1. Introduction
This judgment examines the safeguards governing proclamation proceedings under Section 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). It establishes that an accused’s failure to attend court does not, by itself, justify declaring that person a “proclaimed offender”. The court must satisfy the statutory conditions concerning absconding, publication, the notified appearance date and the seriousness of the alleged offences.
Baldev Singh Bajwa was accused in FIR No. 237 dated 21 October 2023, registered at Police Station Kharar, District SAS Nagar, Mohali, under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”). These provisions concern criminal breach of trust, cheating and criminal conspiracy. After obtaining regular bail from the High Court on 27 November 2024, he subsequently failed to attend the trial court.
Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 528 BNSS, the petitioner challenged orders dated 16 April 2026 and 29 September 2026 relating to cancellation of bail and his subsequent declaration as a proclaimed offender. He alleged procedural non-compliance, asserted that the underlying dispute had been compromised, and expressed willingness to rejoin the proceedings. The State maintained that he had failed to appear despite publication of the proclamation.
The High Court granted conditional relief against the proclaimed-offender declaration. Its reasoning principally reaffirms established procedural safeguards and applies them within the BNSS framework.
3. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court identified four material defects:
- Insufficient recorded satisfaction: The trial court had not recorded a prima facie finding that the petitioner had absconded or was concealing himself to prevent execution of the warrants.
- Incomplete publication: The serving officer described affixation but did not establish that the proclamation had been publicly read in the locality where the petitioner ordinarily resided.
- Unnotified subsequent date: The proclamation required appearance on 5 August 2026, whereas the declaration was made on 29 September 2026 without a fresh proclamation notifying that date.
- Incorrect statutory classification: The Court held that the offences alleged against this petitioner did not satisfy the punishment threshold for proclaimed-offender status under Section 84(4) BNSS.
Consequently, the Court quashed the order dated 29 September 2026, subject to the petitioner depositing ₹30,000 in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh, within 30 days. It also directed him to surrender before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kharar, within the same period and apply for regular bail.
The trial court was directed to decide that application expeditiously and independently. Failure either to appear within the stipulated period or to deposit the costs would result in the petition being deemed dismissed.
Scope of relief: Although both orders were challenged, the operative directions expressly quash only the proclaimed-offender order dated 29 September 2026. They do not expressly set aside the bail-cancellation order dated 16 April 2026 or restore the earlier bail.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
The judgment draws extensively on authorities concerning Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”), the predecessor proclamation provision. Several authorities appear within its quotation from an earlier coordinate-bench decision, rather than through separate examination of their original facts.
The supplied judgment contains apparent transcription errors in some case names and citations. The titles below retain the forms appearing in that text; the discussion is confined to the propositions attributed to those authorities in this judgment.
| Precedent |
Principle and relevance |
| Anita Sharma Vs. State of Punjab |
This coordinate-bench decision supplies the judgment’s principal procedural framework. Its summary requires prior warrants, grounds to believe that the accused is absconding or concealing himself, a properly specified appearance date, the statutory notice period, all mandatory publication methods, and appropriate proof of service. The present Court uses that framework to test the trial court’s process rather than treating non-appearance as sufficient.
|
| Rohit Kumar Vs. State of Delhi |
Cited for the necessity of issuing an arrest warrant before proclamation and for requiring material indicating absconding or concealment that prevents execution. Formal evidence need not invariably precede issuance, but there must still be a factual foundation. This supports the distinction between an unsuccessful warrant and a justified conclusion that the accused is evading it.
|
| Bishundayal Mahton and others Vs, Emperor |
The quoted summary relies on this authority for the rule that proclamation cannot issue routinely merely because the police request it. Judicial satisfaction must independently address whether the person is avoiding execution despite reasonable diligence. This directly informs the criticism of the trial court’s limited observation that attendance could not be procured.
|
| Devender Singh Negi Vs. State of ULP. |
This title appears in the quoted discussion of independent judicial satisfaction. Its stated relevance is that proclamation requires a prima facie conclusion about absconding or concealment, not merely an administrative progression from unsuccessful warrants.
|
| Gurappa Gugal and others Vs. State of Mysore |
Cited for the requirement that the proclamation specify the date and place of appearance and allow at least thirty clear days following issuance and publication. The principle protects a genuine opportunity to respond to the public notice.
|
| Shokat Ali Vs. State of Haryna |
Also cited for the specified-place, specified-date and minimum-notice requirements. It reinforces that the appearance deadline is a mandatory feature of proclamation, rather than a matter that can be left uncertain.
|
| Dilbagh Singh Vs. State of Punjab (P&M) |
Cited for the proposition that an insufficient interval between publication and the stated appearance date prevents a valid declaration and requires a fresh proclamation. Its broader relevance is that defective statutory notice must be renewed rather than retrospectively repaired.
|
| Ashok Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Another |
The authority appears in the quoted summary and is expressly relied upon in paragraph 13. The summary associates it with the need for fresh publication where the required notice period is deficient. The present Court applies its ratio to the later, unnotified appearance date, holding that adjournments did not satisfy Section 84(1) BNSS.
|
| Pawan Aumar Gupta M's. The State of WLB. |
Cited for the conjunctive character of the three publication requirements: public reading, local affixation and courthouse affixation. This is central to the result. Establishing some methods did not dispense with the omitted public reading.
