Continuous-Tort Accrual and Jurisdictional Limits in PFAS Contamination Suits

Introduction

Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc. (2025) is a consolidated mandamus review by the Supreme Court of Alabama of motions to dismiss in a second PFAS-contamination suit (“Gadsden II”) filed by the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden (“Gadsden Water”). After settling a prior PFAS lawsuit (“Gadsden I,” filed in 2016) against 3M and others, Gadsden Water sued new defendants—PFAS manufacturers (DuPont, Daikin) and suppliers (INV Performance Surfaces)—alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and wantonness resulting in Coosa River contamination. The key issues were:

• Whether Gadsden Water’s claims against DuPont and Daikin were barred by the statutes of limitations or by standing principles;
• Whether the Etowah Circuit Court had specific personal jurisdiction over INV, a Delaware supplier with no manufacturing or direct PFAS discharges in Alabama;
• Whether mandamus relief was appropriate to correct the trial court’s denial of dismissal motions.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Alabama granted mandamus relief to DuPont and Daikin, directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss Gadsden Water’s claims against them as time-barred. It held that Gadsden Water’s causes of action accrued no later than September 22, 2016—when it first tested for PFAS above the 2016 EPA advisory—and that subsequent EPA advisory revisions did not restart the limitations clock. The Court also granted mandamus relief to INV, holding that a supplier who never discharged PFAS into Alabama waters cannot be haled into court here based on third‐party actions or mere foreseeability. The petitions of other landfill defendants were denied to the extent they sought dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds they had not raised below.

Analysis

1. Mandamus as the Proper Remedy

A writ of mandamus lies when a party has a clear legal right to relief, the trial court has refused to perform an imperative duty, there is no adequate alternative, and appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked. Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d 174 (Ala. 2016).

2. Statute-of-Limitations and Continuous Torts

Applicable periods:

• Negligence/nuisance/wantonness: 2 years (Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l))
• Trespass: 6 years (Ala. Code § 6-2-34(2))

Under Alabama law, a cause of action accrues when the first legal injury occurs, regardless of whether the full extent of damage is then known. Ex parte Abbott Laboratories, 342 So. 3d 186, 194 (Ala. 2021). Gadsden Water’s 2016 complaint in Gadsden I—alleging PFAS levels above the EPA’s May 2016 advisory—put it on notice of its injury by September 22, 2016. The 2022 EPA advisory lowering the acceptable PFAS threshold did not create a new legal injury or restart the limitations clock. And although Gadsden Water pleaded an “ongoing nuisance,” Alabama does not recognize a continuous tort where the defendant’s wrongful conduct ceased before the limitations period. Abbott Lab’ys, 342 So. 3d at 195–96; see also Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1983).

3. Standing and Private vs. Public-Law Actions

The Court declined to dismiss on standing grounds because standing principles in Alabama apply primarily to public-law cases (challenges to official acts or statutes), not to private suits for damages. See Ex parte Baldwin Cnty. Sewer Serv., LLC (2024). Here, Gadsden Water’s action was a private-rights suit for tort damages, so standing in the public-law sense did not govern subject-matter jurisdiction.

4. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Over a PFAS Supplier

Alabama’s due-process requirement for specific jurisdiction demands:

1. Purposeful availment—the defendant must have purposefully directed activities at Alabama;
2. Claim relation—the suit must arise out of or relate to those Alabama contacts.

INV is a Delaware LLC that never manufactured or discharged PFAS in Alabama or held discharge permits here. Its only Alabama contact was ownership of fiber-processing equipment in one or two carpet mills back in 2006—equipment that never discharged PFAS. Gadsden Water’s theory relied on third-party actions (Dalton carpet mills and Dalton Utilities) and merely foreseeable water pollution downstream. Under Ex parte Aladdin Manufacturing Corp., 305 So. 3d 214 (Ala. 2019), foreseeability alone cannot establish jurisdiction. Nor does INV “systematically serve” an Alabama market for the PFAS that allegedly contaminated Gadsden Water’s intake. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021). Accordingly, the Court held that specific personal jurisdiction over INV is absent and must be dismissed.

5. Precedents Cited

• Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003) – standards for mandamus relief
• Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. 2001) – writ of mandamus criteria
• Ex parte Baldwin Cnty. Sewer Serv., LLC (plurality, 2024) – standing in private vs. public-law cases
• Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So. 3d 214 (Ala. 2019) – specific jurisdiction in PFAS cases
• Ex parte Abbott Laboratories, 342 So. 3d 186 (Ala. 2021) – accrual of causes of action and continuous tort
• Ex parte Watters, 212 So. 3d 174 (Ala. 2016) – mandamus jurisprudence
• Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021) – “arise out of or relate to” test
• Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) – purposeful availment

6. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis turned on two axes:

• Statute-of-Limitations: Gadsden Water’s first tortious injury from PFAS contamination occurred in 2016. Later EPA advisories reflect scientific evolution, not new legally cognizable harm. Without continuing PFAS discharges by DuPont or Daikin within the limitations window, continuous-tort pleading could not save those claims.
• Personal Jurisdiction: A supplier with no direct Alabama presence or discharges cannot be hauled into court based on third-party actions and downstream foreseeability. Alabama’s due-process limits require a direct, purposefully directed link between the defendant’s suit-related conduct and the forum state.

7. Impact on Future Cases

This ruling clarifies the following principles in environmental-tort litigation:

• A cause of action for continuous-tort pollution accrues at first legal injury; downstream consequences or advisory changes do not restart limitations.
• Abatable nuisances follow the same accrual rules: each new defendant must have continuing wrongful conduct in the limitations period.
• Specific jurisdiction demands more than foreseeability of downstream harm; direct discharge or purposeful Alabama-directed acts are required.
• Mandamus review remains a sharp tool to vindicate clear statute-of-limitations and jurisdictional errors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mandamus: An extraordinary writ compelling a lower court to correct a legal error when no adequate appellate remedy exists.
• Continuous Tort: Tortious acts repeated over time that give rise to an ongoing wrong; accrual occurs at first injury unless wrongful conduct continues into the limitations window.
• Accrual Date: The date when the plaintiff first has a claim, even if the full damage isn’t yet known.
• Specific Personal Jurisdiction: A court’s power over a defendant whose forum-related acts gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.
• Purposeful Availment: The defendant’s deliberate entry into or direction of activities at the forum State, making litigation there foreseeable.

Conclusion

Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc. reaffirms that environmental-tort claims must be filed within the statutory window measured from the first legal injury. Downstream effects or advisory changes do not reset the clock. It also underscores that specific jurisdiction cannot be grounded on mere foreseeability of harm; defendants must have directed pollutant discharges or comparable forum-targeted conduct. The decision will guide litigants and courts in PFAS and other contamination suits on statutes of limitations, continuous-tort accrual, and jurisdictional boundaries.