Mandatory Minimum Fines and Ability-to-Pay: Courts Must Impose the Statutory Minimum but Suspend It to the Extent of Inability

1. Introduction

City of Whitefish v. T. Curran (Mont. 2026 MT 65) concerns whether a sentencing court may impose a mandatory minimum DUI fine on a defendant who cannot pay, and whether suspending that fine cures any illegality. The case arises from Thomas G. Curran’s first-offense DUI per se sentencing in Whitefish Municipal Court.

The key legal tension is between: (1) statutes that prescribe a mandatory minimum fine for certain offenses (here, first-offense DUI penalties under § 61-8-722(1), MCA (2019)), and (2) Montana’s general sentencing limitation that a judge may not fine an offender unless the offender “is or will be able to pay” (§ 46-18-231(3), MCA). Curran argued the mandatory nature of the minimum fine rendered the sentencing scheme facially unconstitutional when applied to those unable to pay.

The parties were City of Whitefish (Plaintiff/Appellee) and Thomas G. Curran (Defendant/Appellant). The immediate issue on appeal was narrow: whether Curran’s sentence became illegal when, on remand, the Municipal Court imposed the $600 minimum fine but suspended it in its entirety after finding inability to pay.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Relying on its “recent decision” in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, the Court held that § 46-18-231(3), MCA can be harmonized with mandatory-minimum-fine statutes by: (a) requiring an ability-to-pay determination, and (b) using the court’s suspension authority under § 46-18-201(2), MCA (2019) to suspend the mandatory fine to the extent the defendant cannot pay.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded the Municipal Court did three things correctly: it evaluated Curran’s financial circumstances under § 46-18-231(3), MCA, imposed the statutory minimum fine under § 61-8-722(1), MCA, and then suspended the fine entirely under § 46-18-201(2), MCA. Therefore, Curran’s sentence “is not illegal.”

Three justices dissented, arguing that imposing a fine on someone unable to pay violates the plain language of § 46-18-231(3), MCA and that suspending a fine after imposing it does not cure the illegality. The dissent criticized State v. Cole as effectively departing from State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63 through “strained statutory construction.”

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2023 MT 118 (Curran I)
  Role in this case: Curran I is the direct procedural predecessor. The Court there held the Municipal Court’s original sentence was lawful but that it abused discretion by not considering authorized alternatives to satisfy the fine. Curran I recognized that under § 46-18-201(2)(a), (3)(b), MCA, the court could “suspend Curran’s fine or order donation to the food bank in lieu of monetary payment.” The present opinion is essentially the “completion” of that remand: the Municipal Court used suspension, and the Supreme Court evaluates whether that approach is legal in light of later authority (Cole).
• State v. Daricek, 2018 MT 31
  Role in this case: Cited for the standard of review: legality of sentence is reviewed de novo. It frames the Court’s task as statutory interpretation and legality, not discretionary sentencing review.
• State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63
  Role in this case: Curran relied on Gibbons for the proposition that mandatory fines are unconstitutional because they remove judicial discretion to consider proportionality factors including ability to pay. In Gibbons, the Court held a mandatory minimum fine statute for felony DUIs was facially unconstitutional. In this opinion, however, Gibbons does not control because State v. Cole has since “overruled Gibbons to the extent” it found the mandatory minimum fine facially unconstitutional.
• State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52
  Role in this case: Cole supplies the governing rule. It rejects facial invalidation and instead mandates a harmonization approach: impose the statutorily required minimum fine, determine ability to pay under § 46-18-231(3), MCA, and suspend all or part of the fine under § 46-18-201(2), MCA to align with ability-to-pay limits. This opinion applies Cole directly and treats the Municipal Court’s “impose then suspend” structure as the compliant mechanism.
• State v. Vaska, 2025 MT 168 (dissent discussion)
  Role in this case: The dissent uses Vaska to show the Court recently “declined to overrule Gibbons,” underscoring the dissent’s view that Cole (and now Curran) reflects a jurisprudential shift not driven by intervening law.
• State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979) (dissent)
  Role in this case: The dissent invokes Lenihan for the principle that sentencing authority is strictly statutory, and a sentence must fall within statutory authorization. The dissent uses this to argue that § 46-18-231(3), MCA is a statutory bar to imposing a fine at all if the person cannot pay—so a later suspension cannot validate an initially unauthorized fine.
• Oregon v. Braughton, 561 P.2d 1040 (Or. App. 1977) (quoted in Lenihan; dissent)
  Role in this case: Indirectly supports the dissent’s strict view of sentencing power as limited to explicit statutory grants.

