Florida Insurer Bad Faith: Disputed Settlement Conditions and Communication Failures Can Require a Jury Trial
Case: Charbel Consul v. Progressive American Insurance Company
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: November 5, 2026
Opinion: Judge Abudu; Judge Tjoflat dissenting
Disposition: Summary judgment vacated; case remanded.
1. Introduction
This published decision addresses when an insurer’s handling of settlement negotiations presents a jury question under Florida’s law of third-party insurance bad faith. Its central lesson is that offering the requested money does not necessarily establish good faith when the insurer attaches disputed conditions, inadequately investigates ways to resolve those conditions, and fails to involve its insured in consequential settlement decisions.
Charbel Consul rear-ended William Choisser while driving a vehicle insured by Progressive American Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Consul was entirely responsible for the accident. His policy provided bodily-injury coverage of $10,000 per person and property-damage coverage of $10,000 per accident.
Choisser offered to settle for $10,000 for his injuries and $5,000 for his damaged vehicle, subject to additional matters including a financial affidavit from Consul. Progressive agreed to those monetary amounts but required a release of any loss-of-consortium claim belonging to Choisser’s wife and surrender of the vehicle’s title. Those conditions became obstacles to settlement. The bodily-injury claim eventually produced a judgment exceeding $1 million, including costs and fees.
Consul then sued Progressive for bad faith. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer, finding its settlement conditions and communications reasonable. The Eleventh Circuit majority concluded that the record, viewed favorably to Consul, permitted a reasonable jury to disagree.
The decision does not establish that Progressive acted in bad faith. It holds that the disputed evidence and competing reasonable inferences could not properly be resolved against Consul without further proceedings.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The settlement negotiations
After the September 2016 accident, Progressive investigated the claim, sought medical documentation, and asked Choisser’s attorney, Matthew Posgay, to identify Choisser’s wife. Posgay repeatedly explained that he did not represent her and did not supply her name. Progressive’s independent investigation mistakenly identified Choisser’s former wife as his current wife.
On October 17, 2016, Posgay proposed settlement for the combined $15,000 payment. Consul’s attorney, Christopher Campione, helped Consul complete the requested financial affidavit. On November 15, Progressive sent checks for the proposed bodily-injury and property-damage amounts, accompanied by settlement documents containing the consortium-release and title-transfer requirements.
Posgay questioned both requirements. Progressive maintained them, and Posgay rejected its counteroffer on December 13. Progressive treated negotiations as having reached an impasse. Choisser later filed suit. His property-damage claim ultimately settled for $7,500 in exchange for title, but his bodily-injury claim proceeded to the substantial excess judgment.
The majority’s conclusions
- Consortium release: A jury could find Progressive unreasonable in insisting on a release from a person it never contacted, particularly without consulting Consul about accepting settlement without that protection.
- Vehicle title: A jury could question Progressive’s valuation efforts and its insistence that title had to pass through Progressive, notwithstanding statutory language permitting an owner retaining the vehicle to forward title directly to the state.
- Communication: Disputes remained about whether Progressive adequately explained the settlement obstacles, sought Consul’s input, and warned him about possible excess liability.
- Causation: Evidence supported an inference that settlement within the applicable limits remained realistically possible and that deficient settlement handling contributed to the excess judgment.
The majority therefore vacated summary judgment and remanded. Judge Tjoflat would have affirmed, viewing Progressive’s conduct as reasonable and the asserted deficiencies as insufficiently connected to the judgment.
3. Legal Reasoning
A. Florida law measures the entire settlement process
Because the federal court exercised diversity jurisdiction, it applied Florida substantive law. Under Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, an insurer handling claims against its insured must exercise the care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would use in managing personal business affairs. This includes investigating, considering reasonable settlement opportunities, explaining litigation risks, warning about excess judgments, and identifying protective steps available to the insured.
Harvey v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. frames the inquiry practically: did the insurer work with the diligence, urgency, and precision it would have used if personally exposed to the judgment? The majority applied that standard to Progressive’s actual conduct rather than treating its willingness to pay the requested amounts as dispositive.
The relevant question was not simply whether each proposed condition had a legitimate protective purpose. It was whether Progressive reasonably pursued those protections while keeping the larger objective—protecting Consul from excess liability—in view.
