1. Introduction
This decision addresses a central problem of interstate e-commerce: when does an online retailer become answerable in the courts of a state where it has no physical presence? It also examines whether a retailer can avoid that jurisdiction through website terms selecting its home state’s law, and whether its home-state courts must enforce an resulting out-of-state default judgment.
AF, LLC, doing business as ACF Wholesale, operated an online furniture business from Mississippi. Its sole principal, Benjamin Chad Moody, also lived in Mississippi. The company used a drop-shipping model: it accepted orders and payments, then arranged for manufacturers and independent carriers to deliver furniture directly to customers. Neither defendant maintained offices, employees, property, bank accounts, or advertising in Michigan, and neither traveled there on company business.
Nevertheless, the defendants knowingly served Michigan customers for years and arranged more than one thousand deliveries into that state. Each transaction required a delivery address, making the Michigan destination apparent before payment was accepted. Beginning in June 2020, the defendants retained payments for some furniture they never delivered and failed to provide promised refunds.
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel sued the company and Moody under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) and Michigan’s statutory conversion law. The defendants deliberately declined to appear, intending to challenge personal jurisdiction if Michigan’s judgment was later enforced in Mississippi. After Michigan entered a $124,998.68 default judgment, the Attorney General sought enrollment in Lowndes County, Mississippi.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that Michigan had personal jurisdiction over both defendants. Their deliberate commercial dealings with Michigan residents supplied the required contacts, notwithstanding their Mississippi location, third-party fulfillment arrangements, and contractual choice of Mississippi law. Accordingly, full faith and credit required recognition of the judgment.
3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning
A. Recognition of a judgment is distinct from reconsideration of its merits
The Court began with Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution, the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Under the framework stated in the opinion, Mississippi must recognize a sister-state judgment unless it was procured through qualifying fraud or the rendering court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. The defendants invoked only the jurisdictional exception.
This distinction defined the permissible inquiry. Mississippi could examine whether Michigan had authority to bind these defendants. It could not use enrollment proceedings to retry the consumer-protection claims, recalculate damages, or reconsider the penalties merely because the defendants found them excessive.
The defendants’ deliberate nonappearance preserved their opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction collaterally. But that strategy carried substantial risk: if jurisdiction existed, the adverse merits judgment remained enforceable. Choosing not to participate did not transform enrollment into a substitute Michigan trial or appeal.
B. De novo review and presumptive validity operate together
The Court distinguished two propositions that the parties’ arguments threatened to conflate. First, a sister-state judgment carries a presumption of validity, and the challenger bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating invalidity. Second, a bare jurisdictional declaration in a default judgment does not foreclose constitutional review.
Accordingly, the Michigan court’s one-sentence finding was neither conclusive nor fatal to enforcement. The Mississippi Supreme Court independently evaluated the existing record. Its conclusion rested on the defendants’ documented dealings with Michigan, not on deference to Michigan’s unexplained assertion.
The Court also declined to affirm solely on preservation grounds. The defendants had raised jurisdiction, although chiefly through their mistaken interpretation of the contract provision. Because the issue concerned a potentially void judgment, was purely legal, and had been fully briefed on a complete record, the Court resolved it. This is a case-specific decision to reach the merits, not a general elimination of appellate preservation requirements.
C. Michigan law supplied the statutory jurisdictional framework
Because Michigan rendered the judgment, Michigan’s jurisdictional law governed the collateral inquiry. The relevant long-arm provisions authorize limited personal jurisdiction based on transacting business, causing in-state consequences resulting in a tort action, and contracting to furnish materials or services in Michigan.
The defendants’ conduct satisfied those grounds. Their acknowledged thousand-plus deliveries constituted substantial business activity; their sales contemplated furnishing furniture in Michigan; and retaining Michigan customers’ payments without delivery or refund produced the consequences underlying the conversion and MCPA claims.
For Moody, the Court relied on his personal direction of the unlawful conduct. His role was therefore more than ownership of the company. The opinion does not establish that every owner or manager automatically becomes subject to personal jurisdiction wherever the business sells products.
Michigan interprets these statutes broadly, to the limits permitted by due process. Nevertheless, the opinion retained the two-step structure: statutory authorization first, constitutional validity second.
