Certified Questions May Be Declined After Acceptance: Unresolved Telecommunications Rights at Railroad Crossings

Case: Norfolk Southern Corporation et al. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, d/b/a AT&T Alabama

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
Date: November 13, 2026
Docket: SC-2025-0840

Central significance: The court declined to answer a previously accepted certified question concerning telecommunications installations at railroad crossings. It established no substantive rule governing those installations. Justice Parker’s separate concurrence explains why an insufficiently developed factual record and an overly broad question can make certification unsuitable.

1. Introduction

This dispute concerns the intersection of telecommunications infrastructure, public-highway rights-of-way, and railroad property rights. Norfolk Southern Corporation and the other plaintiffs opposed Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC, doing business as AT&T Alabama, in litigation pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division.

Following the filing of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the federal court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Alabama:

“In Alabama, does a telecommunications provider installing any kind of telecommunications facilities within the margin of the right-of-way of a public roadway have an unqualified right to cross a rail corridor without the permission of the railroad?”

The question implicated Alabama Code § 23-1-85, which grants specified persons and corporations a right-of-way for constructing “electric transmission, telegraph, or telephone lines” along the margins of public-highway rights-of-way. But answering it potentially required resolving two distinct matters: the extent of the government’s property rights at a particular crossing and whether the statute covers the telecommunications technology involved.

Although the Alabama Supreme Court initially accepted the question, it ultimately declined to answer it. The distinction between that procedural disposition and Justice Parker’s explanatory concurrence is essential: the court collectively announced only its decision not to answer; the detailed reasoning appears in a separate opinion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s disposition

The per curiam opinion stated that, after consideration and deliberation, the court would exercise its discretion to decline the certified question. It did not interpret § 23-1-85, determine the scope of any particular right-of-way, or decide whether AT&T needed the railroad’s permission.

Seven justices joined the per curiam disposition. Justice Parker concurred specially, and Justice Wise recused herself. The disposition was therefore agreed upon by all participating justices, but Justice Parker’s reasoning was not expressly adopted by the other members of the court.

Justice Parker’s explanation

Justice Parker regarded the underlying state-law questions as important and unsettled. Nevertheless, he considered the case unsuitable for an answer at that stage because:

  • The factual record had received little development.
  • The ordinary litigation process had not sufficiently narrowed the issues.
  • The relevant property rights could vary from crossing to crossing.
  • Whether fiber-optic cables fall within the statute raised unresolved interpretive and technological questions.
  • These uncertainties made it difficult to provide a clean legal answer that would be determinative of the federal dispute.

His conclusion was expressly provisional: a narrower question, supported by a more developed record and arguments, might be suitable for certification later.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Significance

All the following authorities appear in Justice Parker’s special concurrence, rather than in the court’s brief per curiam explanation. Their role is therefore to support his account of the appropriate use of certification and the unresolved merits issues.

A. Certification, federalism, and judicial discretion

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-80 (1997)

Justice Parker cited this decision for the state supreme court’s position as the final authority on state law. He also relied on its discussion of certification as an alternative to federal-court abstention followed by a full round of state-court litigation. The authority explains why certification serves both federalism and efficiency: federal courts can obtain authoritative state-law guidance without necessarily requiring separate state litigation.

Berkley Reg'l Ins. Co. v. Doe Battery Manufacturer, 173 F.4th 989, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2026)

This decision supplied the concurrence’s description of certification as “cooperative federalism.” It also supported two practical considerations: certification avoids leaving federal courts to predict state law, and suitable questions should likely possess widespread public importance. Justice Parker treated importance as a prudential consideration, not as a newly announced categorical requirement.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)

The concurrence quoted the familiar principle that courts should neither decline jurisdiction given to them nor assume jurisdiction they lack. Justice Parker used that principle to acknowledge the judicial responsibility accompanying Alabama’s constitutional grant of certification jurisdiction. He nevertheless distinguished possession of jurisdiction from an obligation to answer every question submitted under a discretionary procedure.

Alabama State Conf. of NAACP v. Attorney General of Alabama, 161 F.4th 1286, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025)

This authority supported the Alabama Supreme Court’s broad discretion over how, and whether, to answer certified questions. It helps reconcile the court’s constitutional authority to answer with its decision not to exercise that authority in a particular case.

New York Times Co. v. Spears, [Ms. SC-2025-0370, Apr. 10, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2026)

Justice Parker cited this Alabama decision as an example of declining a certified question after initially accepting it because the answer proved not to be determinative. Its direct relevance is procedural: acceptance does not prevent the court from later reassessing whether certification satisfies its purpose.

Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 717 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2013)

This decision supplied the description of an appropriate certified question as “purely legal.” Justice Parker explained that this does not require complete independence from facts. Rather, the necessary facts should be sufficiently developed to permit a clear, informed legal answer.

Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Shelby Realty Holdings, LLC, 83 So. 3d 469 (2011)

The concurrence cited this case by comparison when discussing the limited development of the present litigation. Like the current proceeding, it involved a refusal to answer after initial consent. The concurrence did not supply further details of its underlying dispute, so its significance here should remain confined to that procedural comparison.

B. Property rights and intersecting rights-of-way

Hinote v. Owens, 248 So. 3d 964, 967 (Ala. 2017)

This case supplied the principle that “one cannot convey more property than one owns.” Justice Parker applied it to the statutory right-of-way: if § 23-1-85 essentially conveys an easement, its operation depends on what property rights the government already possesses. Statutory authorization cannot simply be assumed to eliminate another holder’s property interests.

Crawford v. Alabama Power Co., 221 Ala. 236, 238-39, 128 So. 454, 457-58 (1930)

The concurrence cited this decision for the government’s generally broad control over public-highway rights-of-way. That proposition supports the possible breadth of public-road authority, but it does not itself resolve the allocation of rights where a highway intersects a railroad.

Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Faulkner, 217 Ala. 82, 84, 114 So. 686, 687 (Ala. 1927)

This authority supplied the corresponding proposition that railroad companies generally have broad control over railroad rights-of-way. Read alongside Crawford v. Alabama Power Co., it demonstrates why neither party’s general rights necessarily answer the crossing-specific question.

Southern Ry. Co. v. Todd, 279 Ala. 260, 263, 184 So. 2d 341, 344 (1966)

Justice Parker relied on this case for limits on introducing a new use where public-road and railroad uses intersect. As he described the principle, the new use must not destroy the original use and must interfere with it as little as possible. The concurrence also cited Alabama Code § 18-1A-72 in this connection. These authorities suggest an inquiry into compatibility and interference, rather than an automatic priority rule.

Western Ry. of Alabama v. Alabama Grand Trunk R.R., 96 Ala. 272, 277-79, 11 So. 483, 485 (1892)

This decision discusses differences among rights acquired by express dedication, condemnation, and prescription. It supported Justice Parker’s view that the scope of a right-of-way depends on how it arose. That historical and location-specific inquiry undermined the suitability of a universal answer covering every railroad crossing.

4. Legal Reasoning

A. Constitutional authority does not eliminate certification discretion

Article VI, § 140(b), of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 expressly grants the Alabama Supreme Court original jurisdiction to answer state-law questions certified by a federal court. Rule 18(a) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure supplies important conditions: the question must be determinative of the pending federal cause, and there must be no clear controlling Alabama Supreme Court precedent.

Justice Parker distinguished those rule-based conditions from additional prudential considerations. His nonexclusive framework asked whether a question is:

  1. Determinative: Would answering it materially resolve the federal litigation?
  2. Unsettled: Is clear controlling state precedent absent?
  3. Important: Does the question have sufficient public significance to warrant certification?
  4. Cleanly legal: Are the issues and relevant facts developed enough for a reliable legal answer?

This was not a four-part test adopted by the court. It was one justice’s explanation of considerations that can help both certifying courts and the Alabama Supreme Court assess whether certification will be useful.

The difficulty here lay principally in the first and fourth considerations. If unresolved facts determine which legal rule applies, an abstract response may not settle the actual dispute.

B. The property-rights inquiry comes before the statutory entitlement

The concurrence’s central analytical move was to separate statutory permission from the underlying property interest needed to exercise that permission. Justice Parker reasoned that § 23-1-85 essentially conveys an easement. Accordingly, before deciding what AT&T may construct under the statute, one must identify what the government itself could authorize within the relevant highway right-of-way.

This makes the inquiry potentially crossing-specific. Relevant matters include how the right-of-way originated, the extent of the rights acquired, and the relationship between the proposed installation and the existing railroad use. Broad governmental authority over highways and broad railroad authority over rail corridors do not, standing alone, determine their respective rights at an intersection.

Justice Parker therefore viewed the certified question’s request for an “unqualified right” as especially difficult. A universal answer could disregard material differences among locations. Yet a heavily qualified answer might leave the federal court with the same unresolved property issues and thus fail to be determinative.

This reasoning did not establish that railroad consent is always necessary. Nor did it establish that a railroad can prevent every telecommunications crossing. It explained why the record did not permit either categorical conclusion.

