The Reinforced “Four-Corners” Doctrine: Wisconsin Supreme Court Re-limits the Governor’s Partial-Veto Power (Wisconsin State Legislature v. DPI, 2025 WI 27)

The Reinforced “Four-Corners” Doctrine:
Wisconsin Supreme Court Re-limits the Governor’s Partial-Veto Power

Commentary on Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 2025 WI 27

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s unanimous decision in Wisconsin State Legislature v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (“Legislature v. DPI”) re-draws a bright constitutional line around the Governor’s partial-veto authority and clarifies the legislature’s exclusive power over appropriations. The controversy arose out of a trilogy of enactments related to statewide literacy initiatives:

  • 2023 Wis. Act 19 (biennial budget) – appropriated over $250 million to the Joint Committee on Finance (JCF) supplemental account, with an internal, non-binding earmark of $50 million for future literacy programming.
  • 2023 Wis. Act 20 – created an Office of Literacy and two new literacy programs but did not appropriate funds to run them.
  • 2023 Wis. Act 100 – originated as S.B. 971; it created two segregated accounts for the Act 20 programs while appropriating “$0/$0.”

Governor Evers partially vetoed S.B. 971, collapsing its two accounts into one unrestricted literacy fund and eliminating sunset clauses—an action the Legislature contended exceeded his partial-veto power because the bill contained no appropriation. Simultaneously, the Governor and the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) claimed JCF unlawfully refused to release the $49.67 million remainder of the earmarked literacy monies.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Partial-Veto Held Unconstitutional. S.B. 971/Act 100 was not an appropriation bill because within its “four corners” it set aside no public funds. The Governor therefore lacked Article V §10(1)(b) authority to veto it in part.
  • Original Bill Revived. Due to the invalid veto, S.B. 971 as passed by both houses became law in its untouched form.
  • JCF’s Withholding Upheld. The $50 million remained legally appropriated to JCF. DPI had no enforceable right to compel the transfer, and §13.101 procedures (or alleged constitutional infirmities) did not change that fact.
  • Result: Legislature wins on the veto issue, loses on its earlier defeat below; Governor/DPI lose on the funding counterclaim; circuit-court judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

  1. State ex rel. Finnegan v. Dammann, 220 Wis. 143 (1936)
    Introduced the four-corners rule: a bill is an “appropriation bill” only if it contains, within its own text, an appropriation—i.e., a setting aside of public funds for a public purpose.
  2. State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679 (1978)
    Reaffirmed Finnegan and applied it in the campaign-finance context, stressing that an appropriation must both set aside money and authorize its expenditure.
  3. Risser v. Klauser, 207 Wis. 2d 176 (1997)
    Clarified that bond-authorization language is not an “appropriation” and emphasized the need for a “bright-line” rule to curtail perpetual inter-branch litigation.
  4. Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68 (per curiam)  and  C.U.B. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 484
    Cited to illustrate prior instances in which invalid partial vetoes resulted in revival of original legislation and limitations on “write-in” vetoes.

These cases collectively formed the backbone for the Court’s holding: only legislation that appropriates money on its face can be partially vetoed.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Original Public Meaning of “Appropriation Bill”.
    The Court adhered to the framers’ 1930 intent: partial-veto authority was granted only to curb logrolling abuses in “jumbo” spending measures. Any broader reading, it warned, would shift legislative power to the executive contrary to Article V.
  2. Rejection of the “Interlocking Bills” Theory.
    The circuit court had deemed Acts 19, 20, 100 a single legislative package. The Supreme Court rejected this holistic view as amorphous and unpredictable, likening it to an “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” test and warning of endless litigation.
  3. Textual Application to S.B. 971.
    S.B. 971 appropriated “$0” and merely created fiscal accounts—therefore no “set-aside” of monies, no appropriation, no partial-veto power.
  4. Legislature’s Exclusive Appropriation Power.
    Relying on Article VIII §2, the Court held it had no equitable or constitutional authority to shift funds from the JCF appropriation to DPI.
  5. Non-justiciability of JCF’s Statutory Discretion.
    Whether JCF met the “emergency” prerequisites of §13.101(3) was immaterial because—even if it failed—DPI still would not automatically receive the money; thus deciding that question would be an advisory opinion.

3.3 Likely Impact on Wisconsin Public Law

  • Tethering the Governor’s Pen. After years of aggressive partial-veto maneuvers, the decision unmistakably restricts the executive to true appropriation bills—and only those containing their own dollar figures or fiscal set-asides.
  • Legislative Drafting Strategies. The Court green-lights the tactic of splitting policy provisions from budget bills. Legislators can now insulate program-creating statutes from gubernatorial surgery by ensuring such bills carry no appropriation line.
  • Budget Process Dynamics. Governors may need to negotiate up-front policy concessions rather than rely on post-passage veto creativity. Expect heightened legislative-executive bargaining earlier in the session.
  • Judicial Predictability. The “bright-line” four-corners reaffirmation reduces litigation risk: future disputes will hinge on a plain textual check—does the bill itself appropriate money?
  • Joint Committee on Finance. The decision leaves intact the legislature’s long-standing mechanism (§13.101) for supplementing agency budgets, potentially inviting renewed separation-of-powers challenges but with higher hurdles.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Partial Veto: Unique Wisconsin power allowing the Governor to veto specific parts of an appropriation bill (but not general bills) while signing the rest into law.
  • Appropriation Bill: Legislation that both sets aside public funds and authorizes their expenditure. Must contain the appropriation in its own text (“four corners”).
  • Four-Corners Rule: Courts examine only the text of the bill itself to decide whether it is an appropriation bill; outside context or related statutes are irrelevant.
  • Logrolling: The legislative practice of combining unrelated provisions so different voting blocs support a single measure—one of the vices the 1930 amendment sought to mitigate.
  • Joint Committee on Finance (JCF): A bicameral legislative committee that can, under §13.101, supplement agency budgets in limited “emergency” circumstances using funds already appropriated to it.
  • “Release by the Committee” Clauses: Statutory conditions requiring JCF approval before an appropriation becomes spendable; §13.101(7) addresses cases where such release conditions are constitutionally invalid.

5. Conclusion

Legislature v. DPI is a watershed decision re-anchoring Wisconsin’s separation of powers. By reinforcing the four-corners doctrine, the Court curtailed decades of expansive gubernatorial veto practice, restored certainty for legislative drafters, and reaffirmed the Legislature’s exclusive purse-string authority. At the same time, it refused to convert policy hopes or extrinsic budget notes into judicially enforceable rights, emphasizing that “it is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” Going forward, any Governor eyeing creative vetoes will confront a clear textual checkpoint: If the bill itself does not explicitly appropriate money, the partial-veto pen must remain capped.

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