Written Grounds of Arrest under BNSS: Specific, Accused-Centric Allegations Suffice; Remand-Copy Non-supply Not Fatal When Grounds Are Independently Served
1) Introduction
PANKAJ BHANDARI v. STATE OF KERALA (2026 KER 13173, Kerala High Court, decided on 13-02-2026)
arose from a criminal writ petition challenging the legality of the petitioner’s arrest (19.12.2025) and subsequent remand
in Crime No.3700/2025 and Crime No.3701/2025 registered by the Crime Branch.
The petitioner (arrayed as A12 in Crime No.3700/2025 and A9 in Crime No.3701/2025) sought declarations that the arrest and remand
were unconstitutional (Articles 21 and 22), quashing of remand orders, and immediate release—primarily alleging non-compliance with
Supreme Court jurisprudence on written grounds of arrest, intimation to relatives/nominees, access to counsel, and meaningful
opportunity to oppose remand.
Factually, the investigation (by a Special Investigation Team constituted by a Division Bench of the High Court) concerned allegations
that gold-cladded temple components connected to the Sabarimala Sreekovil were removed and the gold misappropriated; the petitioner was
alleged to have stripped the gold at his Chennai establishment (“Smart Creations”).
2) Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that:
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The petitioner was served written grounds of arrest (Exts. P13 and P15) in English, containing specific allegations attributing a role to him,
thereby meeting Article 22(1) and the governing Supreme Court standards distinguishing “reasons” from “grounds” of arrest.
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Service of the grounds on Sri. Rajasekharan S., who accompanied the petitioner, was treated as adequate compliance with the obligation
to inform a “friend/relative/nominee” under the statutory scheme (Section 48 BNSS analogous to Section 50A CrPC).
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Non-supply of the remand application to the petitioner before remand did not vitiate the arrest because the grounds of arrest were independently supplied
in English; the remand report being in Malayalam was not decisive on these facts.
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The petitioner’s chosen counsel was informed telephonically; absence of counsel at 10.00 p.m. production did not trigger a legal-aid requirement in the
circumstances found. A roughly two-hour delay (attributed to medical examination and travel) was not a ground to invalidate the arrest.
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited (and their influence)
This decision was central to the petitioner’s challenge. The Supreme Court held that an arrest memo often contains only generic
“reasons for arrest” (formal, standardised) and cannot be equated with “grounds of arrest” (accused-specific, fact-based basis enabling
opposition to remand and pursuit of bail). The High Court accepted the doctrinal distinction and used it as the benchmark for testing Exts. P13 and P15.
Influence in this case: The High Court examined whether the documents served on the petitioner were merely generic “reasons” or were
personal “grounds.” It held Exts. P13 and P15 contained specific allegations (conspiracy, handing over plates, stripping gold at petitioner’s unit,
knowledge of ownership, concealment, pecuniary loss/advantage) and therefore satisfied the “grounds” requirement even though they ended with
the phrase “your arrest… is inevitable.”
(b) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799
The petitioner relied on this decision for two propositions highlighted by the High Court:
(i) written grounds of arrest are a meaningful Article 22(1) safeguard, and
(ii) in addition to informing the arrestee, intimation to friends/relatives/nominated persons (Section 50A CrPC; mirrored in BNSS) is essential
for enabling swift legal steps to secure liberty.
Influence in this case: The High Court quoted and applied the purpose-based reasoning of paragraph 42, but found compliance on facts:
service on the accompanying person was treated as service on a “friend” for statutory intimation.
The petitioner invoked Mihir Rajesh Shah to argue (i) timing sufficiency (the “two-hour minimum interval” framework before production for remand),
(ii) access to counsel and early legal assistance, and (iii) translated documents/guidelines on early access to justice.
Influence in this case: The High Court addressed these protections, but distinguished on facts by holding that:
the petitioner received written grounds in English; counsel of choice was informed; and the two-hour delay attributed to medical/travel did not,
by itself, render arrest illegal where other safeguards were substantially complied with.
(d) Joginder Kumar v. State of UP & Ors., 1994 4 SCC 260
Joginder Kumar underscores that the existence of power to arrest is different from justification for its exercise, and arrests should not be routine;
necessity must exist (e.g., risk of absconding, influencing witnesses, etc.).
Influence in this case: While the petitioner framed a “no necessity” argument, the High Court ultimately did not treat this as dispositive
in the writ posture given its finding that the procedural and constitutional safeguards (as pleaded) were not breached to the level that would
invalidate the arrest/remand.
(e) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2025 KHC 6542]
Relied on by the State to emphasise that grounds of arrest must convey the “precise acts” constituting the alleged offence (with reference to
“Vimal Kishore Mehrotra (supra)”), and that compliance can be assessed by reviewing the actual grounds.
Influence in this case: The High Court’s “summary of law” incorporated this logic: an accused must be told the acts done by him;
mere citation of legal provisions is insufficient. This supported the court’s conclusion that Exts. P13 and P15 were adequate because they narrated
the petitioner’s alleged acts and role.
(f) Vishnu N.P. v. State of Kerala, [2025 KHC 1262]
This Kerala High Court precedent was cited for propositions including: Article 22(1) requirements are not statute-specific; Section 47 BNSS cannot dilute
Article 22; and (as extracted) supply of grounds in writing within reasonable time—“in any case two hours prior to production”—would be acceptable,
referencing Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another.
Influence in this case: It provided a local doctrinal bridge integrating Supreme Court standards with BNSS provisions and was consistent
with the court’s overall compliance-focused approach.
