1. Introduction
This judgment concerns the Gujarat High Court’s discretion to accept an apology and discontinue suo motu contempt proceedings arising from allegations against sitting judges. Its central significance lies in the Court’s assessment of genuine remorse: although the written apology contained passages tending to justify the respondent’s conduct, the Court accepted it after considering his oral acknowledgment, affidavit, and voluntary charitable contribution.
The decision is best understood as a fact-sensitive application of the law governing apologies in contempt proceedings, rather than the creation of an automatic entitlement to discharge. Neither an apology nor a charitable donation was declared sufficient by itself to terminate contempt proceedings.
Background and parties
Deepak Khosla, respondent No. 1, had filed an application seeking initiation of contempt proceedings. That application contained assertions concerning two sitting judges of the Gujarat High Court. The Court considered both those assertions and his manner of conducting himself sufficiently serious to initiate contempt proceedings on its own motion.
The disputed passages arose from proceedings in Special Civil Application No. 11679 of 2024. They questioned, among other things, a judge’s reasons for examining an email, the allocation of judicial time, and the possibility of communications outside the courtroom. These were the respondent’s allegations, not facts established by the judgment.
Respondent No. 2, whose name is not supplied in the judgment, was also proceeded against. The Court subsequently observed that the assertions were made essentially on respondent No. 1’s legal advice.
Principal issues
- Whether respondent No. 1’s apology demonstrated genuine remorse despite passages tending to justify his conduct.
- Whether objections based on his alleged previous contempt history required rejection of the apology.
- What significance should attach to his voluntary undertaking to donate ₹1,00,000 to a hospital treating cancer patients.
- Whether the proceedings against respondent No. 2 should also be discontinued upon acceptance of her apology.
2. Summary of the Judgment
During the hearing preceding the judgment, the Court drew respondent No. 1’s attention to the objectionable passages. Appearing in person, he offered an unconditional apology and acknowledged that there was no justification for making those assertions. At the Court’s suggestion, he subsequently filed an affidavit of apology.
The Bench acknowledged that the affidavit was lengthy and “at times seeks to justify his conduct.” Nevertheless, it found that he had expressed “genuine regret and remorse” for assertions that were “wholly unnecessary.” Of particular importance was his acceptance that his original contempt application concerned seven respondents and that there had been no justification for making assertions against the judges who heard his matter.
Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta opposed acceptance of the apology, arguing that it was not bona fide. He referred to orders of the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court under which respondent No. 1 had allegedly already been sentenced. Respondent No. 1 answered that those orders had either been stayed or set aside. The Bench did not resolve that disagreement; it remained satisfied that his remorse in the present proceedings was genuine.
The Court also considered his undertaking voluntarily to donate ₹1,00,000 to Mangal Jivan Healthcare Private Limited, described as a hospital treating cancer patients. It accepted the apology, dropped the contempt proceedings, and directed the Registry to transmit the demand draft placed on record to the hospital.
Respondent No. 2’s apology was also accepted, and the proceedings against her were dropped. All pending applications were disposed of consequentially.
Nature of the disposition: The judgment does not record a formal conviction followed by a sentence or fine. It concludes the proceedings by accepting the apologies and dropping the contempt action.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents and Previous Proceedings Mentioned
Ratilal Jhaveribhai Parmar & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors
The only specifically named precedent appears within paragraph 115 of respondent No. 1’s application, reproduced in the judgment. The reference identifies Civil Appeal No. 11,000 of 2024, decided on 21 October 2024.
Respondent No. 1 invoked that case to support his contention that recordings of Gujarat High Court hearings available on YouTube could be reviewed to verify exchanges in court. His submission was that the Supreme Court had itself resorted to reviewing such recordings.
Its role in this judgment is therefore limited and important to distinguish: it was an authority invoked by the respondent in the offending pleading, not a precedent adopted by the Bench as the basis for accepting his apology. The Court did not examine that decision’s reasoning, determine the evidentiary status of online recordings, or formulate a rule governing their use.
Accordingly, this judgment cannot be treated as independently establishing that YouTube recordings authenticate an allegation, prove judicial impropriety, or justify inferences of private communication. The supplied text also does not provide enough information to reconstruct the cited decision’s broader holding.
Unidentified Delhi High Court and Supreme Court orders
Mr. Mehta relied on earlier orders said to have sentenced respondent No. 1 for contempt. Their apparent purpose was to challenge the sincerity of the present apology by reference to his previous conduct.
The judgment supplies no case titles, citations, reasons, or operative terms for those orders. It also records the respondent’s contention that they had been stayed or set aside. Because the Bench did not determine their status, they cannot properly be treated as verified subsisting convictions or as identified precedents supporting the outcome.
Their influence was argumentative rather than doctrinal: they placed the respondent’s claimed history before the Court, but did not displace its assessment of his remorse in the proceedings before it.
