Article 226 Cannot Be Used as a First Resort for FIR Registration When BNSS Remedies Are Available
Introduction
In Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. The State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court considered whether a High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could direct police action leading to registration of an FIR when the complainant had not first pursued the statutory remedies available under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”).
The dispute arose from a commercial property and resort project in Nashik. The complainant company alleged forgery, impersonation, and fraud in connection with a land measurement application allegedly filed using fabricated documents and signatures. Civil disputes relating to leases, sub-leases, possession, and alleged encroachments were already pending between the parties.
Instead of first approaching the Superintendent of Police or the Magistrate under the BNSS framework, the complainant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court seeking registration of offences. The High Court passed an interim order directing the police to record the statement of the company’s director and initiate action as per law. Pursuant to that order, an FIR was registered against the appellants. The accused challenged this before the Supreme Court.
Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s interim order, and quashed FIR No.0194/2025, which had been registered pursuant to that order.
The Court held that where a complainant alleges non-registration of an FIR, the ordinary remedy is not to directly invoke Article 226, but to follow the statutory sequence under the BNSS:
- approach the police station under Section 173(1) BNSS;
- if refused, approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS;
- thereafter, approach the Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS.
The Court clarified that Article 226 is extraordinary and discretionary. It is not a substitute for statutory remedies, especially where no exceptional circumstances such as violation of fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to statutory vires are present.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
This decision was central to the Court’s reasoning. It restated the principles governing exercise of writ jurisdiction where an alternative remedy exists. The Supreme Court relied on it to emphasize that although Article 226 is broad, the High Court ordinarily should not entertain a writ petition where an effective statutory remedy exists.
The exceptions identified in that case—enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, proceedings without jurisdiction, or challenge to vires of legislation—were found absent in the present matter.
Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes
This precedent was cited for the principle that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and should not be used to bypass statutory machinery. The Court applied this reasoning to hold that the complainant company could not avoid the BNSS procedure and directly seek a writ direction for registration of FIR.
Whirlpool Corporation. v. Registrar of Trade Marks
This case was referenced along with other authorities on the doctrine of alternative remedy. It supports the proposition that while alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, writ jurisdiction should normally be exercised only in exceptional circumstances.
Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India
The Court relied on this recent decision to reinforce that where statutory remedies are available, the High Court should not permit litigants to bypass them. It also drew from the principle that a party cannot invoke Article 226 merely because it failed to pursue available statutory remedies.
This decision was cited within the discussion in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India. It reinforces that a petitioner who fails to avail statutory remedies cannot ordinarily seek discretionary writ relief as a substitute.
This case was referred to in the quoted passage concerning circumstances where loss of statutory remedy may affect writ discretion. The present Court used the broader principle to underline that Article 226 is not meant to revive or replace remedies that a party has failed to pursue.
This was the most important criminal procedure precedent cited. It held that if police refuse to register an FIR, the aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police and then the Magistrate under the criminal procedure framework, rather than rushing to the High Court under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC.
The Supreme Court applied this principle to the BNSS regime, treating the new BNSS provisions as the statutory continuation of the earlier CrPC mechanism.
This case was cited as part of the line of authorities discouraging direct writ petitions for registration of FIR when criminal procedure provides remedies before the police hierarchy and Magistrate.
Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India
This precedent was also cited to support the proposition that non-registration of FIR should ordinarily be addressed through remedies under criminal procedure law, not by invoking writ jurisdiction at the first instance.
The Court referred to this case as part of the consistent judicial position that Magistrates have adequate powers to direct investigation and that High Courts should not routinely entertain writ petitions for FIR registration.
This recent authority was cited to affirm the continuing relevance of the principle that statutory remedies must normally be pursued before invoking constitutional writ jurisdiction in matters of criminal investigation.
This decision followed Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. and was relied upon to hold that High Courts should not be flooded with writ petitions seeking FIR registration or monitoring of investigation. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Magistrate is the proper forum for such grievances.
Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning rested on the distinction between the existence of writ power and the propriety of exercising it. Article 226 gives High Courts wide powers, but those powers are governed by judicial restraint and self-imposed limitations.
The Court found that the complainant company had not followed the statutory path under the BNSS. It had approached the Land Records Authority and sent copies to the police, but it had not shown that it approached the Superintendent of Police or the Magistrate before filing the writ petition.
Since no exceptional urgency or imminent threat to life or liberty was shown, the High Court should not have acted as the forum of first instance. The Supreme Court described the writ petition as premature and held that the resulting FIR could not stand because it was the direct consequence of an improper writ order.
Impact
This judgment is significant because it adapts the earlier CrPC jurisprudence on FIR registration to the new BNSS framework. It confirms that the statutory sequence under BNSS must be respected before constitutional remedies are invoked.
The ruling will likely discourage litigants from directly filing writ petitions for FIR registration, especially in disputes involving complex civil or commercial background facts. It also reminds High Courts to be cautious before passing even interim directions that may result in criminal proceedings without notice to affected parties.
At the same time, the Court preserved the complainant’s liberty to pursue lawful remedies. The quashing of the FIR was procedural, not a finding that no offence had occurred.
Complex Concepts Simplified
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Article 226: A constitutional power allowing High Courts to issue writs. It is wide but discretionary, meaning the Court may refuse relief if another effective remedy exists.
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Alternative remedy: A legal remedy already provided by statute. Courts usually require parties to use it before approaching constitutional courts.
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FIR: First Information Report; the document registered by police when information discloses a cognizable offence.
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Cognizable offence: An offence for which police may register an FIR and investigate without prior Magistrate permission.
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BNSS: The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the CrPC and governs criminal procedure.
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Quashing of FIR: Setting aside the FIR so that it no longer operates, though fresh lawful action may still be possible if permitted by law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court laid down a clear rule: a complainant cannot ordinarily bypass the BNSS mechanism and directly seek a writ direction for registration of an FIR. High Courts must exercise restraint and should entertain such writ petitions only in exceptional cases.
The judgment strengthens procedural discipline in criminal law and prevents Article 226 from becoming a routine substitute for remedies before the police hierarchy and Magistrate. Its key significance lies in applying the established Sakiri Vasu line of cases to the BNSS era.