Circumstantial Evidence Plus Corroborating Urinalysis Can Prove Knowing Possession Without Fingerprints/DNA (Mont. § 45-9-102, MCA)

1. Introduction

State v. Bunse, 2026 MT 36N (Mont. Feb. 24, 2026), is a memorandum opinion of the Montana Supreme Court affirming a bench-trial conviction for Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under § 45-9-102, MCA. The case arose from a probationary home visit conducted by Probation and Parole Officer McKenzie Lyons at a residence in Boulder, Montana, where Curtis P. Bunse was residing.

The central dispute was not whether methamphetamine existed (it was found and lab-confirmed), but whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bunse knowingly possessed it—particularly where (i) the evidence was largely circumstantial, (ii) another resident (homeowner Brenda Smith) suggested Bunse slept on the couch, (iii) Bunse offered shifting accounts of where he stayed, and (iv) no fingerprint/DNA testing tied him directly to the contraband.

The sole issue on appeal was sufficiency of the evidence. The Court emphasized at the outset that, as a memorandum opinion under the Internal Operating Rules, it is noncitable and does not serve as precedent, though it illustrates the Court’s application of settled standards to common “constructive possession” fact patterns.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bunse knowingly possessed methamphetamine. The Court held that:

  • The State did not need direct proof of ownership or exclusive control; circumstantial evidence and its cumulative force can suffice.
  • The District Court could reconcile Smith’s testimony with the broader record; finding a witness “not untruthful” does not compel acceptance of every inference favorable to the defense.
  • A confirmed positive urinalysis was not, by itself, dispositive, but could corroborate other evidence tying Bunse to the drugs.
  • The State was not required to conduct fingerprint or DNA testing to meet its burden.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standard of review and the “rational trier of fact” test

  • State v. Bennett, 2022 MT 73, ¶ 7, 408 Mont. 209, 507 P.3d 1154; and State v. Kirn, 2012 MT 69, ¶ 10, 364 Mont. 356, 274 P.3d 746: cited for the proposition that sufficiency-of-the-evidence review in criminal cases is de novo. In practice, “de novo” here does not mean the appellate court re-tries the case; it means the appellate court independently applies a fixed legal test to the trial record.
  • State v. Booth, 2012 MT 40, ¶ 7, 364 Mont. 190, 272 P.3d 89; and State v. Polak, 2018 MT 174, ¶ 34, 392 Mont. 90, 422 P.3d 112: supply the operative question: whether, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Bunse is essentially an application of Booth/Polak to a “shared residence/uncertain room occupancy” scenario.

Bench trials, credibility, and deference to the fact-finder

  • State v. Fish, 2009 MT 47, ¶¶ 12, 27, 349 Mont. 286, 204 P.3d 681: establishes that the Booth/Polak sufficiency standard applies equally to bench trials, and that appellate courts do not substitute their own evaluation of the evidence for the trial judge’s credibility determinations. Fish underpins the Court’s refusal in Bunse to reweigh (i) Smith’s testimony, (ii) Lyons’s testimony, and (iii) Bunse’s shifting explanations.
  • State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343, ¶ 94, 330 Mont. 103, 126 P.3d 463: supports the key move in Bunse’s response to the “internal inconsistency” argument—namely, that a fact-finder may credit parts of a witness’s testimony and reject other parts. Bunse uses Ferguson to explain that the District Court’s statement it did not believe Smith testified untruthfully did not obligate acceptance of the defense’s ultimate inference (that Bunse lacked access/connection to the room where drugs were found).

Drug presence in the body vs. proof of knowing possession

  • In re R.L.H., 2005 MT 177, ¶ 24, 327 Mont. 520, 116 P.3d 791: Bunse invoked this decision for the rule that the presence of a dangerous drug in a person’s body, standing alone, is insufficient to prove knowing possession. The Supreme Court distinguished it: in Bunse, the urinalysis was not the only evidence; it corroborated physical evidence (meth and pipe in plain view) and circumstantial evidence linking Bunse to the room (personal items, access, and shifting statements).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured, “sufficiency review” sequence:

  1. Identify the governing lens: view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution; ask only whether a rational fact-finder could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This framing matters because Bunse’s appeal invited the Court to re-evaluate credibility and weigh competing inferences.
  2. Confirm that “knowing possession” can be proven circumstantially: the Court rejects the premise that circumstantial evidence is categorically weaker or legally inadequate. It emphasizes the “cumulative force” of circumstantial evidence—multiple modest facts can combine into proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  3. Apply “dominion and control” logic to the residence facts: although the opinion does not use the phrase “constructive possession” explicitly, it applies the classic constructive-possession idea: knowledge plus dominion/control inferred from access and personal connection to the area where contraband is found. Here, the Court notes (a) personal items consistent with Bunse’s use (male clothing, men’s toiletries, diabetic kit), (b) Lyons’s testimony that Bunse pointed to both bedrooms (including the room with meth) as where he stayed “between,” and (c) Bunse’s shifting accounts (between rooms; couch; basement), which the fact-finder could treat as consciousness-of-guilt circumstantial evidence.
  4. Integrate the urinalysis as corroboration rather than as sole proof: the positive test the next day (confirmed by the State Crime Lab) strengthens the inference that Bunse knowingly possessed and used methamphetamine near the relevant time. The Court carefully avoids making urinalysis alone dispositive (consistent with In re R.L.H.) and instead uses it to corroborate the physical and situational evidence.
  5. Resolve the “internal inconsistency” claim through partial-credit credibility doctrine: the District Court could regard Smith as sincere yet mistaken, incomplete, or outweighed by other evidence on the ultimate question of Bunse’s access and use of the room. A “not untruthful” witness does not control the fact-finder’s ultimate inference when other evidence points in a different direction.
  6. Reject “missing forensics” as a legal insufficiency argument: the Court treats the absence of fingerprint/DNA testing as a matter of evidentiary weight for the trier of fact, not a legal prerequisite to conviction.

3.3. Impact

Although nonprecedential, Bunse is practically significant for Montana trial practice and sufficiency litigation because it:

  • Reinforces that in possession prosecutions, the State can prevail without exclusive control of a room and without forensic testing, so long as the totality of circumstantial evidence supports knowledge and dominion/control beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Demonstrates how courts may treat shifting explanations about living arrangements as circumstantial evidence supporting guilt.
  • Clarifies the proper use of urinalysis evidence: not as a stand-alone substitute for possession proof (per In re R.L.H.), but as corroboration when paired with physical evidence and access-based inferences.
  • Underscores that “internal inconsistency” arguments often fail on appeal where the alleged inconsistency is simply the trial court’s permissible decision to accept some testimony while rejecting other inferences.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sufficiency of the evidence: A legal check on whether the evidence could allow a reasonable fact-finder to convict—not whether the appellate judges themselves would convict.
  • “Light most favorable to the prosecution”: When evidence conflicts, the appellate court assumes the fact-finder resolved conflicts in the State’s favor.
  • Circumstantial vs. direct evidence: Direct evidence proves a fact outright (e.g., “I saw him hold the baggie”); circumstantial evidence supports an inference (e.g., drugs in plain view in a room tied to the defendant). The law allows conviction based on circumstantial evidence if it is strong enough in combination.
  • Knowing possession / dominion and control: Possession can be inferred when a person knowingly has control over drugs or the place where they are found, even if not found in their hand or pocket.
  • Bench trial: The judge acts as the fact-finder (instead of a jury). Appellate courts defer to the judge’s credibility calls for the same reason they defer to a jury’s.
  • Memorandum opinion (noncitable): The decision resolves the parties’ dispute but is not intended to create binding precedent for future cases.

5. Conclusion

State v. Bunse applies settled Montana sufficiency standards to uphold a knowing-possession conviction grounded in the cumulative force of circumstantial proof: drugs and paraphernalia in plain view in a room the trial court found the defendant used or had access to, personal items connecting him to that space, shifting explanations about where he stayed, and a confirmed positive urinalysis soon after the search. The opinion also illustrates two recurring appellate principles: (1) the State need not produce fingerprint/DNA evidence to establish possession, and (2) a fact-finder may sincerely believe a witness is not lying while still rejecting the witness’s ultimate inference when weighed against the full record.