Mandatory Pre-Cognizance Hearing Under the BNSS and Quashing of Vexatious Extortion Complaints

Case: RAKESH KUMAR TIWARY v. The State of Bihar

Court: Patna High Court
Judge: Justice Soni Shrivastava
Decision: 15 October 2026
Proceeding: Criminal Miscellaneous No. 60085 of 2023, with I.A. No. 1 of 2025

1. Introduction

The Patna High Court examined the safeguards governing criminal complaints, the obligation to apply judicial mind before summoning an accused, and the use of inherent jurisdiction to terminate malicious proceedings. It quashed the criminal proceedings against Rakesh Kumar Tiwary because the allegations did not disclose extortion, the prosecution was found to be vexatious, and cognizance had been taken without the hearing required by the proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”).

The dispute arose from a complaint by Sheela Tiwary, the second opposite party, concerning alleged threats and police action at her husband’s office. The petitioner maintained that the complaint was retaliation for an investigation arising from a case he had lodged in Delhi. The State of Bihar was the first opposite party.

The judgment also addressed an unusual procedural question: could an application originally challenging an FIR be used, through an interlocutory application, to challenge a later cognizance order in a protest-petition complaint after the police case had closed? The Court permitted that course exceptionally, while expressly refusing to make its procedural accommodation a general precedent.

2. Background and Procedural History

Date Development
20 October 2022 Sheela Tiwary filed Complaint Case No. 12294 of 2022.
4–12 May 2023 The complaint was referred for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, leading to Kadamkuan P.S. Case No. 281 of 2023.
2 June 2023 A protest petition was filed, substantially reproducing the original allegations and questioning the investigation.
17 August 2023 The petitioner approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR.
30 April 2024 The police submitted a final report finding the case untrue.
16 December 2024 The final report was accepted, and the protest petition was treated as a complaint.
5 May 2025 Following the complainant’s statement and examination of two inquiry witnesses, the Magistrate took cognizance only under Section 384 IPC and issued summons in Complaint Case No. 15721(C) of 2024.
2025–2026 The petitioner challenged that order through I.A. No. 1 of 2025. The High Court stayed further proceedings against him and subsequently obtained confirmation that no pre-cognizance notice had been issued.
15 October 2026 The High Court allowed the main application and interlocutory application, quashing the proceedings against the petitioner.

The FIR had invoked Sections 339, 354, 385, 451, 452, 469, 506 and 120B IPC, together with Section 66D of the Information Technology Act. The later cognizance order, however, concerned only Section 384 IPC.

Questions Before the Court

  1. Whether the later cognizance order could be challenged through an interlocutory application in the existing FIR-quashing proceeding.
  2. Whether the allegations disclosed the essential ingredients of extortion against the petitioner.
  3. Whether the summoning order demonstrated independent judicial scrutiny.
  4. Whether the hearing safeguard under Section 223(1) BNSS applied notwithstanding the earlier filing of the protest petition.
  5. Whether the appropriate remedy was remand or complete quashing of the proceedings against the petitioner.

3. Summary of the Judgment

  • Exceptional procedural accommodation: A separate challenge to the complaint-case order would ordinarily have been appropriate. Nevertheless, requiring fresh proceedings after substantial consideration of the existing matter would unnecessarily duplicate litigation.
  • No prima facie extortion: The complaint did not disclose the ingredients necessary to sustain Section 384 IPC against the petitioner.
  • Mechanical cognizance: The Magistrate’s order failed to demonstrate adequate application of judicial mind to the allegations and supporting material.
  • Mandatory hearing omitted: Cognizance had been taken without the opportunity of hearing required by the applicable proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS.
  • Malicious proceedings: The surrounding circumstances supported the conclusion that the complaint was a retaliatory and vexatious prosecution.
  • Quashing, not remand: Because substantive defects existed independently of the procedural violation, a fresh hearing before the Magistrate would serve no legitimate purpose.

Accordingly, the Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings against the petitioner, including the order dated 5 May 2025 in Complaint Case No. 15721(C) of 2024. The order did not grant equivalent relief automatically to any other accused.

4. Analysis: Legal Reasoning

4.1 Inherent Jurisdiction and the Limits of Procedural Flexibility

The complainant’s preliminary objection was substantial: acceptance of the final report had brought the FIR proceedings to an end, while the later cognizance order arose from a complaint proceeding. The High Court accepted that, ordinarily, the petitioner should have withdrawn the original challenge and filed a separate application.

