Revocation Limits in Montana: Courts May Revoke Only Suspended/Deferred Time—Not the Probationary Remainder of a Custodial Sentence

1. Introduction

In State v. Sanchez, the Montana Supreme Court confronted a recurring sentencing-administration problem: how to calculate and characterize the “time left” on a DUI sentence when the defendant completes DOC residential treatment and, by statute, serves the remainder of the custodial sentence on probation—while also owing a separate block of suspended time.

Parties and posture. The State of Montana prosecuted Christopher Sanchez for felony DUI. After an original sentence and one prior revocation, Sanchez appealed from a second revocation disposition entered January 3, 2024, arguing the district court unlawfully extended his sentence by revoking more time than remained available.

Core issue. Whether the district court illegally extended Sanchez’s sentence by including the probationary period of the custodial sentence within the time it revoked as “suspended” time—thereby imposing DOC commitment time the court lacked statutory authority to impose on revocation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that, although the district court’s total day-count did not exceed the original six-year term, the court committed a different legal error: it treated probationary time remaining on the original custodial sentence as if it were suspended time and revoked it. Under Montana’s revocation statute, the court may revoke only suspended or deferred time; it has no mechanism to “revoke” an active custodial sentence (even if that custodial sentence is being served on probation due to a DUI treatment statute).

Accordingly, the Court reversed in part and remanded with directions to correct the disposition so it revokes only the 1,204 days of suspended time remaining as of January 3, 2024—not the additional 206 days that were part of the probationary remainder of the original custodial term.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• State v. Torres, 2017 MT 177, ¶ 6, 388 Mont. 161, 398 P.3d 279.
  The Court relied on Torres for the standard of review: revocation decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. This framing mattered because the key dispute turned on statutory authority (a legal question), not merely case-specific discretion.
• State v. Toulouse, 2024 MT 184, ¶ 8, 418 Mont. 1, 554 P.3d 706.
  Toulouse supplied the controlling principle that shaped the outcome: under the revocation framework, a district court’s authority is limited to revocation of suspended time, and the statute “provides no mechanism for a court to revoke an ‘active’ custodial sentence upon petition by the State.” The Court used Toulouse to identify the precise category error below—revoking something that was not “suspended.”
• State v. Youpee, 2018 MT 102, ¶ 11, 391 Mont. 246, 416 P.3d 1050.
  The Court applied Youpee to the “street time” dispute. Even if a district court fails to state reasons for granting/denying street time credit, that defect is waivable when the sentence is facially legal and within statutory mandates. Because neither party objected to the district court’s 338-day street time credit calculation, the Court treated any re-litigation of that issue as waived on remand.
• State v. Kortan, 2022 MT 204, ¶ 11, 410 Mont. 336, 518 P.3d 1283 (quoting State v. Tippet, 2022 MT 81, ¶ 10, 408 Mont. 249, 509 P.3d 1).
  These cases anchored the Court’s distinction between mandatory and discretionary credits. “Calculating credit for time served is not a discretionary act, but a legal mandate.” Thus, on remand, while street time credit is not to be reconsidered due to waiver, any additional detention time shown by the record must be credited.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The day-count did not exceed the original sentence, but the legal characterization was wrong

Sanchez argued the January 3, 2024 disposition was illegal because it imposed “five years and three months” DOC when only “three years and three months” of suspended time remained. The Court agreed the district court’s approach was flawed, but clarified that the illegality was not simply a mathematical “longer-than-original” problem. The Court found:

• The district court was trying to stay within the original six-year cap.
• Yet it intermixed two distinct components of the original sentence:
  • probationary remainder of the custodial sentence (triggered by successful completion of WATCh under the DUI statute), and
  • the separate four-year suspended term.

B. The DUI treatment statute converts remaining custodial time into probationary service—without transforming it into “suspended time”

A crucial statutory pivot was § 61-8-731, MCA (2019), which requires that if the defendant successfully completes an approved residential alcohol treatment program, “the remainder of the sentence must be served on probation.” The district court treated this probationary remainder of the original custodial sentence as if it were part of the suspended time “available to revoke.”