Additional authorities cited in the dissent (comparative Excessive Fines jurisprudence):

• City of Seattle v. Long, 493 P.3d 94 (Wash. 2021)
• People v. Cowan, 260 Cal. Rptr. 505 (2020)
• United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 312, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998)
• Oregon v. Goodenow, 282 P.3d 8 (Or. 2012)
• Stuart v. State Dep't of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1998)
• Colo. Dep't of Lab. & Emp. v. Dami Hosp., LLC, 2019 CO 47M, 442 P.3d 94 (Colo. 2019)
• United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2008)

How they matter here: The majority does not engage these cases, but the dissent uses them to argue that the constitutional “excessive fines” proportionality analysis should include ability to pay, and that many jurisdictions have recognized that history and proportionality require attention to the defendant’s economic circumstances. This comparative body of law supplies normative weight to the dissent’s position that ability-to-pay is not merely a discretionary consideration but a constitutional constraint.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning is fundamentally statutory harmonization, anchored in Cole:

1. No ability-to-pay exceptions in § 46-18-231(3), MCA: The Court treats the provision as broadly applicable, even when another statute prescribes a mandatory minimum fine.
2. Suspension authority in § 46-18-201(2), MCA (2019): Because sentencing judges have express authority to “suspend execution of a sentence” unless “specifically provided by statute,” the Court reads suspension as the mechanism to reconcile mandatory minimums with inability-to-pay findings.
3. Operational rule: The sentencing court must (a) impose the mandatory minimum fine to satisfy the offense-specific statute, then (b) suspend the fine “to the extent” the defendant lacks ability to pay to satisfy § 46-18-231(3), MCA.

Applying that structure, the Court emphasizes record compliance: Curran’s limited social security income, age, disability, and expenses were considered; the $600 minimum was imposed; and the fine was suspended in full conditioned on completion of remaining sentence requirements. Therefore, the sentence is legal.

3.3. Impact

The opinion’s practical effect is to entrench Cole’s framework in Montana sentencing practice, especially for offenses with mandatory minimum fines:

• Mandatory minimum fine statutes remain operable without facial invalidation: Courts can comply with both the minimum-fine mandate and ability-to-pay limits through suspension.
• Ability-to-pay hearings become central: Sentencing courts must build a record on income, expenses, prospects for future earnings, and other financial obligations, because the extent of suspension depends on that finding.
• Litigation shifts from “constitutionality” to “implementation”: Future appeals are likely to focus on whether the court meaningfully assessed ability to pay, whether the suspension decision matches the findings, and whether conditions attached to suspension are lawful and feasible.
• Potential tension remains: The dissent signals continuing disagreement about whether imposing a fine on an indigent defendant is unlawful at the moment of imposition (even if suspended). That tension could reappear if a suspended fine later gets revoked or if collateral consequences attach to the existence of a fine even while suspended.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Mandatory minimum fine”: A statute-required minimum dollar amount the court must pronounce as part of the sentence for a given offense.
• “Ability to pay” under § 46-18-231(3), MCA: A legal requirement that a judge not sentence someone to pay a fine unless they can (now or in the future). It typically requires looking at income, assets, basic living expenses, and realistic earning prospects.
• “Suspend execution of sentence” under § 46-18-201(2), MCA: The court may pronounce a sentence but delay/forgive its enforcement (in whole or in part), usually conditioned on compliance with other requirements. If conditions are violated, the suspended part can potentially be imposed later.
• “Facially unconstitutional”: A law is invalid in all (or nearly all) applications. Gibbons treated a mandatory fine statute this way; Cole (and this case) rejects that approach to the extent Gibbons did so.
• “Statutory harmonization”: A method of interpretation that reads potentially conflicting statutes together so each has effect, rather than declaring one invalid or treating one as silently overriding the other.

5. Conclusion

City of Whitefish v. T. Curran applies and reinforces State v. Cole to hold that Montana courts can lawfully address mandatory minimum fines and indigency together by: determining ability to pay under § 46-18-231(3), MCA, imposing the statutory minimum fine under the offense-specific statute, and then suspending the fine under § 46-18-201(2), MCA to the extent the defendant cannot pay.

The majority’s approach preserves mandatory-minimum-fine statutes while aiming to protect indigent defendants through suspension; the dissent insists the statute’s plain language bars imposing any fine in the first place if the defendant cannot pay, and that suspension cannot cure an unlawful imposition. The decision’s broader significance is that Montana’s post-Cole sentencing landscape will turn less on facial constitutional invalidation and more on careful, record-based ability-to-pay determinations and tailored suspension orders.