C. The statute’s coverage presents a separate unresolved issue

Even if the necessary property rights exist, the proposed facility must fall within § 23-1-85. Justice Parker identified the central interpretive question as whether fiber-optic cables qualify as “electric transmission, telegraph, or telephone lines.”

The statute’s development complicates that inquiry:

  • “Telegraph” was added in 1855, through Act No. 6 of the 1855-1856 Alabama Acts.
  • “Telephone” was added in 1897, as reflected in § 2490 of the 1897 Alabama Code.
  • “Electric transmission” was added in 1975.

These amendments raise questions about the level of generality at which the statutory categories should be understood. Does “telephone line” describe a particular historical technology, or a broader function capable of being performed through newer technology? Does the separate addition of “telephone” show that earlier technological categories were understood narrowly? What assistance might other statutes provide?

The concurrence did not answer those questions or select a definitive interpretive approach. Instead, it explained why technical facts could matter to interpretation: what fiber-optic cables do, how they facilitate telephone service, and how their relationship to telephone service has changed over time.

Notably, the parties had not raised this coverage issue before the district court; the certification order itself identified it. That procedural history reinforced Justice Parker’s concern that the question had arrived before the arguments and record were ready for authoritative resolution.

D. Early certification can separate a legal question from the facts needed to answer it

The preliminary-injunction setting mattered because the record was still comparatively undeveloped. Justice Parker did not suggest that certification during preliminary-injunction proceedings is categorically improper. His concern was functional: in this case, ordinary litigation had not yet clarified the factual premises and legal boundaries necessary for a useful answer.

The refusal therefore reflects an effort to preserve the reliability of state-law adjudication, not a determination that the issue is unimportant or beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

5. Potential Impact

For future certified questions

The immediate procedural lesson is that initial acceptance does not guarantee an answer. A state supreme court may reconsider suitability after examining the record and arguments more closely.

Justice Parker’s concurrence offers persuasive guidance for future certifications: identify the precise legal issue, develop the facts on which it depends, explain why existing precedent does not control, and show how an answer will affect the pending federal case. Where a dispute contains distinct property and statutory questions, narrower or separately framed questions may be more useful than a single request for an unqualified entitlement.

For telecommunications and railroad disputes

The substantive questions remain open. The decision neither excludes fiber-optic facilities from § 23-1-85 nor brings them within it. It neither grants telecommunications providers unrestricted crossing rights nor recognizes a blanket railroad veto.

Future litigation may therefore require attention to both the legal origin and scope of the relevant rights-of-way and the nature and function of the proposed equipment. Those are implications of the concurrence’s analysis, not mandatory evidentiary requirements newly imposed by the court.

For federal-state judicial cooperation

The concurrence presents restraint as compatible with cooperative federalism. Certification is valuable when it produces an authoritative answer to a sufficiently defined question; it is less useful when a response would rest on uncertain factual assumptions.

The Alabama disposition itself did not resolve the preliminary-injunction motion or direct the federal court’s next procedural step. Those matters remain for the federal proceedings.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Certified question
A question of state law that a federal court asks a state supreme court to answer. The state court addresses that question, not the entire federal lawsuit.
Determinative
Sufficiently consequential to the pending case that answering the question can determine its outcome, rather than merely provide an abstract legal discussion.
Right-of-way and easement
A right-of-way can describe a legally protected right to use land for a particular purpose. An easement generally provides a use right rather than unrestricted ownership. Its scope matters as much as its existence.
Dedication, condemnation, and prescription
Different ways land-use rights may arise: an owner’s dedication to public use, compulsory acquisition through legal proceedings, or acquisition through qualifying use over time. The method of acquisition can affect the resulting rights.
Original public meaning
The meaning statutory words would have conveyed when enacted. Applying older terms to modern technology requires deciding how broadly those terms were originally understood.
Special concurrence
An opinion agreeing with the court’s result while offering separate reasoning. Justice Parker’s analysis is informative but was not adopted as the court’s collective rationale.
Abstention
In the comparison discussed here, a federal court’s decision to pause its case while state-law issues are resolved through state-court litigation. Certification can offer a more direct alternative.

7. Conclusion

The decision’s significance is procedural rather than substantive: the Alabama Supreme Court declined a previously accepted certified question without deciding telecommunications providers’ rights at railroad crossings.

Justice Parker’s concurrence explains the underlying difficulty. Statutory authorization may depend on location-specific property rights, while applying nineteenth-century terminology to fiber-optic technology may require developed technical facts and focused legal argument. An important question is not necessarily a question ready for an authoritative answer.

The broader lesson is that certification works best when a clearly framed legal issue rests on an adequate record and its resolution will genuinely determine the pending dispute.