B. Summary judgment could not resolve disputed credibility and reasonable inferences
The appellate court reviewed summary judgment independently. At that stage, it had to accept Consul’s supported evidence and draw reasonable inferences in his favor, without deciding which witnesses were more believable.
That procedural posture was especially important to the disputed excess-warning letter. Progressive’s adjuster testified that she mailed it and produced a time-stamped copy. But another Progressive representative could not locate the letter in the expected records, and an internal form indicated that no excess letter had been sent. Consul did not recall receiving one. The majority treated this as a genuine evidentiary conflict, not something the court could resolve by crediting the adjuster.
The opinion nevertheless preserves summary judgment as a legitimate outcome in bad-faith litigation. Under Eres v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., judgment without trial remains appropriate when no reasonable jury could find bad faith. The majority concluded only that this record crossed that threshold.
C. A protective release can become an unreasonable settlement obstacle
A spouse’s potential consortium claim provides a legitimate reason to consider obtaining a separate release. The majority did not hold that requesting such a release is inherently improper. Its concern was Progressive’s insistence on the condition without adequately pursuing the steps that might have satisfied or removed it.
Progressive knew that Posgay did not represent Choisser’s wife. Nevertheless, it relied on him to address her claim, never contacted her directly, and inserted the former wife’s name into the proposed release. It also failed to ask Consul whether he preferred accepting the available settlement despite the theoretical risk of a later consortium claim.
Consul testified that he would have accepted that risk. The majority also considered evidence that Choisser’s wife did not intend to bring a claim sufficient to support an inference that the obstacle might have been resolved through direct communication.
The distinction between correcting a document and removing an impasse mattered. Progressive offered to amend wording or correct the name, but, in the majority’s view, did not offer to eliminate the disputed waiver requirement. Its analysis therefore differed from cases in which an insurer promptly offered to strike objectionable release language.
The resulting principle is contextual: insisting on broader protection can support a bad-faith finding when the insurer neither reasonably investigates how to secure that protection nor adequately considers whether insisting on it sacrifices a realistic settlement opportunity.
D. A disputed statutory interpretation does not automatically establish good faith
The title dispute involved two related questions: whether the vehicle qualified as a total loss under Florida Statutes § 319.30, and whether Progressive itself had to receive the title.
The majority did not comprehensively resolve the first question. Section 319.30(3)(a) addresses replacement payments, agreements to repair rather than replace, and circumstances requiring a title to be branded “Total Loss Vehicle.” Choisser disputed Progressive’s valuation and its ability to establish total-loss status unilaterally. He wanted the insurer to consider publicly available valuation guides.
Florida Statutes § 626.9743(5) identifies permissible valuation methods, including generally available guidebooks and other supported or agreed methods. The majority reasoned that Progressive’s failure even to consider the proposed sources could be found unreasonable. It did not hold that one particular guidebook was compulsory, and it acknowledged that Posgay’s limited responsiveness could support a defense verdict.
On the second question, the majority was more definite. Section 319.30(3)(b) allows an owner retaining possession of the vehicle to forward the title to the state. Accordingly, Progressive did not necessarily need to take possession of the title itself to ensure compliance with the statutory processing requirements.
This distinction is important: the court did not hold that Choisser could retain an unprocessed or unbranded title regardless of Florida law. It held that statutory compliance did not require Progressive to remain the indispensable intermediary.
The majority rejected the proposition that an insurer’s asserted misunderstanding necessarily insulates its conduct from scrutiny. Its analogy to cases involving legal mistakes reinforced the obligation to investigate consequential legal assumptions. At the same time, the opinion does not make every statutory error bad faith; the ultimate inquiry remains whether the insurer acted with reasonable diligence under the circumstances.
The court suggested that uncertainty might have been addressed through a reservation of rights or declaratory relief rather than an inflexible settlement precondition. Those suggestions identify possible alternatives; they do not establish that either mechanism automatically resolves every title-law dispute.
E. Communication must enable meaningful protection of the insured
The majority’s communication analysis extends beyond whether documents were transmitted. An insurer must give its insured enough information to understand settlement opportunities, emerging obstacles, and the risk of personal exposure.
