Creating Municipality’s Continuing Right to Compel Conveyance of Authority Projects Under MAA §§ 5619(a) & 5622(a), Despite Board Recomposition

• Points of agreement with the Majority:
  • Statements in Burke v. North Huntingdon Township Municipal Authority, 136 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1957), suggesting an authority can initiate a Section 5622(a) conveyance are dicta.
  • An authority does not decide whether to initiate or approve a conveyance under Section 5622(a).
  • Section 5622(a) is unambiguous.
• Core disagreement: Justice Mundy would hold that the City—as the sole municipality that created and incorporated the Authority—retains the present ability to compel conveyance of projects established by the City-appointed “Old Board,” notwithstanding the later, statutorily mandated multi-jurisdictional “New Board” created under Section 5610(a.1).
• Interpretive center of gravity: Justice Mundy reads Sections 5622(a) and 5619(a) together as “two sides of the same coin”: Section 5622(a) supplies the municipality’s power to force conveyance; Section 5619(a) supplies conditions/impediments that must be satisfied before an authority can complete the conveyance (e.g., discharge of bonds secured by project revenues, and other agreements).

Justice Mundy situates her reading of the MAA within a line of cases treating the MAA’s conveyance provisions as interlocking—allowing municipal takeover while protecting creditors and preventing involuntary debt “foisting.”

Burke v. North Huntingdon Township Municipal Authority, 136 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1957)

The dissent agrees with the Majority that Burke’s language implying an authority may initiate a Section 5622(a)-type conveyance is dicta. This matters because it removes any notion that the authority’s board can block a municipality’s statutory choice to acquire a project by insisting the authority must “start” the process.

In re: Chester Water Auth. Tr., 263 A.3d 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

The Commonwealth Court held “despite section 5610(a.1) of the MAA, the City possesses the sole power under section 5622(a) of the MAA to demand and compel the conveyance of the Authority and its assets” by adopting the appropriate ordinance/resolution, while expressly not deciding whether the City could satisfy all Section 5622(a) conditions for obtaining “all” assets. Justice Mundy would affirm this understanding of the City’s baseline authority to invoke the statute.

Cnty. of Allegheny v. Moon Twp. Mun. Auth., 671 A.2d 662 (Pa. 1996)

This decision is central to Justice Mundy’s “paired sections” thesis. She quotes it for the proposition that “Sections 5622(a) and 5619 address the transfer of an authority’s project to the municipality or municipalities that created the authority.” In her view, this doctrinal framing supports reading “power to establish, maintain or operate” in Section 5622(a) as continuing to exist in the “municipality creating the authority,” consistent with Section 5619(a)’s express authorization of conveyance to that creating municipality.

Mifflin Cnty. v. Mifflin Cnty. Airport Auth., 437 A.2d 781

Justice Mundy cites Mifflin Cnty. as confirming that the predecessors to Sections 5619 and 5622(a) “apply when a municipality seeks to acquire a project.” This reinforces her structural claim: the conveyance power and the conveyance conditions operate together rather than independently.

Twp. of Forks v. Forks Twp. Mun. Sewer Auth., 759 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)

Justice Mundy uses Twp. of Forks for a practical synthesis: once the “impediments” in Section 5619 (agreements, claims, and outstanding debt obligations) are discharged, the creating municipality may take over the project pursuant to Section 5622(a). The case supports her view that a municipality’s right to compel conveyance does not depend on current board control, but on satisfying statutory conditions designed to protect obligations.

Forward Twp. Sanitary Sewage Auth. v. Twp. of Forward, 654 A.2d 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)

This case is invoked to emphasize legislative purpose: where no Section 5619 impediments remain and the municipality is not being forced to assume debts without consent, the municipality has power to take over under Section 5622(a). Justice Mundy relies on it to argue the statutory scheme is creditor- and consent-protective, not board-composition-contingent.

Statutory Construction Canon: 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)

Justice Mundy explicitly leans on the presumption against absurd or unreasonable results and the presumption that the legislature intends “the entire statute to be effective and certain.” This canon undergirds her argument that it would be “nonsensical” to allow an authority to convey projects to the creating municipality under Section 5619(a) if that municipality did not, in some continuing sense, have the “power to establish, maintain or operate” those projects.

(a) The dissent’s textual pivot: “established” defines the qualifying project

Justice Mundy begins with the “project-defining clause” of Section 5622(a) (“If a project established under this chapter by a board appointed by a municipality…”). She emphasizes that the statute uses established—not “maintained” or “operated”—to define the relevant class of projects. Using BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), she reads “establish” as “to make or form; to bring about or into existence.” On this view, projects brought into existence by the City-appointed “Old Board” remain within the statute’s qualifying scope, regardless of subsequent governance changes.

(b) The present-tense dispute: who “has power” today?

Justice Mundy accepts the Majority’s insistence that the acquiring municipality must “have power” in the present sense, but rejects the Majority’s conclusion about who holds that power after Section 5610(a.1). In her framing, board recomposition expands appointment rights but does not transform non-joining counties into “creating” or “joining” municipalities under Sections 5603 and 5604. Because Delaware County and Chester County did not “create, incorporate, or join” the Authority, their appointment power does not displace the City’s status as the creating municipality.