The Supreme Court rejected that move. The fact that custodial time is being “served on probation” under § 61-8-731 does not mean it becomes “suspended time.” It remains part of the custodial sentence component—served in a probationary posture due to statute—rather than an independently suspended block that can be revoked and converted into DOC commitment.

C. Revocation authority reaches only suspended/deferred portions

Relying on the revocation statute, § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, and the interpretation in State v. Toulouse, the Court emphasized a boundary principle:

• A district court may revoke the suspension of a sentence (or deferred time where applicable).
• The statute provides no mechanism to revoke an “active” custodial sentence upon petition by the State.

Applying that principle, the Court concluded that as of January 3, 2024, Sanchez had:

• 206 days remaining that were part of the original custodial sentence (required by the DUI treatment statute to be “served on probation”), and
• 1,204 days of true suspended time available to revoke.

The district court exceeded its authority by revoking the 206 days and imposing them as DOC commitment. The remedy was therefore targeted: remand to revoke only the suspended-time remainder (1,204 days).

D. Credits: waiver for street time; mandate for detention time

The Court addressed two distinct credit regimes under § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA:

• Street time credit (discretionary; waiver applies). The district court credited 338 days of elapsed, violation-free time. Because neither side objected, the Court held any challenge was waived under State v. Youpee.
• Detention time credit (mandatory; no discretion). The Court reiterated under State v. Kortan (quoting State v. Tippet) that credit for time served is a legal mandate. If the record shows additional detention days beyond those already credited, Sanchez must receive them.

3.3 Impact

A. Clarifies a common sentencing-administration trap in DUI treatment cases

The decision draws a firm line between:

• suspended time (revocable into DOC commitment), and
• probationary service of custodial time mandated by § 61-8-731, MCA (2019) (not revocable as suspended time).

This matters in WATCh/residential-treatment scenarios where courts, probation officers, and counsel may speak loosely about “time remaining,” potentially collapsing distinct sentencing categories into one revocable bucket.

B. Encourages precision in revocation pleadings and orders

The Court issued a practical caution (¶19): prosecutors should seek revocation of specific periods of suspended/deferred time; district courts should revoke only specific periods; and defendants should actively present and litigate detention and street time credits. This guidance is likely to influence how revocation petitions are drafted and how dispositions are orally pronounced and memorialized.

C. Reinforces waiver doctrine in credit disputes while preserving mandatory detention credits

By pairing Youpee (waiver for street time reasoning defects) with Kortan/Tippet (mandatory detention credit), the Court signals that parties must timely object to discretionary credit determinations, but courts must still ensure the non-discretionary arithmetic of detention credit is correct.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Custodial sentence: the portion ordered to be served under DOC custody (e.g., “2 years DOC”). Some statutes can require that part of it be “served on probation” after treatment—without converting it into suspended time.
• Suspended sentence / suspended time: time imposed but not served in custody unless the suspension is revoked. This is the classic “hanging over your head” portion that can be imposed if probation is violated.
• Revocation: the court’s process (on petition) to determine whether conditions were violated and, if so, to revoke only what the statute permits—here, suspended/deferred time.
• Street time credit: credit for time spent in the community while complying with supervision; treated as discretionary and subject to waiver if not properly preserved.
• Credit for time served (detention credit): credit for actual confinement in jail/detention; treated as mandatory—courts must award it when supported by the record.

5. Conclusion

State v. Sanchez establishes (and operationalizes) a clear rule for Montana revocation practice: courts may revoke only suspended or deferred time; they may not, on a revocation petition, convert the probationary remainder of a custodial sentence—including custodial time statutorily required to be served on probation after residential DUI treatment—into DOC commitment. The Court’s targeted remand (revoking only the 1,204 days of suspended time) and its paired credit holdings (waiver for street time disputes; mandatory detention credit) provide a roadmap for cleaner revocation calculations and tighter, category-accurate disposition orders going forward.