NDPS Vehicle Release on Supurdginama: Trial Courts Must Apply Bishwajit Dey Flexibly and Decide on Merits
Case: Lokendra Alias Golu v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2026 MPHC-GWL 28101
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench
Date: 16-09-2026
Coram: Hon’ble Shri Justice Pushpendra Yadav
Nature: Criminal Revision under Sections 438/442 BNSS against rejection of an application under Section 503 BNSS (release of seized vehicle on supurdginama)
1. Introduction
This decision concerns the interim custody (release) of a vehicle seized in an NDPS case and the correct way to apply the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Bishwajit Dey Vs. State of Assam, (2025) 3 SCC 241. The petitioner, Lokendra alias Golu, sought release of his Creta car (MP-14ZH-3584) on
supurdginama after it was seized in Crime No. 182/2025 (Police Station Mragwas, District Guna) for alleged transportation of 1.608 kg opium,
attracting offences under Sections 8/18 of the NDPS Act, 1985.
Key participants and positions
- Petitioner: Owner and driver of the seized vehicle; challenged the trial court’s outright refusal to release the vehicle.
- State: Opposed release; supported the impugned order.
- Trial Court (Special Judge, NDPS Act, Guna): Rejected the vehicle-release application relying on a Rajasthan High Court order.
Core issue: Whether the trial court could refuse release of the seized vehicle merely by relying on a precedent (via the Rajasthan High Court)
without evaluating the application on its own merits in light of the Supreme Court’s clarification that its framework is not a “rigid formula”.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- The High Court held that the trial court rejected the petitioner’s application outrightly without considering it on merits.
- The trial court’s approach was found inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification in paragraph 35 of Bishwajit Dey Vs. State of Assam
that its discussion should not be treated as a rigid formula.
- The High Court set aside the order dated 31.01.2026 (MJCR No. 81/2026) and remanded the matter for a fresh decision
considering the facts, circumstances, and applicable law, including Bishwajit Dey.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
This Supreme Court decision is the controlling authority discussed. The High Court reproduces paragraphs 33–35, where the Supreme Court:
- Identifies four scenarios of seizure of contraband from a conveyance (owner as accused; agent of owner as accused; stolen vehicle; third-party occupant without allegation of owner’s knowledge/connivance).
- Indicates that in the first two scenarios, the vehicle “may not be released” until the accused-owner discharges the reverse burden.
- Suggests that in the third and fourth scenarios (where the owner/agent is not an accused and no allegation is made against them), the vehicle should normally be released on supurdginama, subject to bond/undertakings.
- Critically clarifies (para 35) that the above is not a rigid formula and trial courts may take a different view depending on case facts.
Role in the present case: The High Court does not decide the release application itself on facts; instead, it enforces the Supreme Court’s
methodological command: trial courts must treat Bishwajit Dey as a guiding framework, not as an inflexible prohibition, and must decide vehicle-release
applications on merits.
(B) Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 7517 of 2025 (Khurshid Vs. State of Rajasthan), order dated 02.12.2025
The trial court relied on this Rajasthan High Court order to reject release. The Madhya Pradesh High Court observes that the Rajasthan High Court’s view
itself was based on Bishwajit Dey. The error found was not the mere act of relying on persuasive authority, but the mechanical reliance
without appreciating the Supreme Court’s explicit clarification (para 35) and without independent merit-based evaluation.
(C) Reference to an “identical case” order: MJCR No. 9 of 2026 (order dated 05.01.2026)
The petitioner produced an order where, on similar facts, the trial court released a vehicle. While not treated as binding precedent, it reinforced the High Court’s
concern about consistency and the necessity of a case-specific, merit-based decision rather than an automatic rejection.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
The High Court’s reasoning is tightly focused on process and application of precedent rather than a final merits determination of release:
-
Misapplication of precedent: The trial court treated the Rajasthan High Court order (and, by extension, Bishwajit Dey) as creating an
effective bar, whereas the Supreme Court explicitly warns against a rigid formula (para 35).
-
Requirement of merit-based adjudication: Vehicle-release applications under Section 503 BNSS require judicial evaluation of the relevant facts
and the applicable legal principles. The High Court found that the trial court rejected the application “out-rightly” without such evaluation.
-
Remand as the corrective mechanism: Because the primary defect lay in the trial court’s approach (and because the High Court’s revisional role
here was to correct that defect), the appropriate remedy was to set aside and remand for a fresh decision in accordance with law.
Notably, the High Court does not declare that release must be granted; it holds that the trial court must reconsider and decide afresh using the
correct legal lens, including the flexibility emphasized in paragraph 35 of Bishwajit Dey.
3.3 Impact
Practical and doctrinal implications
-
No “automatic rejection” policy: NDPS trial courts in Madhya Pradesh cannot refuse supurdginama applications purely on the basis of a perceived
blanket rule derived from Bishwajit Dey or from persuasive High Court orders.
-
Reinforcement of para 35 (“not a rigid formula”): The judgment operationalizes the Supreme Court’s caution—requiring fact-sensitive adjudication
rather than template orders.
-
Consistency and reasoned orders: Given the reference to a similar case where release was granted, the judgment nudges trial courts toward
consistency through reasoned, case-specific analysis.
-
Broader NDPS property-custody jurisprudence: The decision strengthens the idea that interim custody questions (vehicle lying in police custody,
depreciation, preservation) must be balanced against confiscation concerns, through structured reasoning rather than categorical denial.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Supurdginama: A court-directed interim release of seized property (here, a vehicle) to a person (often the owner) on conditions—typically a bond/undertaking to
produce the property when required and to comply with further orders.
-
Reverse burden (in NDPS context): Unlike ordinary criminal cases where the prosecution bears the burden throughout, certain NDPS provisions shift a burden onto the accused
in specified circumstances (e.g., to explain possession/knowledge). In Bishwajit Dey, the Supreme Court links this to whether the owner/agent is accused and how the vehicle was used.
-
Confiscation vs interim custody: Confiscation is a final outcome after adjudication; interim custody addresses who holds the property during trial. Courts often impose conditions
(bond/value undertaking) to protect the possibility of confiscation later.
-
Remand: Instead of deciding the issue finally, the higher court sends the matter back to the lower court to reconsider and decide afresh according to correct legal standards.
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“Not a rigid formula” (para 35 of Bishwajit Dey): A judicial warning that even well-structured frameworks must not become mechanical rules; the facts of each case can justify
a different outcome.
5. Conclusion
The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision establishes a clear procedural and doctrinal takeaway for NDPS vehicle-release applications:
trial courts must not treat Bishwajit Dey Vs. State of Assam as an inflexible bar to release; they must decide applications on merits with case-specific reasoning.
By setting aside the blanket rejection and remanding for fresh consideration, the Court reinforces that interim custody under Section 503 BNSS is a discretionary,
fact-sensitive exercise—guided by Supreme Court principles, but never replaced by mechanical reliance on persuasive or derivative orders.