A Religious Vaccine Exemption Does Not Alone Establish a Religious Objection to Workplace Testing

Case: Kelvin Smith v. Kohler Co.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket: No. 25-3248
Decided: October 28, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed; nonprecedential order.

Precedential status: The court expressly designated this decision nonprecedential, with citation governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. It therefore illustrates the application of existing principles rather than establishing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

This case concerns the relationship between religious accommodation, workplace COVID-19 precautions, and a litigant’s obligation to follow procedural rules. Kelvin B. Smith sued his employer, Kohler Company, and his union, United Autoworkers, Local 833, alleging religious discrimination arising from a policy requiring vaccination or, for exempted employees, regular testing.

Kohler had granted Smith a religious exemption from vaccination. The central substantive question was whether that exemption, together with his allegations about avoiding “toxic substances,” sufficiently established a religious objection to the separate testing requirement. The principal procedural question was whether dismissal with prejudice was justified after Smith repeatedly failed to submit a compliant second amended complaint despite instructions and warnings.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Its reasoning distinguishes an employer’s recognition of a religious objection to vaccination from a plaintiff’s obligation to plead a religious conflict with testing. The decision also reinforces limits on nonlawyer representation, enforcement of filing rules, and preservation of appellate arguments.

2. Background and Procedural History

The workplace policy and Smith’s objections

In November 2021, Kohler informed employees that they had to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination or obtain a religious exemption. Exempted employees were required to undergo regular testing. Noncompliance could result in unpaid leave or termination. Kohler and UAW subsequently entered a memorandum extending the policy to union employees, and UAW allegedly warned members that noncompliance would result in their being “locked out” under the collective bargaining agreement.

Smith obtained a vaccination exemption after asserting that putting toxic substances into his body violated his deeply held religious belief. He nevertheless repeatedly refused the weekly testing required of exempted employees. According to his allegations, Kohler eventually deactivated his badge after he continued refusing testing, preventing him from returning to work.

Kohler lifted the testing mandate in May 2022 and permitted affected union employees to return. By then, Smith alleged, his position had been filled, requiring him to accept a different position.

The district court proceedings

After obtaining an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission right-to-sue letter, Smith brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also purported to pursue a class action on behalf of other affected employees and asserted additional claims concerning the collective bargaining agreement and an alleged invasion of privacy.

Both defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Smith did not timely file compliant opposition briefs. Instead, he later submitted an “objection to hearsay,” supplemental material, and a motion for default judgment. The district court declined to consider unauthorized or noncompliant submissions and denied default judgment because the defendants had timely defended the action.

On the substance of the complaint, the district court:

  • Dismissed the Title VII claim against Kohler without prejudice, finding no adequately pleaded religious conflict with testing;
  • Dismissed the purported class claims with prejudice because Smith, a nonlawyer representing himself, could not represent others;
  • Construed the claims against UAW as alleging breach of the duty of fair representation and dismissed them with prejudice for failure to exhaust and untimeliness; and
  • Allowed Smith to amend only his Title VII claim against Kohler, directing him to use a pre-printed complaint form.

Although warned that further noncompliance would lead to dismissal with prejudice, Smith did not submit the required amended complaint. The district court gave him a final opportunity and then dismissed the action with prejudice when he again failed to comply.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment on several grounds:

  1. The religious-discrimination allegations were insufficient. Smith did not connect his objection to COVID-19 testing with an identified religious observance, practice, or belief. His vaccination exemption did not supply that missing connection.
  2. Repeated noncompliance supported final dismissal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permitted dismissal after Smith repeatedly disregarded the court’s amendment instructions despite warnings.
  3. Smith could not represent other employees. His right to conduct his own case did not authorize him to litigate for a putative class.
  4. The district court could enforce its filing rules. It acted within its discretion in declining to consider untimely and noncompliant submissions.
  5. Default judgment was unavailable. Timely motions to dismiss constituted defending the lawsuit under Rule 55(a).
  6. The challenge concerning leave to amend against UAW was waived. Smith raised it for the first time in his appellate reply brief.

The court did not address the additional collective-bargaining and privacy claims because Smith did not pursue them on appeal.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Ruiz v. Pritzker, 162 F.4th 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2025)

The court cited this decision for the pleading-stage requirement to accept alleged facts as true and draw inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. That framework matters because the court was not deciding whether Smith’s account of workplace events was factually correct. It accepted his account but concluded that the complaint still lacked allegations connecting testing to a religious objection. Favorable treatment of pleaded facts does not supply a missing basis for a claim.

Jackson v. Methodist Health Servs. Corp., 121 F.4th 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 2024)

This was the principal authority supporting the substantive Title VII analysis. The court cited it when explaining that Smith had not connected his objection to testing with a religious observance, practice, or belief. Its role was to support the need for a religious nexus, rather than allowing opposition to a workplace health requirement alone to establish religious discrimination. The order did not use this precedent to announce that all objections to testing are nonreligious.

Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th 507, 520 (7th Cir. 2024)

The court relied on this case to support dismissal with prejudice after repeated failures to follow amendment instructions despite warnings. The relevant comparison was procedural: Smith received instructions, an opportunity to correct his complaint, a warning about dismissal, and a final opportunity to comply. The citation supports the importance of that cumulative history, rather than suggesting that every defective amendment warrants immediate dismissal with prejudice.

Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013)

The court invoked the rule that “[a] nonlawyer can’t handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself.” Together with 28 U.S.C. § 1654, this authority defeated Smith’s contention that barring his proposed representative litigation unlawfully restricted legal practice or violated the Constitution. The obstacle was his lack of authority to represent others, not a determination that those employees necessarily lacked viable individual claims.

