Timely Controversion of a Drug Analyst’s Report Triggers a Mandatory Right to Re-analysis, Irrespective of Imperfect Laboratory Nomenclature

Case: MAXMED LIFE SCIENCES PVT.LTD.AND ORS. v. STATE TH.DRUGS INSPECTOR

Court: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu

Date: 22 September 2026

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal

1. Introduction

The judgment concerns the statutory right of a drug manufacturer to challenge a Government Analyst’s report under Sections 25(3) and 25(4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The principal issue was whether that right was lost because the manufacturer requested re-testing by an “NABL-accredited laboratory” instead of expressly naming the Central Drugs Laboratory.

Maxmed Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. manufactured the drug “Amzone”, Batch No. MLI-386, with a manufacturing date of December 2013 and an expiry date of November 2015. A sample lifted on 16 January 2014 from the Chest and Disease Hospital, Jammu, was declared “Not of Standard Quality” by the Government Analyst because it failed the test for particulate matter.

On receiving the analyst’s report, the company disputed it within the statutory period of twenty-eight days and sought re-analysis. It also stated that control samples tested in its in-house laboratory and in a government-approved laboratory had met the prescribed standards. Although the competent departmental authority permitted prosecution as well as re-analysis under Section 25(4), the sample was never sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory. The petitioners received summons only in November 2016, approximately one year after the drug’s shelf life had expired.

Invoking Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, corresponding to Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the petitioners sought quashing of the complaint under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27(d) of the Act and all consequential proceedings.

2. Questions Before the Court

  1. Whether a timely written intention to controvert the Government Analyst’s report is sufficient to invoke Section 25(3).
  2. Whether mentioning an NABL-accredited laboratory, rather than the Central Drugs Laboratory, amounts to waiver or forfeiture of the right to statutory re-analysis.
  3. Whether the word “may” in Section 25(4) gives the Magistrate an unrestricted discretion to refuse re-analysis.
  4. Whether prosecution can continue after the sample’s shelf life expires because of official inaction, thereby making meaningful re-analysis impossible.
  5. Whether the Government Analyst’s report can remain conclusive after it has been timely disputed.

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the complaint and consequential proceedings insofar as they concerned the petitioners.

The Court held that:

  • The petitioners had validly exercised their right under Section 25(3) by disputing the Government Analyst’s report within twenty-eight days.
  • No prescribed form or express demand naming the Central Drugs Laboratory was necessary.
  • The reference to an NABL-accredited laboratory was an imperfection of form, not a waiver of the statutory right.
  • Once the report was controverted, it ceased to possess conclusive evidentiary status and the mechanism under Section 25(4) became operative.
  • In this statutory context, “may” in Section 25(4) assumes a mandatory character where re-analysis is necessary to protect the right created by Section 25(3).
  • The authorities were required to facilitate re-analysis before expiry of the drug’s shelf life.
  • Because the sample expired before the petitioners received summons, the loss of the statutory remedy caused substantive prejudice.
  • Continuing the prosecution solely on the disputed Government Analyst’s report would defeat the statutory safeguard and amount to an abuse of process.

4. Analysis

4.1 Nature of the Right Under Section 25

Section 25 establishes a two-stage evidentiary framework. Under Section 25(3), the Government Analyst’s report is ordinarily evidence of the facts stated in it and becomes conclusive unless the affected person, within twenty-eight days, gives written notice of an intention to adduce evidence in controversion of the report.

Section 25(4) supplies the mechanism for resolving that dispute. The retained sample may be sent through the Magistrate to the Central Drugs Laboratory, whose report becomes conclusive evidence. The two provisions must therefore be read together: Section 25(3) creates the right to dispute the report, while Section 25(4) makes that right effective.

The Court rejected an interpretation under which an accused could timely controvert the report but remain dependent on an unrestricted official or judicial discretion to obtain re-analysis. Such an interpretation would reduce the right under Section 25(3) to an empty formality.

4.2 Substance Prevails Over the Form of the Request

The respondent argued that the petitioners had asked for testing by an NABL-accredited laboratory, which is not the laboratory designated under Section 25(4). The Court distinguished between:

  • the act required from the affected person under Section 25(3); and
  • the statutory procedure to be followed thereafter under Section 25(4).

