Deemed Approval Under Rule 10 of the 1978 Rules Cannot Validate an Appointment Made in Breach of Mandatory Reservation

1. Introduction

Case: Anil Kumar Chaudhary v. The Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari Gorakhpur And Others
Court: Allahabad High Court
Date: 14.09.2026
Jurisdiction: Writ - A (service/education service dispute)

The petitioner, Anil Kumar Chaudhary, claimed entitlement to salary (and later, consequential service/retiral benefits) as an Assistant Teacher (C.T. Grade) in an aided junior high school, asserting that his appointment made in May 1988 stood “deemed approved” under the Uttar Pradesh Recognized Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers) Rules, 1978 (“Rules of 1978”), because the District Basic Education Officer/Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari did not communicate disapproval within the prescribed time.

The State authorities resisted the claim on the ground that the post was sanctioned/advertised subject to compliance with Scheduled Caste reservation, that eligible Scheduled Caste candidates were available, and that the management selected a general category candidate contrary to the reservation condition; consequently, approval was declined. The petitioner also challenged (i) the later re-advertisement of the same post and (ii) the disapproval order dated 31.12.1988 as violative of natural justice.

Key issues: (a) whether “deemed approval” under Rule 10 can validate an appointment made contrary to mandatory reservation/procedure; (b) whether participation of the DBEO nominee cures illegality; (c) whether denial of an individual hearing vitiated disapproval; (d) whether continuance under an interim order confers salary/retiral rights; and (e) whether re-advertisement was illegal once the petitioner had joined.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It held that:

  • The post carried an express condition to follow Scheduled Caste reservation; selection of a general category candidate despite availability of Scheduled Caste candidates was a foundational illegality.
  • The “deeming” provision in Rule 10 cannot be used to legitimise an appointment made in breach of mandatory statutory conditions (including reservation).
  • Participation of the District Basic Education Officer’s nominee in the selection does not cure a defect arising from non-compliance with mandatory reservation requirements.
  • The natural justice argument did not succeed because the authority raised queries and the management responded; in any event, a hearing cannot be invoked to perpetuate an appointment suffering from a fundamental statutory infirmity.
  • The re-advertisement could not be faulted, as the petitioner’s appointment was not approved and therefore did not exhaust the vacancy in law.
  • Continuance in service under an interim court order does not convert an invalid appointment into a valid substantive appointment for claiming vested retiral/post-retirement benefits; however, salary for work actually performed under court protection may require separate consideration depending on law and the interim order’s terms.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), (2015) 4 SCC 334

The petitioner relied on State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) to contend that recovery of excess payment is impermissible in certain categories, particularly from retired employees. The High Court’s decision, however, did not turn on recovery of excess payment; rather, it turned on whether the petitioner had a legally valid appointment capable of generating enforceable salary/retiral entitlements against the State.

In effect, Rafiq Masih had limited purchase on the core controversy because the dispute was not framed as a recovery case but as a claim for recognition of appointment, salary, and retiral benefits. The Court instead focused on statutory compliance under the Rules of 1978 and the reservation condition attached to sanction/permission.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Reservation condition as a mandatory statutory constraint: The Court treated the reservation stipulation attached to the post’s sanction/permission as binding. Since Scheduled Caste candidates were available and participated, selection of a general category candidate in disregard of the reservation requirement was viewed as a substantive illegality going to the root of the appointment.
  2. Limits of “deemed approval” (statutory fiction): The petitioner’s central submission was that approval must be deemed after expiry of the prescribed period under Rule 10(5)(iii). The Court rejected this by clarifying that a deeming clause cannot be invoked “in isolation” to validate what is illegal at inception. Put differently, the fiction of deemed approval operates within the statutory framework; it cannot be used as a tool to defeat mandatory recruitment conditions such as reservation.
  3. Nominee’s presence does not waive compliance: Even though the Selection Committee included the DBEO nominee, the Court held that such participation cannot dispense with mandatory reservation compliance nor immunise the process from scrutiny. The nominee’s presence was not treated as an estoppel against the statutory authority when the underlying process violated mandatory norms.
  4. Natural justice—contextual application: The disapproval was attacked for want of a personal hearing to the petitioner. The Court held that the authority had raised queries and the management responded; further, refusal of approval to an appointment fundamentally contrary to mandatory procedure did not require a separate opportunity to the appointee as a means to sustain an illegality. The Court’s approach reflects a principle that procedural fairness cannot be deployed to legitimise an outcome the statute forbids.
  5. Re-advertisement and existence of vacancy in law: The petitioner argued there was no vacancy because he was working and never terminated. The Court held the opposite: once approval was declined and the selection found contrary to reservation requirements, the vacancy was not lawfully filled; therefore, re-advertisement could not be condemned as creating an “artificial” vacancy.
  6. Interim orders and substantive rights: The Court underscored that an interim order is interlocutory and does not confer substantive validity on an appointment. Hence, continuance under interim protection cannot automatically create vested rights to retiral/post-retirement benefits. At the same time, the Court left a narrow window open: salary for duties actually performed under court orders might require separate evaluation depending on the interim order’s terms and applicable law.

3.3 Impact

  • Deemed approval is not a cure-all: The judgment clarifies that “deemed approval” provisions under the Rules of 1978 cannot be used to regularise or validate appointments made in breach of mandatory recruitment conditions, especially reservation requirements attached to sanction/permission.
  • Reservation compliance in aided basic schools: Managements of recognized/aided junior high schools are put on notice that deviation from reservation conditions can render the entire appointment unenforceable against the State, even if the teacher joins and works.
  • Interim continuance does not translate into retiral entitlements: The ruling strengthens the distinction between (i) working under interim judicial protection and (ii) holding a substantively valid appointment. This is likely to influence future service claims where long continuance is based primarily on interim orders.
  • Administrative scrutiny retained despite nominee participation: Authorities are not precluded from later refusing approval merely because their nominee attended the selection; compliance is judged against statutory norms, not against mere participation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Deemed approval” / “deeming provision”
A legal fiction where the law treats an event as having occurred (e.g., approval granted) if the authority does not act within a fixed time. This judgment emphasises that such a fiction cannot validate something the law otherwise prohibits (like an appointment made contrary to mandatory reservation).
Reservation requirement attached to sanction/permission
When a post is sanctioned/allowed to be filled subject to compliance with reservation, that condition constrains how the vacancy must be advertised and filled. Non-compliance can make the appointment unlawful.
Interim order
A temporary court order maintaining a status quo during litigation. It does not decide the final rights of the parties and, by itself, does not legalise an otherwise invalid appointment.
Natural justice (opportunity of hearing)
A fairness principle requiring a person likely to be adversely affected to be heard. The Court held that, on these facts, management had an opportunity to respond to objections, and that hearing principles cannot be stretched to perpetuate an appointment that violates mandatory statutory conditions.

5. Conclusion

The decision’s central takeaway is a clear doctrinal limit: statutory “deemed approval” cannot be invoked to legitimise an appointment made in violation of mandatory recruitment norms, particularly reservation conditions. The judgment also reinforces that interim judicial protection cannot convert an invalid appointment into a source of vested retiral rights, while leaving open (in principle) the question of remuneration for work actually performed under court orders. In the broader landscape of service law within aided educational institutions, the ruling prioritises statutory compliance over equitable claims founded on long continuance.