Although Progressive communicated with Campione, the majority found triable questions about whether it sufficiently involved Consul, directly or through counsel, in deciding whether to insist on the additional settlement protections. The disputed scope of Campione’s representation did not itself make communication through him improper: Consul testified that he expected Campione to represent him in dealings with Progressive.
The broader problem was whether the communications adequately conveyed the choices being made and sought relevant input before settlement became less likely. Updating counsel after negotiations failed would not necessarily resolve an earlier failure to consult about avoidable barriers.
F. The excess judgment required a causal connection to the alleged misconduct
Florida bad-faith liability requires more than deficient claim handling followed by an unfavorable judgment. Under Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., the alleged bad faith must be causally connected to the claimed loss.
Here, the majority identified evidence supporting that connection: Choisser’s testimony that he would have settled on the original terms, Progressive’s internal notes suggesting settlement remained possible, and the eventual resolution of the property-damage component. These circumstances supported an inference that the impasse was not inevitable.
The later property settlement did not, by itself, prove that the bodily-injury claim remained settleable on identical terms. It was part of the broader record supporting the majority’s conclusion that settlement possibilities were genuinely disputed.
The requested $10,000 bodily-injury payment and $5,000 property-damage payment fell within their respective coverage limits. Thus, Consul’s theory did not require Progressive to fund a settlement above the policy’s coverage.
The excess judgment was evidence of the resulting loss, not automatic proof of causation or bad faith. The majority held that the whole record permitted a jury to connect the failed settlement process to that judgment.
4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Summary judgment and the federal court’s role
- Guevara v. Lafise Corp., 127 F.4th 824
- This case supplies the independent, or de novo, review standard and requires favorable treatment of the nonmovant’s supported factual position. It directed the appellate court to reconsider the record without deferring to the district court’s assessment.
- Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, and Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573
- The en banc decision in Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., quoting Walker v. Darby, establishes that a mere “scintilla” of evidence cannot defeat summary judgment. These authorities qualified the majority’s jury-centered analysis: Consul needed evidence supporting a reasonable verdict, not speculation alone.
- Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc., 135 F.4th 961, and Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739
- The opinion uses these cases to explain that the nonmovant’s evidence must be accepted for summary-judgment purposes. Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc. also reinforces the substantive insurer-care standard and the distinction between deciding that a jury could find a fact and deciding that the fact has been established.
- Hicks v. Middleton, 141 F.4th 1174, and Baker v. Upson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312
- These decisions reserve credibility assessments and weighing of conflicting evidence for the factfinder. They were especially important to the conflicting testimony and records concerning the excess-warning letter.
- Pincus v. Am. Traffic Sols., Inc., 986 F.3d 1306
- This authority explains that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies state substantive law as the state’s courts would. The decision therefore interprets Florida insurance law rather than creating an independent federal bad-faith cause of action.
B. The substantive duties of an insurer
- Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783
- This Florida Supreme Court decision is the principal doctrinal foundation. Its duties of investigation, fair settlement consideration, warning, and advice explain why the court examined Progressive’s negotiations and communications together rather than treating payment of the demanded amounts as conclusive.
- Harvey v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 259 So. 3d 1
- This decision focuses on whether the insurer worked as diligently and precisely as it would have if exposed personally to the judgment. The majority used it to evaluate Progressive’s persistence in disputed conditions; the dissent acknowledged its warning that claimant conduct does not excuse established insurer bad faith, while disputing that this record showed such conduct.
- Am. Builders Ins. Co. v. Southern-Owners Ins. Co., 71 F.4th 847
- This case restates the insurer’s duties to investigate, explain litigation risks, communicate settlement opportunities, and settle when a reasonably prudent person would. Its discussion of diligence when legal or coverage issues arise also supports the proposition that uncertainty calls for prompt investigation rather than indefinite inaction.
- Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665
- The majority relied on this Florida Supreme Court authority for the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and the focus on the insurer’s performance of its obligations. The dissent’s discussion of manufactured claims drew on Justice Wells’s dissent in that case through later district-court decisions; that separate opinion is distinct from the controlling majority rule.
- Cadle v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 838 F.3d 1113; Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 1270; and Woods v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 159 F.4th 837
- These authorities establish that good faith is a fact-sensitive inquiry ordinarily resolved by a factfinder. Their influence is procedural as well as substantive: they support examining how the insurer’s actions interacted over time rather than isolating each alleged defect.
