CoC-Approved Resolution Plans Bind Both Sides: Improved Profitability Does Not Justify Withdrawal
Case: BANK OF INDIA v. S.M KAMAL PASHA
Citation: 2026 INSC 1154
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 26 October 2026
Bench: J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.
Judgment delivered by: K. Vinod Chandran, J.
1. Introduction
This judgment addresses whether the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”), having approved a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), may withdraw that approval before confirmation by the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) because the corporate debtor’s financial position has substantially improved.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a CoC-approved resolution plan binds both the creditors and the successful resolution applicant (“SRA”), even before judicial approval. The commercial wisdom of creditors does not confer an unrestricted power to abandon an approved plan when subsequent developments make a different transaction appear more attractive.
However, the Court did not itself approve the plan. It preserved the NCLT’s responsibility to examine statutory compliance, including the corporate debtor’s current financial position, while making clear that improved profitability alone cannot justify refusing approval to a plan satisfying Section 30(2).
Background and parties
Bank of India, the first appellant, had initiated the corporate insolvency resolution process (“CIRP”) under Section 7 of the IBC. Six CoC members appealed to the Supreme Court. The first and second respondents constituted the consortium whose resolution plan had been approved; the third respondent was the resolution professional (“RP”); and the fourth respondent was the corporate debtor’s holding company and sole promoter.
The corporate debtor operated a toll-collection business on National Highway 45. According to the creditors, the business had suffered during the COVID-19 pandemic. The approved plan contemplated a resolution amount of ₹172.55 crore when the corporate debtor had an opening balance of approximately ₹30 crore. During the ensuing delay, that balance allegedly increased to approximately ₹165 crore.
The creditors argued that this accumulation would substantially reduce the SRA’s fresh funding requirement and confer a windfall. They therefore sought withdrawal of the approved plan and a fresh invitation for expressions of interest through Form G. The holding company supported withdrawal for a different purpose: implementation of a one-time settlement (“OTS”) and termination of the CIRP.
The SRA resisted both courses. It maintained that the financial improvement had been contemplated in the plan and that, had implementation occurred on time, the subsequent operational revenue would already have accrued for its benefit.
Procedural history
- The CoC approved the resolution plan, and the RP applied for its confirmation through IA No.1505 of 2021.
- Implementation was delayed by earlier litigation, including a Supreme Court stay in proceedings brought by the erstwhile promoter.
- The CoC subsequently voted unanimously to withdraw its approval, and the NCLT allowed the RP’s withdrawal application.
- The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) reversed that decision, holding that the CoC lacked jurisdiction to withdraw from its approval.
- The NCLAT revived the plan-confirmation application and directed consideration of the holding company’s IA No.1679 of 2025, while permitting the SRA to advance its objections.
- The Supreme Court declined to interfere with that arrangement.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court’s principal conclusions were:
- Approval creates statutory obligations: A resolution plan approved by the CoC binds the CoC and the SRA before its confirmation under Section 31.
- The restraint operates reciprocally: Just as an SRA cannot ordinarily withdraw because the transaction has become less attractive, creditors cannot withdraw because the corporate debtor has become more valuable.
- Unanimity does not create jurisdiction: Even unanimous creditor support cannot supply a power to reopen an approved plan that the IBC does not confer.
- Continuing CoC involvement has limits: The CoC’s continuing interest in implementation does not authorise withdrawal or modification of the approved bargain.
- Section 12A must be read with the wider statutory scheme: In paragraph 17, the Court stated that withdrawal is available only until CoC approval and that, after the approved plan is placed before the adjudicating authority, neither the insolvency application nor the approved plan can be withdrawn.
- Judicial scrutiny remains necessary: The NCLT must assess the plan against Section 30(2), considering current financial information alongside the plan’s terms.
- Improved profitability is not independently disqualifying: A financially improved corporate debtor does not, for that reason alone, justify rejection of a compliant plan.
The appeal was disposed of without interference with the NCLAT’s order. The NCLT was requested to hear the pending applications together and decide them expeditiously. The Supreme Court expressly stated that, apart from its conclusion on the binding nature of the plan between the CoC and the SRA, its observations were prima facie and need not govern final adjudication.
3. Analysis: Precedents Cited
3.1 Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Ltd. and Another, (2022) 2 SCC 401
This was the central authority. It examined attempts by successful resolution applicants to withdraw or modify CoC-approved plans before approval by the adjudicating authority—the same procedural stage involved here.
