Oraon Customary Succession: A Ghardamad Cannot Inherit Through an Uncle-in-Law Unless the Custom Is Strictly Proved

1. Introduction

In BEJLA ORAON v. KALI DAS ORAON, 2026 INSC 672, the Supreme Court of India examined a dispute concerning succession to land governed by Oraon/Udaon customary law. The original plaintiff, Sukhu Oraon, claimed entitlement to the family lands of his grandfather’s branch. The defendants resisted the claim on the basis that one Punai, the husband of Budhain, had been taken as a ghardamad and therefore acquired rights in the property.

The principal issue was whether the defendants had proved a binding custom under which an uncle-in-law, namely Ledura, could take his niece’s husband as a ghardamad and thereby confer inheritance rights upon him. The Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court had dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed those concurrent findings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the courts below, and decreed the plaintiff’s suit. The Court held that:

  • A custom must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved by the party relying on it.
  • The custom that a ghardamad may acquire rights in the property of his father-in-law was proved in general terms.
  • However, the defendants failed to prove a custom that an uncle-in-law could adopt or take a niece’s husband as a ghardamad so as to confer succession rights.
  • The evidence did not establish that daughters had inheritance rights in the Oraon/Udaon customary system applicable to the parties.
  • The alleged deed, whether treated as a lease deed or partition deed, could not confer title. A lease does not transfer ownership, and partition is possible only between persons who already have shares.
  • In the absence of a validly established ghardamad succession and in the absence of other male heirs directly entitled, the nearest male agnate would succeed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Custom and its proof

The Court relied on established principles concerning proof of custom. It referred to:

These authorities were used to reaffirm that a custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, continuous, and not opposed to public policy. Most importantly, the burden lies on the party alleging the custom. The Court also referred to Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872, under which the opinions of persons likely to know of the existence of a custom are relevant.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that the defendants could not succeed merely by showing that there was no express prohibition against an uncle-in-law taking a ghardamad. They had to positively prove that such a custom existed.

Interference with concurrent findings under Article 136

Since all three courts below had ruled against the plaintiff, the Supreme Court considered the limits of interference with concurrent findings of fact under Article 136 of the Constitution.

In Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, the Court had held that concurrent findings of fact are ordinarily not disturbed unless exceptional circumstances exist, such as perversity, misapplication of law, or miscarriage of justice. The judgment also referred to Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narayan Roy, emphasizing that the practice of non-interference is not rigid or “cast-iron.”

In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, reiterated in SUSHMA v. NITIN GANAPATI RANGOLE, the Court identified circumstances where concurrent findings may be reopened: where findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, rely on inadmissible evidence, or ignore vital evidence.

Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare was cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court may interfere where material circumstances are ignored or where justice has failed. The judgment also referred to Babu v. Dy. Director, Prasad v. Govindaswami Mudaliar, Dhanjibhai Ramjibhai v. State of Gujarat, Ganga Bishan v. Jai Narain, Uday Chand Dull v. Saibal Sen, and Ram Singh v. Ajay Chawla on the same principle.

Finally, RAMACHANDRAN v. VIJAYAN was relied upon for a consolidated statement of when interference with concurrent findings is justified, including cases involving perversity, findings contrary to law, ignoring material evidence, or causing undue hardship.

The Supreme Court found this to be an appropriate case for interference because the courts below had misdirected themselves on the legal burden of proving custom and had wrongly treated the alleged ghardamad status as sufficient without proof of the specific custom claimed.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rested on three core propositions.

First, custom must be proved affirmatively

The Court emphasized that customary law is not presumed unless already judicially noticed or statutorily recognized. A party relying on a custom must prove its existence, continuity, certainty, and applicability. Therefore, the defendants had to prove not merely the existence of the institution of ghardamad, but the precise custom that allowed an uncle-in-law to confer that status and succession rights.

Second, the evidence did not support inheritance by daughter or through uncle-in-law

The evidence showed broad agreement that daughters did not inherit under the relevant Oraon/Udaon custom. The defendants’ witnesses were inconsistent on this question. Some suggested daughters could receive property by written instrument, while others contradicted that position. The plaintiff’s evidence was more consistent and withstood cross-examination.

On the ghardamad issue, the Court accepted that a son-in-law may, in appropriate circumstances, acquire rights in his father-in-law’s property. However, the crucial defect was that Punai was not shown to have been taken as ghardamad by his father-in-law in a legally recognized customary manner. The claim was that Ledura, the uncle-in-law, had taken him as ghardamad. That specific custom was not proved.

Third, the courts below misread the customary source

The Trial Court had relied on S.C. Roy’s work, The Oraon of Chotanagpur, which stated that where there is no male issue or adopted son, a duly adopted ghardamad may inherit certain lands, while bhuinhari land goes to the nearest male agnate. However, the Supreme Court held that the Trial Court misdirected itself. The source contemplated adoption by the last male owner or his widow, not by an uncle-in-law.

The High Court also erred by observing that there was no established bar against adoption by an uncle-in-law. According to the Supreme Court, this reversed the burden of proof. The correct question was whether the defendants had proved the enabling custom.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

This judgment is significant for customary succession disputes, particularly among tribal communities where inheritance rules may differ from general statutory succession law. Its impact may be summarized as follows:

  • Stricter proof of custom: Courts must insist on clear proof of the exact custom relied upon, not a broad or approximate version of it.
  • No burden-shifting: A party opposing a custom need not prove that the custom does not exist. The party asserting it must prove that it does.
  • Limits on ghardamad succession: A ghardamad may inherit only where the applicable custom is proved and where the relationship is created by a person competent under that custom.
  • Protection against informal title claims: A lease deed or doubtful partition deed cannot be used to create ownership where the parties had no pre-existing share or transferable title.
  • Article 136 review: Even concurrent factual findings may be overturned where they are affected by legal error, misreading of evidence, or incorrect application of customary law.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Ghardamad

A ghardamad is a son-in-law who comes to live in the wife’s parental home and, under certain customs, may be treated similarly to a son for limited inheritance purposes. However, this status does not automatically arise; it must be established according to the applicable custom.

Customary law

Customary law refers to rules followed by a community over a long period with a sense of legal obligation. To be legally enforceable, a custom must be ancient, certain, reasonable, continuous, and proved by reliable evidence.

Nearest male agnate

A male agnate is a male relative connected through the male line. In this case, where no valid daughter’s inheritance or valid ghardamad succession was proved, the nearest male agnate was held entitled.

Lease deed versus partition deed

A lease gives a right to use or enjoy property for a period; it does not transfer ownership. A partition divides property among persons who already have shares. Therefore, if a person has no share, a partition deed cannot create one.

Concurrent findings

Concurrent findings are findings reached by multiple courts in the same direction. The Supreme Court usually does not interfere with them, but it may do so if the findings are legally flawed, perverse, unsupported by evidence, or cause injustice.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in BEJLA ORAON v. KALI DAS ORAON clarifies that customary inheritance rights cannot be assumed or expanded without strict proof. While the institution of ghardamad may be recognized in Oraon/Udaon custom, the specific right claimed must be proved with certainty.

The ruling is important because it prevents vague customary claims from defeating established succession rights. It also reinforces that courts must apply the correct burden of proof when dealing with tribal customary law. The plaintiff’s suit was therefore rightly decreed, with succession following the rule favoring the nearest male agnate in the absence of a validly proved competing custom.