However, the Court considered the identity of the underlying allegations, the prolonged pendency of the matter, the notices already issued, the interim protection granted, and the completion of arguments. A fresh application would repeat procedural steps without advancing adjudication. No serious prejudice requiring that repetition was identified.

This was an exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, discussed alongside its corresponding provision, Section 528 BNSS. It was not recognition of an unrestricted right to substitute a new cause of action through an interlocutory application. Paragraph 21 expressly confines the accommodation to the circumstances of this case and cautions against treating it as a precedent where a separate application is legally required.

4.2 A Protest Complaint May Be Maintainable Yet Unsustainable

The Court did not hold that acceptance of a police closure report necessarily prevents a Magistrate from proceeding on a protest petition treated as a complaint. The precedents cited by the complainant supported the availability of that route, subject to the requirements governing complaints.

The decisive distinction was between procedural competence to entertain a complaint and the existence of sufficient legal and factual grounds to proceed against a particular accused. The former does not establish the latter.

Similarly, the police conclusion that the case was untrue was relevant background, not a substitute for judicial examination. The High Court independently assessed the allegations, the inquiry material and the cognizance order.

4.3 Why the Extortion Allegation Failed

Section 384 IPC punishes extortion. Its defining ingredients include intentionally placing a person in fear of injury and thereby dishonestly inducing delivery of property or valuable security. The complaint needed to disclose a factual connection between the petitioner, the alleged fear, the dishonest inducement and the delivery contemplated by the offence.

The Court found that connection absent. The petitioner was admittedly not present at the place of occurrence and was in Mumbai. His alleged responsibility rested on the assertion that Delhi Police had acted at his instructions when visiting the complainant’s husband’s office in connection with Parliament Street P.S. Case No. 27 of 2022. Earlier allegations of threats concerning the Bihar Cricket Association lacked particulars such as date and time.

Physical absence does not, by itself, exclude criminal responsibility: instigation or conspiracy may connect an absent person to an offence. Here, however, the Court found the asserted connection speculative, unsupported and inherently improbable. The complaint did not supply the necessary ingredients of extortion against this petitioner.

The judgment also noted that Section 384 had not been invoked in the original complaint or FIR. That circumstance should not be mistaken for an independent prohibition on the Magistrate identifying a different offence. The controlling defect was the absence of facts satisfying Section 384, not merely the complainant’s choice of statutory labels.

4.4 Summoning Requires Judicial Scrutiny, Not Numerical Support

Examination of the complainant and two witnesses did not automatically justify issuance of process. The Magistrate had to examine whether their accounts, assessed against the applicable law, disclosed a prima facie offence against the petitioner.

The inquiry witnesses were the complainant’s husband and his employee. The Court regarded them as highly interested witnesses in the circumstances. Such a relationship does not make testimony legally inadmissible or necessarily false; it underscores the importance of careful scrutiny rather than mechanical acceptance.

The judgment therefore concerns the quality of judicial evaluation, not a requirement that the prosecution prove guilt before summons. The preliminary stage requires a legally sustainable prima facie case, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

4.5 Section 223(1) BNSS: A Hearing Before Cognizance

A report obtained from the Magistrate confirmed that no notice had been issued to the petitioner before the order dated 5 May 2025. The High Court held that this violated the applicable proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS, which requires an opportunity of hearing before cognizance on a complaint.

The complainant argued that the protest petition predated the BNSS and therefore attracted the earlier procedure. Relying principally on the analogous chronology considered in Umar & Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., the Court rejected that argument.

In that precedent, the operative later order finding a prima facie case and issuing process was treated as the point at which judicial mind had been applied for taking cognizance. The High Court applied that reasoning to the present sequence of events.

The holding should nevertheless be read within its procedural setting. The judgment does not offer a comprehensive determination of every transitional issue affecting proceedings initiated before the BNSS. Nor does it establish that cognizance invariably occurs only when process is issued.

Crucially, an opportunity to defend oneself after summons is not the same safeguard as the statutory opportunity required before cognizance. The Court treated the omission as a serious legal infirmity, not a harmless irregularity.

