Admission into Evidence Does Not Permit a Pleading to Enter the Jury Room Under Alabama Rule 51
Case: Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner, No. SC-2025-0453
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
Opinion date: November 13, 2026
Author: Justice Wise
Disposition: Reversed and remanded; all participating justices concurred.
1. Introduction
In Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner, the Supreme Court of Alabama clarified an important boundary between admitting a document into evidence and permitting jurors to consult that document during deliberations. Under Rule 51 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading in the case may not be sent into the jury room merely because the trial court has admitted it as an exhibit.
The dispute arose from an unsuccessful effort to repossess a rent-to-own portable cabin. Pharming Capital, LLC sued James R. Turner after its contract manager identified him through property-information sources as the owner of the land where the cabin stood. Turner maintained that he had already sold the land and had never possessed the cabin. He counterclaimed, ultimately obtaining a $75,000 jury award on a negligence/wantonness theory arising from the filing of Pharming Capital’s lawsuit.
The appeal presented two distinct questions: whether Alabama recognizes liability for negligently or wantonly filing a lawsuit, and whether Pharming Capital’s complaint could accompany the jury during deliberations. The Court did not decide the substantive tort question. It declined to reach the specific arguments presented because they had not been adequately raised before the postjudgment stage. Instead, it reversed because the complaint had been sent into the jury room contrary to Rule 51.
2. Background and Procedural History
The cabin and the disputed property ownership
In November 2023, Leland Hedlund entered into a rent-to-own arrangement for a “Premier Lofted Barn Cabin.” The paperwork identified BHR Management, LLC as lessor and reflected an assignment to Pharming Capital. Other evidence indicated that Pharming Capital already owned the used cabin and that the transaction involved a commission sale and delivery rather than the company’s usual contract-purchase settlement process.
Premier Portable Buildings delivered the cabin in December 2023 to rural property in Geneva County, Alabama. The contractual documents contained incomplete or inconsistent address information, and the agreement did not identify the legal owner or landlord of the delivery property. Delivery coordinates nevertheless allowed the cabin to be located later.
Turner had purchased the land in 1991. In 2021, he agreed to sell it to James Gough for $30,000 and allowed Gough to use it while saving the purchase price. Turner testified that the sale closed on May 7, 2024, when he executed and delivered a deed, received payment, and paid off the outstanding mortgage. That deed was not recorded. After a reported problem involving the original paperwork, Turner executed a replacement deed in July 2024, which was recorded on July 22.
The repossession investigation and lawsuit
A January 2024 call log recorded an inquiry from someone identifying himself as the property owner. In May, a repossession contractor located the cabin but could not retrieve it because of a locked gate. A subsequent conversation concerned payment for allowing recovery or obtaining a favorable purchase arrangement. The telephone number associated with that conversation returned to Gough; the record did not establish that Turner was the caller.
BHR’s collection personnel then used delivery information, mapping applications, a property-information service, a TransUnion property search, and Alabama’s GIS system to identify the landowner. Those sources identified Turner. The employee responsible acknowledged that she had not obtained a professional title examination or title opinion.
On May 17, 2024, Pharming Capital sued Turner in Coffee County. Its complaint alleged that he unlawfully detained the cabin and, on information and belief, owned the land where it was located. Pharming Capital sought possession and access to recover the cabin or, if it could not be located, its alternative value of $8,427.
Turner’s counterclaims and the verdict
Turner denied possessing the cabin or owning the land on which it stood. His counterclaim alleged negligence and/or wantonness, abuse of process, malicious civil prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrage, and entitlement to relief under the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act (“ALAA”).
The trial court disposed of the abuse-of-process and outrage claims before trial. Pharming Capital voluntarily dismissed its own complaint under Rule 41(a)(2). At trial, the court entered judgment as a matter of law against Turner on malicious prosecution and the ALAA claim, but submitted negligence/wantonness and punitive damages to the jury.
The jury awarded Turner $25,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. Over Pharming Capital’s objections, the trial court both admitted its complaint into evidence and allowed the complaint to accompany the jury during deliberations. After the denial of postjudgment relief, Pharming Capital appealed.