Unspecified authorities concerning a judge as a “knight errant”
The reproduced application also referred generally to Supreme Court judgments using the expression “knight errant.” No particular decision was identified. Those references formed part of the respondent’s criticism of judicial conduct; the Bench neither adopted them nor examined their applicability.
It would therefore be inaccurate to attribute any particular unnamed authority, or its reasoning, to the Court. Overall, the judgment’s operative reasoning rests on its assessment of the apologies and surrounding circumstances, not on a developed analysis of precedent.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. The allegations were unnecessary to the relief originally sought
A central consideration was the mismatch between the respondent’s original objective and the allegations against the judges. His contempt application was directed against seven respondents. He accepted that assertions concerning the judges hearing his matter were unjustified.
That acknowledgment mattered because it addressed the substance of the Court’s concern. Rather than merely expressing regret for causing offence, he accepted that the allegations should not have been made in the first place.
The judgment does not, however, establish that every criticism of judicial conduct amounts to contempt. It deals with the particular assertions reproduced in the order and the respondent’s acknowledgment concerning them.
2. Sincerity was assessed from the apology as a whole
The Bench expressly noticed the tension between an unconditional apology and an affidavit that sometimes attempted justification. It nevertheless concluded that the respondent’s overall position conveyed genuine regret.
This reflects a substantive rather than purely verbal assessment. The presence of explanatory or defensive material did not automatically defeat the apology; equally, describing an apology as “unconditional” was not treated as conclusive. The operative consideration was the Court’s satisfaction about actual remorse.
The oral acknowledgment and subsequent affidavit were considered together. The judgment does not prescribe a mandatory form of apology or declare that similarly worded affidavits must be accepted in future cases.
3. Previous proceedings did not determine the present outcome
The Court acknowledged the objection based on earlier contempt orders but proceeded on its own satisfaction regarding the present apology. Its reasoning does not make past conduct legally irrelevant. Rather, in the circumstances recorded, the objection did not persuade it to reject the apology.
The narrow point is that disputed references to earlier proceedings did not automatically foreclose acceptance. The judgment establishes neither that those orders remained operative nor that respondent No. 1’s account of their subsequent status was correct.
4. The donation supported, but did not replace, the apology
The voluntary donation was an express additional consideration. The Court described it as a gesture of remorse and linked it to its willingness to accept the apology.
Nevertheless, the donation must be distinguished from a fine. It arose from the respondent’s undertaking, was payable to a named healthcare institution, and was transmitted through the Registry. The judgment did not impose it as a statutory punishment.
Nor does the decision establish a monetary route out of contempt proceedings. The Court had independently found genuine remorse. Treating payment alone as sufficient would detach the donation from the reasoning actually given.
5. Respondent No. 2 received related, but separately recorded, consideration
In dropping the proceedings against respondent No. 2, the Court referred both to her apology and to the fact that the assertions were essentially made on respondent No. 1’s legal advice.
This does not establish a general defence that following legal advice excuses contempt. The narrower conclusion is that the source of the assertions, together with the apologies tendered, justified discontinuing the proceedings against her in this case.
6. Broader legal framework and limits of the ruling
As background, Article 215 of the Constitution recognises High Courts as courts of record with power to punish for contempt. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines criminal contempt, including specified forms of interference with judicial authority and the administration of justice. Section 12 recognises the possibility of discharge or remission of punishment upon an apology satisfactory to the court; its Explanation also protects a bona fide apology from rejection merely because it is qualified or conditional.
These provisions help explain the legal setting, but the judgment does not expressly cite or analyse them. They should not be presented as statutory provisions specifically construed by this Bench.
Similarly, fair criticism of judicial acts must be distinguished from contempt. Section 5 addresses fair comment on the merits of a case that has been heard and finally decided. The present judgment undertakes no analysis under that provision and does not comprehensively define the boundary between permissible criticism and punishable allegations.
Its effective holding concerns the acceptance of apologies and disposal of the proceedings, rather than a complete determination of the statutory ingredients of contempt or the truth of the underlying allegations.
C. Potential Impact
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Substance matters more than labels: Future courts may assess the complete apology and accompanying conduct rather than treating isolated wording as decisive.
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Express acknowledgment carries weight: Acceptance that allegations were unnecessary and unjustified can provide a stronger basis for finding remorse than a general expression of regret.
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Collateral allegations create litigation risk: Pleadings seeking relief against identified parties should not become vehicles for unsupported insinuations concerning judges.
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Charitable contributions remain context-specific: The decision neither requires donations nor fixes any monetary benchmark for acceptance of an apology.
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Relief remains discretionary: The outcome does not require courts to accept apologies in materially different circumstances, particularly where sincerity is not established.
The judgment’s broader value is illustrative rather than transformative. It shows a court choosing to close contempt proceedings after finding genuine acknowledgment and remorse, while leaving broader questions about contempt liability and permissible judicial criticism undecided.