(g) Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 314
Cited for the proposition that a Magistrate/Judge must satisfy himself that materials justify remand.
Influence in this case: The High Court included it in its consolidated “law of arrest” summary, reinforcing that remand is not mechanical
and must be judicially scrutinised—though the petition failed on the court’s assessment of compliance.
(h) Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3031 and Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Cited via Mihir Rajesh Shah on early access to legal assistance, including NALSA’s “Guidelines on Early Access to Justice at Pre-arrest, Arrest and Remand
Stage Framework,” and the entitlement to legal aid at material stages starting from remand where the accused is unrepresented.
Influence in this case: The High Court accepted the normative importance of representation but held the legal-aid mandate inapplicable
here because the petitioner’s counsel of choice was informed (even though counsel did not appear at the late-hour production).
3.2 Legal Reasoning (step-by-step)
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Framework consolidation: The court distilled governing principles (including Article 22(1) duties, the reasons/grounds distinction,
intimation to friends/relatives/nominees, and the accused’s preparedness to oppose remand).
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Testing “grounds of arrest” documents: The key factual/legal fulcrum was Exts. P13 and P15, titled “Notice to inform the Arrestee, the
Grounds and Reasons for Arrest under Section 47 & 35(1)(b)(ii) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.”
The court read them as stating accused-specific allegations (conspiracy, mechanism of handing over temple plates, stripping/misappropriation of gold,
knowledge, concealment, loss/benefit), and thus not mere generic reasons.
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Communication to a “friend”: On the argument that Sri. Rajasekharan S. was neither relative nor nominee, the court inferred friendship
from the fact that he travelled/accompanied the petitioner from Chennai and therefore could not be treated as a stranger. This inference supported
compliance with the statutory intimation requirement.
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Remand application non-supply: While acknowledging that supplying a remand application containing grounds can be a mode of compliance,
the court held that non-supply was not fatal here because grounds were separately supplied in English to the petitioner.
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Right to counsel / legal aid: The Investigating Officer’s uncontroverted case was that the petitioner’s chosen advocate was informed by
phone on 19.12.2025. The court held that, having informed counsel of choice, there was no “necessity” to provide legal aid counsel merely because the
chosen counsel did not appear at 10.00 p.m. production.
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Timing and the two-hour controversy: The court treated the two-hour delay (beyond the time conveyed to the advocate) as attributable to
medical examination and travel (Thiruvananthapuram to Kollam, ~71 km) and not, by itself, sufficient to invalidate an otherwise compliant arrest process.
3.3 Impact
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Operational guidance on BNSS “grounds” notices: The judgment signals that a separately served written notice (like Exts. P13/P15)
containing accused-specific factual assertions can satisfy Article 22(1) and the Supreme Court’s “grounds” requirement even if it also uses
conclusory phrasing (e.g., “arrest… inevitable”), provided the body contains substantive, individualised allegations.
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Broad reading of “friend” for intimation: The court’s inference that an accompanying person may be treated as a “friend” for purposes
of statutory intimation (Section 48 BNSS / Section 50A CrPC analog) may influence future challenges where the nominee/relative question is contested.
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Remand-copy non-supply disputes: The ruling narrows the practical significance of non-supply of the remand application where a separate
“grounds of arrest” document in a language known to the accused is served and acknowledged.
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Late-hour production and counsel absence: While not endorsing hurried procedures, the judgment indicates that mere late-night remand and
counsel non-appearance will not automatically vitiate arrest if the State demonstrates communication to chosen counsel and overall compliance.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
- “Reasons for arrest” vs “grounds of arrest”
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“Reasons” are generic justifications (e.g., for investigation, preventing tampering) that can apply to almost any arrest.
“Grounds” are accused-specific facts and allegations explaining why this person is being arrested, enabling a meaningful
challenge to remand and a bail request (as emphasised in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)).
- Article 22(1) of the Constitution
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Requires that an arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest “as soon as may be.” Courts treat this as a substantive safeguard linked to
liberty under Article 21, not a technical formality.
- Section 50A CrPC / Section 48 BNSS (intimation to others)
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Beyond informing the arrestee, police must promptly inform a friend/relative/nominated person so that someone outside custody can
arrange counsel and pursue bail or other remedies (as discussed in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana).
- Remand application and “meaningful opportunity”
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Remand is judicial authorisation of custody. An accused’s ability to oppose remand depends on knowing the factual basis for arrest.
Some cases treat pre-remand supply of the remand application (if it contains grounds) as crucial; here, the court held separate grounds notices
served that purpose.
- Legal aid at remand stage
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Supreme Court jurisprudence (referred through Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra) stresses representation at remand and legal aid
if unrepresented. This judgment held legal aid was not required on these facts because counsel of choice was informed.
5) Conclusion
The Kerala High Court’s decision in PANKAJ BHANDARI v. STATE OF KERALA reinforces that arrest legality challenges under Articles 21 and 22
will turn on whether police supplied accused-specific written grounds in a language known to the arrestee and substantially complied with statutory
intimation and counsel-notification duties. The court treated separately served BNSS “grounds” notices (Exts. P13/P15) as sufficient compliance, declined to
invalidate the arrest for non-supply of the remand application to the accused where grounds were independently served, and adopted a pragmatic view that
travel/medical-related delay and counsel non-appearance do not automatically vitiate an arrest where counsel was informed. In doing so, the judgment positions
BNSS-era arrest documentation (when fact-specific and acknowledged) as a robust answer to Prabir-style challenges, while leaving intact the constitutional core:
grounds must be real, personal, and meaningful.