State v. Kalina: Franks Hearing Limited to Search Warrants and Reaffirmation of Criminal Procedure Standards

Introduction

In State of Montana v. Justin Dean Kalina, 2025 MT 70, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a broad array of procedural and substantive criminal‐law issues arising from Mr. Kalina’s convictions for Violation of a Protective Order (second offense), Assault with a Weapon, and Tampering with Witnesses and Informants. The Court examined eight issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of evidence for assault, jury instructions regarding defense of an occupied structure, the scope of “opening the door” for prior‐acts evidence under Rule 404(b), the necessity of pretrial and suppression hearings, enforcement of a rejected plea offer, the propriety of sentencing decisions, ineffective assistance claims, and challenges to jury selection procedures. In doing so, the Court reiterated that the Fourth Amendment “Franks” hearing procedure applies only to search‐warrant challenges—not to motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause—and reaffirmed long‐standing Montana standards for justifiable use of force, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, plea bargaining, sentencing, and jury panel formation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court’s July 18, 2023 judgment in all respects. Key holdings include:

1. Evidence sufficed to support the Assault with a Weapon conviction; a jury could credit the victim’s version and reject Mr. Kalina’s self‐defense claim once he exited his vehicle and invited confrontation.
2. No abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct on “Use of Force in Defense of an Occupied Structure” because a car not equipped for habitation is not an “occupied structure.”
3. Rule 404(b) prior‐conviction evidence was properly admitted after Mr. Kalina “opened the door” by testifying he had “never been in an encounter” like the one at issue.
4. No statutory or constitutional mandate required evidentiary hearings on (a) Mr. Kalina’s motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause (Franks‐style hearing); (b) his motion to suppress statements to law enforcement; or (c) his first motion for new trial.
5. The plea offer was unenforceable because Mr. Kalina countered, thereby rejecting the State’s original offer.
6. The sentencing judge did not impose a “trial tax” and adequately explained the departure from the plea recommendation.
7. Ineffective‐assistance claims based on counsel’s rejection of the plea offer failed on the merits; claims concerning text messages and timing of withdrawal lacked factual support in the record.
8. The clerk’s failure to forward nonresponsive jurors to the sheriff did not undermine jury‐selection integrity under the substantial‐compliance standard reaffirmed in State v. Hillious.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Franks v. Delaware (438 U.S. 154): establishes hearing rights for search‐warrant affidavit challenges; Court declines to extend it to motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause.
• State v. Bashor (188 Mont. 397): vehicle not an “occupied structure” absent habitation features.
• State v. McGhee (2021 MT 193): “opening the door” principle for Rule 404(b) evidence.
• State v. Hillious (2025 MT 53): substantial compliance in jury formation; nonresponse service failures do not automatically warrant relief.
• Montana statutes governing use of force (§§ 45-3-102 to ‑115, MCA), jury selection (§ 3-15-405), plea agreements (§ 28-2-102), and motions for new trial (§ 46-16-702).

2. Legal Reasoning

• Franks Hearing Limitation: The Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s Franks procedure—requiring a hearing when a warrant affidavit contains alleged false statements—originates in search‐warrant jurisprudence. Because a criminal‐charge information requires only probable cause to its own elements and is not a Fourth Amendment “affidavit,” no Franks hearing is mandated for motions to dismiss.

• Occupied Structure Defense: Under § 45-2-101(47), vehicles qualify as “occupied structures” only if equipped for human occupancy or lodging. Because Mr. Kalina’s car lacked such features, the District Court properly refused the instruction.

• Rule 404(b) Door‐Opening: When Mr. Kalina testified on direct that he had “never been in an encounter” like the fight, he created a false impression that allowed the State, under McGhee, to cross‐examine him about prior assault convictions.

• Evidentiary Hearings: Sections 46-13-301 and ‑302, MCA, and Rule 46-16-702 do not mandate suppression or new‐trial hearings whenever a motion is filed. The District Court correctly exercised discretion where no disputed factual predicate required resolution.

• Plea Offer Rejection: Contract‐law principles govern plea agreements. A counteroffer constitutes a rejection, extinguishing the original offer. Mr. Kalina’s counsel communicated both a counteroffer and explicit rejection to the court and State.

• Trial Tax: A judge’s sentencing remarks must identify reasons for a harsher sentence if the court participated in plea negotiations. Here, the judge denied involvement and, in any event, articulated valid aggravating factors.

• Ineffective Assistance: Under Strickland, counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable in advising rejection of the offer after consultation; two other claims lacked record support and must be raised postconviction.

• Jury Selection Substantial Compliance: Failure to serve non‐responding jurors personally did not show systematic exclusion or prejudice to Kalina under the fair‐cross‐section requirement.

3. Impact

• Franks Procedure: Future motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause will not trigger Franks hearings; defendants must rely on other pretrial remedies.
• Use of Force Jury Instructions: Trial courts will refuse “occupied structure” instructions for ordinary vehicles unless evidence shows habitation features.
• Rule 404(b) Practice: Defendants who testify to a spotless violent history risk impeachment with prior convictions under the door‐opening doctrine.
• Plea Negotiations: Counsel and defendants must appreciate that any counteroffer forecloses later enforcement of the original offer.
• Jury Selection: Clerks’ actions must substantially comply with § 3-15-405; minor service lapses alone will not invalidate juries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Franks Hearing: A special court hearing to challenge a search‐warrant affidavit’s truthfulness; not available to fight an information’s probable‐cause basis.
2. “Occupied Structure”: A house, business, or vehicle used like a home—merely sitting in a parked car does not qualify.
3. “Opening the Door”: If a defendant’s testimony suggests innocence or good character, the prosecutor may ask about prior bad acts to correct that impression.
4. Counteroffer: Saying “no, but how about this” to a plea deal wipes out the original offer; it cannot later be revived by “yes.”
5. Substantial Compliance: As long as the jury‐selection process roughly follows the law and remains random, minor paperwork or notice errors will not automatically overturn a verdict.

Conclusion

State v. Kalina reinforces key principles of Montana criminal procedure: the Fourth Amendment’s Franks hearing is confined to search‐warrant contexts; ordinary vehicles are not “occupied structures” for force‐defense purposes; defendants who testify to spotless violent records risk “opening the door” to prior‐acts impeachment; plea deals are governed by contract law and perish upon counteroffer; sentencing courts need not penalize the exercise of trial rights absent participation in plea talks; and jury‐selection defects demand proof of prejudice under a substantial‐compliance standard. This decision provides clarity to practitioners and trial courts on the limits of evidentiary hearings, justification defenses, and procedural safeguards.