- Eres v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 998 F.3d 1273
- This case supplies both an important limitation and a comparison. Summary judgment remains available where no reasonable jury could find bad faith, and an overbroad release need not create a trial issue when the insurer offers to strike the offending provision. The majority distinguished Progressive’s willingness to correct wording here from willingness to remove the disputed waiver requirement.
- Cruz v. Am. United Ins. Co., 580 So. 2d 311, and Farinas v. Fla. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co., 850 So. 2d 555
- These Florida appellate decisions establish reasonableness as the standard governing settlement conduct and ordinarily entrust evaluation of settlement strategy to the jury. They connect the general duty of good faith to the particular terms an insurer insists on obtaining.
- Pelaez v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 13 F.4th 1243
- This decision performs three roles: negligent conduct may be relevant without being the governing liability standard; release language must be evaluated in context; and claimant conduct may be factored into the overall circumstances even though the insurer’s conduct remains the focus. The disagreement between majority and dissent concerned the weight of Posgay’s noncooperation, not whether it was legally irrelevant.
- Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12
- The majority relied on this case for duties to advise and warn, and for the insurer’s burden to show that no realistic opportunity for settlement within limits existed. Its instruction to resolve uncertainty about possible settlement outcomes favorably to the insured supported leaving disputed settlement prospects to the jury; it did not eliminate the need for causation.
C. Vehicle valuation, title law, and legal diligence
- Allen v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2024 WL 2976757
- The majority cited this district-court decision, whose recommendation was adopted, as one of the limited authorities discussing § 319.30(3). It supplied statutory context rather than a complete answer to the parties’ disagreement.
- Koung v. Giordano, 346 So. 3d 108, and McKinney v. Fortune Ins. Co., 949 So. 2d 225
- The opinion cites these Florida appellate decisions in connection with agreement between insurer and owner concerning total-loss replacement. They supported taking the disagreement over repair versus replacement seriously, but the majority expressly declined to decide every aspect of § 319.30’s construction.
- Hovercraft of S. Fla., LLC v. Reynolds, 211 So. 3d 1073
- This case concerns an attorney’s mistake of law and appears by analogy. The majority used it to reject an assumption that misunderstanding clear statutory language necessarily excuses an insurer’s conduct; it did not treat attorney-error doctrine as an independent test for insurance bad faith.
- Camp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 12
- This Florida Supreme Court decision supports the affirmative obligation to act diligently in settlement negotiations. It reinforced the majority’s view that Progressive had to do more than maintain a legal position once that position became an obstacle to resolution.
- Martinez v. GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., 152 F.4th 1323
- This authority recognizes that an insurer facing a settlement duty and a coverage issue must have an opportunity to investigate and resolve the issue promptly and thoroughly. Its role is balanced: legal uncertainty can justify investigation, but not the abandonment of diligence.
- Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852, and Hilker v. W. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 N.W. 413
- The Florida decision, quoting the Wisconsin case, supplies the ordinary-person standard of care and diligence. The majority invoked that standard while acknowledging that good faith does not require an insurer to exhaust every conceivable source of information.
- King v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 4052271, and Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1234
- These district-court authorities support asking whether insisting on a legal position was fair and attentive to the insured’s interests, rather than treating the ultimate merits of the legal issue as the entire bad-faith inquiry. They are persuasive applications of the governing standard, not substitutes for Florida Supreme Court precedent.
D. Settlement feasibility, policy limits, and causation
- Messinese v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2916451
- This decision, affirmed in an unpublished appellate opinion, involved claimants who would not have accepted the available policy-limits settlement. The majority distinguished it because this record contained evidence that Choisser remained willing to settle, making the alleged handling failures potentially consequential.
- Deary v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 2022 WL 2916358, and Contreras v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 927 So. 2d 16
- These cases address circumstances in which a claimant’s unwillingness to settle and release an insured removes further meaningful settlement opportunities. The majority found their premise disputed here: rejection of Progressive’s added conditions did not necessarily establish rejection of settlement on the original terms.
- Kropilak v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 806 F.3d 1062
- This decision rejects a duty to agree to an excess consent judgment and thereby expose the insurer to additional bad-faith liability. The majority accepted that limitation but found it inapplicable because the proposed payments were within the respective policy limits.
