Forwarding Offensive Social Media Content Constitutes Liability: A New Precedent from the Madras High Court

Introduction

This Judgment commentary examines the Madras High Court’s decision in S.VE.Shekar v. The State Represented by The Inspector of Police, Cyber Crime Cell, Chennai, pronounced on January 2, 2025. The case revolved around criminal charges against a former Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) who forwarded a derogatory social media post targeting women journalists. The legal questions centered on the extent of liability for forwarding offensive content, the applicability of technological evidence requirements under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, and the sufficiency of an apology in cases of reputational harm. The parties to the case were the petitioner, S. Ve. Shekar, and the respondent, The State represented by the Cyber Crime Cell, Central Crime Branch, Chennai.

Summary of the Judgment

In the original trial, the petitioner was convicted under Sections 504 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002. Arguing that he had merely forwarded (and not authored) a contentious and defamatory Facebook post, the petitioner sought to overturn his conviction. However, the High Court upheld the trial court’s decision, concluding that:

  • The petitioner’s act of forwarding the message—even if not authored by him—was sufficient to establish the requisite intention to commit the offenses charged against him.
  • Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act was adequately addressed through other corroborative evidence (Ex.P-3), reducing the need for additional certification under particular circumstances in this case.
  • An apology and deletion of the post did not negate the petitioner’s initial culpability, especially given that the content in question had already caused reputational harm.
  • There was no procedural irregularity in the questions put to the petitioner under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), and no violation of his right to effective defense was found.

The High Court emphasized that forwarding defamatory or harassing content via social media remains punishable if it meets the criteria under relevant penal provisions, irrespective of the accused’s authorship of the message. It confirmed the petitioner’s sentence and left open a window of 90 days for appeal before the Supreme Court.

Analysis

a) Precedents Cited

The Court referred to Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. (2023 (4) SCC 1) among other cases. The petitioner argued that the Supreme Court cases cited were inapplicable because they involved different factual circumstances related to hate speech or direct authorship. The High Court, however, used those precedents for broader principles concerning free speech boundaries and the liability arising from disseminating defamatory or harassing material.

The petitioner likewise relied on various recent Supreme Court and High Court rulings (Ravinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Randeep Singh alias Rana v. State of Haryana, and R. Thiagarajan v. State). The Madras High Court distinguished these rulings on factual grounds, emphasizing that none addressed the specific scenario of an admitted social media forward coupled with subsequent apology.

b) Legal Reasoning

The High Court’s reasoning was anchored on the principle that forwarding potentially defamatory or harassing content, with knowledge of such content, legally implicates the person forwarding it. The Court observed that while the petitioner did not author the original post, he knowingly shared it on Facebook. Despite his subsequent apology and deletion of the content, the harm had already occurred to the reputation of the women journalists mentioned.

The petitioner contested the admissibility of social media screenshots due to the absence of strict compliance with Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the Court found that Ex.P-3 and the cross-examination statements of prosecution witnesses adequately established the authenticity of the social media post and the petitioner’s actions. The Court also noted that an official certificate under Section 65-B may not be indispensable when the person accused admits certain acts and when other corroborative documentary evidence is sufficient to prove the allegations.

Additionally, the Court reasoned that brandishing an apology does not overturn legal liability for reputational harm, especially when the offensive content is widely disseminated and viewed by an unknown number of people.

c) Impact

This Judgment sets a clear precedent for cases involving the posting or forwarding of offensive or defamatory content on social media. Key highlights of its potential impact include:

  • Expanded Liability: Even forwarding content (not merely authoring it) can lead to criminal liability if the individual understands its potential to harass or defame others.
  • Technological Evidence: While Section 65-B remains crucial, courts may sometimes accept supplementary evidence or admissions to establish that the accused indeed circulated the content.
  • Mens Rea: An apology does not absolve liability if the mens rea (criminal intent or recklessness regarding the harm) can be inferred from the context and factual evidence.
  • Social Media Scrutiny: Individuals in public life, such as politicians, are subject to heightened scrutiny over their online postings, as such conduct can have serious reputational ramifications for third parties.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act: This provision stipulates that electronic records (such as social media posts, emails, or screenshots) must typically be accompanied by a specific certificate to be admissible as evidence. In practice, if the accused admits the act or other corroborative evidence exists, courts can deem the electronic record sufficiently proved for the specific purpose of the case without strictly insisting on a certificate.

Sections 504 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): These sections deal with intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace (Section 504 IPC) and word, gesture, or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman (Section 509 IPC). Both criminalize insulting or harassing conduct capable of disrupting the peace, with a particular emphasis on protecting women’s modesty and dignity.

Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002: This state-specific legislation criminalizes various forms of harassment against women, including those that may occur through virtual spaces or social media. Forwarding objectionable content aimed at women journalists or professionals may fall within the ambit of this Act.

Conclusion

The Judgment in S.VE.Shekar v. State reinforces that forwarding objectionable or harassing content on social media is not a trivial act. An apology, while indicative of remorse, is insufficient to undo the legal violations once cinematic or textual content has become public and has caused reputational harm. This ruling provides a significant guiding principle for courts dealing with electronic evidence under Section 65-B, clarifying that corroborative material, the accused’s admission, and contextual evidence can together suffice to prove a defendant’s culpability.

Long-term, the decision underscores the growing judicial intolerance toward online harassment and reaffirms the courts’ willingness to apply criminal statutes to curb the misuse of digital platforms. It serves as a cautionary reminder that individuals—particularly those in positions of social responsibility—must exercise diligence and prudence in sharing social media content, as their actions can have profound legal consequences.