3. Summary of the Opinion
The Supreme Court resolved the appeal through three principal rulings:
- The specific substantive challenges were not properly presented for appellate reversal. Pharming Capital first squarely argued after judgment that Alabama does not recognize negligent or wanton filing of a lawsuit and that Turner’s alleged injury was legally unforeseeable. The record did not show that the trial court considered those new arguments.
- The challenge to admitting the complaint was inadequately briefed. Pharming Capital did not supply authority addressing whether the pleading could be admitted as evidence. Rule 51 and the cases it cited concerned materials entering the jury room, not admissibility.
- Sending the complaint into the jury room violated Rule 51. Although courts ordinarily have discretion to permit admitted exhibits to accompany jurors, Rule 51 expressly excludes pleadings. The violation required reversal.
The Court reversed the judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion. It expressly disclaimed any determination of whether Alabama recognizes a cause of action for negligently or wantonly filing suit.
4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Preservation requires more than a broadly related objection
Pharming Capital argued that its appellate contention—that Alabama should not recognize the asserted tort—merely reframed or expanded its earlier position that it owed Turner no duty. The Court examined the actual arguments made at summary judgment and trial rather than accepting that characterization.
Those earlier arguments largely concerned who delivered the cabin, whether Turner remained the record owner, whether Pharming Capital reasonably investigated ownership, and whether Turner proved the elements of his claims. Although a written trial motion stated that Turner could identify no duty, the Court regarded that statement as an unsupported assertion rather than a developed presentation of the specific legal theories later advanced.
The distinction was consequential. An argument that the evidence does not establish negligence in a particular transaction is not necessarily the same as an argument that the legal system recognizes no such cause of action at all. Likewise, asserting that a defendant acted reasonably does not automatically preserve a distinct legal argument that the plaintiff’s injury was unforeseeable and therefore no duty arose.
The Court did not impose an absolute bar on new postjudgment arguments. A trial court may consider them in its discretion. Here, however, nothing showed that it had done so, and Pharming Capital supplied no justification for the delay. The appellate court therefore declined to reverse on those grounds.
B. The existence of a negligent-litigation tort remains unresolved
The opinion’s express reservation is essential to understanding its precedential reach. Allowing the case to proceed to reversal on a procedural ground did not validate Turner’s negligence/wantonness theory.
Accordingly, the opinion establishes neither:
- a general duty to investigate or contact a prospective defendant before filing suit;
- a rule that reliance on property databases is sufficient or insufficient as a matter of law;
- a new tort of negligent or wanton litigation; nor
- the substantive adequacy of Turner’s evidence supporting compensatory or punitive damages.
Those questions cannot be answered by treating the Court’s preservation ruling as an endorsement of the trial court’s legal theory.
C. Admissibility and access during deliberations are different questions
Pharming Capital separately challenged the complaint’s admission into evidence and its delivery to the jury room. The Court treated those challenges independently.
Rule 28(a)(10) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant to support its contentions with relevant authority and developed reasoning. Pharming Capital cited Rule 51 and decisions concerning written instructions entering the jury room, but those authorities did not establish that a pleading could not be admitted into evidence. Its admissibility challenge therefore failed the briefing requirement.
This was not a substantive holding that the complaint was admissible. Rather, it was a determination that Pharming Capital had not adequately supported its request for appellate relief on that particular issue.
D. Rule 51 limits the ordinary discretion governing jury-room exhibits
Section 12-16-14, Alabama Code 1975, provides that instruments of evidence and depositions read to the jury may accompany jurors upon retirement. The Court recognized that this provision ordinarily leaves the handling of such materials to the trial court’s discretion.
Rule 51, however, supplies a specific limitation:
“Neither the pleadings nor ‘given’ written instructions shall go into the jury room.”
The Committee Comments reinforce that the rule bars pleadings from the jury room. Thus, the general authority to send exhibits to the jury did not authorize the court to send this particular category of document.
The decisive point is that admission as an exhibit did not eliminate the complaint’s status as a pleading. Its relevance to Turner’s counterclaim could not create an exception to Rule 51’s prohibition.