4.6 Why Remand Was Rejected

Had the only defect been failure to provide the statutory hearing, reconsideration after compliance might have been appropriate. The Court expressly acknowledged that option.

Remand was rejected because it would not cure the independent absence of an offence or the abusive character of the prosecution. Repeating the process would prolong litigation that, on the Court’s assessment, lacked a legitimate criminal foundation.

4.7 Application of the Bhajan Lal Categories

The Court placed the case within categories (1), (5) and (7) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal:

  1. Category (1): Allegations accepted at face value do not constitute an offence against the accused.
  2. Category (5): Allegations are so absurd or inherently improbable that they do not reasonably justify proceeding.
  3. Category (7): Proceedings are manifestly attended by mala fides or instituted maliciously for an ulterior purpose.

These grounds reinforced one another: missing statutory ingredients, an implausible attribution of police conduct to the petitioner, and an apparent retaliatory purpose together justified intervention.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Proceedings Following Acceptance of a Closure Report

Zunaid vs. State of U.P. and Ors. — (2023) 14 SCC 576

The complainant cited this authority to support the Magistrate’s power to entertain a complaint or protest petition despite acceptance of a final report. It addressed the availability of the procedural route, not whether the allegations against this petitioner justified summons.

Vishnu Kumar Tiwari vs. State of U.P. & Anr. — (2019) 8 SCC 27

This decision was cited for the proposition that acceptance of a final report does not itself bar cognizance on a protest petition satisfying the requirements of a complaint. Such a complaint must be dealt with under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. Its significance was to distinguish the closure of police proceedings from the separate complaint procedure.

Mukhtar Zaidi v. State of U.P. — 2024 SCC OnLine SC 553

This was another authority invoked by the complainant concerning the treatment of a protest petition. The supplied judgment does not separately explain its ratio, so it should not be attributed a broader role than the procedural argument for which it was cited.

5.2 Subsequent Developments and Substantial Justice

Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. — (2026) 6 SCC 813

As quoted by the High Court, this decision distinguished Article 226 proceedings from inherent jurisdiction where a cognizance order intervenes during an FIR or charge-sheet challenge. Under inherent jurisdiction, the subsequent order could be considered if properly placed on record, supported by pleadings and a strong case for quashing.

The High Court found the analogy incomplete: the present FIR had closed, and the challenged order arose from a protest complaint. The precedent therefore supported flexibility only to a limited extent; it did not eliminate the ordinary requirement of a separate challenge.

Collector (LA) & Anr. v. Katiji & Ors. — (1987) 2 SCC 107

The Court invoked its preference for substantial justice over technical considerations. That principle helped justify avoiding a fresh filing where the existing proceeding had already reached final adjudication.

Sugandhi & Anr. v. P. Rajkumar — (2020) 10 SCC 706

Paragraph 9 supplied the principle that procedure is the handmaid of justice and that procedural obstacles should not defeat substantive adjudication where no serious prejudice results. It supported the exceptional entertainment of the interlocutory application, not disregard of the mandatory hearing safeguard.

5.3 Responsible Summoning and Protection Against Harassment

Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Judicial Magistrate — (1998) 5 SCC 749

Paragraph 28 was central to the finding of mechanical summoning. Criminal law cannot be set in motion merely because a complainant produces two supporting witnesses. The Magistrate must examine the allegations, evidence and applicable law and demonstrate independent judicial consideration.

Krishna Lal Chawla & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. — (2021) 5 SCC 435

This authority reinforced the gravity of issuing criminal process and the responsibility accompanying powers affecting liberty. Its discussion of frivolous litigation supported early intervention against proceedings used to harass adversaries. It did not establish that every complaint repeating earlier allegations is automatically barred.

Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union Of India — (2014) 8 SCC 470

This case appeared through the passage quoted from Krishna Lal Chawla & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. Its observations about the financial, emotional and temporal costs imposed by irresponsible litigation strengthened the anti-harassment rationale. It was contextual support rather than the direct criminal-law test for quashing.

5.4 The BNSS Hearing Safeguard

Umar & Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. — 2026 INSC 1058

This was the closest factual analogy on the procedural transition. Earlier police proceedings and a protest complaint preceded the BNSS, but the operative cognizance order followed its commencement. The Supreme Court required a hearing before that later cognizance. The High Court relied on this reasoning to reject the complainant’s reliance solely on the earlier filing date.