(c) Reading Sections 5622(a) and 5619(a) together

The dissent’s signature move is structural: Section 5619(a) expressly authorizes an authority, after discharge of bonds secured by project revenues (and subject to agreements), to convey the project “to the municipality creating the authority.” Justice Mundy treats this as strong evidence that the creating municipality must retain the legal capacity to “establish, maintain or operate” the project; otherwise Section 5619(a) would authorize a conveyance to an entity incapable of lawful operation—an outcome she deems inconsistent with 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)-(2).

(d) The dissent’s rebuttal to the Majority’s “current control” test

Justice Mundy directly rejects the Majority’s view that Section 5622(a) “only permits a conveyance … to a municipality (or municipalities) that today controls the authority.” She argues this test is inconsistent with:

• Section 5622(a)’s focus on who appointed the board that “established” the project; and
• Section 5619(a)’s continuing designation of the “municipality creating the authority” as the recipient of project conveyance (once conditions are met).

On her account, the legislature’s decision to enact Section 5610(a.1) without altering Sections 5619(a) or 5622(a) suggests continuity rather than displacement: appointment-sharing does not rewrite conveyance entitlement.

(e) Practical endpoint: the City may compel conveyance, but Section 5619(a) conditions still matter

Justice Mundy underscores that compelling conveyance under Section 5622(a) does not erase the “impediments” and creditor/obligation protections embedded in Section 5619(a). Her approach preserves a two-step logic:

1. Authority to demand conveyance: supplied by Section 5622(a) to the creating municipality for qualifying projects; and
2. Ability to complete conveyance: constrained by Section 5619(a) (bonds, agreements, and related conditions).

Although Justice Mundy’s writing is a concurrence/dissent (and therefore not itself controlling law), it articulates a clear alternative rule with substantial practical consequences for municipal-authority governance and water/sewer system monetization in Pennsylvania:

• Stability of “creating municipality” status: If adopted, a municipality’s creation/incorporation of an authority would carry enduring conveyance leverage under Section 5622(a), even if later statutes redistribute board appointments to other counties or municipalities.
• Transactional leverage and privatization dynamics: The dissent’s approach would strengthen financially distressed cities’ capacity to extract value from authority assets by compelling conveyance and then pursuing a sale (subject to statutory conditions and assumption of obligations).
• Governance expectations for multi-county service areas: Counties or served municipalities receiving appointment power under Section 5610(a.1) would not gain parallel “ownership-exit” control; their influence would remain governance-based rather than conveyance-entitlement-based unless they formally “join” under Section 5604.
• Litigation framing in future disputes: Parties would likely litigate (i) which projects were “established” by which board; and (ii) whether Section 5619(a) impediments (bond discharge, agreements) block conveyance even if Section 5622(a) is invoked.

By contrast, the Majority (as described by Justice Mundy) would tie Section 5622(a) conveyance power to the municipality or municipalities that “today” control the authority, reducing the creating municipality’s unilateral leverage after board recomposition.

• Municipal authority: A separate legal entity created by one or more municipalities to finance, own, and operate public projects (like water systems), often with revenue bonds.
• “Project” (53 Pa.C.S. § 5602): The facilities/undertakings an authority is authorized to acquire, construct, finance, improve, maintain, or operate (e.g., water infrastructure).
• Section 5622(a) conveyance: A mechanism allowing a municipality, by ordinance/resolution, to require an authority to convey a project to the municipality, with the municipality assuming the authority’s obligations “with respect to that project.”
• Section 5619(a) “impediments”: Conditions that limit when an authority may convey a project—especially that bonds secured by project revenues (and their interest) have been paid/discharged, and that relevant agreements are honored.
• Dicta: Statements in a judicial opinion not necessary to the decision; they do not bind future courts in the same way as holdings.
• Judgment on the pleadings: A procedural request to decide a case based solely on the pleadings (complaint/answer), arguing there are no material factual disputes and the law dictates the result.
• Statutory “plain language” interpretation: A method focusing on the enacted text’s ordinary meaning, often strengthened by reading related provisions together to avoid internal inconsistency or absurd outcomes.

Justice Mundy’s concurring and dissenting opinion advances a cohesive textual-structural theory of the MAA: the “municipality creating the authority” retains present legal power to take back authority projects under Section 5622(a), and Section 5619(a) confirms (and constrains) that power by setting conditions that protect creditors and existing agreements. The dissent rejects a “current control” approach rooted in board composition, stressing that Section 5610(a.1) redistributed appointment rights without altering the conveyance architecture in Sections 5619(a) and 5622(a).

In broader context, the opinion spotlights a recurring tension in public-utility governance: whether expanded regional representation in authority boards should also entail reduced unilateral exit/asset-control power by the creating municipality. Justice Mundy’s answer is “no” unless the legislature expressly rewrites the conveyance provisions—an interpretive position that, if adopted in future cases or legislation, would materially shape municipal leverage over water and sewer authorities across Pennsylvania.