Section 216 CrPC Applications May Bring Omitted Charges to the Court’s Notice, but Addition Requires an Independent Prima Facie Foundation

Case: DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT v. MD. SALEEM KHAN AND OTHERS (CENTRAL BURAEU OF INVESTIGATION)

Court: High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Parihar

Date: 25 September 2026

Proceedings: Crl R No. 25/2026; CrlM No. 625/2026

1. Introduction

The judgment addresses the relationship between the criminal court’s power to add or alter charges under Section 216 CrPC and the ability of a person or authority, not conducting the predicate-offence prosecution, to draw attention to an alleged omission in the charges.

The dispute arose from the alleged misappropriation of funds received by the Jammu and Kashmir Cricket Association (“JKCA”) from the Board of Control for Cricket in India. Approximately Rs.112.13 crores had been remitted to the JKCA, of which about Rs.43.69 crores were alleged to have been misappropriated through unauthorized accounts, banking operations and transfers.

The CBI charge-sheet accused the respondents of conspiracy, criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust under Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 of the Ranbir Penal Code (“RPC”). The Directorate of Enforcement (“ED”), although not the prosecuting agency in that case, applied for the addition of charges under Sections 411 and 424 RPC. These offences were important to the ED because Sections 406 and 409 RPC were not scheduled offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), while the addition of a scheduled offence could affect the jurisdictional basis of money-laundering proceedings.

The Trial Court rejected the ED’s application substantially on the ground that it lacked locus standi. The High Court was therefore required to decide:

  • whether the ED could bring an alleged omission in the charges to the Trial Court’s attention;
  • whether liberty granted by superior courts required consideration of the application on merits;
  • whether the material in the CBI charge-sheet disclosed offences under Sections 411 or 424 RPC; and
  • how Section 216 CrPC operates when an application for addition of charges is made by someone other than the prosecuting agency.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Core holding: A person or authority permitted to approach the criminal court may bring an alleged omission in the charges to its notice. The application cannot be rejected solely for want of locus standi. Nevertheless, Section 216 CrPC vests the power in the court, and an additional charge can be framed only where the existing or subsequently emerging material independently discloses the ingredients of that offence.

The High Court partly allowed the revision. It set aside the Trial Court’s finding that the ED had no locus standi to seek consideration of additional charges. The ED had previously been granted liberty to approach the Trial Court, and the Trial Court itself had earlier treated the application as maintainable. At the minimum, the application had to be regarded as information drawing the court’s attention to a possible omission.

The Court nevertheless rejected the substantive request to add Sections 411 and 424 RPC. The CBI material portrayed the respondents as participants in the principal conspiracy and breach of trust, not as subsequent receivers or retainers of property that had already become “stolen property.” Nor was sufficient material shown to establish dishonest or fraudulent concealment or removal of property under Section 424 RPC.

The rejection was expressly confined to the material currently available. If evidence emerging during trial discloses Sections 411, 424 or any other offence, the Trial Court remains free to exercise its power under Section 216 CrPC after observing the safeguards necessary to protect the accused from prejudice.

Issue Decision
Could the ED’s application be rejected solely for lack of locus standi? No. It could at least be treated as information bringing an alleged omission to the Trial Court’s notice.
Did superior-court liberty establish that Sections 411 and 424 RPC were made out? No. Liberty required consideration, not acceptance.
Did the charge-sheet disclose Section 411 RPC? No. It did not show receipt or retention distinct from participation in the principal misappropriation or breach of trust.
Did the material disclose Section 424 RPC? No. The required factual foundation for dishonest or fraudulent concealment, removal, or assistance was not demonstrated.
Can charges later be altered? Yes. Section 216 CrPC remains available if further material emerges before judgment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Locus standi and the court-controlled nature of Section 216 CrPC

The Court drew an important distinction between the right to place information before a court and the power to demand that a charge be framed. Section 216 CrPC confers power upon the criminal court—not upon the prosecution, informant or any other applicant. An application may alert the court to material already on record, but the court must independently determine whether the proposed offence is prima facie disclosed.

The ED’s application therefore could not be dismissed merely because the CBI was the investigating and prosecuting agency. This was reinforced by the previous liberty granted to the ED and the Trial Court’s own order dated 19 August 2025, which had treated the application as maintainable.