E. The Court treated the violation as requiring reversal
The Court held that permitting the complaint to enter the jury room was reversible error. It supported that conclusion by analogy to a decision describing a Rule 51 violation involving a written jury instruction as reversible error per se.
The opinion did not conduct a separate prejudice analysis or require Pharming Capital to prove how the complaint affected particular jurors. Its direct holding concerns the pleading sent into the jury room; it should not be expanded into a conclusion that every evidentiary error involving a pleading automatically requires reversal.
5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Negligence, wantonness, and foreseeability authorities
These authorities explain the substantive framework and the parties’ arguments, but they did not resolve the appeal’s dispositive Rule 51 issue.
- Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala. 1994), supplied the Court’s statement of the elements of negligence and the definition of wantonness. It framed the distinction between failure to exercise legally required care and conscious wrongdoing or omission of a known duty.
- Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895, 897 (Ala. 1992), appeared within the quotation from Martin v. Arnold as authority for negligence’s four elements: duty to a foreseeable plaintiff, breach, proximate causation, and injury.
- Jones v. Newton, 454 So. 2d 1345, 1348 (Ala. 1984), was cited in Pharming Capital’s trial motion for the same negligence elements. Its significance was principally to show how Pharming Capital had framed its trial-level challenge.
- Mascot Coal Co. v. Garrett, 156 Ala. 290, 47 So. 149 (1908), appeared as supporting authority within that trial submission. The Supreme Court did not independently analyze it or derive a litigation-specific duty from it.
- Rutley v. Country Skillet Poultry Co., 549 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala. 1989), also appeared in the trial motion as support for the negligence framework. It did not establish that the later appellate arguments had been preserved.
- Hood v. Murray, 547 So. 2d 75, 79 (Ala. 1989), and McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So. 2d 228, 231 (Ala. 1988), appeared in the trial materials defining wantonness as conscious conduct or omission undertaken with awareness that injury would likely or probably result. The Court recounted that argument without deciding the ultimate evidentiary sufficiency of Turner’s wantonness claim.
- Dolgencorp LLC v. Gilliam, 392 So. 3d 71, 74–75 (Ala. 2023), supported Pharming Capital’s appellate argument that foreseeability depends on probable, not merely possible, harm and excludes unusual or extraordinary occurrences. Pharming Capital characterized the unrecorded sale as such an occurrence. The Court did not apply that argument on its merits because it had not been timely presented.
B. Authorities governing new postjudgment arguments
- Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Blalock, 525 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Ala. 1988), established that a trial court has discretion, but no obligation, to consider a new legal argument raised after judgment. This principle directly controlled the treatment of Pharming Capital’s belated theories.
- Special Assets, L.L.C. v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 991 So. 2d 668 (Ala. 2007), supported the refusal to presume that the trial court had considered the new arguments when the record did not indicate that it had.
- Espinoza v. Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 416 (Ala. 2010), supported the conclusion that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by failing to consider arguments presented late without justification.
Together, these decisions prevented the appeal from becoming the vehicle for resolving an inadequately presented first-impression tort question.
C. Authorities requiring adequate appellate briefing
The Court relied on Harris v. Owens, 105 So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2012), which collected the following authorities concerning Rule 28 and the limits of appellate advocacy:
- Ex parte Borden, 60 So. 3d 940, 943 (Ala. 2007), explained that briefing requirements conserve judicial resources and inform the opposing party of the issues requiring a response.
- United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004), appeared within that explanation as federal authority concerning briefing requirements and abandonment of unbriefed issues.
- Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003), and Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994), established that courts do not undertake a party’s legal research or construct arguments from unsupported general propositions.
- Van Voorst v. Federal Express Corp., 16 So. 3d 86, 92–93 (Ala. 2008), reproduced and applied those briefing principles and formed part of the authority quoted in this opinion.
- Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1985), and S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 89 (Ala. 2006), explained that general propositions of law do not themselves constitute adequate supporting authority.
- Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 79 (Ala. 1992), reinforced that appellate courts will not create a party’s legal arguments.
- Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So. 2d 347, 348 (Ala. 1993), quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990), recognized that an appellate court may affirm as to an inadequately supported issue rather than supply the missing research.
- Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 960 (Ala. 2011), collected these related principles and was likewise included in the Court’s quotation from Harris v. Owens.
The practical application was precise: authority about jury-room access did not adequately support a separate argument about admissibility.
D. Authorities concerning materials taken into the jury room
- Tombrello v. McGhee, 282 Ala. 408, 411, 211 So. 2d 900, 903 (1968), recognized the trial court’s ordinary discretion concerning materials accompanying jurors under the governing statute and its predecessors. It supplied the general rule that Rule 51 limits.
- Nix v. Myers, 330 So. 3d 818 (Ala. 2021), concerned portions of jury charges entering the jury room. It did not support Pharming Capital’s separate objection to admitting a pleading as evidence.
- Carson v. Teagle, 408 So. 2d 494 (Ala. 1981), likewise addressed jury-charge material, not the admissibility of pleadings. Its subject matter illustrated why the appellant’s evidentiary argument lacked directly relevant support.
- Dunn v. Syring, 425 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Ala. 1983), held that sending a written pattern instruction into the jury room in response to a jury question constituted reversible error per se under Rule 51. Although it did not resolve admissibility, it provided the decisive analogy supporting reversal for sending the complaint into deliberations.
The Court also cited McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 10.04(1), for the distinction between ordinary discretion over exhibits and restrictions imposed by court rules. That distinction reconciled the general evidentiary statute with Rule 51’s specific exclusion.
6. Potential Impact
Trial management
The opinion directs Alabama civil courts to screen deliberation materials by category, not merely by exhibit status. A pleading does not become eligible for the jury room simply because it has been marked and admitted. Counsel should address admission and deliberation access through separate requests and objections.
Litigation arising from earlier litigation
The ruling is particularly important where the content of a complaint is central to a later claim or counterclaim. Even when the allegations themselves form part of the disputed conduct, their evidentiary relevance does not remove Rule 51’s restriction.
Preservation and appellate briefing
The decision warns against relying on a generic “no duty” assertion to preserve every later theory concerning duty or the existence of a tort. Specific legal grounds should be developed at the appropriate trial stage. On appeal, each distinct request for relief requires authority addressing that issue, rather than a neighboring procedural question.
Limited substantive effect
The opinion leaves future courts free to address, in a properly presented case, whether Alabama recognizes negligent or wanton initiation of litigation. It also leaves unresolved the appropriate standard for investigating ownership before a repossession action and the significance of an unrecorded conveyance in that setting.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Pleading
- A formal document stating a party’s claims or defenses, such as a complaint, answer, or counterclaim. Here, the prohibited document was Pharming Capital’s complaint in the same action.
- Admission into evidence versus jury-room access
- A document may be accepted for use as evidence at trial without being permitted to accompany jurors during deliberations. The Court’s central holding preserves that distinction.
- Preservation of error
- A party ordinarily must give the trial court a timely and sufficiently specific opportunity to address an argument before seeking appellate reversal on that basis.
- Judgment as a matter of law
- A ruling that a claim cannot legally be submitted to, or sustained by, a jury because the required legal or evidentiary basis is missing.
- Negligence and wantonness
- Negligence generally involves failing to exercise legally required care. Wantonness involves conscious conduct or omission with awareness that injury will likely or probably result; it is not simply another label for carelessness.
- Recorded ownership and an unrecorded deed
- Public records may continue to identify a seller after a transaction that has not been recorded. The resulting gap between recorded information and the asserted transfer was central to the factual dispute, but the Supreme Court did not resolve its substantive consequences here.
- Reversal and remand
- The appellate court sets aside the challenged judgment and returns the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. It does not necessarily decide who ultimately should prevail.
8. Conclusion
Pharming Capital, LLC v. Turner establishes a clear procedural boundary: a pleading admitted into evidence remains barred from the jury room by Alabama Rule 51. The general discretion to allow jurors to take exhibits into deliberations does not override that prohibition.
The decision is equally important for what it leaves undecided. It neither recognizes nor rejects a tort of negligently or wantonly filing suit. Its broader lesson is that substantive arguments must be specifically preserved, appellate challenges must be supported by relevant authority, and evidentiary admission must be distinguished from access during deliberations.