Continued Unwanted Contact After Notice Supports a Stalking Protection Order, but Creates No New Precedent

Introduction

Mueller v. Haasch concerns a two-year order of protection obtained by Haley Ann Mueller against Jeffrey Vincent Haasch. Mueller alleged that Haasch repeatedly contacted her and members of her family after she had clearly told him to stop. The Flathead County Justice Court found that this conduct constituted stalking under Montana law. The Eleventh Judicial District Court affirmed, and Haasch appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

Haasch challenged the sufficiency and intelligibility of the record, his access to documentary evidence, the admission of texts and emails, the exclusion of witnesses and testimony, the Justice Court’s management of the hearing, and the absence of a jury trial. The Supreme Court rejected each argument and affirmed the protection order.

Importantly, the Court designated the decision as a noncitable memorandum opinion. It therefore establishes no new binding precedent. Its significance lies in its application of settled rules governing stalking-based protection orders, appellate review, evidentiary discretion, preservation, and self-created procedural prejudice.

Summary of the Opinion

Mueller petitioned for a temporary order of protection on November 3, 2025. Following hearings on November 24 and December 4, the Justice Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haasch had stalked Mueller and issued a two-year order prohibiting contact with Mueller and certain family members.

The evidence included Mueller’s testimony that Haasch sent 31 text messages over a short period after being told to stop, continued communicating after she blocked his number and designated his email as spam, contacted her parents with private information, and interacted with her in person. Two witnesses described Mueller’s fear following encounters with Haasch, and texts and emails were admitted into evidence.

The Supreme Court held that:

• The stalking finding was supported by substantial, credible evidence.
• Repeated contact after actual notice that contact was unwanted satisfied the statutory “course of conduct” requirement and constituted prima facie evidence of purposeful conduct.
• Credibility determinations belonged to the Justice Court and were entitled to appellate deference.
• Montana law does not provide a jury-trial right in protection-order proceedings.
• Haasch received a meaningful opportunity to review the documentary evidence and could not create a due-process violation by avoiding the access arranged by the court.
• The evidentiary and courtroom-management rulings were within the Justice Court’s discretion.
• Unpreserved claims did not qualify for plain-error review.

Analysis

1. Governing Statutory Framework

Section 40-15-102, MCA, permits a protection order when a petitioner reasonably apprehends bodily injury from a partner or family member or is the victim of an enumerated offense, including stalking. Under § 45-5-220, MCA, stalking requires a “course of conduct” directed at a particular person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct requires at least two acts and may consist of communications.

Section 45-5-220(7), MCA, was particularly important. Attempts to contact a person after actual notice that the contact is unwanted constitute prima facie evidence of purposeful conduct. Mueller’s repeated instructions to Haasch to stop, followed by numerous additional messages and contacts, directly supported this element.

2. Precedents Cited

Hennon v. Weber

Hennon v. Weber supplied two relevant principles. First, a district court reviewing a justice court of record acts as an intermediate appellate court and is confined to the existing record and questions of law. Second, a protection order must be supported by substantial, credible evidence and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The Court also relied on Hennon v. Weber when rejecting Haasch’s record-completeness claim. Unlike situations in which a district court acknowledges that the record is inadequate, the District Court here reviewed the audio recordings and found them sufficient for meaningful review.

Cook v. Bodine

Cook v. Bodine reinforced the limited appellate role of a district court reviewing a justice court of record. It also supported the proposition that stalking may be established through a pattern of harassing contact and resulting emotional distress even in the absence of physical violence. This undermined any suggestion that Mueller needed to prove an actual physical assault.

Stanley v. Lemire

Stanley v. Lemire established the Supreme Court’s standards of review in this procedural posture. The Supreme Court reviews the lower court’s decision under the same standards that governed the District Court: factual findings for clear error, discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and legal or mixed questions de novo.

Boushie v. Windsor

Boushie v. Windsor was central to several aspects of the decision. It confirmed that continuation or permanent issuance of a protection order requires substantial, credible evidence and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. It also established that credibility determinations are for the factfinder, not the appellate court.

Finally, Boushie v. Windsor supported rejection of Haasch’s jury-trial claim. Protection-order proceedings are designed to provide prompt protective relief, and Montana law does not require a jury in such proceedings.

Schiller v. Schiller

Schiller v. Schiller was cited for the established rule that an order of protection must rest on substantial, credible evidence and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. It placed the Court’s analysis within Montana’s longstanding protection-order jurisprudence.

Fritzler v. Bighorn

Haasch relied on Fritzler v. Bighorn, where a permanent protection order was reversed because the petitioner offered no live testimony or corroborating evidence beyond the allegations in the petition. The Court distinguished that case.

Mueller testified from personal knowledge, two additional witnesses testified, and texts and emails were admitted. Thus, this case contained the tested and corroborated evidence that was missing in Fritzler v. Bighorn.

