Attempted Witness Intimidation Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305(a) Requires Specific Intent and a Proven Nexus to the Witness’s Duty

Case: Steve Brandon Brown v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 6 (Wyo. Jan. 13, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from two felony convictions for witness intimidation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305(a), based on (1) statements Steve Brandon Brown made during a supervised visit with his two daughters—DB (14) and AB (11)—then placed at the Youth Alternative Housing Association (YAHA) in Evanston, and (2) a Facebook post he made later the same day.

The alleged “witness” context was two pending juvenile CHINS proceedings in which DB and AB were scheduled to attend a placement review hearing two days later. The State’s theory was that Mr. Brown’s statements and post constituted threats intended to influence, intimidate, or impede the girls “in the discharge of [their] duty” as witnesses.

On appeal, Mr. Brown challenged the convictions on two principal grounds: (a) First Amendment protection for speech, and (b) insufficiency of the evidence—particularly, the lack of proof that any threat was made with the purpose of affecting the girls’ participation as witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed on sufficiency grounds and therefore did not reach the First Amendment question.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court assumed—without deciding—that three of the alleged statements could qualify as “threats” under the statute, but found the State failed to prove the critical element: a demonstrable connection between the threats and an attempt to affect DB’s or AB’s witness-related duties in the CHINS proceedings. Timing alone (the hearing being two days later) did not establish that nexus.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence framework

The Court reaffirmed the familiar Wyoming sufficiency standard: appellate review accepts the State’s evidence and reasonable inferences, does not reweigh credibility, and asks whether a reasonable jury could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court anchored this approach in:

• Bean v. State, 2016 WY 48 (quoting and synthesizing prior cases) — the principal statement of the standard applied.
• Andersen v. State, 2014 WY 88 — cited through Bean for accepting the State’s evidence and reasonable inferences.
• Toth v. State, 2015 WY 86A — additional support for the same review posture.
• Oldman v. State, 2015 WY 121 — emphasized that the appellate lens is “singular,” focusing on the reasonableness of inferences from evidence adverse to the defendant.
• Hill v. State, 2016 WY 27 — clarified the question is whether evidence could reasonably support a guilty finding.
• Levengood v. State, 2014 WY 138 — cited through Hill on the “could reasonably support” formulation.
• Guerrero v. State, 2012 WY 77 — cited through Bean/Andersen for applying the same standard to circumstantial evidence.

These cases did not drive the substantive outcome so much as discipline it: even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, the Court found the missing “nexus” element could not be supplied by speculation.

B. General intent vs. specific intent and the “attempt” concept

The opinion’s most significant doctrinal move is its explicit reclassification of attempted witness intimidation under § 6-5-305(a) as a specific intent offense.

• Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1995) — the Court acknowledged that Smith had treated § 6-5-305(a) as lacking “articulation of any specific intent,” and thus as a general intent crime. In Brown, the Court accepted the State’s invitation to abrogate that aspect of Smith.
• Black v. State, 2020 WY 34 — foreshadowed the shift by observing that Smith’s discussion of intent was “generally inconsistent” with more recent interpretations, but declined to revisit it because the parties had not raised the issue. Brown squarely confronts the question and resolves it.
• Kite v. State, 2018 WY 94 — supplied the controlling analytical framework: attempt crimes are generally specific intent because “an attempt requires an intent to do some further act or create an additional consequence.”
• Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98 — quoted by Kite for the general rule distinguishing general intent (mere intent to do the act) from specific intent (intent to accomplish a further act or consequence).

Applying Kite/Sam, the Court reasoned that the statutory word “attempts” in § 6-5-305(a) necessarily requires an intent to bring about the further consequence of influencing, intimidating, or impeding a witness in the discharge of duty. Thus, “attempted witness intimidation” is not merely “making a threat”; it is making a threat with the purpose of affecting the witness’s performance of witness duties.

C. The “nexus” between threat and witness-duty (comparative authority and Smith’s own caution)

Brown uses Smith in a second way: not for its intent holding (now rejected), but for its articulation that even where a person is a “witness,” an assault or threat must be connected to the judicial proceeding—clear “in time, causation, and logic”—to fall within the statute. This conceptual “nexus” becomes decisive in Brown.

• Smith v. State — distinguished factually. In Smith, the attack occurred within hours of testimony and the defendant explicitly linked the violence to the witness “lied in court,” demonstrating causation and purpose. Brown found no comparable evidence connecting Mr. Brown’s conduct to influencing DB’s/AB’s CHINS participation.
• Fisher v. McDaniel, 9 Wyo. 457, 64 P. 1056 (1901) — cited within Smith as part of Smith’s discussion of witness concepts and reliance on other jurisdictions.
• State v. Hodge, 2020-Ohio-3002, ¶ 73, 154 N.E.3d 671 — used as persuasive authority because Ohio’s intimidation statute is similar. Hodge reversed an intimidation conviction where a defendant made angry threats at an officer but there was no evidence the threats were intended to affect charging or testimony (no “quid pro quo”).
• State v. Jackson, 2003-Ohio-6183 — reinforced the “nexus” requirement; threats alone, without evidence they were made to discourage reporting or testimony, were insufficient.