- McNamara v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, and Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893
- These decisions explain the insurer’s duty and the need for a causal connection between bad faith and loss. The excess judgment supplied a straightforward form of claimed injury, while the evidence of an available settlement supplied the disputed causal bridge.
- Mesa v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 799 F.3d 1353
- The dissent relied on this case for the proposition that negligent failures to communicate are immaterial when they did not cause the excess judgment. It used Consul’s testimony that he would have set the letter aside to argue that the mailing dispute lacked legal significance even if factually genuine.
E. Authorities emphasized in the dissent
- Clement v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 1545
- This case warns that releasing an insured from excess liability before a valid assignment can extinguish the bad-faith claim. It also discusses litigation arrangements designed to leave the insured as the named plaintiff. Judge Tjoflat invoked both concerns, while recognizing that the arrangement described here had not completely released Consul from liability.
- Ellis v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 541 F. Supp. 3d 1371; Cosola v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 4854516; and Shin Crest PTE, Ltd v. AIU Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1234
- These district-court cases caution against manufacturing bad-faith claims to create effectively unlimited coverage. They supported the dissent’s concern about litigation incentives and strategic noncooperation. The majority did not adopt a finding that Consul’s claim was manufactured.
- Ilias v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 61 F.4th 1338
- The dissent cited this decision to insist that analysis begin with the insurer’s actions in fulfilling obligations to its insured. It argued that hypothetical cooperation from Choisser’s wife could not replace an assessment of the information and options actually available to Progressive.
- Busby v. Winn & Lovett Miami, Inc., 80 So. 2d 675
- This Florida Supreme Court decision recognizes the separate character of a spouse’s consortium action. It supported the dissent’s position that Progressive had a legitimate reason to seek protection against a later claim even if Choisser’s own injury claim settled.
5. The Dissent: Reasonableness, Causation, and Litigation Incentives
A. A different assessment of Progressive’s conduct
Judge Tjoflat agreed with the governing summary-judgment standard but concluded that the evidence could not support a reasonable finding of bad faith. He emphasized Progressive’s repeated requests for the wife’s identity, its internet and database searches, its disclosure that the identification might be mistaken, and its willingness to correct the release.
From that perspective, Posgay’s refusal to identify the wife—and failure to correct the mistaken name—materially constrained the insurer’s options. The dissent also understood Progressive to have offered an alternative: removal of the wife from the release upon an assurance that no consortium claim would be pursued. The majority stressed the difficulty of obtaining such an assurance from an attorney who expressly did not represent her.
B. The wife’s intentions did not necessarily establish willingness to sign
A particularly important disagreement concerned the difference between not intending to sue and agreeing to sign a waiver. The majority regarded the evidence as permitting a favorable inference that direct contact could have resolved the issue.
The dissent emphasized contrary testimony. Choisser believed his wife would not have signed because she distrusted lawyers and disliked unnecessary agreements. Asked whether she would have signed, she answered, “I have no idea. That never came up.” These statements make clear why the majority’s treatment should be understood as a permissible inference at summary judgment, not a factual finding that she would certainly have signed.
C. Communication and causation
The dissent considered communication through Campione reasonable because it matched Consul’s expectations and included settlement correspondence and telephone updates. It also argued that the excess-letter dispute could not establish causation if Consul would not have read the letter.
On settlement feasibility, Judge Tjoflat credited Posgay’s testimony that policy-limits resolution was no longer available after the December rejection. The majority instead found conflicting evidence sufficient to leave that question open. This disagreement illustrates the case’s central procedural tension: when does evaluating the significance of evidence become impermissibly choosing between competing inferences?
D. The agreement benefiting Choisser
The dissent examined an arrangement under which any recovery by Consul would be used to satisfy Choisser’s judgment. Although witnesses described that arrangement differently and its complete terms were not in the appellate record, Judge Tjoflat considered it important to understanding who would practically benefit from the litigation.
He nevertheless acknowledged Consul’s standing because the judgment remained outstanding against him. Being judgment-proof does not, by itself, erase a legal debt or the interest in eliminating it.