D. Purposeful availment arose from commercial decisions, not website accessibility alone
The decisive contacts were the defendants’ own choices. Michigan consumers may have initiated visits to the website, but the defendants knowingly accepted their orders, collected their money, agreed to deliver to Michigan addresses, arranged fulfillment, and continued corresponding with them afterward.
Those were bilateral commercial transactions, not unilateral consumer activity. The required shipping addresses were especially important: they showed that the defendants knew the forum destination when accepting each purchase. Repetition over several years further demonstrated deliberate service of Michigan’s market.
The Court used the Zippo internet-jurisdiction framework, but its reasoning did not depend exclusively on website interactivity. Traditional purposeful-availment principles and a totality-of-the-circumstances assessment independently supported jurisdiction. An interactive website was the mechanism through which the defendants knowingly conducted forum-directed business.
Nor did drop shipping alter the result. Outsourcing manufacturing and transportation did not change who accepted the customers’ payments or undertook to supply furniture in Michigan. Physical possession of inventory and physical presence in the forum were unnecessary.
E. Choice of law did not amount to a jurisdictional exclusion
Section 9 of the Terms of Use stated that the website operated in Mississippi and that Mississippi law governed the terms. Despite its heading, “Governing Jurisdiction of the Courts of Mississippi,” its operative language did not identify an exclusive court or require suits to be filed in Mississippi.
The Court therefore classified the provision as a choice-of-law clause, not a forum-selection clause. A contractual selection of governing law addresses which law applies to the agreement; it does not itself determine which courts can exercise personal jurisdiction.
The provision also did not reject Michigan orders. Its disclaimer about the website’s availability elsewhere was contradicted, for jurisdictional purposes, by the defendants’ sustained acceptance and fulfillment of Michigan purchases. Purposeful availment depends on actual conduct, not merely on contractual descriptions of that conduct.
Additionally, the Attorney General brought a statutory enforcement action and was not a party to the consumer contracts. The defendants did not maintain that she was contractually bound. Although the Michigan court had declared the supposed forum clause void under Michigan Compiled Laws Section 445.910(2), the Supreme Court’s analysis did not require a sweeping ruling against genuine forum-selection agreements.
Equally important, the Court did not decide that Mississippi choice-of-law provisions are generally invalid. It decided that this provision could not negate Michigan contacts or prevent this public enforcement action.
F. The alleged intentional misconduct supplied an additional jurisdictional connection
The Court also applied the intentional-tort “effects” analysis. The defendants allegedly accepted money from buyers known to be in Michigan, sometimes researched their Michigan locations, failed to deliver, and withheld promised refunds. The resulting Michigan injury was not accidental.
This alternative rationale rested on conduct directed toward the forum, not merely on the consumers’ residence there. That distinction matters: a plaintiff’s location alone cannot establish jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Here, the defendants created the Michigan connection through their own transactions and subsequent dealings.
G. Relatedness and reasonableness were strongly established
The claims arose from the very Michigan transactions that supplied the defendants’ contacts. This was not a case requiring an expansive understanding of claims merely “related to” forum activity. Taking payments from Michigan consumers and failing to deliver or refund were both the jurisdictional conduct and the basis of the lawsuit.
Michigan also had a substantial interest in enforcing its consumer-protection statute for its residents. Consumer witnesses were located there, and the MCPA designated Ingham County as the venue for the Attorney General’s action against defendants not established in Michigan.
The defendants’ small-business status and resource imbalance with the Attorney General did not establish that Michigan was an unreasonable forum. Those disadvantages would exist in Mississippi as well. Although interstate litigation imposes burdens, the defendants did not present a compelling reason why the burdens here were constitutionally unacceptable.
Mississippi’s interest in its resident businesses did not make its jurisdiction exclusive. Multiple states can have legitimate interests in a controversy without either state’s exercise of specific jurisdiction violating due process.
H. Penalty proportionality was not decided in the enrollment proceeding
The Court explained that the award reflected Michigan’s statutory remedial scheme: treble conversion damages, civil fines, and attorneys’ fees. More decisively, the amount did not demonstrate absence of jurisdiction or qualifying fraud.
The Court therefore rejected the award-size argument as a ground for refusing recognition. It did not independently adjudicate every possible constitutional challenge to the fines or hold that any statutorily authorized penalty is necessarily proportionate. Its holding concerned the limits of collateral review at enrollment.