Section 18 RTE Act: Unrecognised Schools Must Be Closed—NIOS Accreditation Not a Substitute (with Transitional Relief)

1. Introduction

The Kerala High Court in MOITHUNNYKUTTY v. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR (2026 KER 9078, decided on 02-02-2026) decided two connected writ petitions concerning the legality of running an educational institution without government recognition under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“RTE Act”).

Parties and posture: In WP(C) No.21615/2023, the petitioners (Moithunnykutty and Bappu) complained that respondents 5 and 6 were running an educational institution (impleaded as additional respondent 7, Ma'din Knowledge Garden Public School) without the licence/recognition mandated by the RTE Act. In WP(C) No.28053/2024, the institution itself challenged administrative steps (including a direction to close the institution and issue transfer certificates).

Core issues: (i) Whether the institution could continue to operate without “appropriate recognition” under Section 18 of the RTE Act; (ii) whether an accreditation/recognition from the National Institute of Open Schooling (“NIOS”) could justify continued operation despite lack of government recognition; and (iii) what relief and timelines were appropriate, considering the impact on students.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court held that Section 18 of the RTE Act makes government recognition mandatory for schools/institutions of the relevant kind and that the institution before it was admittedly running without valid recognition from the concerned Government.
  • WP(C) No.21615/2023 was allowed, with a direction to the competent authority to take steps to shut down the educational institution, in light of the Court’s findings.
  • However, on equitable considerations and at the institution’s request for time to make alternate arrangements, the Court directed that authorities permit the institution to run for the academic year 2025–26.
  • WP(C) No.28053/2024 (filed by the institution) was dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Trustee, Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala and Others [2020 (1) KHC 775]

The petitioners relied on Trustee, Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala and Others, where the Court examined RTE compliance in the context of curriculum control and religious instruction. The quoted passages emphasize that:

  • The RTE Act was enacted pursuant to Article 21A and mandates that curriculum/evaluation procedures be laid down by the “appropriate authority” (the State Government within the State).
  • Where recognition is required, a school cannot impart religious instruction or religious study without State Government permission.
  • Violation could justify closure/derecognition, subject to due opportunity depending on facts.

Influence on the present decision: While the immediate dispositive ground here was lack of government recognition under Section 18, the precedent reinforced a broader regulatory principle: schooling that falls within the RTE governance structure is subject to State oversight over recognition and (where applicable) curriculum-related matters. The present Court also noted the institution’s own pleading that it was imparting preschool education to about 300 students, teaching Quran and allied subjects—facts that made the regulatory concerns in the cited precedent contextually relevant, even though the operative holding here rested squarely on Section 18 non-compliance.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  • Statutory compulsion under Section 18 (RTE Act): The Court treated Section 18 as mandatory—schools covered by the provision cannot operate without “appropriate recognition” from the concerned Government.
  • Admission/lack of dispute on absence of government recognition: The Court explicitly recorded that there was “no dispute” that the institution was running without valid government recognition.
  • NIOS accreditation not treated as “appropriate recognition” for Section 18 compliance: The institution relied on an NIOS accreditation (Ext.R7(k) dated 28.11.2024) to argue it was running with valid recognition. The Court nonetheless concluded the institution was not entitled to run without valid recognition from the concerned Government, thereby implicitly rejecting NIOS accreditation as a substitute for the statutory “appropriate recognition” contemplated by Section 18 in the case’s circumstances.
  • Balancing legality with student welfare (transitional relief): Even while directing shutdown steps, the Court permitted operation for the academic year 2025–26, reflecting a pragmatic, child/student-centered transition to avoid abrupt displacement.
  • Procedural context (prior interim order and appeal): The Court noted an earlier order (17.07.2024) clarifying that pendency of WP(C) No.21615/2023 would not prevent authorities from acting if the school functioned without recognition. It also noted that the Division Bench, in W.A.No.1283/2024, rejected the appeal and observed that the stop memo could be challenged in appropriate proceedings—supporting continued administrative enforceability during pendency.

3.3 Impact

  • Reinforcement of strict recognition compliance: The judgment strengthens enforcement messaging that institutions cannot continue operations merely on the strength of non-governmental or alternative-board accreditations if “appropriate recognition” under the RTE Act is absent.
  • Limited equitable protection, not a legal entitlement: Permission to run for academic year 2025–26 is framed as transitional relief, not validation of illegality; future institutions may receive limited time-bound relief, but cannot treat it as a right.
  • Administrative readiness to act notwithstanding litigation: By referencing the earlier order and the dismissal of the related writ appeal, the decision supports the proposition that recognition-related enforcement can proceed even while writ proceedings are pending (subject to appropriate challenge routes for specific coercive orders like stop memos).
  • Signal to “religious instruction” institutions operating as schools: The Court’s reliance on Trustee, Hidaya Educational & Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala and Others indicates heightened scrutiny where institutions provide schooling-like services coupled with religious instruction, especially if operating outside the State’s recognition framework.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Recognition” under Section 18 (RTE Act): A legal permission granted by the competent Government/authority for a school to operate lawfully under the RTE regime. Without it, the institution’s operation is treated as impermissible.
  • “Appropriate authority”: Under the RTE framework (as reflected in the cited precedent), the State Government is the appropriate authority for schools within the State for curriculum/evaluation-related oversight.
  • “Stop memo”: An administrative order directing cessation of an activity (here, school functioning) for non-compliance; it may be separately challengeable.
  • Writ petition (WP(C)): A constitutional remedy seeking High Court intervention against alleged illegality or failure of public authorities to act according to law.
  • NIOS “accreditation/recognition”: Recognition by NIOS for specified purposes; this judgment indicates that such accreditation does not automatically satisfy the State “appropriate recognition” requirement under Section 18 in the factual/legal setting before the Court.

5. Conclusion

The Kerala High Court’s decision establishes a clear operational rule: an educational institution cannot lawfully continue as a school without “appropriate recognition” under Section 18 of the RTE Act, and alternate accreditations (such as NIOS accreditation) do not, by themselves, cure the statutory defect where government recognition is required. At the same time, the Court demonstrates a transition-sensitive approach by allowing continued operation for one academic year (2025–26) to protect students from abrupt disruption. The judgment is likely to be cited to support firm regulatory enforcement against unrecognised institutions, while also guiding courts and authorities on providing narrowly tailored, time-bound relief in the public interest.