation: The court addressed the principal mitigation themes (upbringing, parenting, mental health/substance abuse), as required by United States v. Sanchez.
  • Lack of remorse: Consideration was permissible for deterrence/rehabilitation purposes under United States v. Keskes.
  • Substantive reasonableness: A within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and was supported by a § 3553(a)-based explanation, consistent with United States v. Major.
  • Supervised release: No preserved challenge; issues were waived/forfeited under United States v. Flores, and the within-range term was presumptively reasonable under United States v. Lickers.

Impact

Formally, the disposition is designated NONPRECEDENTIAL and “to be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1,” limiting its binding effect. Practically, however, the order is informative in three ways:

  1. Prosecutor-disqualification claims based on threats face steep headwinds: The court’s textual approach to 28 U.S.C. § 528 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, coupled with its policy concern about incentivizing threats (“shopping”), signals skepticism toward disqualification absent a preexisting “personal relationship” or other concrete conflict.
  2. Consciousness-of-guilt evidence remains broadly admissible: Efforts to fabricate an alibi can be admitted even when the defense later abandons an alibi theory, reinforcing that relevance turns on the defendant’s conduct and intent, not strategic follow-through.
  3. Anders screening remains robust: The order illustrates that the Seventh Circuit will dispose of a wide range of issues at the Anders stage where governing law is settled and the record is strong—reducing the likelihood of merits briefing when objections are preserved but legally foreclosed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anders brief: When an appointed lawyer believes an appeal has no arguable merit, counsel may ask to withdraw and file a brief identifying potential issues. The court then independently checks whether any nonfrivolous issue exists.
  • Rule 403 balancing: Even relevant evidence can be excluded if its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Here, the murder-penalty search was prejudicial but probative of intent within the kidnapping scheme.
  • “Consciousness of guilt”: Conduct like fabricating an alibi can be used as circumstantial evidence suggesting the defendant knew she was guilty.
  • Conjunctive indictment vs. disjunctive proof: Prosecutors often charge statutory alternatives using “and” in the indictment, but the jury may be instructed that proving any one alternative (“or”) is enough, so long as the statute works that way.
  • Variance: A variance occurs when proof at trial differs materially from what the indictment alleged. Not every discrepancy matters; it must be meaningful and prejudicial.
  • Obstruction enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): The guidelines can increase the offense level if the defendant attempted to obstruct justice; success is not required.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness concerns correct calculation and proper consideration of factors; substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is defensible given the § 3553(a) factors.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s dismissal in United States v. Ademeko Maclin-Carney is primarily an Anders application to a factually strong kidnapping conviction, but it contains an especially salient point on conflicts: threats against a prosecutor, without a qualifying “personal relationship” or comparable conflict recognized by 28 U.S.C. § 528 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, do not supply a viable basis for disqualification—both as a matter of text and to avoid incentivizing strategic intimidation. Alongside reaffirmations of established doctrines (consciousness-of-guilt evidence, disjunctive instructions, limiting-instruction presumptions, and within-guidelines sentencing deference), the order underscores how settled law can render a wide array of objections nonstarters on appeal when the evidentiary record is substantial.