Article 226 Challenges to Statutory Tribunal Orders Remain Appealable Where High Court Rules Permit
1. Introduction
In AJIT SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN, the Supreme Court of India examined two connected issues: first, whether an intra-court appeal was maintainable against a Single Judge’s decision in a writ petition challenging an order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal; and second, whether the transport authorities had lawfully rejected the appellant’s application for a stage carriage permit.
The appellant, Ajit Singh, had applied for stage carriage permits on routes including the linked route Bikaner–Suratgarh–Ganganagar. His application was rejected by the State Transport Authority, Rajasthan, and the rejection was affirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Rajasthan High Court Single Judge dismissed his writ petition, and the Division Bench dismissed his intra-court appeal as not maintainable, treating the matter as one under Article 227 rather than Article 226 of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reversed that view and clarified the distinction between Articles 226 and 227, particularly in cases involving orders of statutory tribunals.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside:
- the Division Bench judgment dated 23 September 2025;
- the Single Judge order dated 17 January 2022; and
- the State Transport Appellate Tribunal order dated 26 April 2019.
The Court held that the appellant’s writ petition had invoked Article 226, not Article 227. Therefore, the Division Bench erred in holding that the intra-court appeal was barred under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952.
On the transport law issue, the Court held that there is no statutory cap under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the number of stage carriage permits an individual may hold, since the earlier cap under Section 71(4) was omitted by the 1994 amendment. It also held that possession of a ready vehicle is not an absolute precondition for applying for a permit, though it may be a relevant factor where multiple applicants compete.
The matter was remitted to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal for fresh decision within six months.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
The Court referred to this Constitution Bench decision for the distinction between certiorari under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. In that case, it was observed that while a High Court issuing certiorari under Article 226 may annul a tribunal’s decision, under Article 227 it may also issue further directions. The Supreme Court in the present case clarified that this observation must be understood in the context of the prayer for certiorari in that case and cannot be read as making Article 227 universally broader than Article 226.
This decision was central to the Court’s reasoning. It held that powers under Article 227 are not greater than those under Article 226 when dealing with judicial or quasi-judicial orders. Article 226 can be used to quash an order for an error apparent on the face of the record, while Article 227 is concerned with ensuring that tribunals remain within jurisdictional limits. The Supreme Court relied on this case to confirm that orders of tribunals acting judicially can be challenged either under Article 226 or Article 227.
This case was cited to emphasize the wide remedial sweep of Article 226. Article 226 is not confined to traditional writs; it enables High Courts to issue orders and directions to reach injustice wherever it is found. This supported the Court’s rejection of the argument that absence of a specific writ prayer meant the petition was necessarily under Article 227.
The Court relied on this precedent to explain that, in appropriate cases, a High Court under Article 226 may not only quash an illegal order but also compel lawful exercise of discretion, or even pass the order that the authority ought to have passed. This strengthened the conclusion that Article 226 jurisdiction is broad enough to deal with tribunal orders and administrative refusals.
This landmark Constitution Bench decision was cited for the proposition that judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court used it to reiterate that tribunal decisions remain subject to scrutiny by High Courts. The Court extended this reasoning to statutory tribunals such as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act.
The Supreme Court expressly approved this Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. It supported the principle that where a statutory tribunal’s order is challenged, the proceeding may lie under Article 226 or Article 227 depending on the nature of jurisdiction invoked, and Article 226 cannot be refused merely because Article 227 was also available.
G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd.
This older decision was cited to show that orders of transport appellate authorities under motor vehicles legislation have historically been challenged through Article 226 proceedings. The Court used it to reject the idea that challenges to State Transport Appellate Tribunal orders must necessarily be treated as Article 227 proceedings.
This case was similarly cited as an example of a challenge under Article 226 to orders arising from transport tribunal proceedings. It reinforced the Court’s conclusion that Article 226 jurisdiction is available against such tribunal decisions.
Mahendra Kumar Jain (supra)
The Rajasthan High Court Division Bench relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the intra-court appeal was not maintainable. The Supreme Court found that such reliance did not justify treating the appellant’s Article 226 petition as one under Article 227. The judgment noted that the Division Bench did not provide adequate reasoning for applying that principle to the facts of the case.
B. Legal Reasoning
Article 226 and Article 227 are distinct constitutional powers
The Supreme Court emphasized that Article 226 is the source of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction and judicial review power. It allows the High Court to issue writs, orders, and directions for enforcement of fundamental rights and for “any other purpose.”
Article 227, by contrast, is supervisory jurisdiction. It enables the High Court to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority. Though both provisions may sometimes overlap in practical effect, they are constitutionally distinct.