By invoking Hodge and Jackson, the Court underscored a limiting principle: intimidation statutes are not “all-purpose” threat crimes. They criminalize threats when tethered to the specific objective of corrupting or obstructing witness functions.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Recharacterizing the offense as specific intent

The Court’s core interpretive move is textual and structural: § 6-5-305(a) punishes one who “by force or threats” “attempts to influence, intimidate or impede a … witness … in the discharge of his duty.” The term “attempts” imports an intent-to-achieve element—an intent to influence, intimidate, or impede in relation to the duty—beyond merely uttering words that could be construed as threatening.

This matters because it elevates the prosecution’s burden. Under a general intent view, the State could argue that intentionally making a threat to someone who happens to be a witness is enough. Under Brown’s specific intent view, the State must prove the defendant made the threat for the purpose of affecting the witness’s discharge of duty.

B. Separating “threat” from “witness intimidation”

Brown illustrates a two-step structure embedded in the statute:

• Step 1: There must be “force or threats.”
• Step 2: The force or threats must be used in an attempt to “influence, intimidate or impede” a witness “in the discharge of duty.”

The Court assumed arguendo that three alleged items could satisfy Step 1: (1) the “how would you feel if I took your kids away” comment; (2) the “right to bear arms” comment; and (3) the later Facebook post with violent language. It treated the “tablet” statement as irrelevant because the State expressly disclaimed reliance on it as a qualifying threat under § 6-5-305.

C. The missing nexus to the CHINS “witness duty” element

Even granting possible threats, the Court found no evidence—direct or circumstantial—connecting any of them to an attempt to influence DB’s or AB’s performance at the CHINS placement review hearing.

• The “take your kids away” comment: The record did not tie it to the hearing or testimony. AB understood it as likely aimed at YAHA staff, not at influencing her own court participation. No witness supplied a logical inference connecting the rhetorical question to the girls’ witness duty.
• The “right to bear arms” comment: YAHA staff interpreted it as alarming and terminated the visit, but did not connect it to the CHINS hearing or to pressuring the girls about what to say in court.
• The Facebook post: The girls never saw it and had no social media access; it did not mention CHINS, the hearing, or the girls’ testimony; and there was no evidence it was directed to them. The Court accepted that it might be threatening in a general sense, but not as proof of intent to influence these particular “witnesses.”

The State’s main linkage was temporal: the hearing was scheduled two days later. Brown rejects timing alone as a substitute for proof of purpose. By contrasting Smith (where “time, causation, and logic” were “clear”) with this case (where causation and logic were absent), the Court effectively requires a demonstrable bridge between the threat and the witness function—such as statements referencing the proceeding, conditional demands about what the witness should do, or other evidence showing the threat was designed to affect testimony or cooperation.

3.3 Impact

Brown is consequential in two distinct ways:

1. It changes Wyoming law on mens rea for attempted witness intimidation: The Court abrogates Smith’s general-intent characterization and holds that attempted witness intimidation under § 6-5-305(a) is a specific intent crime. Prosecutors must now prove the threat was made with the purpose of influencing, intimidating, or impeding witness duties—not merely that a threat occurred near the existence of a proceeding.
2. It strengthens the “nexus” requirement as a sufficiency constraint: The opinion signals that threatening conduct, even alarming conduct, will not sustain a witness-intimidation conviction absent evidence linking it to the witness’s discharge of duty. The Court’s reliance on State v. Hodge and State v. Jackson suggests Wyoming courts may look for evidence resembling a “quid pro quo” or other indicia of purpose directed at testimony/cooperation (even if not as formal as an explicit bargain).

Practically, Brown may redirect charging decisions. Conduct that is threatening but not tethered to witness duties may fit other offenses (e.g., general threat or harassment statutes, depending on Wyoming’s code and facts). Brown narrows the pathway for using § 6-5-305(a) as a catch-all threat provision and pressures the State to develop proof of proceeding-related intent.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Specific intent vs. general intent

A general intent crime usually requires only that the defendant intended to do the prohibited act (for example, intentionally saying certain words).

A specific intent crime requires more: the defendant must act with a further purpose or objective (for example, saying threatening words in order to alter a witness’s testimony or participation). Brown holds that because the statute criminalizes an attempt to influence or impede, the State must prove that further purpose.

“Nexus” to the discharge of duty

“Nexus” here means a meaningful connection between the threat and the witness’s role in a legal process. A person can be a witness in some case, but a threat made for unrelated reasons (anger, venting, general hostility) is not automatically witness intimidation. The threat must be aimed at influencing or obstructing the witness’s performance of witness duties.

CHINS proceedings

“CHINS” stands for “Child in Need of Supervision.” In this case, the jury was instructed these were confidential juvenile matters with placement review proceedings, and the children were scheduled to attend and address the court. The State’s intimidation theory depended on the idea that DB and AB were “witnesses” in that setting.

5. Conclusion

Steve Brandon Brown v. The State of Wyoming establishes two major takeaways: (1) attempted witness intimidation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-305(a) is a specific intent offense, and (2) convictions require proof that threats were made for the purpose of influencing, intimidating, or impeding a person’s discharge of duty as a witness. Applying that rule, the Court found the State proved—at most—general threatening conduct, but failed to prove the necessary nexus between the threats and DB’s/AB’s expected participation in the CHINS hearing. The convictions were reversed, narrowing the statute’s reach to threats genuinely aimed at corrupting or obstructing witness functions.