Recent, Temporary Parental Improvements Do Not Defeat Termination Under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(v) After 15 of 22 Months in Foster Care

Introduction

Case: In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: BAR, Minor Child, Heather Dawn Ritchie v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services, 2026 WY 13 (Wyo. Jan. 23, 2026).

The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Heather Dawn Ritchie’s (“Mother”) parental rights to BAR after a five-day bench trial. The Wyoming Department of Family Services (“DFS” or “the Department”) petitioned to terminate under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v), and the district court terminated under both provisions. On appeal, Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Court treated § 14-2-309(a)(v) as dispositive and affirmed on that ground alone.

The core dispute was not the statutory “time in care” requirement—Mother did not contest that BAR had been in foster care under the State’s responsibility for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months—but whether Mother was “unfit to have custody and control” of BAR at the time of trial, particularly in light of Mother’s claimed late-stage improvements (housing, work, transportation, counseling, and sobriety).

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reaffirmed that termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v) requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of two elements: (1) the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and (2) the parent is unfit to have custody and control of the child.

With the first element conceded and established as a “mathematical question,” the Court focused on unfitness and upheld the district court’s finding that Mother was unfit based on a combination of factors persisting over the life of the case: failure to sufficiently address mental health issues, inability to maintain safe and stable housing, inconsistency in visitation (including five months of no contact while incarcerated), and unresolved substance abuse (positive THC tests, missed UAs, and termination from the Drug Court Program). The Court held that Mother’s “temporary or recent improvements do not outweigh a long history of instability,” and emphasized the child’s right to stability and permanency.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Matter of PML, 2024 WY 37, ¶ 19, 545 P.3d 856, 860 (Wyo. 2024): The Court relied on this articulation of the termination standard of review—strict scrutiny in light of the competing interests, the requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence, and the appellate lens that views evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below while discounting conflicting evidence from the unsuccessful party. This framework largely explains why Mother’s evidence of late improvements did not control the outcome on appeal; the Supreme Court assessed whether clear and convincing evidence supported the district court’s determination, not whether the record could also support a different result.
• Matter of JPL, ¶ 21, 493 P.3d at 180 (as cited) and In re BAD, 2019 WY 83, ¶ 15, 446 P.3d 222, 225-26 (Wyo. 2019): These authorities supported the Court’s decision to affirm on a single statutory ground (here, § 14-2-309(a)(v)) without addressing all grounds found by the district court. This is a consequential procedural point: once one ground is sustained by clear and convincing evidence, the termination judgment stands.
• Matter of LCH, 2019 WY 13, ¶ 10, 434 P.3d 100, 102 (Wyo. 2019): The Court used this case for the proposition that the “fifteen of twenty-two months” requirement is a “mathematical question.” By characterizing the first element in this way, the Court narrows litigation to the second element—unfitness—once the timeline is established.
• In re BAD, ¶ 16, 446 P.3d at 226 and Matter of JPL, ¶ 23, 493 P.3d at 180: These cases supply the working definition of “unfit” as the ability to meet the child’s “ongoing physical, mental and emotional needs,” and stress that fitness is case-specific. The Court used these principles to evaluate Mother’s situation holistically, tying mental health treatment, housing stability, visitation consistency, and substance use to parenting capacity.
• Matter of JPL, ¶ 24, 493 P.3d at 180 (quoting In re BAD, ¶ 16, 446 P.3d at 226): The opinion emphasizes that termination is rarely justified by a single incident; courts look to a “combination of factors, incidents, and conditions” over time. This directly tracks the district court’s reasoning and the Supreme Court’s affirmance: Mother’s unfitness was established by persistent patterns, not one isolated event.
• LeBlanc v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2017 WY 107, ¶ 23, 401 P.3d 932, 936 (Wyo. 2017): The Court reproduced LeBlanc’s non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to unfitness (e.g., unstable living situation, ongoing drug use, criminal record, inability to provide a safe environment, unsafe associates, and visitation problems). The list functioned as a doctrinal checklist aligning with the district court’s findings: unstable housing, substance use, domestic violence, and the child’s disruption from inconsistent visitation all fit within LeBlanc’s framework.
• Matter of KGS, 2017 WY 2, ¶ 16, 386 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting PRG v. State, Dep't of Family Servs. (In re KMO), 2012 WY 100, ¶ 20, 280 P.3d 1216, [1223] (Wyo. 2012)): The Court applied the rule that while fitness is determined “at the time of trial,” the court does not ignore past conduct; past behavior is relevant to present fitness. This precedent underpins the Court’s treatment of Mother’s late improvements as insufficient to erase a lengthy, documented pattern of instability.
• Matter of GGMC, 2020 WY 50, ¶ 25, 460 P.3d 1138, 1146 (Wyo. 2020): Cited for the proposition that past behavior is “plainly relevant” in determining fitness. In practice, it validates reliance on the full case history (mental health noncompliance, housing moves, domestic violence, drug use, visitation inconsistency), rather than a snapshot at trial.
• In re AD, 2007 WY 23, ¶ 29, 151 P.3d 1102, 1109 (Wyo. 2007) and In re AD, ¶ 31, 151 P.3d at 1109-10: These citations do the opinion’s most explicit “work” in addressing Mother’s appellate theory. The Court invoked In re AD to reaffirm that short-lived stability (e.g., housing shortly before the hearing) does not override a long history of instability. It also reiterated that children have a right to stability and permanency and “cannot wait indefinitely for parents to achieve stability.” The present opinion thus continues Wyoming’s line of cases rejecting “last-minute” remediation as a bar to termination when the longer record shows chronic unfitness.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory selection and dispositive ground: Because the district court terminated under both § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v), and because Wyoming law allows affirmance on any single supported ground, the Court elected to analyze § 14-2-309(a)(v) alone (relying on Matter of JPL and In re BAD). This approach reinforces that appellate reversals are unlikely where one statutory basis is strongly supported, even if another might be arguable.
2. Element one—time in care—is objective: The Court treated the fifteen-of-twenty-two-months requirement as a straightforward calculation (Matter of LCH), and Mother did not dispute it. This moved the case directly to the unfitness inquiry.
3. Element two—unfitness—requires a holistic evaluation over time: Applying In re BAD, Matter of JPL, and LeBlanc v. State Dep't of Family Servs., the Court evaluated whether Mother could meet BAR’s ongoing needs by examining patterns across multiple domains:
   • Mental health noncompliance: Evidence showed multiple diagnoses, inconsistent counseling, “no call/no shows,” switching providers, and limited progress, all of which delayed reunification. The Court treated these as directly relevant to parenting capacity rather than as isolated personal difficulties.
   • Housing instability and unsafe relationships: Mother had numerous addresses and frequently moved in with romantic partners; the record included domestic violence and drug use in these living environments. This instability prevented progression to in-home or unsupervised visits and supported the district court’s finding that Mother could not provide a safe, stable home.
   • Visitation inconsistency and lack of contact: Mother declined all video visitation during five months of incarceration and later missed a substantial portion of scheduled visits, resulting in a “time contract” and professional concerns that inconsistency harmed BAR.
   • Substance abuse: Mother admitted methamphetamine use at case inception, had repeated THC positives, missed UAs, and was terminated from the Drug Court Program. The Court characterized these as unresolved safety risks persisting for more than two years.
4. Late improvements do not erase chronic patterns: Mother argued she had improved by trial, but the Court—applying the clear-and-convincing standard and viewing the record favorably to DFS—held the district court could still find unfitness because “temporary or recent improvements do not outweigh a long history of instability” (In re AD). The Court also grounded the analysis in the child’s interest in permanency, reiterating that children cannot wait indefinitely.