At the first stage, the affected person need only communicate an intention to controvert the report. Correctly naming the Central Drugs Laboratory is not a condition precedent. Once the intention is clear, the authorities and the Magistrate must apply the statutory procedure, irrespective of the terminology used by the accused.

An NABL-accredited laboratory may possess technical accreditation, but its report does not acquire the special statutory conclusiveness attached to a report of the Central Drugs Laboratory. Nevertheless, requesting such a laboratory demonstrated disagreement and a desire for independent testing; it did not amount to abandonment of the statutory remedy.

4.3 “May” in Section 25(4) Read as Mandatory

Although Section 25(4) states that the Court “may” send the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory, the High Court held that the term cannot confer unfettered discretion. Where the affected person has complied with Section 25(3), the power must be exercised when necessary to preserve the statutory right.

The Court did not hold that “may” must invariably mean “shall”. Its conclusion was context-specific: the nature of the right, the legislative purpose, and the irreversible prejudice caused by expiry of the sample collectively make re-analysis mandatory where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

4.4 Effect of Expiry of Shelf Life

Shelf life was central to the decision. A physical sample may continue to exist after expiry, but it may no longer provide a reliable basis for determining whether the drug conformed to standards during its valid life. Thus, delayed re-analysis is not an adequate substitute for timely testing.

The petitioners disputed the report in time, yet the sample was not sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory. Summons were received only after the expiry date. The Court therefore attributed the loss of the effective remedy to the failure of the statutory machinery, not to the petitioners.

4.5 Evidentiary Consequence

Timely controversion does not erase the Government Analyst’s report from the record, but it removes its special status as conclusive evidence. Where the prosecution’s failure makes the superior statutory test impossible and seriously prejudices the defence, the disputed report cannot by itself sustain the prosecution.

5. Precedents Cited

Northern Mineral Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr.

This Supreme Court authority, arising under the analogous provisions of the Insecticides Act, was the principal foundation of the judgment. It held that merely notifying an intention to controvert an analyst’s report confers the right to have the sample tested by the Central Insecticides Laboratory. The accused need not expressly demand testing by that particular laboratory.

The High Court applied the same reasoning to Section 25 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The petitioners’ written disagreement was sufficient; their use of the expression “NABL-accredited laboratory” did not defeat the right.

Rakesh RanjanShrivastava v. State of Jharkhand

This authority established that “may” does not invariably denote discretion and may be construed as “shall” depending on legislative intent, the nature of the power, context, and consequences. It supported the conclusion that Section 25(4) becomes mandatory when necessary to give practical effect to the right under Section 25(3).

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque

The Supreme Court recognized that statutory language cannot be interpreted mechanically: a provision framed in mandatory language may be directory and vice versa. The High Court relied on this principle to undertake a purposive, rather than literal, interpretation of Section 25(4).

State of U.P. and Others v. Babu Ram Upadhya

This case similarly explained that “shall” and “may” may take different meanings depending on statutory context. It reinforced the proposition that legislative purpose and consequences control interpretation more than isolated terminology.

M/s. Medicamen Biotech Ltd. and Another v. Rubina Bose, Drug Inspector

This was a direct authority under Sections 25(3) and 25(4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The Supreme Court treated the right to obtain testing by the Central Drugs Laboratory as a valuable safeguard. Where the accused had communicated its intention to controvert the report but the fourth sample was not sent for re-analysis before expiry, the proceedings were quashed.

The High Court treated this case as demonstrating that failure to preserve the right is not a minor procedural irregularity; it may be fatal to the prosecution.

State of Haryana v. Unique Farmaid (P.) Ltd. &Ors.

Under the corresponding Insecticides Act provisions, the Supreme Court held that an accused who timely disputes the analyst’s report has a valuable right to testing by the Central Insecticides Laboratory. Expiry of the sample before that right can be exercised causes prejudice and prevents the original report from being treated as conclusive.

Northern Mineral Ltd. v Union of India and Anr.

Cited again in the judgment, this authority was used to emphasize that once the accused notifies the Inspector of its intention, the Inspector must act promptly, institute the complaint, produce the sample, and facilitate reference to the designated laboratory. Official inaction cannot be used to defeat the accused’s right.

Albert David Limited v. Union Territory of J&K &Ors.

This Court’s earlier decision recognized that the statutory procedure is inherently time-bound because the efficacy of re-analysis is closely connected with the drug’s shelf life. It supplied local precedential support for requiring prompt official action.