The Supreme Court drew particularly on the distinction in Ebix between an ordinary contract and a resolution plan operating within the IBC. An ordinary contract generally binds its parties. A resolution plan derives binding effects from a statutory process and, after approval under Section 31, extends to stakeholders who may not have consented to its terms.
The present judgment relied on the following propositions:
- The plan binds the CoC and SRA even during the interval between creditor approval and NCLT confirmation.
- Its binding effect prevents either side from reneging after approval through the statutory voting mechanism.
- Ordinary contractual doctrines such as frustration or force majeure do not supply a general escape from the IBC framework.
- The adjudicating authority cannot invent an unprovided mechanism for withdrawal or compelled renegotiation.
The Court also reviewed the different appeals decided in Ebix. Concerns about investigations into Educomp’s earlier affairs did not justify withdrawal. Seroco’s reliance on economic slowdown and frustration was rejected. In Kundan Care’s appeal, a consensual request connected with uncertainty over a power purchase agreement attracted exceptional, one-time relief under Article 142.
That exceptional relief did not establish a general withdrawal jurisdiction. Here, the SRA opposed withdrawal and specifically resisted invocation of Article 142.
Influence on the present decision: The Court applied Ebix reciprocally. Although that decision principally concerned withdrawal sought by resolution applicants, its reasoning equally restricted creditors seeking to abandon their own approval. The judgment therefore makes explicit that statutory finality protects both sides, not creditors alone.
3.2 State Bank of India and Others v. Consortium of Murari Lal Jalan and Florian Fritsch and Another, (2025) 4 SCC 354
This authority appears in the Supreme Court’s account of the NCLAT’s reasoning. The NCLAT had relied on it, together with Ebix, when holding the withdrawal application inconsistent with the IBC.
The supplied judgment does not separately analyse its facts or extract a distinct proposition from it. Its significance here is therefore corroborative: it formed part of the precedent-based foundation for the NCLAT’s decision, which the Supreme Court declined to disturb. A broader account of its independent ratio would go beyond the supplied text.
3.3 Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., (2026) 6 SCC 431
The creditors relied on this decision to argue that the CoC continues to exist and retain an interest in the resolution process until implementation and payment are complete.
The Supreme Court accepted the continuing-interest proposition but rejected the inference that it authorised withdrawal. In Kalyani Transco, implementation had encountered obstacles including investigations and property attachments. The approved plan itself permitted an extension of the effective date with the prescribed creditor majority. The CoC’s subsequent decision facilitated implementation within that framework.
The present judgment emphasised that the relevant clause did not authorise withdrawal, modification, or open-ended renegotiation. It also discussed Regulation 18 and the restriction against decisions affecting the resolution plan already submitted to the adjudicating authority.
Influence on the present decision: Continuing institutional involvement is different from continuing freedom to redesign the transaction. A CoC may retain functions connected with implementation without retaining a power to undo the approved plan.
This decision explained the structured withdrawal procedure under Section 12A and Regulation 30A. The Court identified four procedural stages:
- Before admission, when the applicant may approach the adjudicating authority directly.
- After admission but before constitution of the CoC, through the interim resolution professional.
- After constitution of the CoC and before the expression-of-interest stage, through the interim resolution professional or RP.
- After the expression-of-interest stage, through the prescribed procedure and with reasons explaining the delayed withdrawal request.
The unresolved question for the present case was whether that withdrawal route survives CoC approval of a resolution plan. Reading Section 12A with Sections 30 and 31, the Court answered against an unrestricted post-approval exit.
Influence on the present decision: The precedent supplied the procedural framework; the present judgment addressed its relationship with the finality generated by CoC approval.
3.5 Amtek Auto Ltd. (CoC) v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian, (2021) 4 SCC 457
This authority appears within the passages reproduced from Ebix. A successful resolution applicant had relied on a force majeure clause to seek a direction requiring the CoC to negotiate modifications. The Court rejected the attempt, holding that there was no scope for such negotiations after CoC approval.
Influence on the present decision: It reinforced the proposition that commercial disappointment cannot be converted into an entitlement to reopen an approved plan through general contractual arguments.
3.6 Uttara Foods & Feeds (P) Ltd. v. Mona Pharmachem, (2018) 15 SCC 587
This decision also appears through Ebix. It involved one-time relief under Article 142 where the parties presented signed consent terms. The discussion connected such earlier exceptional relief with the subsequent legislative introduction of Section 12A and its 90% voting threshold.