Impact

Although the opinion largely applies established doctrine, it meaningfully consolidates several recurring principles into an accessible termination analysis under § 14-2-309(a)(v):

• § 14-2-309(a)(v) is a powerful, streamlined termination path once the “fifteen of twenty-two months” timeline is met. The litigation center of gravity becomes unfitness, and appellate courts will often treat other grounds as unnecessary to reach.
• Unfitness is demonstrated by patterns, not single events. The Court’s affirmance underscores that parents facing termination should anticipate a totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation across time, especially where the record shows repeated relapse, repeated housing disruption, and repeated noncompliance.
• “Last-minute” compliance is not a litigation reset. The opinion strengthens the practical point for both sides: evidence of late-stage employment, transportation, or treatment engagement may help, but it does not compel a fitness finding if the broader record supports chronic instability and continuing risk.
• Visitation consistency is treated as substantive evidence of parenting capacity, not merely procedural participation. The Court credited evidence that inconsistent visitation was harmful to the child and that Mother’s choices (including declining all visitation for months) reflected on fitness.
• Case planning and services matter—but unfitness may be found even where services were offered extensively. The opinion details DFS supports (ASI funding, UAs, counseling referrals, transportation, transitional housing referrals, visitation arrangements), which helps insulate the record against arguments that the outcome was driven by lack of opportunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Clear and convincing evidence”

A heightened proof standard requiring that the factfinder be persuaded the claim is “highly probable.” It is more demanding than “preponderance of the evidence” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Strict scrutiny in termination cases

Because parental rights are fundamental, courts apply careful review to ensure statutory requirements and procedural safeguards are satisfied, while also recognizing the State’s compelling interest in child safety and welfare.

§ 14-2-309(a)(v): “15 of the most recent 22 months”

A timing threshold: if the child has been in foster care under the State’s responsibility for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months, the State may seek termination under this provision, but must still prove the parent is “unfit.”

“Unfit to have custody and control”

Not a moral judgment, but a functional one: whether the parent can meet the child’s ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs, assessed in context and based on patterns over time.

MDT (Multi-Disciplinary Team) and permanency planning

A team and process used in child welfare cases to recommend a permanency goal (e.g., reunification, adoption). A “concurrent plan” means the system may pursue reunification while simultaneously preparing for adoption if reunification fails.

ASI (Addiction Severity Index) and UAs (urinalysis tests)

Tools commonly used to assess and monitor substance use. Missed tests and positive results are often treated as evidence of ongoing substance issues.

Drug Court Program and community corrections (CRC)

Structured criminal-justice programs aimed at rehabilitation. Termination from such programs (as occurred here due to positive UAs and other noncompliance) can be evidence that substance issues remain unresolved despite significant support and supervision.

Conclusion

In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: BAR, Minor Child, Heather Dawn Ritchie v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services affirms termination under Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-309(a)(v) where the statutory time-in-care threshold is met and clear and convincing evidence shows unfitness, proven through a sustained pattern of mental health noncompliance, housing instability, inconsistent visitation, and unresolved substance abuse. The opinion’s central doctrinal reinforcement is that recent improvements—while relevant—do not necessarily overcome a long history of instability, and that the child’s need for stability and permanency is a legally significant counterweight to extended parental remediation timelines.