Masters Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Comerica Bank

Masters Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Comerica Bank supported the trial judge’s authority to control courtroom proceedings and limit irrelevant, repetitive, or needlessly cumulative testimony. After reviewing the audio record, the District Court found that the Justice Court’s interruptions were directed at repetitive or irrelevant testimony rather than an improper denial of Haasch’s opportunity to be heard.

State v. George

State v. George governed preservation and plain-error review. Issues generally cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To obtain plain-error review, an appellant must firmly convince the Court that a fundamental right is implicated and that refusing review may cause a manifest miscarriage of justice or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.

Haasch failed to meet that demanding standard. He participated in the hearings, filed motions, cross-examined witnesses, and received appellate review in the District Court.

3. Legal Reasoning

Substantial evidence of stalking

The Court focused on the cumulative evidentiary record rather than any isolated incident. The 31 text messages, later emails and texts, communications with Mueller’s parents, in-person contacts, corroborating witnesses, and Mueller’s demonstrated fear collectively established a repeated course of unwanted conduct.

The Justice Court expressly found Mueller highly credible and Haasch not credible. Because appellate courts do not retry witness credibility, those findings received substantial deference.

Access to evidence and self-created prejudice

The first hearing was continued to give Haasch additional time to examine the exhibits. The court attempted to send the materials to an email address confirmed on the record. The Justice Court found that Haasch purposely avoided receiving the evidence. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that he had been afforded an opportunity for review and could not transform his own failure to use that opportunity into a due-process violation.

Texts, emails, and hearsay objections

The Court upheld admission of the communications because the Justice Court addressed authenticity, allowed time for review, and received foundation and corroboration. Haasch was also a participant in the communications and did not deny sending those attributed to him.

The opinion did not undertake an extended statement-by-statement hearsay analysis. Instead, it concluded that the admission and evidentiary weight of the communications fell within the Justice Court’s discretion and that Haasch had shown neither surprise nor reversible prejudice.

Witness responsibility and courtroom management

The absent witness identified by Haasch had not been subpoenaed by either party. The Court emphasized that a litigant bears responsibility for securing the attendance of his own witnesses. The Justice Court was not required to procure the witness and properly excluded hearsay concerning that nonparty.

Likewise, limiting repetitive or irrelevant testimony was a permissible exercise of courtroom control under Masters Grp. Int'l, Inc. v. Comerica Bank and Montana Rules of Evidence 402 and 403.

No right to a jury

The statutory protection-order process calls for prompt judicial hearings. Neither the statutory scheme nor Montana precedent provides a right to have a jury determine whether a protection order should issue.

Potential Impact

Because this is a noncitable memorandum opinion, it cannot serve as precedent in future Montana cases. Its formal impact is therefore limited. Nevertheless, it illustrates how existing Montana law is likely to be applied in similar proceedings:

• Repeated electronic communications may establish stalking when they continue after clear notice to stop.
• Physical violence is not required when the conduct causes reasonable fear or substantial emotional distress.
• Live testimony, corroborating witnesses, and documentary communications distinguish a sufficient record from untested allegations.
• A self-represented litigant remains responsible for reviewing available evidence, subpoenaing witnesses, preserving objections, and using record-correction procedures.
• Appellate courts will defer heavily to trial-level credibility findings and discretionary management of protection-order hearings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Memorandum opinion

A short-form decision applying settled law. Here, it may not be cited and does not create precedent.

Substantial, credible evidence

Reliable evidence that a reasonable factfinder could accept as sufficient to support the decision.

Clear error

A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake was made.

Abuse of discretion

A ruling made arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason.

De novo review

The appellate court independently decides a legal question without deferring to the lower court’s conclusion.

Prima facie evidence

Evidence sufficient to establish a point unless it is rebutted. Continued contact after notice to stop is prima facie evidence of purposeful conduct under the stalking statute.

Hearsay

An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. Not every text or email is necessarily inadmissible hearsay; admissibility depends on its purpose, authorship, foundation, and applicable evidentiary rules.

Preservation

The requirement that a party timely raise an issue in the lower court before asking an appellate court to decide it.

Plain error

An exceptional doctrine allowing review of some unpreserved errors involving fundamental rights and a serious risk of injustice.

Conclusion

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed because Mueller presented substantial, credible evidence of repeated unwanted contact amounting to stalking, while Haasch failed to demonstrate reversible procedural or evidentiary error. The decision reinforces settled principles concerning deference to credibility findings, judicial control of hearings, preservation of appellate claims, and the absence of a jury-trial right in protection-order proceedings.

Its broader legal significance must remain qualified: Mueller v. Haasch applies existing law but, by the Court’s express designation, creates no citable precedent.