Influence on the present decision: It illustrated the difference between exceptional constitutional relief and an ordinary statutory entitlement. A specifically enacted withdrawal procedure cannot be treated as authority for every later attempt to escape an approved resolution arrangement.
4. Analysis: Legal Reasoning
4.1 The plan’s binding force comes from the IBC
The judgment distinguishes two stages of legal effect. Before NCLT approval, the CoC-approved plan binds the creditors and the SRA within the statutory framework. After approval under Section 31, its binding effect extends to the stakeholders identified by the legislation.
This distinction answers a central argument implicit in the dispute: the absence of NCLT confirmation does not mean the parties remain free to walk away. Judicial approval is still necessary, but the interval awaiting approval is not an unrestricted renegotiation period.
4.2 Commercial wisdom operates within statutory limits
The creditors argued that courts ordinarily defer to their commercial wisdom when they approve a plan with the required majority. A unanimous decision to withdraw, they submitted, deserved equivalent respect.
The Court rejected that equivalence. Commercial wisdom governs decisions that the IBC authorises the CoC to make; it does not itself create new powers. Accordingly, a voting majority sufficient to approve a plan cannot automatically be used to revoke that approval outside the statutory framework.
The distinction is between deference to an authorised commercial decision and recognition of a power the statute does not confer.
4.3 Maximisation of value does not require perpetual re-bidding
The creditors’ strongest economic argument was that the improved cash position would permit a better recovery and reduce the haircut associated with the approved plan. Nevertheless, value maximisation is not the IBC’s sole operative consideration. It must function alongside certainty, timely resolution, and implementation of approved outcomes.
If every favourable development permitted fresh bidding, the process could remain open indefinitely. Conversely, allowing applicants to withdraw whenever performance deteriorated would undermine creditor confidence. The Court’s reciprocal approach prevents either side from treating approval as binding only while commercially advantageous.
The alleged windfall was also disputed. The SRA argued that the revenue increase was foreseeable and would have accrued to it following timely implementation. The Supreme Court did not finally determine the plan’s financial mechanics or the extent of any actual advantage.
4.4 Section 12A is not a free-standing post-approval escape route
Section 12A concerns withdrawal of the underlying insolvency application, ordinarily requiring approval by creditors holding 90% of the CoC’s voting share. That is conceptually different from withdrawing approval of a particular resolution plan while keeping the CIRP alive for fresh bidding.
Both forms of relief were present here:
- The creditors wanted the existing plan displaced and a fresh Form G issued.
- The holding company wanted the CIRP itself ended through settlement.
The Court acknowledged the apparent breadth of Section 12A when read alone and observed that subordinate regulations cannot curtail the parent statute. However, it read the provision harmoniously with Sections 30 and 31. Paragraph 17 states that withdrawal is available only until CoC approval and rules out withdrawal once the approved plan is before the adjudicating authority.
An important qualification: The Court nevertheless preserved consideration of the holding company’s pending application and expressly limited the finality of its observations, apart from the plan’s binding nature. The judgment should therefore not be presented as having finally rejected that application on its merits. Its restrictive reasoning on post-approval withdrawal must be read alongside the actual remand directions.
4.5 The NCLT retains a real but limited scrutiny function
The NCLT is neither a rubber stamp nor a substitute commercial decision-maker. Section 31 requires it to determine whether the approved plan satisfies Section 30(2).
The judgment emphasised insolvency-cost priority, statutory payment safeguards, and fair and equitable distribution under Explanation I. It also referred to Explanation II concerning the application of the 2019 amendments to plans awaiting approval or rejection.
The payment safeguards discussed under Section 30(2) must be understood within their statutory scope. They are not a general guarantee that every creditor will receive full payment or share in every subsequent increase in enterprise value.
The Court directed examination of the corporate debtor’s current financial position and cash balance against the plan’s terms. This is important: binding approval does not freeze the evidentiary record. Current information remains relevant to statutory scrutiny, but cannot become a pretext for demanding a better bargain.
4.6 Delay does not automatically discharge the parties
The delay here resulted from earlier proceedings and a Supreme Court stay; it was not attributed to the SRA. The Court recognised, through Ebix, that prolonged approval delays can substantially affect commercial assumptions.