|
| Birad Dan Vs. State |
Cited for recording the serving officer’s statement about the date and mode of publication and for the issuing court’s written declaration of due publication. The judgment reproduces the predecessor provision’s rule that such a judicial statement constitutes conclusive evidence. Here, examination of the officer’s account instead revealed that a mandatory publication step was not established.
|
| Devendra Singh Negi alias Debu Vs. State of U.P. and another |
Cited in the quoted summary for the mandatory nature of the publication conditions and the proposition that their breach is not a curable irregularity. The supplied text cites this title and the earlier “Devender Singh Negi” rendering against the same reported citation; its inconsistent rendering should not be mistaken for a separately verified account of the authorities.
|
| Pal Singh Vs. The State |
Supports the proposition that non-compliance with mandatory publication requirements renders the proclamation and consequential proceedings a nullity. This explains why the defect justified quashing rather than being treated as harmless procedural imperfection.
|
| Navneet Sharma Vs. State of Punjab and Others |
Expressly relied upon with Ashok Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Another for the conclusion that the trial court failed to comply with Section 84(1) BNSS when it proceeded on a subsequent date without fresh publication notifying that date. The judgment does not set out this precedent’s underlying facts.
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B. Legal Reasoning
1. Non-appearance and absconding are not interchangeable
Proclamation is not an automatic consequence of a missed hearing. The statutory premise is that a warrant cannot be executed because the person has absconded or concealed himself.
The trial court’s order of 5 June 2026 stated that the petitioner’s presence could not be obtained through the existing process. The High Court found no recorded prima facie satisfaction that he had absconded. The distinction matters: failure to secure attendance describes the result of an attempted process; absconding or concealment supplies the statutory reason for escalating to proclamation.
2. The publication requirements operate cumulatively
Under Section 84(2)(i), the required methods include:
- Public reading at a conspicuous place in the town or village where the person ordinarily resides;
- Affixation at a conspicuous part of the person’s house or homestead, or at a conspicuous place in that town or village; and
- Affixation at a conspicuous part of the courthouse.
These are cumulative requirements, although the second contains alternative permissible locations. The judgment therefore does not require both house affixation and local public-place affixation in every case.
ASI Parminder Singh described affixing copies in the locality, at Bus Stand Kharar and at the court complex. His statement did not establish public reading. Multiple affixations could not substitute for that separate mandatory act. Optional newspaper publication likewise does not displace the statutory methods.
3. The notified appearance date is substantive notice
The proclamation specified 5 August 2026. The matter was subsequently adjourned to obtain the serving officer’s evidence, and the declaration followed on 29 September 2026. No fresh proclamation notified the latter date.
The Court held that these adjournments did not comply with Section 84(1). Its reasoning treats the specified date as an integral part of the notice given to the accused, not simply an internal listing date.
Importantly, the identified defect was not that the original interval from publication on 15 June to appearance on 5 August was shorter than thirty days. It was the absence of fresh publication for the subsequent date on which the Court proceeded. The decision should be read in that factual setting, rather than as resolving every possible circumstance in which a proclamation-related order is recorded after the original date.
4. “Proclaimed offender” is a restricted statutory classification
The Court separately held that the offences alleged against this petitioner did not meet the imprisonment threshold of ten years or more discussed under Section 84(4) BNSS. He therefore could not be declared a proclaimed offender, although the Court recognised the distinct terminology of “proclaimed person” or “absconder”.
This was an additional defect, not a substitute for valid publication. The judgment does not authorise the authorities simply to relabel the petitioner while retaining the defective proceedings.
Nor should its conclusion about Section 120-B IPC be generalised to every conspiracy prosecution: the Court assessed the offences alleged in this case. Conspiracy liability can depend on the object offence and applicable punishment provision.
5. Earlier procedural authorities remain relevant, but statutory differences matter
The judgment quotes Section 82 Cr.P.C. and applies its procedural authorities to Section 84 BNSS. This reflects continuity in safeguards concerning warrants, judicial satisfaction, notice and publication.
However, the reproduced Section 82(4) used a list of specified IPC offences, whereas the Court’s analysis of Section 84(4) focuses on punishment-based eligibility. Procedural continuity should therefore not be confused with complete identity between the provisions.
6. Conditional relief preserves responsibility to attend trial
The Court corrected unlawful procedure without excusing the petitioner’s absence. Costs, surrender and a fresh bail application ensured that relief restored an opportunity to participate lawfully rather than conferred immunity from the prosecution.
The alleged compromise was not the basis of the decision. The Court neither quashed the FIR nor determined the criminal allegations. Similarly, it did not accept the petitioner’s assertion about absence of notice as a finding invalidating the April bail-cancellation order.
C. Potential Impact
- More disciplined proclamation orders: Courts should record why the material indicates absconding or concealment, rather than merely recording unsuccessful attempts to secure attendance.
- More complete service reports: Officers should document public reading as well as the locations and dates of affixation.
- Closer scrutiny of changed dates: Courts must address whether a subsequent appearance date requires renewed proclamation rather than assuming an adjournment supplies notice.
- Accurate statutory classification: Proclaimed-offender status requires independent examination of Section 84(4), even where proclamation procedure is otherwise valid.
- Continuity under the BNSS: Earlier Cr.P.C. authorities remain influential where the relevant safeguards correspond, subject to changes in statutory language.
The ruling’s practical importance lies in treating these safeguards as legal conditions, not optional formalities. At the same time, its conditional disposition demonstrates that procedural protection and enforcement of attendance can operate together.