M/s. Gupta Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Another

The Supreme Court held that where the accused timely expresses an intention to challenge the report but the Inspector neither sends the sample to the Central Laboratory nor promptly files the complaint, expiry of the shelf life makes continued prosecution futile and an abuse of process.

This reasoning closely matched the present facts: the petitioners acted within time, whereas official inaction made the statutory remedy unavailable.

Shiv Narain Bansal And Anr. v. State Of Haryana And Anr.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that an accused is deprived of the right under Section 25(3) where the request is made in time but the Inspector sends the sample only after expiry. It supported the conclusion that responsibility for official delay cannot be shifted to the accused.

Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Ghisa Ram .

Under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Supreme Court described testing by the superior laboratory as a valuable defence right because its certificate supersedes the Public Analyst’s report and becomes conclusive. Denial of that right through prosecution conduct creates serious prejudice.

The High Court used this analogous principle to show that statutory re-testing rights in regulatory prosecutions are substantive safeguards rather than procedural technicalities.

6. The Rule Emerging from the Judgment

Where a person, within twenty-eight days, communicates in writing an intention to controvert a Government Analyst’s report, the report loses its conclusive character and the statutory mechanism under Section 25(4) must be meaningfully facilitated. The right is not forfeited merely because the person refers to an NABL-accredited laboratory rather than expressly naming the Central Drugs Laboratory. If official delay allows the sample’s shelf life to expire and thereby destroys the opportunity for effective re-analysis, prosecution based solely on the disputed report may be quashed.

7. Impact of the Judgment

  • No “magic words” requirement: Manufacturers need not expressly name the Central Drugs Laboratory if their timely intention to challenge the report is clear.
  • Prompt action by Drug Inspectors: Inspectors must not wait until expiry of the sample. They must promptly institute proceedings, preserve the sample, and facilitate its production before the Magistrate.
  • Active role of Magistrates: Before issuing process or treating an analyst’s report as conclusive, Magistrates must examine whether the report was timely disputed and whether re-analysis remains practically possible.
  • Substantive protection of fair trial rights: The decision treats re-analysis as a meaningful defence safeguard, not a technical procedural privilege.
  • Limits on prosecution: A prosecution cannot benefit from its own delay by relying on the original report after the superior statutory test has become impossible.
  • Case-specific quashing: Quashing is particularly justified where the accused acted within time, the authorities failed to act, the shelf life expired, and the prosecution depends substantially on the disputed report.

The judgment does not decide questions concerning the personal or vicarious liability of company directors. Nor does it declare every delay fatal. Its reasoning depends on timely invocation of the right, loss of meaningful re-analysis, attributable official inaction, and resulting prejudice.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusive evidence
Evidence that the Court must ordinarily accept as establishing the stated facts unless the statute permits it to be challenged in a specified manner.
Controversion of the report
A written statement that the person disputes the analyst’s findings and intends to produce evidence against them.
Central Drugs Laboratory
The laboratory statutorily designated to conduct the superior re-analysis contemplated by Section 25(4). Its report becomes conclusive evidence.
NABL accreditation
Recognition of a laboratory’s technical competence by the National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories. It does not, by itself, give the laboratory the special statutory status of the Central Drugs Laboratory.
Shelf life
The period during which the drug is expected to retain its prescribed quality. Testing after expiry may not reliably establish its condition during its valid life.
Purposive interpretation
Interpreting statutory language in a manner that advances the object of the law. Here, “may” was treated as mandatory where necessary to preserve the right to re-analysis.
Inherent powers
The High Court’s authority to prevent abuse of judicial process and secure the ends of justice, exercised here under Section 561-A Cr.P.C.

9. Conclusion

The judgment affirms that the right to controvert a Government Analyst’s report is a substantive statutory safeguard. Once invoked within twenty-eight days, it cannot be defeated by technical objections to the wording of the request or by administrative delay.

By holding that a request mentioning an NABL-accredited laboratory still validly triggers the statutory protection, and that “may” in Section 25(4) becomes mandatory when needed to preserve that protection, the Court placed substance, fairness, and legislative purpose above procedural formalism. Since the authorities allowed the sample to expire before meaningful re-analysis and then sought to rely on the disputed report, continuation of the prosecution would have caused manifest prejudice and constituted an abuse of process.