Nevertheless, delay did not itself create a withdrawal entitlement. The appropriate response was expedited adjudication of the pending applications, not an unrestricted reopening of the resolution process.
4.7 Unequal exit consequences reinforce the need for certainty
The Court noted that the SRA had maintained its performance bank guarantee at considerable expense. It contrasted the absence of statutory compensation to a resolution applicant upon withdrawal with the potentially serious consequences of failing to implement a judicially approved plan, including guarantee forfeiture and prosecution under Section 74 where applicable.
These consequences should not be confused with automatic criminal liability merely because a dispute arises before NCLT approval. Their relevance was structural: insolvency law imposes substantial implementation obligations, making an unrestricted creditor-side escape particularly problematic.
5. What Was Decided—and What Remains Open
| Decided |
Left for the NCLT |
| The CoC-approved plan binds the CoC and SRA. |
Whether the particular plan satisfies Section 30(2). |
| Creditor unanimity does not independently authorise withdrawal. |
The effect of current financial information when assessed against the plan. |
| Improved profitability alone cannot justify refusing a compliant plan. |
The pending holding-company application and the parties’ contentions, within the governing legal limits. |
| The NCLAT’s operative arrangement would not be disturbed. |
The final disposition of both pending applications after a joint, expedited hearing. |
The Supreme Court therefore neither confirmed the resolution plan nor approved the OTS. It preserved adjudication while settling the central principle of inter-party binding effect.
6. Potential Impact
Greater certainty for resolution applicants
The decision reduces the risk that a successful bidder will lose its approved transaction merely because the corporate debtor’s business recovers during litigation. This is particularly relevant to operating businesses whose cash generation may improve significantly during CIRP.
Stronger discipline at the approval stage
Creditors must evaluate foreseeable changes in performance and the treatment of interim cash before approving a plan. The judgment underscores the importance of clear, lawful provisions addressing accumulated cash, implementation dates, and operational receipts, rather than reliance on later withdrawal.
No continuous auction
The ruling discourages attempts to restart bidding solely because a later transaction might produce a higher recovery. Value maximisation remains important, but it does not displace the statutory finality of an approved process.
Clearer boundaries for continuing CoC functions
The distinction drawn from Kalyani Transco will matter in implementation disputes. Continuing creditor participation may support completion of the plan without authorising alteration of its essential bargain.
Careful treatment of late settlement proposals
The judgment creates a substantial obstacle to using Section 12A as an unrestricted exit after CoC approval. At the same time, its express reservation and remand require future courts to distinguish the binding principle from matters the Supreme Court deliberately left for adjudication.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Committee of Creditors
- The creditor body that makes key commercial decisions during CIRP. Its authority remains subject to the IBC.
- Successful Resolution Applicant
- The bidder whose resolution plan has been selected and approved by the CoC.
- CoC approval versus NCLT approval
- CoC approval selects the plan through the statutory voting process. NCLT approval confirms that it satisfies legal requirements and gives it the wider binding effect prescribed by Section 31.
- Commercial wisdom
- Creditors’ business judgment about matters such as feasibility and recovery. Judicial deference to that judgment does not place it above statutory limits.
- Section 12A withdrawal
- Withdrawal of the insolvency application through a prescribed procedure. It is different from abandoning one plan and continuing the insolvency process with new bidders.
- Haircut
- The reduction between a creditor’s claim and the amount it receives under the resolution arrangement.
- Performance bank guarantee
- A bank-backed security intended to support the applicant’s performance obligations.
- Functus officio
- A description of a body that has exhausted its authority. The CoC may retain implementation-related functions without retaining power to reopen the approved plan.
- Article 142
- The Supreme Court’s constitutional power to do complete justice. Exceptional relief under it does not automatically establish an ordinary statutory withdrawal mechanism.
- Prima facie observations
- Provisional observations that do not finally determine an issue. The Court expressly used this qualification for its observations other than the plan’s binding nature.
8. Conclusion
The judgment’s central contribution is to make the finality of CoC approval expressly reciprocal: creditors, like successful resolution applicants, cannot treat an approved plan as optional when later developments improve their bargaining position.
Its broader significance lies in reconciling value maximisation with certainty. The NCLT must examine present financial realities and statutory compliance, but improved profitability alone cannot undo a legally compliant plan. The ultimate approval and settlement applications remain for adjudication; the binding character of the approved resolution arrangement does not.