Alternatively, the dissent would have directed consideration of joining Choisser and Posgay under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and issuing a Rule 11 show-cause order concerning attorneys Richardson and Thompson. Those proposals sought inquiry into participation, authorization, and litigation purpose. They were not majority holdings, findings of misconduct, or sanctions actually imposed by the appellate court.
6. Potential Impact and Limits
For insurers
The decision underscores the importance of evaluating settlement conditions against the risk they create. Insurers should document not only monetary offers but also the reasons for additional conditions, efforts to resolve objections, investigation of controlling law, and consultation with the insured about consequential alternatives.
A requested release may protect the insured, yet insisting on it without pursuing available means of obtaining it can jeopardize a much more valuable settlement. Likewise, legal uncertainty should prompt focused investigation rather than an assumption that the insurer’s initial interpretation supplies a complete defense.
For insureds and claimants
The opinion confirms that an insured may present a triable claim without showing that the insurer refused to pay the requested money. Allegedly unreasonable conditions and inadequate communication may matter when supported by evidence that settlement was genuinely available.
At the same time, claimant noncooperation remains relevant. The majority expressly acknowledged that Posgay may have contributed to the impasse and that a jury could ultimately find Progressive acted reasonably.
For future litigation
The decision’s strongest precedential significance concerns how courts apply summary judgment to a combined record of disputed settlement terms, incomplete investigation, communication failures, and realistic settlement prospects. It does not create an automatic duty to abandon consortium protection, accept a claimant’s valuation, or exhaust every investigative avenue.
As a published Eleventh Circuit decision interpreting Florida law, it guides federal courts within the circuit on that state-law question. It is not a Florida Supreme Court decision and does not displace that court’s authority over Florida substantive law.
The statutory safe-harbor reference
The majority also cited Florida Statutes § 624.155(4)(A), describing protection against bad-faith actions when an insurer timely tenders the lesser of policy limits or the demand after receiving sufficiently supported notice. The opinion does not analyze that provision’s temporal applicability to these 2016 negotiations or make the safe harbor the basis of its disposition. The citation should therefore not be expanded into a holding resolving those questions.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Third-party bad faith
- A claim that an insurer mishandled another person’s claim against its insured, thereby causing legally recoverable harm to the insured. The injured person’s underlying accident claim and the insured’s later bad-faith claim are different lawsuits.
- Excess judgment
- A judgment exceeding applicable insurance coverage. The uninsured portion can expose the insured’s own assets to collection.
- Summary judgment
- A decision without trial when no genuinely disputed, outcome-relevant fact requires a factfinder. It is not an opportunity to choose the more credible witness.
- Totality of the circumstances
- Looking at the whole course of conduct—including timing, investigation, communications, and settlement terms—rather than deciding the case from one isolated act.
- Loss of consortium
- A spouse’s claim for injury-related loss of companionship, assistance, or marital relations. It is distinct from the injured spouse’s personal-injury claim.
- Counteroffer
- A response that changes proposed settlement terms rather than simply accepting them. Agreement on payment alone does not necessarily establish an enforceable settlement.
- Title transfer and title branding
- Transfer concerns who receives the ownership document; branding records a vehicle’s legally significant damage status. An owner’s ability to submit title directly to the state does not eliminate applicable processing obligations.
- Causation
- The required connection between the insurer’s wrongful conduct and the loss. A handling mistake that made no difference to settlement does not establish liability merely because an excess judgment followed.
- Assignment and judgment-proof status
- An assignment transfers a legal claim. Being judgment-proof means having insufficient reachable assets to satisfy a judgment; it does not necessarily extinguish the judgment or the debtor’s related legal claims.
- Vacated and remanded
- The appellate court set aside the district court’s judgment and returned the case for further proceedings. It did not enter judgment for Consul.
8. Conclusion
Charbel Consul v. Progressive American Insurance Company applies established Florida bad-faith principles to a settlement process in which the requested payments were available but disputed conditions obstructed resolution.
Its key holding is procedural and fact-sensitive: a jury could find that Progressive’s combined handling of the consortium release, vehicle title, and insured communications unreasonably defeated a realistic settlement and contributed to the excess judgment. Whether that actually occurred remains unresolved.
The broader lesson is that good-faith settlement handling requires more than willingness to write a check. It requires diligent, informed efforts to make a reasonable settlement achievable while protecting and meaningfully advising the insured.