Allen-Noll v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 969 F.3d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2020)

This decision supported the district court’s discretion to enforce local rules strictly and disregard noncompliant filings. Civil Local Rule 7(b) required an opposition brief within 21 days. Smith instead submitted unauthorized materials more than a month after the motions were filed. The precedent supported enforcement of the established filing requirements notwithstanding his self-represented status.

White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021)

The court cited this case for the rule that arguments first presented in a reply brief are waived. Smith’s contention that he should have received leave to amend his claim against UAW therefore came too late. This authority resolved that appellate issue without requiring the court to decide whether amendment would otherwise have been appropriate.

B. Legal Reasoning

The religious conflict must concern the challenged requirement

The central distinction was between vaccination and testing. Kohler’s recognition of Smith’s religious objection to vaccination did not establish that testing also conflicted with his beliefs. These were different workplace requirements, and his complaint needed allegations explaining the religious conflict associated with the requirement he challenged.

Smith’s reference to “toxic substances” did not adequately perform that function. As the court described the deficiency, he neither explained the religious basis of the objection nor connected it specifically to testing. The issue was therefore the adequacy of the allegations, not a factual finding that Smith was insincere.

This distinction limits the decision’s reach. The order does not prescribe a particular theology, require membership in an organized religion, or hold that religious objections to testing are categorically invalid. Nor does it decide whether testing introduced toxic substances into Smith’s body. It holds that the complaint lacked the necessary explanation linking the challenged practice to religion.

The pleading defect and final dismissal rested on distinct grounds

The initial dismissal of the Kohler claim was without prejudice, allowing Smith to correct the missing allegations. The ultimate dismissal with prejudice followed his repeated failure to comply with the amendment orders.

Rule 41(b) authorizes dismissal when a plaintiff fails to prosecute or comply with a court order. Here, the repeated instructions and warnings were central. The appellate court thus approved both the identification of the pleading deficiency and the later procedural decision to end the case after opportunities to cure it went unused.

The court did not simply equate failure to oppose a motion with failure to state a claim. Its discussion separately addressed the substantive inadequacy of the religious-discrimination allegations.

Self-representation does not permit representation of others

Section 1654 permits parties to conduct their own federal cases personally or through counsel. It does not authorize a nonlawyer to conduct another person’s case. Smith therefore could pursue his own interests, but he could not convert that permission into authority to represent similarly situated employees.

The ruling concerns representative capacity. It does not establish that a properly represented class could never challenge a comparable policy.

Defending a lawsuit does not require filing an answer immediately

Rule 55(a) concerns a party’s failure to “plead or otherwise defend.” A motion to dismiss qualifies as otherwise defending. Consequently, the defendants’ timely motions defeated the premise of Smith’s default request, even though they had not answered the complaint.

Smith also failed to follow Rule 55’s procedure for obtaining an entry of default. But the more fundamental obstacle was that neither defendant was in default.

The union ruling received limited appellate consideration

The district court had characterized the UAW claims as duty-of-fair-representation claims and dismissed them for nonexhaustion and untimeliness. The appellate court’s express treatment of Smith’s amendment challenge rested on waiver because he raised it only in reply.

Accordingly, the order should not be read as a developed appellate analysis of the applicable exhaustion requirements, limitations period, or possibility of amendment against UAW. Its guidance on that issue is principally about preserving arguments for appeal.

C. Potential Impact

For religious-accommodation litigation: The decision illustrates why a complaint should identify the particular religious conflict associated with each challenged workplace requirement. Approval of one accommodation does not automatically establish entitlement to another.

For employers and employees: The order encourages attention to the actual practice at issue rather than treating vaccination and testing as legally interchangeable. It does not, however, validate every testing policy or resolve whether a sufficiently pleaded religious objection would require accommodation.

For self-represented litigants: The case demonstrates that opportunities to amend carry corresponding obligations. Repeatedly substituting unauthorized submissions for an ordered complaint can result in dismissal with prejudice, even where the original pleading defect was potentially curable.

For appellate practice: Arguments must be presented in the opening brief. Raising an amendment issue only in reply can prevent substantive appellate consideration.

These implications remain limited by the order’s nonprecedential status. The court did not decide undue hardship, the general legality of COVID-19 testing mandates, or whether Smith could have stated a claim through a properly amended pleading.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Religious nexus
The connection between an employee’s religious belief or practice and the workplace requirement being challenged. A general objection does not itself explain that connection.
Rule 12(b)(6)
A procedure for testing whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, adequately state a legal claim. It ordinarily does not determine whose factual account is correct.
Without prejudice and with prejudice
Dismissal without prejudice generally leaves room to correct or reassert a claim, subject to applicable rules. Dismissal with prejudice generally ends the claim and prevents its relitigation.
Pro se litigant
A person representing himself or herself without a lawyer. That status does not authorize representation of other people.
Duty of fair representation
A union’s obligation to represent bargaining-unit employees without arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct. The district court treated Smith’s union claims as arising under this duty.
Exhaustion
Completing applicable preliminary remedies before seeking judicial relief. The order does not explain the particular exhaustion requirements underlying the district court’s union ruling.
Default
A failure to participate in defending a lawsuit as required. A timely motion to dismiss is participation, not default.
Waiver on appeal
As applied here, the loss of appellate consideration because an argument was first raised in the reply brief rather than the opening brief.

6. Conclusion

Kelvin Smith v. Kohler Co. reinforces a focused pleading principle: a religious exemption from vaccination does not, by itself, establish a religious conflict with workplace testing. The complaint must explain that connection.

Equally important, the affirmance rested on repeated procedural noncompliance after opportunities to amend. This nonprecedential order therefore offers guidance about both the specificity required in religious-accommodation allegations and the consequences of disregarding court instructions, without establishing a categorical rule approving testing mandates or rejecting religious objections to them.