Fundamental Right to Walk: Demarcated Footpaths as a Constitutional Priority Over Motorised Traffic

Introduction

In MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN, the Supreme Court of India converted a tragic motor accident compensation dispute into a significant constitutional pronouncement on pedestrian rights. The case arose from the death of a five-year-old child who was struck by a tanker while walking with his father to school. The Court noted that there was neither a footpath nor a pedestrian crossing at the place of the accident.

While the immediate issue concerned compensation under motor accident law, the Court used the case to address a broader constitutional question: whether citizens have a fundamental right to walk safely on demarcated footpaths. The Court answered this in the affirmative, declaring that the right to walk is part of the fundamental right to move freely under Article 19(1)(d), read with Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) and Article 21 of the Constitution.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court enhanced the compensation payable to the appellants from the reduced amount of Rs. 4,70,000/- awarded by the High Court to Rs. 11,44,628/-, applying the principles laid down in Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha.

More importantly, the Court declared:

  • The right to walk is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution.
  • This right includes the right to demarcated, safe and well-maintained footpaths.
  • The right of pedestrians to footpaths is primary and has priority over movement by motorised vehicles.
  • Urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats have a correlative duty to provide and maintain pedestrian infrastructure.
  • Violation of this right can give rise to constitutional and legal remedies, including restitution and compensation, independent of remedies under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The Court also directed that the matter be re-numbered as a petition under Article 32 titled Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath, and impleaded the Union Government through the Ministries of Housing and Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport and Highways.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India in W.P. (C) No. 295/2012

The Court referred to S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India in W.P. (C) No. 295/2012 to acknowledge that road safety has already been an area of continuing judicial concern. In that matter, the Supreme Court has been monitoring the implementation of road safety guidelines. However, the present judgment distinguished general road safety from the more foundational constitutional issue of the right to walk.

The Court observed that pedestrian rights had so far been accommodated only within the framework of motor vehicle regulation. This judgment moves beyond that approach by recognising walking not as an incidental road-use activity, but as an independent constitutional entitlement.

In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388

The Court also cited In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388, where guidelines relating to road safety were issued. This precedent reinforced the Court’s continuing concern with road accidents. However, in the present case, the Court clarified that the issue was not merely safety regulation, but recognition of walking as a fundamental right requiring institutional and statutory protection.

Lucknow Public School, Eldico v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 422

Lucknow Public School, Eldico v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 422 was cited while discussing how legislatures convert fundamental rights into statutory frameworks. The Court referred to the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 as an example of legislation that identifies the right, duty bearers, remedies and regulatory institutions.

This comparison was used to show that the right to walk similarly requires legislative recognition, clear identification of responsible authorities, remedies for violations, and a dedicated regulatory mechanism.

Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha

The compensation aspect of the case was decided by applying Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha. In that case, concerning the death of a six-year-old child, the Court assessed notional income by reference to minimum wages, added future prospects, deducted personal expenses, and applied the multiplier method.

Following the same approach, the Court recalculated the compensation in the present case as follows:

  • Loss of dependency: Rs. 10,11,528/-
  • Loss of consortium: Rs. 96,800/-
  • Loss of estate: Rs. 18,150/-
  • Funeral expenses: Rs. 18,150/-

The total compensation was fixed at Rs. 11,44,628/-.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rests on a rights-and-duties framework. It began with the premise that walking is the most basic form of human movement and predates motorised mobility. Therefore, the constitutional guarantee under Article 19(1)(d), which protects the right to move freely throughout India, cannot be understood only as a right of vehicular movement.

The Court held that the right to walk is also linked to:

  • Article 21: because safe walking is integral to life and personal liberty;
  • Article 19(1)(a): because walking can be a mode of expression;
  • Article 19(1)(b): because processions and marches involve peaceful assembly;
  • Article 19(1)(c): because walking together may involve association and collective action.

The Court also criticised the dominance of motor vehicles in urban planning and legal regulation. It observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is centred on vehicles, licensing, registration, permits, traffic control, insurance and claims. It does not recognise or protect the fundamental right to walk.

Accordingly, the Court held that where a road exists, there must be a corresponding duty to provide a demarcated and maintained footpath. This duty falls on urban development authorities, municipal corporations, municipalities and panchayats.

Impact

This judgment has potentially far-reaching consequences for constitutional law, urban governance and public infrastructure planning.

  • Constitutionalisation of pedestrian rights: Pedestrian access is no longer merely a matter of municipal convenience or traffic regulation. It is now a fundamental right.
  • Priority over motorised vehicles: The Court expressly held that the right to walk on demarcated footpaths has priority over motorised movement.
  • Enforceable municipal duty: Local bodies may now face legal action for failure to provide or maintain footpaths.
  • Independent remedies: Citizens may seek restitution or compensation for violation of pedestrian rights independently of motor accident claims.
  • Legislative push: The Court urged the Union Government and Law Commission to consider a statutory framework for protecting the right to walk.

The decision may influence future litigation concerning encroached footpaths, unsafe roads, inaccessible pedestrian crossings, urban planning failures, and road design that prioritises vehicles over walkers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Fundamental Right to Walk

This means that walking safely in public spaces is not merely a convenience. It is protected by the Constitution as part of the right to movement, life, expression, assembly and association.

Correlative Duty

A right usually creates a corresponding duty. If citizens have a right to walk safely, public authorities have a duty to create and maintain safe walking infrastructure such as footpaths.

Restitutionary Remedy

Restitution means restoring a person, as far as possible, to the position they would have been in if the legal wrong had not occurred. In this context, it may include directions to construct footpaths, remove obstructions, or pay compensation.

Independent Remedy under the Constitution

The Court clarified that a claim for violation of the right to walk is separate from a motor accident compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. A citizen may therefore pursue constitutional or civil remedies against public authorities responsible for unsafe pedestrian infrastructure.

Conclusion

MANIYAR ILIYAZ @ SHAIK RIYAZ v. P. AYYAPPAN is a landmark judgment recognising the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths. The Court shifted the legal focus from vehicle-centric road regulation to human-centric constitutional mobility.

The key takeaway is that roads are not meant only for motor vehicles. Where roads exist, pedestrian infrastructure must also exist. The judgment lays down that walking is integral to life, liberty, expression, assembly and movement, and that public authorities have an enforceable duty to protect this right.