The nature of the petition must be determined holistically
The Court rejected the argument that jurisdiction can be identified merely by reading the prayer clause. Instead, courts must examine:
- the preamble of the petition;
- the provision invoked;
- the subject matter of challenge;
- the pleaded violation of legal rights;
- the grounds raised; and
- the prayers sought.
Since Ajit Singh’s petition expressly invoked Article 226 and the Single Judge had declined writ jurisdiction, the Division Bench erred in treating the appeal as arising from Article 227 jurisdiction.
Intra-court appeal was maintainable
Rule 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules excludes appeals from orders made in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. But because the Single Judge’s order was passed in a writ petition under Article 226, the intra-court appeal was maintainable. The Division Bench’s dismissal on maintainability was therefore legally untenable.
No statutory cap on number of permits
The Supreme Court examined Section 71(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Before its omission by the 1994 amendment, it restricted the number of stage carriage permits that could be granted to an individual operator. Since that provision no longer exists, neither the transport authority nor the court can reintroduce such a cap by interpretation.
Possession of a ready vehicle is not mandatory at application stage
The Court considered Rule 5.11 and Form R.S. 5.1 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990. These provisions allow an applicant who does not possess a registered vehicle at the time of application to produce registration details after sanction of the application and before issuance of the permit.
Therefore, the Single Judge erred in treating use of the same chassis number in multiple applications as a sufficient basis to deny relief. However, the Court added that where several applicants compete for the same route, possession of a ready vehicle may be a legitimate factor in favour of one applicant, because public convenience is the paramount consideration.
Transport authorities must give reasons
The Court held that where an applicant seeks a permit on a notified route, the authority must provide strong and adequate reasons for refusing that route. Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires reasons to be recorded. The STA’s order failed to give proper reasons and did not assess the relative merits of the appellant and private respondents.
C. Impact of the Judgment
This judgment has significant implications for constitutional and transport law.
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For writ practice: It clarifies that tribunal orders can be challenged under Article 226, Article 227, or both if High Court rules permit. Courts cannot automatically classify every tribunal challenge as an Article 227 proceeding.
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For intra-court appeals: If a Single Judge decides a petition under Article 226 and High Court rules provide an appeal, such appeal cannot be barred merely because Article 227 could also have been invoked.
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For transport operators: The ruling confirms that there is no legal limit on the number of stage carriage permits one individual can hold under the current Motor Vehicles Act.
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For permit applications: Applicants need not necessarily own or possess a ready vehicle at the time of application, though doing so may improve their comparative claim.
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For administrative authorities: Transport authorities must record clear reasons when rejecting permit applications, especially where competing applicants are involved.
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For High Court administration: The Supreme Court highlighted the problem of “bench-hunting” and recommended that High Courts consider framing rules or practice directions for allocation of tribunal-related Article 226 and Article 227 matters.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
Article 226
Article 226 gives High Courts the power to issue writs, orders, and directions against public authorities, tribunals, and persons performing public functions. It is a broad power of judicial review.
Article 227
Article 227 gives High Courts supervisory power over subordinate courts and tribunals. It is used to ensure that such bodies act within their jurisdiction and do not commit grave procedural or jurisdictional errors.
Intra-court appeal
An intra-court appeal is an appeal from a Single Judge of a High Court to a Division Bench of the same High Court. Whether such an appeal lies depends on the relevant High Court rules and the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Single Judge.
Stage carriage permit
A stage carriage permit authorizes a vehicle operator to run a passenger transport service on a specified route, picking up and dropping passengers at stages along that route.
Sine qua non
“Sine qua non” means an essential condition. The Court held that possession of a ready vehicle is not a sine qua non for applying for a stage carriage permit.
Bench-hunting
Bench-hunting refers to attempts by litigants to choose or manipulate the forum or bench likely to hear their case. The Supreme Court expressed concern that overlapping Article 226 and Article 227 remedies may enable such practices unless High Courts frame clear rules.
5. Conclusion
The judgment in AJIT SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN is important for two reasons. Constitutionally, it clarifies that a challenge to a statutory tribunal’s order may validly be brought under Article 226, and an intra-court appeal will lie if the High Court rules permit. Such a petition cannot be converted into an Article 227 proceeding merely because it concerns a tribunal order.
On transport law, the Court reaffirmed that there is no current statutory ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits an individual may hold, and possession of a vehicle at the time of application is not mandatory. The ruling strengthens procedural fairness by insisting that transport authorities record proper reasons and evaluate competing claims lawfully.
The decision will likely guide future High Court practice on tribunal challenges and encourage clearer administrative rules to prevent bench-hunting and ensure consistency in adjudication.