At the same time, the High Court declined to endorse the broader proposition that the ED was necessarily an “interested and necessary party” in the predicate-offence trial. Its ruling was narrower: the ED could place relevant information before the court, and the court had to consider it on its merits.

3.2 Liberty to apply is not a direction to frame charges

The judgment carefully limited the legal effect of the liberty granted by the High Court and the Supreme Court. Such liberty prevented the application from being rejected without consideration, but it did not predetermine whether Sections 411 and 424 RPC were attracted.

Procedural permission to approach a court does not establish the substantive ingredients of the offence sought to be added.

This distinction prevents superior-court liberty from being converted into an implied adjudication on the merits of an unframed charge.

3.3 Standard applicable at the stage of charge

At the charge stage, the court may sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of deciding whether a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists. It must not conduct a detailed trial or assess the evidence as if deciding guilt. The court is neither a passive “post office” nor entitled to undertake a roving inquiry.

Applying this standard, the High Court examined the CBI charge-sheet itself rather than remanding the matter, because all principal parties agreed that the issue could be decided on the existing record.

3.4 Why Section 411 RPC was not attracted

Section 410 RPC gives “stolen property” an extended meaning. Property subjected to criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust can acquire that character. But this does not automatically make every participant in the misappropriation guilty of receiving stolen property under Section 411 RPC.

Section 411 requires:

  • property having the legal character of stolen property;
  • receipt or retention of that property by the accused;
  • dishonesty; and
  • knowledge or reason to believe that the property was stolen.

Crucially, the receipt or retention must be distinguishable from the principal act through which the property became stolen property. The respondents were accused of participating in the conspiracy by which JKCA funds were diverted. The transfers through personal or intermediary accounts were alleged to be components of that very scheme, not subsequent receipts by persons acting as receivers of property already stolen by others.

In relation to Bashir Ahmad Misger, the material alleged that he facilitated unauthorized accounts and banking transactions. Even if he knew that the diversion was unauthorized, such knowledge supported the allegation of conspiracy; it did not substitute for proof that he dishonestly received or retained stolen property in the capacity contemplated by Section 411 RPC.

3.5 Why Section 424 RPC was not attracted

Section 424 RPC concerns dishonest or fraudulent concealment or removal of property, or assistance in such concealment or removal. The Court found that no distinct material satisfying these ingredients had been identified. The charge-sheet principally alleged conspiracy, misappropriation and breach of trust. The mere movement of funds through accounts did not, without a separate factual foundation, establish the specific offence of concealment or removal under Section 424.

The Court’s treatment of Section 424 was briefer than its analysis of Section 411. Nevertheless, the governing principle remained the same: similarity between the underlying facts is insufficient unless each statutory ingredient of the proposed additional offence is prima facie demonstrated.

3.6 The PMLA context could not determine the predicate charges

The ED’s interest in adding Sections 411 and 424 RPC arose from their possible significance as scheduled offences under the PMLA. The High Court held that this consequence was legally irrelevant to the charge-framing exercise. A charge cannot be added merely to create PMLA jurisdiction; equally, it cannot be refused merely because it may produce that consequence.

The predicate-offence court must look exclusively at the evidentiary material and the ingredients of the offence. Jurisdictional consequences under the PMLA arise only after a scheduled offence is validly disclosed and made part of the predicate proceedings.

4. Precedents Cited

4.1 Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366

This authority supplied the governing test for framing charges. The court may sift the record to determine whether there is grave suspicion, but it cannot conduct a meticulous evaluation of the prosecution case. The High Court used this standard to undertake a limited examination of whether Sections 411 and 424 RPC were disclosed.

4.2 Anant Prakash Sinha v. State of Haryana and another, (2016) 6 SCC 105

This was the principal precedent on Section 216 CrPC. It recognizes that an informant may bring an omission in the charge to the court’s notice. The statutory power remains with the court, which must independently examine the material. The case directly supported the High Court’s conclusion that the ED’s application could not be rejected solely for want of locus, while also confirming that filing an application does not create a right to the requested charge.

4.3 Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643

The ED relied on this decision to argue that property affected by criminal breach of trust can be “stolen property” and that its knowing receipt may attract Section 411. The High Court accepted the general proposition but held that the precedent ultimately assisted the respondents. It distinguishes the principal offender from the subsequent receiver of stolen property. Here, the charge-sheet alleged participation in the principal misappropriation rather than a separate, subsequent receipt.