Parvinder Singh v. Enforcement Directorate — 2026 SCC OnLine SC 903

The High Court referred to this decision through its discussion of Umar & Anr. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., identifying it as part of the Supreme Court’s consideration of Section 223’s statutory mandate. The supplied text does not independently elaborate its facts or precise holding.

Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Enforcement Directorate — 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221

This authority supplied the express proposition that the proviso to Section 223(1) places an embargo on cognizance without an opportunity of hearing. Its natural-justice rationale supported treating the omission as a serious infirmity rather than a mere procedural irregularity.

5.5 Contextual Examination and Inherent Quashing Powers

Salib @ Shalu @ Salim v. State of U.P. & Ors. — 2023 (3) PLJR 389 (SC)

The Court relied on this authority for examining surrounding circumstances in manifestly frivolous or vexatious proceedings, rather than restricting scrutiny mechanically to the complaint’s wording. Such examination must remain careful and circumspect.

Sujoy Ghosh vs. State of Jharkhand — 2026 SCC OnLine SC 454

Cited alongside Salib @ Shalu @ Salim v. State of U.P. & Ors., it supported consideration of the broader factual setting. That approach informed the finding that the complaint sought to connect the petitioner speculatively to police action arising from the Delhi case.

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal — 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

This supplied the final doctrinal framework for quashing. The Court expressly applied categories (1), (5) and (7), grounding relief in the absence of an offence, inherent improbability and malicious institution of proceedings.

6. Impact and Limits of the Decision

For Magistrates

The judgment reinforces two distinct duties: ensuring that the material discloses the ingredients of an offence against the particular accused, and observing the applicable pre-cognizance hearing requirement. Compliance with one does not excuse failure on the other.

For Transitional Proceedings

An earlier protest-petition date cannot, by itself, settle the applicable procedure. Courts must identify the relevant cognizance stage and apply the governing transitional principles. The decision’s specific chronology matters; it should not be converted into a universal rule for all pending complaints.

For Abuse-of-Process Challenges

The decision illustrates when contextual scrutiny can justify quashing without a trial. A retaliatory background alone is insufficient if the complaint otherwise discloses an offence. Here, the Court combined that background with missing statutory ingredients and inherently improbable allegations.

For Procedural Practice

Litigants should ordinarily challenge a distinct complaint-case order through the appropriate separate proceeding. The exceptional allowance of the interlocutory application is expressly fact-specific and should not be treated as a dependable filing shortcut.

For the Choice of Remedy

The distinction between remand and quashing is especially important. A curable hearing defect may justify reconsideration; an independently baseless and abusive prosecution may justify termination. This judgment falls in the latter category.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cognizance
The court’s judicial consideration of an alleged offence for proceeding under criminal law. It is distinct from police registration and should not automatically be equated with every preliminary court order.
Summons or issuance of process
A direction requiring an accused to appear before the court. Because it brings a person into criminal proceedings, it requires proper judicial scrutiny.
Final report or closure report
A police report recommending closure rather than prosecution. Acceptance does not necessarily prevent a legally maintainable complaint on the allegations.
Protest petition
A complainant’s objection to the investigation or its outcome. If it meets the legal requirements, it may be treated as a complaint and processed accordingly.
Prima facie case
A sufficient initial legal and factual basis to proceed—not a final finding of guilt.
Inherent jurisdiction
The High Court’s power under Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 BNSS, to prevent abuse of court process and secure justice.
Mala fide or vexatious prosecution
Criminal proceedings brought dishonestly, for retaliation, or to harass rather than genuinely enforce the law.
Natural justice
Basic procedural fairness, including the opportunity to be heard where the law requires it.
Remand versus quashing
Remand sends a matter back for lawful reconsideration; quashing terminates the impugned order or proceedings to the extent directed.

8. Conclusion

The judgment reinforces that criminal process cannot rest on speculative attribution, missing offence ingredients or mechanical acceptance of supporting witnesses. It also treats the applicable pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223(1) BNSS as a mandatory safeguard.

Its significance lies in the combined remedy: the Court did not merely correct procedure but terminated a prosecution independently found baseless and malicious. At the same time, its procedural flexibility in entertaining the interlocutory challenge was expressly exceptional. The broader message is careful judicial scrutiny, faithful observance of statutory safeguards and timely intervention against abuse—not unrestricted departure from procedural rules.