4. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
4.1 Institutional exemption does not determine every information request
DVAC had been exempted under Section 24(4) through G.O.Ms.No.158, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, dated 26 August 2008. The Court nevertheless emphasised the proviso excluding information relating to allegations of corruption and human rights violations from that exemption.
Because this enquiry concerned corruption allegations, DVAC could not end the analysis simply by invoking its institutional status. The Court accordingly separated two questions: whether the organisation’s general exemption applied, and whether particular information remained protected under Section 8.
This distinction is central to the decision. Falling within the corruption exception makes an application eligible for consideration under the RTI framework; it does not automatically render every document disclosable. Conversely, an agency cannot use its exempt status to avoid examining an otherwise qualifying request.
The fact that the enquiry ended favourably for Jangid did not remove its connection with allegations of corruption. The Court treated the subject matter of the enquiry, rather than an eventual finding of wrongdoing, as material to the Section 24(4) analysis.
4.2 Section 8(1)(g): safety risks and confidential sources are distinct
The Court distinguished the two relevant protections in Section 8(1)(g). One concerns disclosure that would endanger a person’s life or physical safety. The other concerns disclosure revealing the identity of a confidential source of information or assistance for law-enforcement purposes.
On safety, the State identified no specific threat, circumstance, or supporting material explaining how disclosure would create danger. A general assertion that witnesses or third parties might be affected was insufficient. The judgment therefore requires an explanation connecting the information sought with the protected harm, rather than accepting an assumption that all vigilance records are inherently dangerous to disclose.
Confidential-source protection was treated separately. The Court recognised that a person who supplied information in confidence could legitimately require protection. However, the mere appearance of someone’s name in an enquiry file did not establish that the person was such a source.
Importantly, the judgment does not require proof of physical danger before a genuinely confidential source’s identity can be protected. Its point is that confidentiality must itself be established through the nature of the information and the circumstances of its supply. Neither limb justified indiscriminate withholding on the facts presented.
4.3 Precedents cited: privacy in service and disciplinary records
Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner, (2013) 1 SCC 212
The Court cited this Supreme Court decision for the proposition that disciplinary and service-related material may constitute personal information protected from disclosure unless larger public interest justifies its release.
Its relevance was to establish that an official record does not lose all privacy protection merely because it concerns public employment. An enquiry file may contain information about third parties that remains genuinely personal.
The High Court nevertheless distinguished the present request. Jangid was not seeking the service records of an unrelated employee: the requested material substantially concerned the enquiry conducted against him. The precedent therefore did not justify withholding the entire file. Its privacy principle remained relevant to particular third-party information within that file.
This decision was cited as reiterating the protection applicable to personal service-related information. Together, the two Supreme Court authorities supplied the privacy framework considered under Section 8(1)(j).
Again, the High Court distinguished rather than rejected the precedent. A request for one’s own enquiry records differs materially from a request for unrelated employees’ personal service information. That distinction prevented the privacy exemption from becoming a basis for total refusal.
The Court also imposed an important limit: being the subject of an enquiry does not confer an unrestricted entitlement to every item in the file. Identifiable, genuinely private information concerning unrelated third parties may still be protected. The resulting approach preserves the cited privacy principles while requiring their application to specific material.
4.4 Section 10 makes partial disclosure the practical solution
Section 10 supplied the mechanism for reconciling access with legitimate confidentiality. Where exempt information can reasonably be separated, the remainder should be furnished rather than the entire document withheld.
This supported the Commission’s direction to disclose the records after masking the names and particulars of the other officers. The Court also rejected the argument that the volume of documents made redaction impracticable. Administrative effort could not transform otherwise disclosable information into exempt information.
The distinction between the Court’s reasoning and the operative order is worth preserving. It rejected a blanket claim that all third-party names were protected under Section 8(1)(g), yet upheld the particular masking directed by the Commission. The judgment should therefore not be read as holding either that all names must be disclosed or that every name in a vigilance file is automatically exempt.
4.5 Internal confidentiality instructions cannot add statutory exemptions
Rule 29 of the DVAC Manual could not independently justify withholding the entire enquiry record. The Court treated the Manual as an internal administrative instrument, not a source of exemptions additional to those recognised by the RTI Act.
Nevertheless, the Manual was not declared wholly irrelevant. An internal confidentiality requirement might assist in assessing whether particular information had actually been supplied in confidence. Its possible evidentiary relevance was thus distinguished from an asserted power to override statutory access rights.
4.6 Evidentiary privilege and RTI disclosure require separate analysis
The State relied on pending civil proceedings, O.S.No.13833 of 2010, and a privilege claim under Section 124 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court held that neither supplied an independent ground for refusing the RTI request.
Whether a document is privileged from production in judicial proceedings is a different question from whether it is exempt under the RTI Act. The judgment did not decide the validity of the privilege claim in the civil suit. It held that the RTI application had to be determined by the applicable RTI exemptions, rather than by the existence of that separate dispute.
4.7 Section 11 is a procedural safeguard, not a standalone exemption
Section 11 applies where the Public Information Officer proposes to disclose information relating to or supplied by a third party and that information has been treated as confidential, subject to the provision’s statutory conditions. The Court rejected its use as an independent reason to refuse the whole file.
At the same time, the Court did not dispense with the procedure. Paragraph 26 expressly required compliance before disclosing any particular document attracting Section 11. This document-specific obligation could not be used to withhold other information that was otherwise disclosable.