4.4 Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1586

This decision established that Section 120-B IPC does not become a scheduled offence under the PMLA merely because it is mentioned in the Schedule. The conspiracy must concern the commission of an offence that is itself scheduled. Accordingly, conspiracy relating only to Sections 406 and 409 RPC could not independently sustain PMLA jurisdiction.

4.5 Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929

This authority was cited for the proposition that a scheduled offence is the jurisdictional foundation of PMLA action. The ED cannot proceed on a notional assumption that such an offence has been committed. If the scheduled-offence proceedings are quashed, or the accused is finally discharged or acquitted, the corresponding foundation for money-laundering proceedings ceases to survive.

4.6 Abdul Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Choudhary, (2014) 10 SCC 754; Adalat Prasad, (2004) 7 SCC 338; and Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 13 SCC 324

The ED invoked these authorities to contend that a criminal court cannot review or recall its own order unless expressly empowered by statute. Its argument was that the Trial Court, having earlier recognized the maintainability of the application, could not later reverse that position by holding that the ED lacked locus standi.

Although the High Court did not rest its final conclusion exclusively on the prohibition against review, it accepted the practical substance of the argument: the Trial Court could not disregard its earlier maintainability determination and the liberty granted by superior courts without addressing their legal effect.

4.7 Enforcement Directorate v. Prakash Industries, 2025 SCC Online Del 8243

The ED submitted that the Trial Court had relied on Prakash Industries even though that ruling had subsequently been set aside by the Division Bench in Enforcement Directorate v. Prakash Industries. The High Court recorded this argument but resolved the revision principally through the independent requirements of Section 216 CrPC and the absence of material supporting Sections 411 and 424 RPC.

4.8 Majid Yaqoob Dar and Another v. State of J&K and Others, PIL No. 08/2014

This proceeding formed part of the case’s institutional history. The investigation originally registered by the local police was transferred to the CBI by order dated 3 September 2015. The respondents relied on that transfer and the resulting CBI investigation to emphasize that the designated investigating agency had found only Sections 120-B, 406 and 409 RPC to be disclosed.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Predicate or scheduled offence

Money laundering depends upon property derived from specified underlying crimes. Those underlying crimes are called scheduled or predicate offences. Without such an offence, PMLA jurisdiction ordinarily lacks its statutory foundation.

Locus standi

Locus standi means legal standing to approach a court. Here, the ED was not the prosecuting agency, but it could still provide relevant information. That did not make it the controller of the prosecution or give it a right to insist on particular charges.

Prima facie case and grave suspicion

At the charge stage, the court does not decide guilt. It asks whether the material, if taken at face value, creates a sufficiently strong basis to put the accused on trial for the particular offence.

Alteration or addition of charge

Section 216 CrPC permits the court to correct, alter or add a charge at any time before judgment. The power may be exercised on existing material or evidence emerging during trial, but the accused must receive a fair opportunity to meet the altered accusation.

Principal offender versus receiver of stolen property

A person who commits the misappropriation is ordinarily the principal offender. Section 411 targets a person who later receives or retains property already rendered stolen, knowing or having reason to believe that it is stolen. The two roles cannot be merged without distinct supporting facts.

6. Impact of the Judgment

  • Broader access, controlled result: Informants and public authorities may point out omitted charges, but they cannot compel their addition.
  • Judicial independence: The court must independently test every proposed charge against its statutory ingredients.
  • Protection against collateral PMLA expansion: Predicate charges cannot be added merely to cure a jurisdictional defect in money-laundering proceedings.
  • Preservation of fair-trial rights: Altered charges require procedural safeguards and an effective opportunity for the accused to respond.
  • Clarification of Section 411: Participation in misappropriation does not automatically amount to receiving stolen property.
  • Continuing jurisdiction: Rejection at the initial stage does not bar the Trial Court from adding charges if later evidence supplies the missing ingredients.

7. Conclusion

The judgment establishes a balanced rule: a criminal court must not reject relevant information about an omitted charge merely because it comes from an authority or person outside the prosecuting agency. However, procedural standing to raise the issue is distinct from substantive entitlement to the charge.

The ED succeeded in overturning the finding that it lacked locus standi, but failed to show that the existing material disclosed the independent ingredients of Sections 411 and 424 RPC. The ruling preserves both judicial flexibility under Section 216 CrPC and the accused’s protection against charges framed for collateral or jurisdictional purposes rather than on a genuine prima facie evidentiary foundation.